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Abstract  
 
This thesis is a comparative study of the pre-trial procedures of England and Wales and 
Saudi Arabia. Its aim is to show how the pre-trial procedures of Saudi Arabia could be re-
designed in order to conform to both the standards set by international human rights and 
the norms of Shari’ah law and argues that there is much common ground between the 
two. It addresses the human rights relevant to pre-trial procedures and explores in-depth 
how these are expressed in international human rights legislation and in the current 
legislation of England and Wales with particular reference to the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (1984). They are contrasted with the relevant articles of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure 2001 (CCP) of Saudi Arabia. Individual rights such as the right to 
liberty, the right silence, the right to privacy, the right to bail and the right to an effective 
remedy are examined in depth and relevant case law is cited throughout.  
 
The history of pre-trial procedures and regulations in England and Wales and Saudi 
Arabia is explored in order to understand how these have developed into what exists 
today. The former is traced from the Norman period to the present day and the latter from 
the pre-Islamic era of the Arabian Peninsula.  
The actual practice of these procedures is explored comparatively through a fieldwork 
project involving semi-structured interviews with police officers and lawyers in England 
and police officers, police officers, prosecutors and lawyers in Saudi Arabia.  
The thesis ends with a thorough examination of how pre-trial procedures in Saudi Arabia 
could be regulated and monitored so as to bring them in line with the standards required 
by international human rights legislation and international practice and with the demands 
of Islamic law. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction  
 
 1. General Introduction:             
  
Saudi Arabia's position with regard to international human rights has been widely 
debated; especially since the Saudi Government declined to vote in favour of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights UDHR in 1948. The reason for this abstention 
was that in the Saudi perspective, the UDHR reflects aspects of Western culture that are 
frequently at odds with Arabic culture (Alhargan 2012 p.607). However, it will be argued 
here that some of these international human rights can be applied to non-Western 
countries without prejudice to their cultural values. In the last ten years there has been 
significant procedural reform in Saudi Arabia involving a new Code of Criminal 
Procedure (CCP) (2001) and the Shari’ah Procedure Law (2000) (see Appendix C.1 for 
full list). These laws appear to protect human rights at the stage of criminal investigation 
among other stages of the legal process to meet the requirements, if not explicitly, of the 
standards of international human rights, showing these to be compatible with Islamic law 
(Shari'ah) and Saudi culture. The basis of Islamic law is religious rather than secular and 
rests on the Qur’an and Sunnah (the sayings of the Prophet), rather than any purely 
governmental ordinances.  In spite of these Islamic laws, the reality of what happens 
before a trial might be different. This thesis, therefore, aims to examine the issue of 
human rights at the stage of criminal investigation in Saudi Arabia.   
 
The injustices at this stage of criminal investigation are not always acknowledged by 
students of the law in Saudi Arabia. Al Anad (2007) suggests that human rights have 
become the most important legal issue in Saudi Arabia and the relevant law is a perfect 
reflection of the principles of Islamic law. Similarly, Al Salem argues that Saudi law in 
all its ‘features and roots’ is totally Islamic and as such is perfect and just (2010 p.5). 
However, case studies in 2011 from Amnesty International show a gap between these 
claims and the reality of enforcement officers' practice. For example, Saudi Arabia has 
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arrested hundreds and sent them to prison under cover of fighting terrorism, some of 
whom have been killed and some of whom were sentenced without trial (Amnesty 
International 2012). Amnesty has identified 58 Saudi cases in 2011-12 which raise 
serious human rights issues at the pre-trial stage. To date the literature has revealed there 
has been almost no empirical research carried out by Saudis of their own pre-trial system. 
The main criticisms of the system have come from outsiders who have had no direct 
experience of how the Saudi system of criminal investigation actually works in practice. 
This thesis seeks to rectify this lack by interviewing current officers and lawyers about 
their actual practice and comparing this to how things are done in England and Wales, 
where the pre-trial system is regulated by legislation such as the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). 
 
Not everyone agrees that the situation is unproblematic. Vogel for example has conceded: 
“the law in Saudi Arabia is perfect, but humans are not, mankind struggles to learn 
Shari’ah from the Qur’an and Sunna. The process by which scholars find laws by the 
interpretation of revealed text is ijtihad.”(2000 p.1). ‘Ijtihad’ means the Qadi or judge’s 
personal judgement, which may be partly based on precedent and partly on his 
interpretation. To undertake this properly takes skill and expertise and Vogel suggests 
that it does not always take place and Saudi law therefore does not perfectly apply 
Shari’ah (ibid.) Finally, Vogler proposes that the law in Islamic countries like Saudi 
Arabia has become part of a tradition “which is largely inquisitorial, to produce a form of 
justice which is highly authoritarian.” (Vogler 2005.p 105). 
 
The recent uprisings in Arabic countries meanwhile have demonstrated that the Arab 
people are intensely aware of issues of human rights and the shortcomings of legal 
systems that do not adequately reflect these (Hauge 2011). Saudi Arabia is no exception 
and, over the last ten years, there has been some movement towards meeting these 
concerns with, for example, the establishment in 2004 of the Human Rights 
Commission
1
. 
                                                 
1
  Human Rights Commission in Saudi Arabia (www.haq-ksa.org). 
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 I intend to explore the above debate and show that, in practice, Saudi Arabia still has not 
gone far enough in introducing rights for those involved in pre-trial procedures and there 
is a need for more regulated procedures as an important step forward.  
 
2. Rationale.  
 
The idea of this study stemmed from two influences: one was personal and the other was 
professional. The first arose out of my own personal experience at the Ministry of Interior 
in Saudi Arabia. During my working experience, I was interested in ways in which the 
system of criminal justice was regulated. Initially, I believed that if the Saudi government 
issued a law and was strict when someone breached the law, criminal justice would be 
perfect. I still believe that our government has a willingness to develop Saudi Arabia’s 
criminal justice system to be both effective and fair. However, I realized that criminal 
justice needs a proper infrastructure, rather than just a single individual decision. Justice 
begins at arrest, not at the trial and pre-trial procedure in Saudi Arabia mostly rests on 
commands from the head of police or the head of prosecution, and also from the judge. 
My experiences of monitoring police stations for the Ministry of the Interior made me 
question whether these commands were sufficiently regulating the process, and what 
measures could be put in place to improve matters. 
The second reason was that the Saudi government has invested lot of money in the 
development of criminal justice. Despite this massive expenditure, the quality of civil 
rights is weak (as is shown in Chapter Seven).  
 
Another problem that Saudi government suffers from in pre-trial procedure is that of 
applying Shari'ah law without prejudice.  Shari'ah has a central principle of respecting 
humanity, but its principles are more general than codified. Shari'ah says everyone 
should monitor him or herself, which in practice is an insufficient guideline for effective 
criminal procedure. Shari'ah is mainly concerned with moral guidance and says that 
wrongdoing (such as not behaving humanely towards people in custody) is a sin which 
the perpetrator will have to account for to their Creator.  
16 
 
 
These problems mentioned above gave rise to an idea to find an effective system that the 
government could adopt which would comply with both the norms of Shari'ah and 
international human rights laws. The challenge of this study is how to persuade the Saudi 
government to adopt pre-trial procedures and regulations from the West, as this is a 
controversial issue.  
 
3. Questions for the Thesis. 
 
The central question for this thesis is to discover a way to introduce pre-trial procedures 
into Saudi law that both reflect the human rights principles contained in Shari'ah and 
International Human Rights law. There are a series of sub-questions that emerge from 
this. Firstly, how far is International Human rights law and Islamic law compatible on the 
issue of human rights at pre-trial and what do Islamic scholars have to say about this? 
Secondly, how does the law of England and Wales regulate pre-trial, and how are these 
applied in practice? Thirdly, how are pre-trial procedures regulated and practiced in 
Saudi Arabia? Finally, what elements of pre-trial procedures could be usefully applied in 
Saudi Arabia as well as an effective system for training and monitoring? 
       
4. Literature Review. 
 
There are only a limited number of studies that deal specifically with a comparison of the 
criminal procedures in Saudi Arabia with those of the West. Many of these are general 
and deal with comparisons between Human Law and Shari’ah. To date, I have not found 
any studies that deal specifically with the comparison of pre-trial procedures within the 
legal systems of England and Wales and Saudi Arabia, although there are many studies 
that compare legal systems in general e.g. Bielefeldt (2000), Abu-Sahlieh (1990), El- 
Fadl (2003) and Ahmad (1994).These studies are largely descriptive and I have had 
problems finding sufficient academic sources that offer any kind of analysis. My own 
study aims to complete the gaps in knowledge on this specific topic. Also, the literature 
which analyses Saudi pre-trial procedures, notably that of Alhargan, starts with the 
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prosecution service and does not look at the practices that go on in Saudi police stations. 
There are, however, many more studies of the criminal procedures in England and Wales, 
which I intend to explore when completing my thesis – e.g. Zander (2013) and Leonard 
(2000). 
 
Whilst there are a limited number of key texts that focus on criminal justice in Saudi 
Arabia more generally, these texts have a number of limitations.  For example,    
“Accusatory Systems in Saudi Arabia” by Ali Ben Mohammed Al Salem (2010).   
 is a descriptive study and somewhat vague, as ordinances are mentioned but not 
specified. The description of the accusatory system is also generalised and Al Salem does 
not distinguish between the different eras with reference to the development of Shari’ah 
law. He does, however, agree with my thesis that proper pre-trial procedures are essential 
for the establishment of justice in Saudi Arabian law. I intend to take this further by 
distinguishing the different stages of pre-trial procedures; i.e. search, arrest and 
investigation none of which are specifically addressed by Al Salem, who asserts that the 
accusatory system exists within Shari'ah and thus the legal system of Saudi Arabia, rather 
than just stemming from Latin law or Anglo-Saxon law, and that for this reason Shari'ah 
is sufficient. I hope to show that specific guidelines and the monitoring of procedures 
need to be put in place if the principles of human rights contained in Shari'ah are to be 
adhered to. 
  
Another key source is Judicial Officer” by Share Niaf Al Guari (2003).This study focuses 
on the role of the investigating officer. The first stage of an investigation is described and 
there is a description of how this role is carried out in other legal systems. This study 
appears to support my emphasis on the importance of the proper regulation of the role of 
the investigating officer and that any abuse of this procedure may lead to transgressions 
of human rights. Al Guari concentrates only on the role of the investigating officer and 
the Prosecution and Investigation Act. He does not put this in the context of other 
relevant Saudi Acts such as the Lawyers’ Act, Penal Procedures Act or the Shari’ah 
Pleadings Act. This means that the study is limited when it comes to providing an 
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analysis of how criminal investigation procedures function in Saudi Arabia and thus 
offers no real critical analysis. 
 
“The Saudi Pre- Trial Criminal Procedure and Human Rights” by Alhargan, 
Abdullhamid (2006), which provides a comparison between Saudi law and Canadian law, 
took international human rights as a base. It did not make recommendations as to how 
Saudi law needs to change, but rather it focussed on criticisms rather than giving 
solutions or remedies for the defects from which Saudi law suffers especially in its 
practical application at the stage of criminal investigation. Alhargan agrees that Saudi law 
is a long way from reflecting international human rights standards (2006 p294); he also 
believes that Canadian law completely respects them. His work is, however, not based on 
any evidence from looking at how pre-trial procedures are actually interpreted and carried 
out in police stations and I intend to rectify this. I will be using the law of England and 
Wales as a model, just as Alhargan used Canadian law, but will also look at how this law 
works in practice. 
Alharagan suggests that it is impossible to change Saudi law because it entirely applies 
Shari’ah; on the other hand, he also asserts it is possible to change its application if you 
change the education of the qadis (judges), stating that they need to have more education 
and training in politics in order to understand what is going on in the world and to be 
aware about any new events. Alharagan thus believes the qadis are a hindrance to the 
development of Saudi law. I disagree with Alhargan in that the qadis in Saudi Arabia are 
like any judges in other countries. The problem is that Saudi law cannot be just down to 
the qadis, it should lay down regulations from the first arrest and search by the 
enforcement officers. Once there is proper regulation in pre-trial procedure there will be a 
great deal of progress in Saudi law. ,  
However, Alhargan does not cover pre-trial procedures in Shari’ah and Saudi Law. This 
thesis will adopt a different approach and provide more analysis about Saudi law as well 
as effective recommendations based on this regarding necessary changes and 
developments of the procedure at the stage of criminal investigation.  
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The role of Qadis in Saudi Arabia has further been explored by Vogel (2000) in “Islamic 
law and legal system: Studies of Saudi Arabia”.  Vogel spent many years in Saudi Arabia 
in order to study the legal system, working alongside Qadis and Ulama (experts in 
Shari'ah). He recorded his observations in order to draw conclusions about how Islamic 
law was being applied and concluded that in the legal system in Saudi Arabia the courts 
did not simply apply regulations but also consulted scholars of Shari’ah. Vogel’s study 
concentrates mainly on marriage and divorce and does not focus on pre-trial procedures. 
However, he does contend that, contrary to what the West might expect, the Saudi legal 
system is actually very flexible and pragmatic. My study also reaches this conclusion, 
suggesting that there will not necessarily be any contravention of Shari’ah law by 
introducing the effective regulation of pre-trial procedures. 
 
A recent study is "Islamic Law and International Human Rights Law" by A.M. Emon et al 
(2012 )  Oxford. The study covers the major debates about the conflicts that have arisen 
between Shari’ah and international human rights law. The authors point out that there is 
common ground between the two, such as minority rights and rights for non-Muslims, as 
Shari’ah recognises the rights of both these groups. However, the authors found serious 
divergence when it came to the rights of women and for Muslims wishing to change faith. 
They suggest, however, that this is more to do with local culture than with Islam itself. 
The authors believe that it is more difficult to find a compromise between Shari’ah and 
international human rights where Islam is the basis of the law. So, for example, Islam 
forbids apostasy. However, when it comes to deciding what the punishment should be, 
there are different interpretations, and not all schools of thought agree that apostates 
should be executed. 
 
Generally, the authors seem to be more focused on pre-modern interpretations of 
Shari’ah and do not take much account of modern interpretations which might be easier 
to reconcile with international human rights. The book concentrates on issues such as the 
rights of women, minority groups and apostasy and does not directly address conflicts 
between Shari’ah and international human rights law with regard to pre-trial procedures. 
The explorations of this thesis suggest that there may not be such major conflict in this 
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area. It is one of the aims of this thesis to show how these conflicts may, to some extent, 
be reconciled here.   
 
5. Debates on the compatibility of Saudi Law, Shari’ah and internationally 
recognised human rights standards.  
 
There are two main perspectives on Saudi law. Firstly there are those who, like Alsalem 
(2010) argue that Saudi Law is strictly in accordance with Shari’ah, that it is immutable 
and that the introduction of elements such as pre-trial procedures is not an import from 
the ‘infidel’ West and should not be countenanced. Secondly, there are those such as 
Almajed (2011) who argue that Saudi law needs to change as it is no longer properly 
representative of the humanitarian spirit of Islam. They hold that pre-trial procedures 
such as the right to legal representation are not the sole property of the West, but a wider 
manifestation of universal human rights.  
Thus, there is disagreement among theoreticians in this field as to whether Saudi Arabia 
applies the Shari'ah concepts of human rights at the pre-trial procedure stage of criminal 
investigation. This is discussed later in Chapter 2. This thesis seeks to explore differing 
perspectives on this question in a positive way with a view to examining how a more 
developed form of pre-trial procedures could usefully be incorporated in Saudi law. In 
order to do this, it seeks to build on the theoretical ideas of thinkers like, Alanad, Duyfer 
and Almajed, as well as examining the extent to which the CCP and other relevant 
legislation at the stage of pre-trial investigation complies with international human rights 
standards and thus provides a sound basis for an implementation of laws and practices 
consistent with these human rights. Firstly however, compatibility between Shari’ah and 
internationally recognised human rights standards needs to be examined with a view to 
discovering the extent to which they conflict or coincide. 
 
According to Islamic Law (Shari'ah), human rights come from God and are embodied in 
the Qur’an and the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed. For this reason, this thesis will 
focus on critiquing the practical effects of the interpretations of some of these teachings 
as pertain to pre-trial procedures, rather than the teachings themselves, as doing the latter 
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would be unacceptable to both the Saudi government and the people.  This thesis aims to 
find positive solutions for an effective and fair administration of pre-trial procedures 
which could usefully contribute to a process of progressive change to Saudi Law without 
actual prejudice to religious ideals.  
 
This thesis uses the laws of England and Wales as a focal point for comparison with 
Saudi Law. It explores how many of the pre-trial procedures represented by the laws of 
England and Wales are, in effect, not too dissimilar to ideas contained in Islamic law. . It 
also seeks to show how these ideas are not at present contained in Saudi Law in terms of 
their practical application to pre-trial procedures, or in some cases, that the actual 
codification of Saudi Law is ambiguous and allows the police to act with impunity in 
terms of how they execute pre-trial procedures. The thesis seeks to find a solution to this 
gap in Saudi Law in terms of its regulations and monitoring of their practical application 
in pre-trial procedures. My study will have a specific section about the history of criminal 
justice in the UK; moreover, I intend to supplement the evidence with interviews. My aim 
is to discover if the officers and lawyers are really happy with the Acts I mentioned 
earlier. This data will then be analysed and compared to that from Saudi Arabia, with a 
view to examining how that country could implement effective law at the stage of 
criminal investigation.  
 
 
The laws of England and Wales have been selected firstly, because instruments such as 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) recognise the rights of the suspect in 
a manner comparable to that adopted by international human rights law; and secondly 
because they provide a basis by which to determine the extent to which Saudi law and 
practice comply with international human rights law. This will allow the researcher to 
determine the nature of the changes that need to be made for better compliance with these 
standards. It is also the case that PACE has been tried and tested for about 30 years and 
amended to improve it as an instrument for, among other things, regulating pre-trial 
procedures. PACE also has the advantage of providing a balance between the rights of 
the community to be protected and the rights of suspects at the stage of pre-trial (Zander 
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2012). According to Vogler (2005 pp.152-153), PACE (1984) not only establishes a 
complete codification of pre-trial procedures and process rights, but also a detailed code 
of practice. There is wide acclaim for PACE as a statutory system which provides for 
tight time limits in police detention and investigation, and protects the rights of suspects 
and detainees during arrest, stop, search and seizure and detention as well as providing 
for the repeated notification of rights, including the right to silence.  Although this thesis 
uses the laws of England and Wales as a template for introducing pre-trial procedures, it 
will not disregard the criticisms of these laws, and these will be discussed in relation to 
international criteria about which human rights are addressed in pre-trial procedures. 
  
As an illustration of how Islamic Law contains the concepts of human rights that underlie 
laws pertaining to pre-trial procedures in England and Wales, we can consider the Saudi 
criminal procedure law s.35, which stipulates that arrests should be carried out  
badown unf (without force) (Almajed p.5 2011). This thesis sets out to show that the 
reality is very different and the police do not follow these procedures. It will also explore 
how complaining effectively about this is virtually impossible not least because the 
bureaucracy that deals with complaints is very slow. 
 
This links to the more general question of the compatibility of human rights with 
Shari’ah.  There are a number of different perspectives on this issue. For example, Meyer 
(2006) has suggested that the conservative Islamic perspective on human rights is the 
result of the political system. She believes that it is this, rather than actual Islamic 
writings, which shape policy in relation to human rights and she compares this to the way 
in which conservative Islamic authors reject Western models of freedom for political 
rather than religious reasons. Resistance to the introduction of pre-trial procedures is 
presented by Meyer as being based on an adherence to Shari’ah whereas in reality it is 
the result of political forces.  In comparison, Aldosari (2010 p.19) is at pains to point out 
that there is a fundamental difference in Western and Islamic perspectives on human 
rights. In Islamic law there is the notion that these rights come from God and therefore 
they do not originate from any secular source such as a monarch or legislature even 
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though they may be implemented by it (these ideas will be explored further in Chapters 2 
and 3).  
Litman (1999) meanwhile also suggests that the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in 
Islam CDHRI (1994), and Arab Charter of Human Rights 2008, which was in part a 
belated response to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights demonstrates Islamic 
awareness of Western ideas of human rights as these charters sought to provide 
guidelines on the implementation of human rights, albeit according to the principles of 
Islamic Law. (See more details in Chapter 2, Arab Charters of Human Rights). 
 
 Jones points out that there are many Shari’ah rules and practices that are at odds with 
international human rights, such as punishment by execution, limb amputations, stoning 
and imprisonment for women found guilty of adultery as well as the criminalization of 
sex outside marriage and homosexuality. Other factors such as non-recognition of 
transgendered people, rules concerning polygamy, honour killings and child custody of 
children over 7 only for fathers, are also problematic (2013 p.54). In terms of pre-trial 
procedures, this could, for example, affect the issue of where a transgendered person 
would be put into custody.  
 
Another factor to consider is the role of the Islamic religion that underpins Shari’ah law. 
Rehman (2011 p.38) has outlined how religion has often been used to promote 
intolerance and justify the persecution or elimination of religious minorities. 
Furthermore, concerns over whether Islam is compatible with Western human rights 
standards have intensified since September 11, 2001, as Islam has been portrayed as an 
enemy of democracy, human rights and freedom and synonymous with terrorism and 
violence. Shari’ah law is thus seen as causing much violence, injustice and human rights 
violations. Proponents of this view cite examples such as Hudod which prescribes harsh 
punishments and the Law of Inheritance which discriminates against women and non- 
Muslims (Moghaddam 2012 p.4-5). However, it should be noted that there are high 
standards of proof necessary before harsh punishments can be given, and this is only in a 
small number of cases. For example, if a conviction of adultery is to be obtained, the 
accused must confess to it four times or four adult male witnesses of good character must 
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testify that they witnessed the sex act. If considered over its entire history, Islamic law 
has offered the most human and liberal legal principles anywhere in the world. These 
principles and those of international human rights can be adhered to when it comes to 
pre-trial procedures under Shari’ah (Dacey & Koproske 2008 p.22). 
 
 
However, Aldosari (2010 p47) argues that, in spite of this, the Western perspective is 
fundamentally a secular one and that this perspective has its origins in concerns about 
historical events such as slavery and the Holocaust. This culminated in the UDHR 
(1948).  He goes on to suggest that since secularisation, many scholars from the Western 
tradition have viewed religion as an obstacle to the development of human rights and 
believe that many Islamic states prevent the internationalisation of these rights because of 
their adherence to Shari’ah. It should be noted that this argument contains a 
contradiction, since adherence to a religion is such a fundamental human right. He also 
believes that, although this fundamental difference cannot be bridged, it is possible to for 
both perspectives to co-exist and for a respectful dialogue to be maintained. However, I 
will seek to demonstrate that Aldosari's perspective ignores the fact that Shari'ah is based 
on respect for humanity and is thus in harmony with the principles of international human 
rights.   
Although there are undoubtedly problem areas, there are equally many areas of common 
ground, especially with regard to the regulation and control of pre-trial procedures. The 
overall aim of this thesis is to analyse all aspects of pre-trial procedures that could be 
incorporated into Saudi Law in such a way as to reflect the human rights ideals 
encapsulated in Islamic Law. The rights that relate specifically to pre-trial procedure are: 
the suspects' rights to liberty, to legal advice, against self-incrimination, to privacy, to 
bail and to an effective remedy. It will do this by using English and Welsh Law for 
comparison. As a result, this thesis will be using a comparative methodology both in its 
secondary source research, where the two bodies of laws relating to pre-trial procedures 
will be examined, and in its primary source research where similar semi-structured 
interviews will be used to explore the pre-trial procedures of both the English and Saudi 
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legal systems. The thesis also aims to show how the pre-trial procedures outlined in 
PACE could be incorporated into Saudi Law without prejudice to Islamic principles. 
6. Methodology. 
 
This thesis will be using a comparative methodology both in its secondary source 
research, where the two bodies of laws relating to pre-trial procedures will be examined, 
and in its primary source research, where similar semi-structured interviews will be used 
to explore the pre-trial procedures of both the English and Saudi legal systems. The thesis 
also aims to show how the pre-trial procedures outlined in PACE could be incorporated 
into Saudi Law without prejudice to Islamic principles. 
 
The aim of this study is to explore and understand actual practice of pre-trial procedures 
in both the laws of England and Wales and Saudi Arabian law. Furthermore, the study 
explores international human right laws and the Islamic law (Shari'ah), in order to 
demonstrate if there is any conflict between them. The investigation uses some case laws, 
adopting a qualitative research paradigm. The data was obtained from the documents 
relating to the study, also the data collected from the police officers and solicitors in 
England, and police officers, prosecutors and lawyers in Saudi Arabia.  
6.1. Secondary sources. 
“Secondary data helps us to understand the condition or status of a group, but compared 
to primary data they are imperfect reflections of reality. Without proper interpretation and 
analysis they do not help us understand why something is happening.”2  
 
I have obtained a large number of secondary sources to inform my investigation of pre-
trial procedures. Some of these are Arabic sources and some are English. The Arabic 
sources are not analytic and are largely descriptive. Although there are explanations, laws 
that stem from religious writings are not criticized. Conversely, English sources do 
contain critiques and are more international in their focus. As is often the case with 
secondary sources, it was difficult to find the information that one is looking for. I 
devoted much time to locating precisely the information that I required– in particular 
                                                 
2
 (http://pqdl.care.org). 
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historical information about the legal system of England and Wales and Saudi law. Some 
of these sources contained information that was out-of date, incomplete and inaccurate 
and it was important to select it carefully and be aware of bias. Sources on the Internet in 
particular may not be subject to close editorial scrutiny and may therefore be 
unrepresentative or lack validity. 
 
6.2. Primary Sources (Interviews). 
 
Interviewing is regarded as the most commonly used and preferred method of qualitative 
research, as they help to explain reality from the respondents' point of view (Schstak 
2009). Kvale defines interviewing as simply a conversation with a structure and an 
objective. However, it is not merely everyday conversation, but extends beyond such 
pleasantries to a professional dialogue involving careful questioning and listening 
techniques. He adds, it is an ‘inter-view, where knowledge is constructed in the inter-
action between the interviewer and the interviewee’ (2009 p.3). Interviews are generally 
divided into three types: structured, semi- structured, and unstructured (Cohen et al 
2011).    
 
This study used just one research method, i.e. semi–structured interviews; it is also used 
audio recordings of most of the interviews. Semi-structured interviews have a clearly 
developed interview with a list of questions and themes that need greater discussion 
(Bernard 2011). This approach allows researchers to maintain their focus on key issues, 
while allowing the respondents to expand and provide more details. In addition, it allows 
the respondents to comment on issues they see relevant to the topic that the researcher 
might not have thought about. Furthermore, it allows other themes to emerge and 
provides more in-depth understanding about the phenomena. This type of interview is 
useful for collecting data about how the respondents contextualise their attitude, values 
and opinions about the issues under study and giving participants a greater chance to 
input into the research. Bryman (2012) stressed that the use of semi-structured interviews 
is suitable when the investigation has a fairly clear focus but there might be an 
expectation of emergent issues to be addressed.  
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This study conducted a number of semi–structured interviews both in Saudi Arabia and in 
Brighton. These interviews were conducted with criminal investigations officers; 
arresting officers; custody sergeants; prosecutors and defence lawyers. The aim of these 
interviews was to collect qualitative data about pre-trial procedures and to identify 
whether these procedures are carried out in accordance with what is legally required and 
with notions of human rights.  
 
There are a number of issues associated with conducting semi-structured interviews, 
which I had to take into consideration. For example, I had to obtain permission to carry 
out these interviews from the appropriate authorities. In Saudi Arabia I needed to 
approach the Ministry of the Interior (General Security, Prosecutors and public inquiry) 
and the Sussex Police and CPS in Brighton. Other ethical considerations include issues of 
confidentiality and anonymity and the importance of gaining informed consent from the 
respondents. 
 
In carrying out my research, semi-structured interviews allowed me to gain a better 
understanding of the context from the interviewees' points of view. I chose to use semi-
structured interviews as this format both ensures that all the questions in the interview 
guide are asked, and allows the opportunity for the interviewee to raise unanticipated 
issues which can provide a new insight into the topic. Formal interviews were conducted 
at the beginning of the study, and I was obliged to ask the interviewees to give up their 
time.  The interviewees spoke about how they dealt with suspects and their feelings 
toward the law in both England and Wales and Saudi Arabia. Some of them added some 
suggestions while others complained about the law that applies in Saudi Arabia. It should 
be noted that the interviews in England were more formal in tone as they were conducted 
with participants who were not known to me and for this reason were quite uniform in 
terms of time taken and environment in which they were conducted. In Saudi Arabia, I 
was able to interview a couple of participants more informally as they were known to me. 
These interviews were lengthier and I was able to get more detailed information. Given 
the nature of the topic, I would say that it was helpful to have these more informal 
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interviews as the participants were able to open up. One issue which was not anticipated 
but which emerged as a result of using the semi-structured format was how suspects in 
Saudi Arabia are taken to the Notary in handcuffs if they want to have the necessary 
documentation for legal representation. Although there was no specific question in the 
interview guide about this point, it emerged as part of the interview. 
 
I was also aware that my presence could affect how the interviewee responded, especially 
on such a sensitive matter. The questions I asked largely determined what responses I got 
so I needed to be aware not to ask leading questions.   
 
Prior to administering the interview guides to the police officers, prosecutors, and 
lawyers, the interview guides were piloted. Flyvbjerg (2006) argues the importance of 
piloting the tools for individual interview and how this can help to improve the quality of 
the information obtained.   
  
6.3. The Interviews –Brighton and Riyadh. 
 
Sampling is regarded as a unit of analysis that helps to identify the potential sources of 
information. Careful selection of the sample is imperative for the development and 
understanding of the case study under investigation (Shenton 2004). The type of 
sampling that should be used is determined by the type of the research (Yin 2009). 
Qualitative research tends to study small samples where participants are usually recruited 
to a study because of their exposure to participation in or experience of the phenomenon 
in question (Flyvbjerg 2006).  
 
As one research question of this study focuses on understanding what actual practice in 
England and Wales is, I conducted all the interviews at a Sussex police station; and 
interviewed nine people - seven police officers and two solicitors. I did not encounter any 
problems while conducting these interviews. The reason I limited the number of 
interviews was that there were many sources to help me understand the pre-trial 
procedure in England and Wales (Books, articles, journals, and media). The interviews 
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conducted in Brighton were just to observe actual practice in pre-trial procedure. The 
interviews in Brighton all went very smoothly.  
 
When I conducted the interviews in Saudi Arabia in Riyadh, I interviewed 25 people: five 
investigating officers, three custody sergeants, five arresting officers, five prosecutors, 
and seven lawyers. I interviewed the police officers in four police stations, I had to apply 
for permission to conduct the interviews to the head of General Security, and it took over 
6 months to receive the permission. Some of the officers did consent to my recording of 
the interview, so I had to write up the interview on paper and then type it up. One of them 
did not tell the truth about the pre-trial procedures in Saudi Arabia, he explained the 
procedures at pre-trial in Saudi Arabia as an ideal process, so I decided not to include his 
interview in the data analysed. Three of the prosecutors said that they preferred me to 
take notes and type them up later. 
 
The biggest problem I encountered was finding lawyers who work at this stage of 
criminal investigation. There is no Bar Association in Saudi Arabia to ask about them. I 
had to find interviewees, by asking friends and police officers if they knew a lawyer who 
worked in pre-trial procedure. There is a lack of criminal lawyers in Saudi Arabia (see 
more information in Chapter Six, Section 2- the right to legal advice).  I interviewed the 
lawyers in their offices and worked day and night to finish off the interviews 
successfully.    
 
The reason for interviewing a large number of interviewees in Saudi Arabia was the lack 
of resources. There are only five books and a few Articles that talk about pre-trial 
procedure in Saudi Arabia, so I had to interview widely to find out the truth for my thesis 
and see how the procedures work in Saudi Arabia.                         
                   
  6.3.1. Piloting of the interview. 
 
I had already developed a semi-structured interview based on research questions which I 
had piloted with one solicitor in England and Wales and one police officer in Saudi 
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Arabia, which I further adapted for the present study.  The pilot study in England helped 
me to understand the importance of translating the interview guide into Arabic (i.e. the 
mother tongue of the interviewees in Saudi Arabia). Moreover, in this first interview, I 
thought I would be able to easily and instantly translate the questions into Arabic for the 
interviewees. This interview showed how difficult it was to do this in an interview 
context, as it was not easy to follow the conversation and at the same time think about 
accurate translation. Thus, it was necessary to translate the entire police officers’, 
prosecutors’ and lawyers’ interview guide in advance, and this also helped to ensure that 
all the interviewees received exactly the same information. Furthermore, piloting with 
English lawyer helped me to avoid any unacceptable questions such as those about 
discrimination. Also it allowed me to understand the way to approach interviews within 
English culture and how best to obtain the information that I was looking for.  
 
Further issues arose which required to be addressed before conducting the interviews 
with prosecutors in England and Wales. The pilot highlighted that the prosecutors are not 
involved with the investigation procedures, and that is entirely different to Saudi law, 
where it is the police who are not involved with the investigation procedures. That helped 
me to decide that there was no need to interview prosecutors in England and Wales.  
 
The interview guide was piloted once more with a police officer in Saudi Arabia. This 
gave me a full understanding of pre-trial procedures in Saudi Arabia. There were some 
issues arising about my interview guide for Saudi interviewees. For example, to include 
questions about the attorney, and the role of police soldiers, neither of which exists in 
England and Wales. Because of these anomalies, I had to add questions that I asked the 
interviewees in Saudi Arabia to have the actual information that I needed and which were 
relevant to the thesis.   
 
These pilot interviews also gave me the opportunity to sharpen and clarify the interview 
questions and think about alternative ways to phrase them in order to be able to prompt 
the interviewees without leading them. In addition, the transcripts from the pilot 
interviews helped me to identify emerging themes and patterns. 
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6.4. Audio recording. 
 
Audio recording is regarded as a powerful method of data collection. One of the main 
advantages of such media is that much of what takes place can be recorded and played 
back, allowing focus on various aspects of events as one chooses (Richards & Lockhart 
2002).  
 
I tape-recorded the interviews so that I had a more accurate record of what was said. This 
also allowed me to concentrate more on the respondent without the distraction of making 
notes. Some respondents, however, felt awkward about being taped or worried about the 
tape being heard by others; even though I offered a promise of confidentiality and offered 
to give them the tape once I had finished with it. The interviewees were assured at the 
beginning of the interview that no one would listen to the recording other than me or my 
supervisor. However, some of the interviewees asked me to stop the tape for a while and 
then carried on the interview without taping. On some occasions, they allowed me to 
write the conversation down but not to record it.    
 
Even with taped interviews, it is possible to misinterpret what a respondent means; and I 
was aware of this. I got clarification from the respondent, and tried not to let my own 
views affect what conclusions I drew from these interviews. The analysis of the audio 
recordings allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of the experiences and attitudes of 
those questioned, as the data was very detailed and lead to further insights.  
  
Semi-structured interviews will, I hope, afford me some insights into how pre-trial 
investigations are carried out. It is, of course, not possible to generalise from single case 
studies, but I hope to gain details, which it would not be possible to gain from conducting 
a survey. 
 
I investigated sources which gave guidelines on the correct methodology in doing 
research into legal matters. From this, I devised a research plan, which allowed me to 
effectively gain the necessary authorization as well as formulating a set of pertinent 
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questions for my semi-structured interviews. I also investigated how to correctly analyse 
the data which such interviews would yield.  
 
6.5. Data Analysis. 
 
Once data had been collected, the next stage of the research project was to analyse it. To 
analyse the interviews, I mainly used the 'meaning condensation' methods after 
indentifying themes suggested by Kvale, who defines the technique thus: "meaning 
condensation; entails an abridgment of the meaning expressed by the interviewees into 
shorter formulation. Long statements are compressed into briefer statements in which the 
main sense of what is said is rephrased in a few words" (2009 p.205). 
 
Based on this definition, Kvale highlights the following five steps in utilising this 
approach; firstly, the whole of interview transcript should be read once to establish the 
main ideas; secondly, the exact words of the subjects are identified by the researcher; 
thirdly, a main theme is assigned to each response by the researcher without bias; 
fourthly, meaning units should be related to the purpose of the study, which can be done 
by reminding oneself of its main questions; fifthly; the researcher gives a relevant 
description to each theme. 
 
Before commencing the process of analysis, I recorded the interview digitally. I then 
listened once to each recording to get a sense of the whole. Next, I began a transcript of 
the interview, translating from Arabic to English as I went along. However, the Brighton 
recordings were transcribed verbatim. However, there were a few interviewees in Riyadh 
who refused to be recorded, so I had to write the whole of the conversation on paper and 
then type it up.  The next step was to identify the main themes that emerged from 
interviewees' responses. Sometimes, themes could be determined though the use of 
repeated words. I used different coloured pens to mark relevant themes, from which I was 
able to identify meaning units as they emerged from the text.  Finally, I gave an 
appropriate title to each theme with each having a sub-theme. Under each of them, I 
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made a short introduction, and then related then to arguments from authors. After that, I 
suggested solutions that could resolve difficulties highlighted in the interviews.       
 
It is important here to highlight several methodological issues encountered when 
translating the interviewees' interviews. Culturally and linguistically, English and Arabic 
are two different languages and thus translating the interviewees’ views from Arabic to 
English was a significant challenge. Regmi et al (2010) argue that translating qualitative 
data across language is a challenge that requires competency in both languages. As a 
researcher who developed the theoretical framework for this inquiry in English and also 
as an Arabic speaker, I was able to translate the interviewees’ interviews from Arabic 
onto English. It must be acknowledged that I had to check with another English speaker 
about my translation of specific concepts that I had in the interviewees’ data to validate 
the translation accuracy. 
 
Data obtained from documents (books, articles, and case laws) was used throughout the 
study, from developing the rationale of the study, reviewing the literature, analysing the 
documents and writing up the findings and analyses. From the start of the study, all the 
different documents that I was able to access about international human rights laws, pre-
trial procedure in England and Wales, and Saudi Arabian pre-trial procedure were 
analysed. On obtaining data from the interviews, the analysed data obtained from the 
documents was then linked to emerging themes and patterns.  
 
6.6. Trustworthiness.  
 
Trustworthiness has to be established though the reflexivity of the researcher, the use of 
an appropriate methodology, instrument representation, and the approach to data 
collection (Flyvbjerg 2006). Yin (2009) suggested that the rigorousness of qualitative 
research has to be formulated at the level of data collection, where different tools and 
resources are used to complement each other in order to safeguard rigour, and though 
good practice. Trustworthiness within this study is applied at different group as way of 
evaluating the validity and rigour of the whole research process from start to finish.  
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More than six months were spent on the fieldwork. This helped me to gain an 
understanding of the different issues that the interviewees had to deal with on a daily 
basis. Working with the Ministry of Interior for more than 17 years also allowed a 
relationship of trust to be established with the interviewees, and thus they could act more 
naturally and speak freely. My work with 21 -criminal cases panels- which included 
police officers- had allowed me to further understand the pre-trial procedure clearly and 
to more easily gauge how accurate interviewees’ responses were. Furthermore, the data 
was collected through documents, and the interviews. These different tools were used to 
construct reality from different sources, which could then be triangulated in the analysis 
stage. In addition, interviews were conducted with 9 interviewees in England and Wales, 
and 25 interviewees in Saudi Arabia, with different groups involved in the pre-trial 
procedure in different roles. These viewpoints, which were sometimes at odds with each 
other, allow me to gain more credible information. 
 
Another measure for establishing trustworthiness was through the way in which 
participants were recruited. All the participants who took part in this study were 
volunteers from various stages of the fieldwork. Although, there was a purpose in 
selecting different groups- arresting officers, investigating officers, prosecutors and 
lawyers- this helped to minimise the bias in this study. Also, none of the interviewees 
were forced to take part; they also had the option of refraining from the answering any 
question with which they felt uncomfortable and that also built a trusting rapport.  
  
Although, initially there was some mistrust among the participants, which I had to cross 
out from the study. I had suspicion from the information I had been given from one 
police officer and one from the prosecutors in Saudi Arabia, which I had to focus on with 
the others officers, prosecutors, and lawyers to find the truth that this study was seeking 
for. However, all the interviewees in this study contributed willingly and provided 
genuine and honest information.   
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6.7 How the interview data was used in the thesis. 
 
The data obtained from the interviews was used to highlight points about how pre-trial 
procedures are actually carried out by the police. Quotations from the interview 
transcripts were extracted to illustrate specific points, such as whether detainees were 
allowed to have legal representation; and this allowed the answers from English and 
Saudi officers to be contrasted. The data was also used to construct a general impression 
of the culture that exists in the two police stations investigated. For example, the 
interview data was used to illustrate how the culture in Saudi police stations is one of 
'following precedent' whereby officers do what their predecessors did and that this is seen 
as more important than following regulations in the CCP. This was contrasted with the 
culture observed in the English police station, where things are done 'by the book'. The 
data obtained from Saudi Arabia is unique in that the researcher found no other study in 
which police practice in that country has been investigated in this way. 
 
The data acquired thus acted in two ways. In the case of England and Wales, the 
researcher was coming from a different culture and had no specific views on what to 
expect; thus, the interviews allowed an insight into police procedures both from the point 
of view of the police and that of the lawyers. This was important in informing the 
investigation into each of the human rights relating to pre-trial procedures such as the 
right to silence where the police and the lawyers having different interests – solving the 
crime and protecting the suspect. In contrast, having worked in police stations in Saudi 
Arabia, the researcher anticipated that regulations would not be followed by the police 
and the interviews served to confirm the extent to which this was the case. As will be 
seen, the study highlights just how far regulations are not just flouted but even unknown 
by the police in Saudi Arabia. Most of the interviewees were totally unaware about  the 
Code of Criminal Procedure(CCP), they thought it vague and difficult to apply. That led 
the researcher to believe that there was an urgent need to change the CCP to be more 
applicable and that enforcement officers needed to be trained to apply it.  Furthermore, 
the interviews showed that there was no effective way to obtain the right to an effective 
remedy. Before the interviews, I had thought being able to claim against a police assault 
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would be a basic right to find in any country. However, the interviews revealed that in 
Saudi Arabia even the police and prosecutors have no clear idea about how someone 
could claim as the CCP neglected that right. Also there was no monitoring of custody in 
the Saudi police stations as the CCP also remains silent about that. As data such as this 
emerged from the interviews, it confirmed the central idea of this thesis that the CCP 
 needs to be change and enforcement  officers should be monitored and trained to be 
compatible with Islamic law and intentional human rights norms  
 
7. Proposed Thesis Structure. 
 
After a general introduction, the second chapter explores the principles of International 
Criminal Justice. This chapter concerns the international instruments relating to Human 
Rights, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). The Arab Charter on Human Rights 
(2008) is also discussed here.  A discussion of the philosophical and historical origins of 
human rights and the sources of international human rights is also provided.  It explores 
the difference between the international and regional human rights treaties at the stage of 
criminal investigation. I briefly review how the concept of human rights is contained in 
these instruments, comparing and contrasting them with notions of human rights in 
Islamic law.  
The following chapter (3) examines procedural rights at the stage of criminal 
investigation by comparing international human rights laws and Shari'ah. The purpose of 
examining these laws is to ascertain if there is any conflict between them, in terms of 
respecting human rights at the pre-trial stage, and how the fundamental principles they 
contain are manifested in specific pre-trial procedures. Chapter Three also examines how 
international human rights law applies to human rights at the stage of criminal 
investigation. A further objective is to determine if international human rights laws can 
be adopted by Muslim countries, without prejudice to Islamic principles. 
 
The next chapter (4) aims to investigate the history and development of criminal justice 
in England and the major events which led to the development of criminal justice in 
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England and Wales. Chapter Four starts with the Norman period, then briefly examines 
relevant legal development into the current century. In particular, the 20
th
 and 21
st
 
centuries are examined because it was then that the majority of Acts which pertain to 
Human Rights and pre-trial procedures were passed.   
 
Chapter Five looks at the procedure of criminal investigation in England and Wales. In 
order to understand the success or failure of English Law in respect to human rights at the 
stage of criminal investigation, English Law is analysed in terms of international human 
rights and the practice of pre-trial procedures. I include my comments about the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), which is considered the main Code relating to 
the stage of criminal investigation. I conducted interviews in Brighton Police station in 
order to understand actual practices used in dealing with suspects.  The aim of this 
chapter is to examine PACE in order to consider its potential application to Saudi pre-
trial procedures, in a way that is compatible with Shari'ah and international human rights 
laws. Furthermore, this chapter considers the use pre-trial procedures embedded in PACE 
to make recommendations about changes required in Saudi law.  
 
The history and development of criminal justice in Saudi Arabia is considered in Chapter 
6. This chapter explores the major events which led to the development of criminal 
justice in Saudi Arabia; and notes how Saudi Arabia has never been colonised and 
Islamic law has never been influenced by Western law. The first part is about criminal 
justice before Prophet Mohammed and second part is about criminal justice after the 
Prophet. The chapter describes how there was no legal system as such before Prophet 
Mohammed as every tribe had its own rules and procedures. The chapter then briefly 
examines relevant legal development into the current century in Saudi Arabia. 
  
The following chapter (7) examines the procedure of criminal investigation in Saudi 
Arabian Law, in particular the Code of Criminal Procedure (2001), which is considered a 
revolution in criminal procedure in Saudi Arabia. This chapter will analyse this and 
discover if it is compatible with human rights requirements. This will be done for each 
element used in pre-trial procedure. I conducted interviews in Riyadh Police stations in 
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order to understand actual practices used in dealing with suspects.  The aim of Chapter 
Seven is to examine the CCP in order to ascertain the extent to which it complies with 
international human rights standards. Finally, Chapter Eight covers conclusions and 
recommendations. 
Appendix A looks at The Contemporary Development of Criminal Justice in England and 
Wales: the Terrorism Acts 2000-06; the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act(2005); 
the Criminal Justice Act (2003)and the Human Rights Act (1998). 
Appendix B lists various relevant Saudi Royal Decrees.  
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Chapter Two 
 The Principles of International Human Rights Law 
Introduction:  
The origins of human rights has been hotly debated, whether it has religious roots, or has 
just arisen from ideas about 'natural law' and the rights contained therein.  In many 
Muslim countries there is a belief that human rights came with the birth of Islam (Jones 
2013 p.47). On the other hand, in Western countries there is a belief that the evolution of 
human rights began with the Enlightenment and that the US and French revolutions 
initiated the movement for modern human rights (Klug 1999 p.68). Gilbert (1987) points 
out that human rights developed radically after the Second World War. Many nations had 
suffered serious losses due to the activities of despots like Hitler, not least due to the Nazi 
extermination of over six million Jews between 1939 -1945. As well as the six million 
Jews who were murdered, more than ten million other non-combatants were killed by the 
Nazis (ibid.,p.68). Partly because of this, it was recognized that there was a need to 
establish international legislation to protect humanity from authoritarian regimes and also 
to protect human rights in times of war.  
Thus the starting point for modern human rights law was the establishment in 1945 of the 
United Nations (UN) which was to provide a new international system to safeguard 
human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 is thus the 
charter around which progress in international human rights has been made. Since the 
UDHR, there have been a large number of charters and treaties generated, signed and 
ratified around the world. These aim to protect human rights at every stage and in every 
area, including crime, the media and education. Notably, the UDHR marks the first truly 
international system. 
Muslim countries believe that the origin of human rights came with the birth of Islam. 
Many Muslims also believe that ‘international’ human rights are based on philosophies 
that exist in Western culture and thus are not suitable for Muslim states (Bielefeldt p.3 
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2000). In view of this, basic human rights as established in Shari’ah will be explored in 
this chapter, in order to assess the compatibility between international human rights law 
and Islamic law. What Shari’ah has to say about human rights specifically at the stage of 
criminal investigation will be examined in depth in Chapter Three. Hence, the aim of this 
chapter is a general exploration of the origin of human rights and their development both 
in the West and in Muslim countries. This chapter will argue that the origin of human 
rights has religious roots in both Western and non-Western countries. The chapter will be 
organised as follows: Section One explores the origins of human rights; Section Two 
explores the jurisprudential basis of human rights and Section Three specifically 
investigates human rights in the Islamic tradition. 
 
1.  The Origins of Human Rights. 
 
The idea that an individual has rights just by virtue of being human is seen as a relatively 
modern one and, according to Alhargan, has its origins in the philosophical and political 
revolutions of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries (2006 p.42.). Freeman points out that there were, 
however, ideas about power and its abuse which are much older. The ancient Greeks 
developed the concept of the tyrant who governs unjustly and treats people oppressively 
for his own ends. This was similar for the Romans, but neither conceived of the idea that 
all people had rights (2002 pp16-17). 
Chaudhry (1993 p.13), among others, believes that it is possible to see the emergence of 
the modern concept of human rights during the rise of the Islamic civilisation fourteen 
centuries ago, which will be explored in more detail later. This section will argue that all 
modern human rights have religious roots; and will examine two different periods. The 
first is the late 18th century, when declarations of human rights were proclaimed in North 
America and France, the second, the present day, from which we look back over the 
development of human rights and the effects of their important historical interpretation.  
   
Joas (2006 p.3) mentioned Weber who showed that the ideas of natural law and humanity 
were not, as was often assumed, " merely modern or merely West European concepts" 
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but rather " ideas of a great antiquity". Religion is often identified as a source of ideas 
about human rights, for example the 10 Commandments are partly about how people 
should be treated. What all the major religions do have in common are ideas about human 
dignity and worth. They all contain norms and values about how people should behave 
towards each other and, in particular, how humans have a responsibility for caring about 
each other and helping those who are oppressed or suffering. It is in the latter belief that 
the global nature of human rights resides (Lauren 2008 p.95). Having said this, religious 
beliefs have often been perverted by leaders who were prepared to sanction oppression, 
bigotry and even genocide to serve their own ends. Lauren cites the examples of “anti-
Semitism, the Spanish Inquisition…wars between Sunnis and Shi’ites and between 
Catholics and Protestants, violence between Hindus and Muslims, crusades against 
‘heathens’, and jihads or holy wars against infidels’’ (Ibid. p.96). It is this disparity 
between religious principles and the behaviour of those purporting to uphold religious 
principles that will be later examined in relation to human rights in Saudi Arabia. 
 
The US Declaration of Independence (1776) was based on the idea that citizens were 
‘endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights’. This was echoed in the French 
National Assembly’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789). This 
proclaimed a universal right to ‘liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression. It 
affirmed equality before the law, freedom from arbitrary arrest and the presumption of 
innocence’ (Freeman 2002 p24.). However, by the end of the eighteenth century the 
belief in natural rights was opposed on the one hand by radicals, such as the Jacobins 
who felt it justified inequalities of wealth, and on the other by conservatives who 
considered the concept of natural rights too subversive and egalitarian and believed that 
the French Revolution was stark evidence that their fears were justified (ibid., p.27). Joas 
cites Jellinek who argues that the belief in the dignity of all people is rooted in the 
centuries-old Judeo-Christian tradition, though this tradition cannot be treated as an 
unbroken process of maturation that gave rise to modern ideas (2006 p.11). Joas 
disagrees saying:' this view cannot be defended. It does not obtain for France in any case; 
nor did religious freedom exist in most of North America until the 20th century’. He adds 
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that the codification of human rights was more a matter of secular forces (ibid.).  It could 
be argued here, that there is a difference between codification and principles at the roots 
of human rights.  For example, Islamic law contains human rights principles but is 
uncodified; and that has led to many interpretations which have negatively affected pre-
trial procedures as will be explained in Chapter Seven. However, ideas about treating 
other human beings with respect can be found in both the Judeo-Christian and Islamic 
philosophies and form an important part of the history of ideas about human rights (Joas 
2006 p.12). 
 
Arguably, one of the major challenges for the modern human rights movement is how to 
engage with different faith communities. According to Marthoz & Saunders (2005 p.2), it 
is not possible for human rights to become truly global unless their relevance can be 
acceptable to all states, including those whose behaviour is determined by religion. As far 
as Muslim States such as Saudi Arabia are concerned, human rights principles are 
contained in Islamic Law and the state simply needs to establish clear regulations 
relevant to the native culture. Furthermore, after over sixty years the UDHR has been the 
backbone of the human rights movement and could usefully be the link between the West 
and Muslim countries.  
States such as Saudi Arabia could be encouraged to ratify the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966 ( ICCPR) if it is demonstrated that its underlying 
principles are not in contradiction but rather support the human rights principles 
contained in Islam. Having looked briefly at the origin of human rights in Western 
thought, it is now important to consider the jurisprudential basis to these rights. This is 
the means whereby human rights can be encapsulated in law and instruments by which 
people can have their rights established. 
 
2. The Jurisprudential Basis of Human Rights: 
The United Nations (U.N), since it was established in 1945, has played an instrumental 
role in providing human rights with international protection. Over the last sixty years, the 
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U.N has gone through various stages to finally achieve a coherent system for the 
protection of human rights. It started its mission on human rights by initially expressing 
the international concern over human rights under the United Nations Charter 1945; 
declaring a list of universal rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; 
elaborating internationally protected rights and providing enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure the practice implementation of these rights at the national level. This was done 
through the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), and the 
International Covenants of on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR). 
The Declaration and the two Covenants represent the U.N Bill of Rights.  
2.1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
 
The Commission on Human Rights was established by the Economic and Social Council 
of the U.N in June 1946. The main task of the Commission was to draft an International 
Bill of Rights (Reichert 2002 pp.41-42).The General Assembly eventually adopted the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) unanimously, with eight abstentions, on 
December 10, 1948. It is noteworthy that Saudi Arabia did not vote for the Declaration 
did not signed or ratified the ICCPR -this point is illustrated later- (ibid., p.43).The 
UDHR provides “a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.” 
Every “individual and every organ of society” shall promote “respect for these rights and 
freedoms … by progressive measures ...” The goal was “to secure their universal and 
effective recognition and observance.”(UDHR 1948). McGuinness (2011 p.750) observes 
that the UN General Assembly may have set norms regarding human rights but had no 
actual legal authority or indeed any mechanisms of enforcement to compel its member 
states to comply. The Commission on Human Rights thus regarded its next step as the 
formation of a binding human rights treaty in order to ensure that the principles laid out 
in the UDHR were adhered to. The next section will elaborate on the ICCPR (1966) and 
why Saudi Arabia and some Muslim countries did not sign or ratify it, even though it is 
one of the most significant human rights treaties.   
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2.1.1. The Two Covenants. 
The Human Rights Commission had an arduous task in deciding what the appropriate 
means to enforce the UDHR was to be. Cole (2004 p.5) notes that the West was most 
concerned with civil and political rights and the Communist States with economic, social 
and cultural rights. Eventually, a compromise was reached whereby there were to be two 
distinct documents dealing with the different categories of rights and outlining how best 
to enforce these. After 18 years of negotiations, this process produced the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Culture Rights 1966 (ICESCR) (Özden 2006 p.4). 
As pre-trial procedures are the theme of this thesis, the ICESCR will not be discussed and 
the chapter will focus on the ICCPR. The ICCPR has been ratified by a large number of 
States (168 of 168 States Parties to the ICCPR as of 1 Dec 2014 but there are a number of 
key members who remain outside the system, particularly China and Cuba, Saudi Arabia 
has also not signed (Brown 2008 p.11). Saudi Arabia's refusal to ratify the ICCPR rests 
on their objections to just two Articles (discussed below). Because of these objections, 
they refused to ratify the entire treaty. However, it must be noted that no specific 
objections were made to any other part of the ICCPR, including those sections relevant to 
pre-trial procedures. 
Brown believes that many countries view the UDHR with suspicion, in particular, states 
which follow what he calls ‘political Islam’, a movement that started in the nineteenth 
century, but gained momentum after the Second World War. Political Islam asserts that 
its laws come directly from God and should be paramount (2008 p.12). Brown goes on to 
say that it is unsurprising that strict Islamists have problems with the UDHR as it 
supports equality between men and women, and between Muslims and non-Muslims, the 
right to leave one’s country and the right to marry who one chooses. However, the most 
problematic Article is Article 18: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance” (ICCPR 1966). 
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Muslims do not accept apostasy from Islam, and in some Islamic states it is punishable by 
death (Bagnh ND). Brown also points out that in Saudi Arabia, religious practices other 
than those of Islam are forbidden and any attempt to convert a Muslim is also a crime 
(2008 p.12).  
 Article 19 is also problematic as it states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers” (ICCPR 1966). Many Muslims would not accept the freedom to criticise Islam 
(Brown 2008 p.12).  Saudi Arabia's refusal to sign the ICCPR has attracted criticism 
about its record on human rights from organisations such as Amnesty International 
although Saudi Arabia decided to accept several recommendations as to how it could 
improve this during the recent United Nations Human Rights Council review session in 
Geneva.  Said Boumedouha, Deputy Director of Amnesty’s Middle East and North 
Africa programme, commented “(u)ntil Saudi Arabia’s actions match its words the 
Kingdom’s dire reputation as a grave violator of human rights is unlikely to change,” . 
Indeed, Saudi Arabia refused to ratify the ICCPR saying that this was still only under 
consideration. It also refused to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) or withdraw reservations about the Convention on the 
Elimination on all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). It did however; 
fully accept 145 out of 225 recommendations (Amnesty Organization 19 Mar 2014). 
Although Saudi Arabia has problems with Articles 18 and 19 there is nothing to stop it 
from ratifying other Articles of the ICCPR which do not violate Shari’ah and submitting 
reservations about the relevant articles. Specifically, it does not need to disregard those 
Articles which relate to pre-trial procedures, to integrate them into domestic law and 
implement them in practice. The ECHR, the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights (CDHR) 
and the Arab Charter of Human Rights (ACHR) will next be examined as these are all 
relevant to the issue of pre-trial procedures in both Saudi Arabia and England and Wales.   
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2.1.2 Regional instruments. 
The global human rights system is complemented by regional mechanisms in the 
Americas, Africa, and Europe. In some instances, treaties with strong monitoring and 
redress mechanisms have been developed. Currently there are three human rights systems 
that operate at the regional level. These are the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom 1950, the American Convention on Human 
Rights 1969, and the African Charter on Human People’s Rights 1981. Asia, the Pacific 
and the Arab States are the regions where regional human rights mechanisms still have to 
enter into force. The Arab Charter on Human Rights came into force on 15 May 2008, 
however, it is not accepted internationally as an effective way to uphold human rights, as 
I argue later, as it is not backed up by any kind of Court of Human Rights.  
2.1.2.1 The European Human Rights system.  
 
The first major treaty the Council of Europe produced after the Statute and the General 
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe was the [European] 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). 
The convention was signed on November 4, 1950, and came into force on September 3, 
1953. It was the first real human rights treaty. The first section of the Convention sets out 
the particular human rights and fundamental freedoms that are to be protected (ECHR). 
The first thirteen items, which appear in the original ECHR, were intended to restrain 
governments from tyrannizing the people. This was the result of the experience of 
occupation during the war on the continent. Since they were set up in 1953, the structure 
of the Council’s enforcement institutions has changed twice. In 1998 the European 
Commission of Human Rights was discontinued and Protocol 11 gave over its functions 
to the Court (Hart 2010 p.538). Protocol 14 (2010) developed from Protocol 11 and 
aimed to improve the efficiency of the Court by eliminating cases that were unlikely to 
succeed along with those which were similar to cases already brought against the same 
member state. For a case to be admissible the applicant has to have suffered 'significant 
disadvantage'; and this can only be used "when an examination of the application on the 
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merits is not considered necessary". Also, the matter of the application will have to have 
been considered by a national court (ECHR Protocol 14).  
 
2.1.2.2. The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI). 
The CDHRI was adopted in 1990 by members of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) and a version of the CDHRI was submitted to the UN by the OIC prior 
to the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. It has been signed by 45 
states so far and adopts the Islamic perspective of human rights in response to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The member states include Saudi Arabia. This 
declaration provides an overview of Islamic human rights, in accordance to 
Shari’ah (Islamic Laws). CDHRI declared its purpose to be "general guidance for its 
member states in the field of human rights" (CDHRI 1990). Although the declaration 
does talk about all men being equal in terms of ‘dignity’ (Article 1(a), it does not state 
that rights are equal for all individuals and nor does it accept equal dignity for men and 
women and for Muslims and non-Muslims, and so does not necessarily entail them 
having the same rights (Delling 2004 p.47) 
 
According to Laluddin et al, this declaration differs from the secular UDHR, as it is seen 
as embodying God-given rights which cannot be amended by legislation. (2012 pp. 115-
6).  When the UDHR was adopted, Saudi Arabia delegation's abstention was prompted 
primarily by two of the Declaration's Articles: Article 18, which states that everyone has 
the right "to change his religion or belief"; and Article 16, on equal marriage rights.   
Saudi Arabia and Iraq asked the UN Commission on Human Rights to accept the Cairo 
Declaration as an alternative for Muslim states; but, the UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan refused saying that human rights were universal. (Delling 2004 p.47).Brown 
comments that as the Cairo declaration affirms its basis in Shari’ah in Arts. 19, 24 and 25 
it is therefore subject to different interpretations of Shari’ah “of which the most extreme 
without a doubt falls outside the international human rights standards" (2008 p.12). 
Thus, many Arabic Countries felt that there was a failure to ensure human rights in Islam 
through the CDHRI, and formulated these in the Arab Charter of Human Rights (ACHR 
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2008). The ACHR is more accurate and many of its Articles are similar to those in 
international human rights charters, and that will be examined next.  
 
2.1.2.3. The Arab Charter of Human Rights (ACHR 2008).  
 
This charter was revised from the original Charter that was published in 1994, but not 
ratified by any state. The main weakness with the 1994 version was the lack of any 
human rights enforcement mechanism, particularly in comparison to those within the 
European and American Conventions on Human Rights, and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.  The new version came into force on March 15 2008 and has 
been ratified by more than half the members of the League (22 states), As of November 
2013, the Charter has been ratified by Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the UAE and Yemen. Member states are 
expected to submit a report to the Arab Human Rights Committee after a year of 
accepting the Charter and every three years thereafter (Article 48); but by 2012, only 
Algeria, Jordan and Bahrain had done this and there were delays in making the reviews 
public. On July 1 2013, Qatar submitted its report, the  United Arab Emirates followed on 
October 2  2013, and on September 14 2014 Iraq handed in its report;  however, Saudi 
Arabia has to date not submitted its report. 
 
The Charter comprises a preamble and 53 Articles In terms of Articles relevant to pre-
trial procedures it enshrines the principle of non-discrimination (Article 3) and equality 
before the law (Article 11),  It protects privacy of family, home, and correspondence 
(Article 21),  enshrines the right to liberty and security of persons, prohibits arbitrary 
arrest and detention (Article 14), torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatments 
which are considered as crimes not subject to any statute of limitations, and sets out the 
right to reparation for victims of torture (Article 8) and the humane treatment of persons 
deprived from their liberty (Article  20). The Charter also provides for a separate judicial 
system for juveniles (Article 17) (ACHR 2008). According to Akram & Al-Midani, the 
problem is that the Charter is not effectively enforced. State compliance is monitored by 
an Expert Committee which receives reports from state parties, but no individual or state 
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can petition the Committee if there have been violations; nor is there an Arab Court for 
Human Rights. The Charter will have to be amended if it is to provide a human rights 
system that is both meaningful and enforceable (2006 p.149). Rishmway comments that 
there are further problems with the Charter as it does not prohibit punishments that are 
inhuman and degrading, including the death penalty for children, if the national law 
allows it; nor does it extend rights to non-citizens in many areas. (2009). 
 
In spite of this, Akram and Al Midani point out that the Arab Charter represents a step 
forward in the protection of human rights, and in accepting that human rights are 
universal (2006 p.147). It is the first time that Arab states have adopted unanimously and 
without reservation a charter that not only affirms this universality, but also establishes 
protection for a great number of rights on a par with other international and regional 
instruments. The ACHR 2008 Articles that relate to pre-trial procedure resemble those of 
the ICCPR. Art. 14 (1) of ACHR and Article 9 (1) of the ICCPR both provide:  
"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest, search or detention without a legal warrant.’ Art. 14 (1) requires a 'legal 
warrant' but it is not clear if that means any enforcement or judicial department can issue 
that warrant. This would clearly be unsatisfactory and this should be interpreted as 
meaning ‘without a judicial warrant. Meanwhile Article 9(1) of the ICCPR also provides 
that: ‘No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance 
with such procedure as are established by law.’  Article 14(2) of the ACHR is similar, but 
additionally provides ‘and in accordance with such procedure as is established thereby.’   
  
Art. 14 (3) of the ACHR also uses similar wording to Art.9 (2) of ICCPR and states that " 
Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, in a language that he 
understands, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges 
against him. He shall be entitled to contact his family members".  The words in italics are 
those that are not found in the ICCPR and enlarge the right.  Art.9 (2) of ICCPR does not 
give suspects a right to contact their family, which is a point in favour of the ACHR  The 
first sentence of Art. 14 (5) of the ACHR is exactly the same as the first sentence of Art.9 
(3) of the ICCPR which states " Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall 
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be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial 
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release.’ 
Article 14(5) ACHR then goes on to provide:  ‘His release may be subject to guarantees 
to appear for trial. Pre-trial detention shall in no case be the general rule."  This compares 
to Article 9(3) of the ICCPR which provides that: ‘It shall not be the general rule that 
persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to 
guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should 
occasion arise, for execution of the judgement’. However, the Arabic version of the 
ACHR is a bit confusing ir states that " He may be release if his detention or arrest is 
unlawful" , which gives Arab states more leeway over detention.   
Art. 16(4) of the ACHR gives the suspect the right to have free legal advice if he cannot 
defend himself or if the interests of justice so require, and the right to the free assistance 
of an interpreter if he cannot understand or does not speak the language used in court.  
However, these rights are not afforded to the suspect at the pre-trial stage. Furthermore, is 
not the case that the right to legal advice is guaranteed by the local laws such as the 
Criminal Procedure Law in Saudi Arabia; indeed, this thesis will show that in law and 
practice there is no guarantee for the suspect to have a free legal advice.  This is similar 
the ICCPR Art.14 3(d) and (f). 
Art. 14 (7) of ACHR requires that anyone who has been the victim of arbitrary or 
unlawful arrest or detention shall be entitled to compensation. That is highly optimistic, 
given the current situation in most Arab states. This thesis will show that in Saudi Arabia 
there is no easy way to make a claim for compensation when someone has been subjected 
to arbitrary arrest or detention. It could be argued as having been included to avoid 
criticism by the UN and non-government organisations. Saudi Arabia signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the OHCHR in 2012.   
Art. 16 of the ACHR requires that "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty by a final judgment rendered according to law and, 
in the course of the investigation and trial", which is similar to Art.14 (2) of the ICCPR. 
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Art. 21 of the ACHR mirrors Art. 17 of the ICCPR and reads: "No one shall be subjected 
to arbitrary or unlawful interference with regard to his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence; nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or his reputation". Art.8 of the 
ACHR also echoes Art.7 of the ICCPR and reads "no one shall be subjected to physical 
or psychological torture or to cruel, degrading, humiliating or inhuman treatment", but 
omits that this applies also to punishment after sentencing. The ACHR gives Arab states 
the right not to comply with the ACHR, in a state of public emergency.  Art.4 (2) states: 
"In exceptional situations of emergency, no derogation shall be made from the following 
Articles: Arts. 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14 Para 6, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28, 29 and 30. In addition, 
the judicial guarantees required for the protection of the aforementioned rights may not 
be suspended".  This Article undermines the principles of the ACHR as the most 
important human rights relating to pre-trial procedures in this Charter are in Arts.14 & 
21. By allowing derogation states will easily avoid having to abide by these articles. 
Moreover, the ACHR entirely neglects the right to bail which is required in human rights 
law internationally. Although non- discrimination has been addressed in the ACHR 
(Article 3 (1), the preamble of the ACHR calls on signatories to discriminate against 
those who do not believe in divine religion as it reads "in furtherance of the eternal 
principles of fraternity, equality and tolerance among human beings consecrated by the 
noble Islamic religion and the other divinely-revealed religions". This is in contradiction 
of Article 3 which prohibits discrimination on grounds of religious belief as well as race, 
colour, sex, language, opinion, thought, national or social origin, property, birth, and 
disability. 
Saudi Arabia signed and ratified the ACHR, and, as is shown above, the ACHR articles 
for pre-trial procedure are similar to the ICCPR's. Saudi Arabia’s rejection of Articles 18 
and 19 of the ICCPR (See Chapter 6) need not prevent it from signing and ratifying it 
(with reservations) and rectifying its reputation for abusing human rights including 
during pre-trial procedures, such as not informing suspects of what they are accused of, 
or keeping suspects in detention for unnecessarily long periods. Signing and ratifying the 
ICCPR would also act as an encouragement to other Muslim nations to follow suit (such 
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as Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Palestine who have not signed or ratified the 
ICCPR).   
It is submitted there is no proper justification to keep Saudi Arabia from signing the 
ICCPR and reassuring the world and its own citizens of its commitment to human rights. 
Although, Saudi Arabia has signed and ratified the CDHR 1990 and the ACHR 2008 this 
is not sufficient to ensure that human rights principles will be adhered to, as these two 
Charters have been shown to be ineffectual. The Arab Charter does pay lip service to 
human rights, in that the committee receives reports and comments on them, but there is 
no mechanism for these rights to be enforced. As the Arab Charter is ineffective in 
upholding human rights, this thesis will not be examining it in depth as a means of doing 
so.   Having examined briefly the jurisprudential basis of human rights, the next section 
will demonstrate the origin of human rights in the Islamic tradition in order to identify its 
roots and why such rights have not been backed up with any effective means of enforcing 
them. 
 
3. Human Rights in the Islamic Tradition. 
 
Prophet Muhammad received his first revelation from Allah in AD 610. He started 
teaching his companions that all they needed in life was to behave respectfully and 
lawfully towards all people. In Islam, the only law is the law of God, and the law of God 
is the Shari'ah [all Muslims believe that Islamic law is intended to serve as the expression 
of God's will]. Literally ‘the pathway’, Shari'ah is the civil and criminal law of the 
religion that Prophet Muhammad and his companions followed (the criminal law 
procedures of pre-trial will be discussed in-depth below). Indeed, ‘the term ‘Islam’ means 
"submission" and the Shari'ah is meant to regulate "daily life, religious activity, social 
behaviour, financial transactions, and family affairs ... and provides punishment for 
crimes and civil offences” (Walker 1993 p.863). According to Jones (2013 p.47), it is 
possible to view Shari’ah as an all-encompassing metanorm and philosophy that, to 
practicing Muslims, is more than just a rule of law; although it acts as a legal system like 
any common or civil law. It refers to established sources such as the Qur’an and the 
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Sunna in order to make legal decisions and is analogous to human rights law. In spite of 
this, Shari’ah will need to change considerably to come into line with the latter on all 
matters. 
 
Shari’ah has different applications and interpretations in different Islamic states. Because 
currently there is no single political or religious institution that can speak for the entire 
Muslim world; interpretations and applications are often contradictory and controversial. 
Some of these interpretations are contrary to international human rights standards. Some 
of the more controversial examples of this are to do with discrimination against women 
and the concept of Jihad or ‘holy war’ (Moghaddam 2012 p.20). A’n Na’mi & Deing 
(1990 p.178) also point out that difficulties arise when a human right recognized in 
international human rights law is not treated in the same way in Shari’ah. They give 
freedom of religious affiliation as an example as, according to Shari’ah, an al-murtad (a 
Muslim who repudiates his faith in Islam) is accorded the death penalty if he refuses to 
return to Islam. Not only this, but according to the influential Hanafi School of 
jurisprudence, anyone who kills an al-murtad is not punished, since disbelief is a 
legitimate cause for execution. This has ramifications for pre-trial, as an al-murtad might 
die in custody as the result of their treatment there. 
 
Furthermore, women and non-Muslims are not accorded the same level of remedy for 
violations of their rights, although all Muslim men, women and dhimis (protected non-
Muslim minorities) all have the right to life. Mayer (2002 p.3) points out some people 
may consider international human rights standards as alien and distorting when used to 
evaluate the situation of women in Muslim societies. She also believes that it is important 
to make a distinction between genuine and principled applications of women’s 
international human rights and those applications which are just politically motivated. 
Olowu (2008 p.62) cited Howard who strongly believes that ‘the Islamic conception of 
justice is not one of human rights’ Olowu believes that ideas such as those of Howard 
mean that many acts, such as those of Al-Qaida, are mistakenly labelled as being from an 
Islamic perspective when this is not the case. There are however some academics in 
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Western countries who open their minds to discuss the ideas of Islam. Olowu (2008 p.63) 
cited Simonsen as an example who said: 
Politically active groups in all parts of the Islamic world, exhausted by political 
oppression, saluted the growing international focus on human rights from the 
middle of the 1970s onwards and tried to take advantage of it. Several Muslim 
intellectuals argued for compatibility between Islam on the one hand and the 
concept of human rights as defined by the UN on the other. A parallel trend has 
been the publication of a number of books in which Muslim intellectuals argue 
that human rights have always been an integrated part of Islam along the lines 
of the Cairo Declaration’’. 
Mayer (1995 pp.64-5) contends that ‘contemporary endorsement of international human 
rights by Muslims is more apparent than real’, because applying Islamic law under 
Shari’ah will lead to many violations particularly against non-Muslims and women. 
According to Vogler (2005, p.126), the current Islamic revivalism does not bode well for 
criminal justice reforms; especially when compared to the progress that has been made 
with this in other parts of the world. Although many would point to the inability of 
Shari’ah to determine state policy and a lack of strong procedural norms in Qur’anic 
authority; Vogler believes that a much more important factor in explaining 
authoritarianism in Islamic state justice has been the almost continuous domination of 
military regimes in the region.  
However, human rights in Islam have a religious aspect in that the norms of Islam are 
perceived as stemming from a divine source, therefore all right actions and social deeds 
of Muslims are ordered by God (Awan 2009 p.1)
3
. This would include the treatment of 
suspects before trial as well as prisoners. Islamic law has two categories; the first one 
being commandments for religious and spiritual purposes which include the norms of 
worship and faith. The second category is the rules and law which organize society. The 
latter includes criminal and civil law as well as laws relating to the constitution and 
international laws. The two categories are intertwined in Islam (Khatab and Bouma 2007 
p. 94). 
                                                 
3
 The Glorious Qur’an says: “Allah commands justice, the doing of good, and liberality to kith and kin, and 
He forbids all shameful deeds, and injustice and rebellion: He instructs you, that ye may receive 
admonition.” [Qur’an, 16:90-91] 
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Al Awabdeh (2005 p.100) identifies the place of religion and God as the most significant 
difference between modern Western attitudes and Islamic attitudes to human rights. The 
former has a secular approach, whilst the latter sees God as the ultimate source of justice, 
including human rights. According to the Qur’an, Islam requires the establishment of 
human right for all members of a Muslim state; it stipulates over 20 basic human rights, 
including the right to life, freedom, dignity, social security and protection against 
harassment. However, these principles were only legally recognized in the West in the 
aftermath of the French Revolution, whereas they have formed part of Muslim 
philosophy for over 1,000 years. 
 
Al Awabdeh goes on to suggest that although, Islamic law has a moral-legal autonomy 
and is not based on legislation arising from international human rights conventions which 
rely on the acceptance, ratification and adherence of single states, it does not necessarily 
follow that there is a contradiction between the two (2005 p.101). Muslims generally 
regard Shari’ah as a strong basis on which to socialize their children and give their 
society and relationships a moral foundation; it thus functions as the Islamic element of 
local culture and is regarded as a comprehensive and integrated theological, ethical and 
jurisprudential system despite not being a formally enacted code of positive law (A’n 
Na’mi &Deing p.178 1990). 
Furthermore, there are three principles regarding the basis of the notions of human rights 
in Islam; Tawhid (Unity of God), Rasal (Prophethood) and Khilafa (Caliphate). 
A’laMawdudi (1995 p.5) points out that an understanding of these three principles are 
fundamental to an understanding of Islamic Law. In this section, it is necessary to explain 
the role of a Khilafa in relation to human rights in Islam. Khilafa means in Islam the 
representative of God on the earth, He must follow what the prophet Mohammed 
received from God and apply it on earth. A group or community can just appoint a 
Khilafa and decide whether he deserves to be the representative of God on the earth 
(ibid.).  
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      ‘‘This is the point where democracy begins in Islam; every person in an Islamic 
society enjoys the rights and powers of the caliphate of God and in this respect all 
individuals are equal. NO one takes precedence over another or can deprive anyone 
else of his rights or powers’’ (ibid. p.2). 
Islam has laid down fundamental rights that are appropriate to every Muslim, whatever 
their status or location. In Islam no one is allowed to spill any blood without a strong 
reason and every person has to have his/her rights without any prejudice or 
discrimination (ibid., p.8). According to the sacred writings of the Qur’an, the soul of 
every human being deserves respect ‘We have honoured the progeny of Adam’ (Qur’an, 
17:70)  which means that God gave every single person on this earth full respect and no 
one is allowed to demean others. 
Islam also laid down the rights of non-Muslims. They are given their rights without 
prejudice and they have the same rights as Muslims in respect of civil or criminal law. 
They have the freedom to practice their religious rites and ceremonies in any way they 
like. Although, the rights that are given are not restricted, they have to respect the 
legislation of each Muslim country (A’laMawdudi 1995 p.8). Crane points out that it is 
useful to consider human rights in Islam from legal, political, economic and spiritual 
perspectives, and it is the first of these that he addresses. This legal perspective on human 
rights in Islamic jurisprudence, which constitutes the roots (usul) of Islamic law 
(Shari’ah), developed over centuries (2007 p.86). Islamic jurisprudence has, as its 
guiding principles, the Maqasid or purposes of Islamic law (Crane 2007 p.88). The 
Maqasid incorporates both spiritual and social principles.  According to Laluddin et al 
(2012 p.112), the Maqasid form the basis of Islamic human rights with the avoidance of 
harm as the focal point. The six higher purposes of securing and preserving religious 
rights and the right to life, lineage, property, dignity and intellectual rights are seen as 
essential to the existence and continuation of society and human life. 
Malekian (2009 p. 591) points out that there is no serious difference between interna- 
tional and Islamic justice, except for the interests of their exponents and the political 
power behind their motivations. Pure Islamic justice does not refute logic, theory, norms 
or the Statute. Some practical virtues of Islamic law are its adaptability, flexibility, 
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development of justice on case law, as well as its insistence on the use of peaceful means 
to settle international disputes. The entire Islamic juridical, political philosophy is based 
on the promulgation of the principles of universal human rights justice. Islamic law 
"enjoins justice" and judges all man- kind as "a single nation" (ibid.). This perspective 
would suggest that, given that there are no fundamental conflicts in Western and Islamic 
ideas of justice at the pre-trial stage, there would not be any jurisprudential reasons why 
suspects could not be afforded the rights they given in international human right law in 
Islamic legal systems.   
 
Thus, it can be seen that the relationship between Shari’ah and international human rights 
law is complicated and problematic and that many of these problems have more to with 
fundamentalist interpretations of Shari’ah rather than Islam itself. However, to regard 
human rights as being irreconcilably divided into ‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ would be an 
end to the concept of universal human rights. As Bielefeldt commented: “the language of 
human rights would thus simply be turned into a rhetorical weapon for intercultural 
competition” (2000 p.91). However, it is important to recognize that Islamic law is, 
largely, a ‘jurists’ law’ and it is specialists in legal science and scholarly handbooks that 
hold sway rather than the state (Dacey & Koproske 2008 p.16). 
Conclusion  
The basis of the Islamic notion of human rights lies in the divine revelations of the Quran 
and the Prophetic Sunnah, and is contained in the maqasid of Shari’ah Law. It is a 
comprehensive system which covers a range of rights, all classes of people and provides 
a set of values that are appropriate for all eras and geographical locations. Muslims 
believe that because these rights are rooted in divine sources they have the strength and 
durability which make them applicable both nationally and internationally. Having said 
this, there are fundamental issues of equality which need to be addressed if there is to be 
reconciliation between international human rights law and Shari’ah. Principles contained 
in universal human rights are at odds with the values of traditional caste societies, which 
need to be transformed so as to contain the idea that all humans should be treated 
humanely and with equality before the law. This thesis suggests that this can be in part 
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accomplished by overhauling the pre-trial procedures in Saudi Arabia’s Code of Practice. 
More discussion on this topic will be presented in Chapter 6 and 7.  The next chapter 
meanwhile aims to compare procedural rights at the pre-trial stage in international human 
rights law and Shari’ah, in order to examine the extent to which there is harmony and 
conflict between them.  
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Chapter Three 
Procedural Rights at the Pre-trial Stage in International Human Rights Law and 
Shari'ah 
 
Introduction:  
This chapter will examine Islamic principles of human rights, in particular to demonstrate 
whether there is any conflict between these and the principles expounded in international 
human rights law. The chapter goes on to explore specifically the rights which pertain to 
pre-trial procedures. With respect to Islamic law there are simply general principles 
which can be applied to pre-trial procedures, such as the right to privacy. International 
human rights law has both general principles, and specific regulations. According to 
Islam, human rights come from God and it is important to understand the Islamic 
tradition from this perspective; both in terms of how it is that these general principles 
inform Shari'ah, and with respect to the difficulties involved in making accurate 
translations across cultures.  
The aim of this comparison is to show how pre-trial procedures, derived from the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) PACE are in accordance with international human 
rights law and would not be in conflict with the spirit of Islamic law.  The chapter will 
first consider pre-trial procedural rights in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as the 
two most established civil and political rights instruments at both the international and 
European levels before comparing and contrasting with   Shari’ah, it will then proceed to 
discuss the same rights from the perspective of Shari’ah. 
I intend to examine the provisions contained in the ICCPR, and ECHR with regards to 
specific rights. It should be noted that these rights focus on the right of the suspect to 
have their human rights respected. These rights are often contrasted with the 'right' of the 
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community to be protected against crime by the successful detection and prosecution of 
criminals. However, although there is a difference of focus, these rights are not in conflict 
with each other. The public's need for protection is best served by an efficient police 
force, this does not mean a police force that is willing to abuse the rights of suspects. It is 
arguably in the interests of everyone to have a humane police force that is seen as fair and 
accountable.  I will also show how these treaties have limited powers in enforcing the 
rights encapsulated in them on their signatories. Saudi Arabia has not signed, or ratified, 
the ICCPR (See Chapter 2); and there are still major problems in ensuring that detainees 
are given their rights at the pre-trial stage of criminal investigation. 
 
This thesis aims to show how the principles of human rights contained in Shari'ah are not 
in conflict with those of International Human Rights law in terms of the treatment of 
suspects and detainees at pre-trial. The following discussion highlights the importance of 
not only establishing clear definitions of these rights, but crucially ensuring that they are 
reflected in clear guidelines controlling actual police behaviour. Given the large cultural 
difference between countries, international definitions are wide so as to encompass this. 
Individual states need to make sure that rights relate to the situation in their country and 
that those enforcing the law have clear codes of practice. 
 
1.  Procedural Rights at the Pre-trial Stage in International Human Rights Law. 
 
In this section, I will explore and examine international human rights treaties with regard 
to pre-trial procedural rights, focusing on in particular the right to liberty, the right to 
legal assistance, the right against ill-treatment, the right to privacy, the right to bail and 
the right to an effective remedy. 
 
1.1. The Right to Liberty.  
Detention is the procedure most likely to usurp a person’s freedom for a period of time, 
especially as the principles of international law provide that the accused is innocent until 
proven guilty by the judgment of a court. For this reason, international treaties such as the 
61 
 
ICCPR and ECHR require that arrest and detention only occur when necessary, and for 
this to have both public and private guarantees. The public guarantees state that any 
person whose freedom is restricted should be treated in a manner that preserves their 
dignity and may not be abused or caused psychological harm (ICCPR and ECHR). The 
principles of international human rights law in relation to these matters will be discussed 
next. 
Article 9(1) of ICCPR, which mirrors Article 5 of the ECHR
4
, stipulates: ‘‘Everyone has 
the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or 
detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedure as are established by law... ’’ (ICCPR).  In relation to the 
right to liberty, Art. 9 does not require complete freedom from arrest or detention. Article 
9(1) of the ICCPR guarantees two distinct rights: liberty and security of person. The 
discussion here is concerned only with the right to liberty, as security of person will be 
discussed under the right against ill-treatment.  Art.14 (1) of ACHR guarantees these 
rights, but still needs some amendments to be equivalent to the ICCPR and ECHR  
In the following section, the prohibition of unlawful deprivation of liberty and the 
procedural safeguards designed to protect the right to liberty under Article 9 of the 
ICCPR and Article 5 of the ECHR are discussed. 
 
 1.1.1. The Prohibition of Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Liberty. 
 
Article 9 of the ICCPR requires that any deprivation of liberty must not be arbitrary. 
Furthermore, deprivation of liberty must be reasonable, proportional and non-
discriminatory. Joseph et al point out that, according to Article 9, depriving someone of 
their liberty is only allowed if it is ‘in accordance with procedures as are established by 
law’; and that this law and its enforcement should not be arbitrary. Hence, under the 
ICCPR, ‘arbitrariness’ is ‘a principle above, rather than within, the law’ (2000 pp.211-
212). Article 9 does not however list permitted exceptions. This is in contrast to Article 5 
                                                 
4
 Art.5 of the ECHR addressing the same rights of liberty and security of person reads: “Everyone has the 
right to liberty and security of person. ‘‘No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases 
and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law...’’ 
62 
 
(1) (f) which provides ‘for lawful; arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting 
an unauthorised entry into the country, or of a person against whom action is being taken 
with a view to deportation or extradition’. It does give the state powers to detain in 
particular circumstances, without seeming to refer to the necessity of detention’ (Edward 
2011 pp.22-23). Michaelsen notes that the European Convention permits detention on 
condition that it is ‘in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law’. For example, 
Article 5 (1) (f) specifically allows for lawful; arrest or detention (2005 p.133). 
Kessler (2009 p.593) points out that detention could be deemed unlawful and arbitrary if 
the detainees are kept in custody over time, even with reasonable suspicion. He cites the 
example of the 9/11 detainees such as Khalid Shaik and Golam Rohany, who were 
arrested with reasonable suspicion and are still being held in detention even though the 
US government is incapable of finding sufficient evidence to put them on trial. This 
custody procedure regulation fails to adequately guard against arbitrary detention as 
required by Article 9(1) of the ICCPR.The US has had to answer charges of widespread 
human rights violations at the United Nations in Geneva. It claims that it has met fair trial 
standards and properly monitored its surveillance agencies. The UN Human Rights 
Committee had criticised the US for racial discrimination among other human rights 
violations at Guantanamo.(The Guardian 14, March, 2014). 
The problem here is that Article 9 of ICCPR is not sufficiently explicit about which 
grounds are accepted for a detention, it just requires that the detention must be for a 
reason. With regard to illegal entry, the Human Rights Committee (HRC)
5
 has 
nonetheless clarified that ‘without such factors (as reasonable suspicion) detention may 
be considered arbitrary’ (HRC).6 Thus if the domestic law contains policy guidelines 
                                                 
5 The Human Rights Committee is the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by its State parties. All States parties are obliged to 
submit regular reports. States must report initially one year after acceding to the Covenant and then 
whenever the Committee requests (usually every four years). The Committee examines each report and 
addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the form of "concluding observations.  
6 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 8, Para 1 (16
th
 session (1982). 
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which are not adhered to with regard to detention, this can and has meant that a challenge 
to the detention can be made, as Article 9 does not provide the State with an automatic 
power to detain (Edward 2011 p. 23). Clements et al note that although the issue of 
whether detention is in breach of domestic law is mainly a question for the national 
courts, it is also subject to scrutiny by the European Court (1996 p.141). In Koroleva v. 
Russia (1600/09)
7
, 
 
the court stated that the applicant had not, according to national law, 
committed a criminal offence, that of large-scale drug trafficking. She was, however, 
detained unlawfully for a long time whist the investigation dealt with her co-offender.  In 
the light of this, her detention was a violation of Article 5 (1). Proportionality of 
detention refers to the duration in custody, which should be reasonable, and in the case of 
Koroleva, it was deemed not to be as her detention was simply while waiting for another 
to be processed.  
Another problem that Kessler points out is that the meaning of the word ‘arbitrary’ is 
somewhat vague. It does not just refer to detentions that are unlawful, but also to any that 
could be deemed ‘unjust, unpredictable, capricious or disproportionate’. Factors such as 
the passage of time or the lack of a warrant could turn a lawful detention into an 
‘arbitrary’ one (2009 p.581). For this reason a clearer definition of what is meant by 
'arbitrary' is established by case law. Martin (2012 p.14), comments that the wording of 
the list in Article 5 (1) is confusing. This has prompted much interpretation of the list, as 
the State Parties have understandably wanted to know all the circumstances in which a 
detention might be thought ‘arbitrary'. She also adds Article 5 (1) (c)  can be 
characterised, without probably overdoing it, as one of the most unfortunate of the ECHR 
in terms of understanding of what is set forth. Still after almost sixty years since it was 
drafted, there is seldom consensus as regards the exact purpose, meaning and scope of 
this phrase (ibid.).   
Article 5(1) recognises that the ‘right to liberty’ cannot be absolute, and paragraphs (a) to 
(f)
8
 list situations where it is possible to detain someone in the public interest. Some 
                                                 
7
 Koroleva v. Russia, (1600/09) ECHR 13 November 2012. 
8
 Art. 5(1) a. the lawful detention  of a person after conviction by a competent court;b. the lawful arrest or 
detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the 
fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; 
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cases, such as the detention of a convicted criminal in a mental hospital, would fall under 
both sub paragraph (a) and (e). Furthermore, under Article 15 of the Convention, it is 
possible to derogate from Article 5 in times of emergency. It provides that the State party 
does not lawfully detain a person unless the reason for the detention is in the list set out in 
Article 5(1).  These reasons include detaining someone who has been convicted by a 
court or has been arrested as well as situations such as the educational supervision of a 
minor, to prevent the spread of infection, when someone is of unsound mind or when 
someone is going to be deported or extradited (ECHR). As well as being a test for the 
legality of a detention, this Article also provides detainees with a set of procedural 
safeguards to ‘ensure speedy and effective judicial determination of the justification of 
detention’ (Starmer et al 2001 p.19). 
  
Starmer et al comment that although Article 5(1) (b) and (c) do allow detention in order 
for a suspect to be brought to court when there is reasonable suspicion of a crime having 
been committed, the European Court has resisted a wide interpretation of this, stipulating 
that there must be specific and concrete reasons for detention (2001 p.95). The case of 
Ghiurău v. Romania (55421/10)9, shows that the intention behind the detention is 
important. The Court reiterated that the police should seek to obtain sufficient evidence to 
bring charges either at the time of arrest or when the suspects were in custody, even 
though the applicants were subsequently neither charged nor taken to court. It may have 
been difficult to obtain evidence or to produce it in court without possibly endangering 
                                                                                                                                                 
c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is 
reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done 
so; 
d. the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful 
detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;e. the lawful 
detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of 
unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; 
f. the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the 
country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
extradition. 
 
9
 Ghiurău v. Romania, (55421/10) ECHR 20 November 2012.  
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the lives of others. In this case, the police were deemed to have acted in good faith and in 
accordance with paragraph (1) (c). Starmer et al point out that, in contrast, there have 
been cases where the European Court has decided that the UK was in breach of (1) (c); 
for example (Ireland v UK (5310/71) (2001 p.98). In spite of noting that ‘terrorist crime 
falls into a special category as police are obliged to act with the utmost urgency’, the 
Court ruled that, in the case of Ghiurau v. Romania, simply detaining someone because 
of previous convictions for terrorism was not a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion.  
 
Although Article 5 (1) (c) does recognise that detention can be used to prevent a crime 
being committed, it does not give a general authorization for preventative detention. In a 
case concerning the pre-trial procedures carried out by the British in Northern Ireland 
from 1971-5 (Ireland v UK (5310/71)
10
, the European Court held that internment ‘simply 
for the preservation of peace and the maintenance of order’ did not fall within the 
Article’s remit unless there was some belief that an offence had been committed. 
Clement et al consider that there is a difference between arrest and ‘helping the police 
with enquiries’. To some extent, what constitutes ‘deprivation of liberty’ is subjective and 
the personal circumstances of each suspect are relevant. Just because someone initially 
consents to go to the police station, this does not mean that this is not deprivation of 
liberty (1999 p.140). This is especially true when the suspect may not be entirely clear 
about why they are being taken to police station. 
 
In conclusion, the ICCPR, ECHR and ACHR all stipulate that detention must conform to 
national as well as international law. However, if domestic legislation permits detention 
which is in breach of international human rights norms this is a violation of Article 9(1) 
of the ICCPR which prohibits any unlawful and arbitrary form of detention without 
listing specific grounds, as does Article 5 of the ECHR. The right to liberty is guaranteed 
in Shari’ah and is closely linked to the right to know why one has been arrested. The next 
section looks at this right. 
 
                                                 
10
 Ireland v. United Kingdom, (5310/71) ECHR 1 18 January 1978. 
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1.1.2.   The Right to Know the Reason for Arrest and What Charges are Being   
Brought.  
 
Suspects need to know what the exact charges are because, at the moment of arrest, they 
are very vulnerable. Many people do not know their rights and may not even know they 
can remain silent or ask for a lawyer, let alone clarify what exact charges are being 
brought. It is for this reason that protective legislation has been adopted  internationally. 
Article 9 (2) ICCPR states: " Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of 
arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against 
him". It provides for the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest so that all persons 
arrested should know the reasons for being deprived of their liberty. Joseph et al argue 
that it is not enough, for example, to tell someone that they are being arrest for ‘security 
reasons’; the person needs to know the reason more precisely (2000 p.219).  Kessler 
(2009 p.582) points out that the notification of charges must be specific, to give the 
arrestee a chance to defend him or herself against the charges.  
 
Similar to Article 9 (2) of ICCPR is Article 5(2) of the ECHR,  also Art.14 (3) of the 
ACHR  which requires that the arrested person be informed promptly ‘in a language he 
understands’ of the reason for his arrest, he must be told in ‘simple non-technical 
language ... the essential legal and factual reasons for his arrest’. This is so that 
individuals can challenge the legality of their detention. Just being told that they are 
being held under the provisions of emergency legislation is not enough. In the case of 
Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
11
, it was held that one of the reasons a person is 
‘entitled to know what are the facts which are said to constitute a crime on his part’ is in 
order to make a proper defence and not simply deny the charge. The suspect should be 
informed of sufficient relevant details, such as where and when the offence occurred and 
any facts that are said to constitute the offence. Sometimes, just stating what the alleged 
crime is not sufficient. Starmer et al point out that the police must obtain sufficient details 
of the case before making an arrest. However, in the case of suspected terrorism, delaying 
                                                 
11
 Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 10 Ohio Misc. 9, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 
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the reason for arrest for a few hours may not be deemed a violation of Article 5 (2001 
pp.100-1). 
 
The ICCPR and ECHR require that all arrested persons should be informed promptly in a 
language they can fully understand. However, the language of Article 9(2) is vague and 
the provision does not state clearly if this applies to both criminal arrests and detentions 
which are for non-criminal reasons such as immigration or for reasons of mental health 
(Kessler 2009 p.596).  In the case of Kamel Rakik v. Algeria (1753/2008)
12
, the 
respondents’ State was found to have breached numerous sections of the ICCPR. One 
violation concerned the fact that Kamel Rakik was arrested by plain-clothed police 
officers, without a warrant, and without being informed of the reasons for his arrest, or of 
the facts of the crime, including the identity of the victim. The Committee held that under 
Article 14 (3) the accused has the right to be informed promptly about why an arrest is 
being made against him. As this only applies to people who have been formally charged, 
the Committee held that Kamel’s situation was in violation of Article 9 (2) of the ICCPR.  
 
Clements notes there is some flexibility in the application of Article 5 (2) of the ECHR. If 
it can be shown that the accused could not fail to understand why he or she was being 
arrested and what the legal and factual grounds of that arrest were, then there is no 
absolute requirement for that to be given in writing (1996 p.146). Harris et al note that 
there is some overlapping of Article 5(2) and (4) and Article 6 (3) (a)of ECHR. The latter 
stipulates that a detainee must be promptly told of the nature and cause of any 
accusations which are being made. Because this is intended to allow the accused to 
prepare a defence, it requires a more detailed explanation of reasons (1995 p. 131).   
 
To conclude, any person arrested or detained must be told promptly and in simple 
language the essential factual and legal basis for the detention. This will enable detainees 
to apply to challenge the lawfulness of the detention if they so wish. Whether the 
obligation is met will be determined in the light of all the circumstances of each case. 
                                                 
12
 Kamel Rakik v. Algeria Communication No. 1753/2008, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/105/D/1753/2008.(2012). 
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Article 9(2) of ICCPR and Article 5(2) of ECHR applies in respect of everyone who is 
arrested or detained. The right to inform the suspect about the reason of arrest is 
recognized by Shari'ah.  
  
1.1.3. The Right to be Brought Promptly Before a Judicial Officer. 
 
 
     Article 9, Para 3 of the ICCPR stipulates: “Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal 
charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to 
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. 
It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but 
release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial”. The wording of Article 9(3) 
makes it clear that it is the obligation of the State to bring the arrested or detained person 
promptly before a judicial officer. One of the keys to interpretation of Article 9(3) is the 
meaning of the word ‘promptly’. 
 
 In the case of Marques v. Angola (1128/2002)
13
  the HRC found that Angola had 
violated Articles 9 of (ICCPR), on the basis that, inter alia, Marques’s arrest and 
detention were not reasonable or necessary; his incommunicado detention denied him the 
right to be brought before a judge; and he was denied counsel at an initial stage, as well 
as his right to habeas corpus.  Thus, it cannot be argued, where the arrested or detained 
person has not been brought promptly before a judicial officer, that Article 9(3) has not 
been violated because the arrested or detained person did not request the review of his 
arrest or detention. The wording of this provision is strikingly similar to that of Article 
5(3) of the ECHR, 
14
 also similar to Art.14 (5) of ACHR which reads " Anyone arrested 
or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer 
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a 
                                                 
13
 Marques v. Angola (1128/2002) Human Rights Committee (UN Doc. A/60/40, Vol. II at 491). 
14
 Art,5 (3)  reads “Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of 
this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial 
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be 
conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial’’. 
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reasonable time or to release. His release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial. 
Pre-trial detention shall in no case be the general rule". 
The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has decided what ‘promptly’ should 
mean, depending on the facts of each case. For example, in Brogan and others v UK 
(11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84; 11386/85)
15
, a delay of four days and six hours was 
considered a breach of Article 5(3), even in a terrorism case. The applicants were 
released without charge after being questioned for that length of time. The Court held that 
this was not in keeping with the concept of ‘aussitôt’ (the French equivalent of 
‘promptly’), which demonstrates that there is a limited degree of flexibility attaching to 
the idea of what ‘promptness’ consists of (Harris et al 1995 p.134).  
The fact that Article 9 (3) considers detention to begin from the moment of arrest, 
suggests that this article applies to all deprivation of liberty for the purposes of criminal 
law enforcement, regardless of whether there has been a charge or not. Alternatively, 
‘charge’ within the meaning of Article 9(3) is to be given an autonomous meaning similar 
to that of the concept of ‘charge’ under Article 14 of ICCPR, which considers a person to 
be charged for the purpose of Article 14 once he has been subjected to the State’s 
coercive powers (i.e., arrested), regardless of whether or not he is considered to be 
formally charged under the domestic law. This is also similar to the wording of Article 
5(3) of the ECHR.  
Schomburg (2009 p3.) notes that limiting the period between initial detention and 
appearance in court to approximately three days complies with Article 9 (3) of the ICCPR 
and, detention of four days or over, even in complex cases is a breach of the Article.  In 
Freemantle v. Jamaica (625/1995)
16
 an incommunicado detention for a period of four 
days was found to be in violation of Art 9(3) of the ICCPR and in McLawrence v. 
Jamaica (702/1996)
17
 the Human Rights Committee explicitly referred to its General 
                                                 
15
 Brogan and others v UK 11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84; 11386/85)
 
ECHR 29 November 1988. 
16
 Freemantle v. Jamaica, Communication No. 625/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/68/D/625/1995 (2000) (an 
incommunicado detention for a period of four days was found to be in violation of Art 9(3) of the ICCPR). 
17
 McLawrence v. Jamaica, Communication No. 702/1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/702/1996 (1997) (the 
Committee explicitly referred to its General Comment No. 8 and found a violation of art. 9(3) due to a 
delay of one week before an initial appearance occurred).  
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Comment No. 8
18
 and found a violation of Art. 9(3) due to a delay of one week before an 
initial appearance occurred
19
. Such delays are also considered not to comply with the 
ECHR - Article 5(3) by the European Court of Human Rights. The right to be brought 
promptly before a judicial officer does not feature in Shari'ah as the pre-trial procedure at 
the time it was formulated was short and limited to questioning of defendants by judges. 
The ICCPR and the ECHR, however, stipulate that suspects must not be detained for 
longer than necessary. Being in detention is stressful and having legal assistance can do 
much to reassure the detainee. This right is examined next. 
 2.2. The Right to Legal Assistance. 
 
The right to legal assistance is guaranteed under Article 14(3) (b)&(d) of the ICCPR, 
which states " In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be 
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (b) To have adequate time 
and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his 
own choosing; (d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through 
legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, 
of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests 
of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have 
sufficient means to pay for it". These provisions mirror those in Article 6(3) of the 
ECHR. Art. 16 of ACHR guarantees the legal advice to the suspect even though it is not 
clear in which stage (pre-trial or in trial). Two issues will be addressed next as follows: 
the scope of the right to legal assistance; and the condition for the eligibility for free legal 
assistance.   
 
1.2.1 The Scope of the Right to Legal Assistance.  
 
Paragraph 14 (3) (b) of the ICCPR requires that once the accused chooses his legal 
assistance, he must have ‘adequate time and facilities’ in order to prepare his defence. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
18
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 8, Article 9 (30 June 1982). 
19
 See also Kurbanov v. Tajikistan (1096/2002) (a period of seven days before an appearance before a 
judicial officer was found to be incompatible with the ICCPR). 
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Article 14 guarantees to give the accused ‘equality of arms’ to ensure a fair trial. 
However, ‘adequate time’ depends on the circumstances of each case. If the accused did 
not have enough time with his or her legal assistance, counsel can request to postpone the 
trial. “Adequate facilities” means that the accused and the lawyers should have access to 
all the evidence and materials that the prosecution plans to produce in court against the 
accused (Zhang 2009 p.p.40-41). In case of Zhuk v. Belarus (1910/2009)
20
, the applicant 
was arrested for murdering two people. He was allowed to see his lawyer for just five 
minutes; and was executed in 2010. The HRC ruled that he was not allowed sufficient 
time with his lawyer in violation of Article 14 3 (d) of the ICCPR.   
 
However, Article 14 does not give a clear and specific right to the accused of access to all 
the evidence and materials used in the preparation of the trial against him in a language 
he can understand. V. P. (not represented by counsel) v Russian Federation (1627/2007) 
21
case dealt with this issue. The Human Rights Committee noted that although the 
defence must have an opportunity to study the documentary evidence, this does not give 
automatic right to the accused to have translations of all the documents. It is enough that 
the defendant’s counsel understands the documents. 
  
Article 6 (3) (b) of the ECHR has the same wording as Article 14 of the ICCPR that the 
accused has the right to be informed in the language he can understand; be given the 
reasons for the accusation in adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their 
defence, and the right to disclosure of evidence. The principle of “equality of arms” 
underlines the right against undue haste in prosecutions and the right to adequate 
facilities for preparation of a defence. An application’s access to evidence, facilities and 
lawyers is restricted to what is necessary for the defence (Kempen 2010 p.15). In Penev 
v. Bulgaria (20494/04)
22
 the applicant had not been given the opportunity to defend 
himself against the charge. The European Court of Human Rights considered that sub-
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 6 § 3 were connected and that the right to be informed of 
                                                 
20
 Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1910/2009. Views adopted by the  Committee at its 
109th session (14 October – 1 November 2013). 
21
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.32 (27 July 2007). 
22
 Penev v. Bulgaria (20494/04), ECHR (7 January 2010). 
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the nature and the cause of the accusation must be considered in the light of the accused's 
right to prepare his defence. Therefore, the European Court found that Article 6(3) (b) 
was violated.  
 
Not giving the suspect the right to have access to his lawyer from the start of the 
interrogation, could be seen as an opportunity for the police extract a statement under 
duress. The emphasis throughout is on the presence of a lawyer as necessary to ensure 
respect for the right of the detainee not to incriminate himself. However, there is room for 
a restriction of the right of access to a solicitor during the police interrogation, but only if 
there are compelling reasons in the light of the particular circumstances of the case which 
make the presence of a solicitor impracticable. The denial of access to a lawyer from the 
outset of the detention of a suspect may violate Article 6 of the ECHR whether or not this 
has harmed the case of the defence. This has given rise, in both cases,  Salduz v Turkey 
(36391/02)
23
 and  Cadder v HM Advocate UKSC 43 
24
to the European Court of Human 
Rights unanimously holding that there had been a violation of Articles 6(1) and 6(3)(c) 
ECHR. In the case of Salduz , because he had not had the benefit of legal advice when he 
was in police custody. In the case of Cadder,  The Supreme Court of United Kindom held 
that Cadder's rights was not compatible with European Convention on Human Right 
because he had been denied access to a solicitor before he was interviewed by the police 
in Scotland,  and was therefore unlawful in terms of the Scotland Act 1998. As a result, 
Scottish police must offer suspects the opportunity to consult with a lawyer, not just 
before they interview the suspect, but throughout the whole process of investigation 
should the suspect so request. 
 
 
1.2.2. Legal Aid. 
 
In some countries such as the UK, legal aid is provided in both criminal and civil cases.   
State funded legal aid is a right that is based in Article 14 of the ICCPR, Article 6 of the 
                                                 
23
 Salduz v Turkey (36391/02) ECHR November 2008.  
24
 Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43, 2011 S.C. (U.K.S.C.) 13. 
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ECHR and Art.16 (3) of the ACHR. According to this, state-funded legal aid is awarded 
on the basis of means and/or merits tests and the ‘interests of justice test’ (Burmitskaya 
2012 p.28). In England and Wales there have been cuts which have affected the possible 
quality of this legal aid and this has sparked a heated debate (See Chapter 5). 
Paragraph 14 (3) (d) of the ICCPR guarantees that the accused has the right to have free 
legal assistance in the interests of justice; unless he or she has the ability to pay for it. In 
Para. 11 of the General Comment N13
25
, the Human Rights Committee referred to the 
right to free legal aid envisaged in Article 14 (3)(d) of the ICCPR, pointing out that the 
State parties should undertake the necessary arrangements to ensure that legal assistance 
is available to those who are not able to pay for it. However, the accused is provided with 
legal aid depending on the gravity of the offence. For example, for serious crimes, 
lawyers must be appointed at all stages of the investigation (Zhang 2009 p.41). 
 
Joseph noted that not all state reports to the HRC have dealt with all aspects of the right 
of defence as defined in subparagraph 3 (d). The Committee has sometimes lacked 
sufficient information about the details of how the accused was charged with the crime, 
such as the procedures taken to provide the accused free legal assistance.  The accused 
and his or her counsel have the right to employ every available defence and to complain 
if they feel the case is not being conducted fairly. These rights are even more important if 
the case is held in absentia (2000 pp.316-317). 
 
1.3. The Right Against Ill- Treatment. 
 
Article 7 of the ICCPR stipulates: “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected 
without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation”. Similarly ECHR 
Article 3 states "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment". The ICCPR, the ECHR and Art.8 of the Arab Charter of 
                                                 
25
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, Article 14 (21st session, 1984), Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 14 (1994). 
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Human Rights (ACHR) prohibit self-incrimination that results from torture, inhumane 
and degrading treatment. Everyone is supposed to be innocent unless proved otherwise.  
This section will discuss the rights against ill treatment. 
 
The prohibition of torture is codified in the UDHR (Article 5), the ICCPR 1966 (Article 
7) and  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 1984 (CAT), and also in regional treaties such as ECHR (Article 3), the 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (HREA) 1975, the ACHR (Article 8), the Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Punish Torture 1987 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
1987 (Article 5). It also appears in some legally non-binding but morally authoritative 
instruments, including the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 1955, 
the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners 1990, the Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment 1988, the 
United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (1990), 
and the Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1999). Torture is also absolutely 
prohibited by various provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in particular their 
common Article 3. Furthermore, the Rome Statute of ICC defines torture as a “crime 
against humanity” when it is knowingly committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against any civilian population (Nowak 2005 p.90). 
 
Protection from torture (Article 7) is one of the few absolute rights in the ICCPR; no 
restrictions are permitted and it is a non-derogable right. The ICCPR specifically forbids 
self-incrimination on these grounds, protects against arbitrary search, seizure or 
interference with privacy as well as torture and cruel and degrading treatment. It requires 
the presumption of innocence and that suspects are not deprived of their freedom pending 
trial unless this is necessary (Ricketts 2004 p.177).  
 
Waldron notes that Article 7 (ICCPR), Article 3 (ECHR) and Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Convention all seek to establish and enforce norms against outrages on personal 
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dignity (2010 p. 200). In General Comment 20
26
, the HRC expands upon the meaning of 
Article 7. It confirms that Article 7 aims to protect the dignity of individuals as well as 
their physical and mental integrity. The State is responsible for preventing all acts 
prohibited by Article 7 and punishing the perpetrators whether these are acting in their 
official capacity or as private individuals. Article 7 extends to both acts and omissions. 
An example of the later could be the denial of food. It can also be breached by acts that 
unintentionally cause pain and suffering, although the intention to hurt must be present if 
the act is to class as ‘torture’. Indeed, the HRC has stated that various ill-treatments can 
be categorised by their purpose (Joseph et al 2006 p.157).  
 
In Rojas Garcia v. Colombia (687/96)
27
, a search party mistakenly stormed the home of 
the complainant at 2 am, verbally abusing and terrifying the man and his family, 
including young children. It turned out that the search party meant to search another 
house, and they had no particular intention to harm the complainant or his family. The 
Human Rights Committee therefore decided that there has been a violation of article 7 of 
the Covenant in this case.  As well as intention, it is important to note the personal 
characteristics of the victim are relevant in deciding if Article 7 has been breached.  In 
Vuolanne v. Finland (265/87)
28
, the HRC 
29
stated that whether an act falls under the 
scope of Article 7: “depends on all the circumstances of the case…the duration and 
manner of the treatment, its physical or mental effects as well as the sex, age and state of 
health of the victim”. Thus, what might be considered degrading and inhuman treatment 
for a child may not be considered the same for an adult. 
 
Definitions of ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ or ‘punishment’, which Article 7 
prohibits, have not been given by the HRC. If Article 7 is found to have been violated, 
                                                 
26
 General comment No. 20:  Article 7 (Prohibition of torture, or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment) (44
th
 session 1992). 
27
 Rojas Garcia v. Colombia (687/96) Human Rights Committee HRC (16 May2001). 
28
 Vuolanne v. Finland (265/87) (1989) UN Doc CCPR/C/35/D/265/1987, (1989) HRC 8, (96 ILR 649, 
IHRL 2460 (UNHRC 1989), 7th April 1989, Human Rights Committee. 
29
 ibid. 
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the HRC generally have not specified which part. Paragraph 4 of the HRC’s General 
Comment 20 notes: ‘The Covenant does not contain any definition of the concepts 
covered by Article 7, nor does the Committee consider it necessary to draw up a list of 
prohibited acts or to establish sharp distinctions between the different types of 
punishment or treatment; the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and severity of 
the treatment applied’ (HRC).  
 
Article 3 of ECHR declares that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment”; this is pertinent to how someone is treated at the 
point of investigation, detention or imprisonment.  In Özen v. Turkey (46286/99)
30
, the 
applicant complained under Articles 3 of the Convention that he had been subjected to ill-
treatment while in detention in the Şırnak provincial gendarmerie command. He was 
stripped naked and beaten. He was also deprived of food and water and was prevented 
from going to the toilet. The applicant was kept in a small and dark cell. The Court 
reiterated that Article 3 of the Convention ranks as one of the most fundamental 
provisions in the Convention, from which no derogation is permitted. It also enshrines 
one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. The 
Court found a violation of Article 3 of ECHR. Thienel notes that because Article 3 
includes a duty to protect persons from being tortured, it is not in a state’s interests to 
expel or extradite a suspect to a state which might use torture, even if they believe that 
such an action would produce useful evidence (2006 p.361).  
 
In conclusion the torture and inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees is a 
significant issue and prohibited in the ICCPR and ECHR. also in the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, also 
in the Arab Charter of Human Rights in Article 8.  Shari'ah also prohibits torture of 
suspects, seeing this loss of dignity as a serious matter. After illustrating how ill-
treatment is forbidden in the ICCPR and ECHR, the presumption of innocence while 
detaining the suspect is next examined.    
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 Özen v. Turkey (46286/99), ECRH (11 January 2011). 
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1.4. Police Conduct during interrogations.  
The Police and the prosecutions have the responsibility of proving the charge beyond 
reasonable doubt and defendants have the right to be treated in accordance with the 
principle of international human rights . The presumption of innocence, the right to 
silence and the right against self incrimination woll be discussed next.    
   
1.4.1. The Presumption of Innocence.  
 
Due to terrorist threats and reports of serious crimes, governments are under pressure to 
be seen to be addressing these issues. Ashworth points out that this can be at the expense 
of considerations of constitutional rights, such as the presumption of innocence (2006 
p.276). As Ferzan comments, the requirement that the State treats its citizens ‘with a 
degree of trust unless and until they are found guilty of a crime’, leads to concerns that 
treating groups of people with suspicion goes against the constitution (2014 p.515). A 
definition of the presumption of innocence is that it is the prosecution who has the 
responsibility to prove that the accused has committed the elements of the offence 
beyond reasonable doubt (Ashworth 2006 p.258). Ferzan makes a distinction between 
probatory presumption of innocence whereby the jury simply starts with the assumption 
that there is no evidence of guilt; and material presumption of innocence where the jury 
begins with the assumption that the accused did not commit the act (2013 p.512). 
 
In the case of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence, these can be 
seen as separate to the presumption of innocence, in that the right to silence involves no 
negative inferences being made from the silence of the accused, where the latter concerns 
the need for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the defendant and not how this guilt was 
proved. Ashworth however, points out that if a law allows for adverse inferences being 
made from a defendant’s silence this can diminish the prosecution’s burden of proof. 
Furthermore, the defendant’s refusal to answer questions was at a previous stage of the 
investigation when the case against the accused was yet to be made and when there was a 
considerable difference in power between the suspect and the police. For this reason there 
is a relationship between these rules (2006 p.256)  
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The presumption of innocence is contained in the ICCPR Article 14(2) "Everyone 
charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law". The prosecution has the responsibility of proving the charge 
beyond reasonable doubt and defendants have the right to be treated in accordance with 
this principle. Mahoney comments that this acts as a procedural guideline for courts and 
is also important in determining how evidence is collected. It places the burden of proof 
squarely onto the prosecution and gives the benefit of the doubt to the accused (2004 
p.120). However, as noted by the Human Right Committee in General Comment 13
31
 , 
the concept of presumption of innocence is often accompanied by conditions that render 
it ineffective or expressed ambiguously. This is why it is important for States to prohibit 
any methods of investigation that could be construed as putting undue pressure on a 
suspect to make a confession or testify against him or herself. A suspect’s guilt can only 
presumed when the charge has been proved beyond any reasonable doubt and a final 
judgement has been made. It is the responsibility of the State to prove guilt and, as such, 
the bias is in favour of the suspect because innocent people must be protected from 
wrongful conviction, even if some guilty ones might escape being convicted (Naughton 
2011 p.41). In matters of granting bail or remanding in custody prior to trial, European 
human rights law states that a presumption of the innocence of the suspect must be made 
and strong reasons have thus to be given for any deprivation of liberty as it is the duty of 
the State to acknowledge that the suspect has a legal status of innocence at every stage of 
legal proceedings before they are convicted (Ashworth 2006 p244). 
 
Following from this, it appears that the presumption of innocence is not just about the 
burden of proof being on the prosecution, but that all pre-trial procedures should be 
conducted as if the suspect were innocent. Ashworth notes that it is the latter that 
underpins the restraints on how the suspect can be treated during the investigation (2006 
p.243) Ferzan comments that as it is only at trial that evidence is weighed up so as to 
determine guilt the defendant, the treatment of the suspect as innocent is a fundamental 
part of due process (2013 p.514). 
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 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 13:  Article 14 (Administration of Justice), 21st 
session (1984). 
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The rationale behind the presumption of innocence has been classified by Ashworth as 
follows: Firstly, in the matter of censure and punishment, being wrongly convicted is ‘a 
deep injustice and a substantial moral harm’ (2006 p.248) and avoidance of this underlies 
the importance of having a fair trial. As it is impossible to remove any possibility of 
error, there are instead procedural procedures, including the presumption of the suspect’s 
innocence and the placing of the burden of proof on the prosecution. Linked to this is the 
fact that it is very difficult to establish what the truth is, especially as evidence is often 
given much later and humans are often fallible. Thus, when there is a choice between 
acquittal of the innocent and convicting the guilty, the justice system should lean towards 
the former. No one, including the victims of crime has an interest in convicting the 
innocent. Thirdly, the State’s respect for the dignity and autonomy of the individual 
should be paramount in a democratic society. Thus the State needs to show that it has 
acceptable reasons for interrogating someone and for charging them with an offence. It 
should not be the responsibility of the citizen to answer charges until the prosecution has 
produced sufficient evidence to make a case; nor should they be liable to conviction until 
their guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Finally, the prosecution having to prove 
guilt beyond reasonable doubt reinforces the values described above. Making the level of 
proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ highlights that here must be justification for public 
censure and punishment, an assurance as far as possible that an innocent person has not 
been wrongly convicted given the fragility of much evidence (ibid p.248-51). 
 
The Human Rights Commission (General Comment 13, para 7) suggest that presumption 
of innocence can be protected by making sure public officials such as the police, 
prosecutors and judges do not make statements about an individual’s guilt if he or she has 
not been convicted, although the public can be given the names of suspects and the facts 
of the case. Another way to protect the presumption of innocence is to ensure that the 
burden of proof is on the prosecution, in other words, the suspect should not have to 
prove their innocence. This is encapsulated by Article 6 (2) of the ECHR which 
stipulates: “Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law". The presumption of innocence is also reflected in how a 
suspect is presented (Naughton 2011 p.42). The suspect or person who is accused should 
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be treated gently without being routinely caged or shackled, and should be allowed to 
wear civilian clothes. If there is a need to handcuff the suspect, for example to prevent 
self-harm himself or escape, then his or her right will not violated.    
   
Naughton points out that there is a difference between how the presumption of innocence 
operates in theory and what actually happens. Innocent people are convicted of crimes 
they did not commit as sometimes evidence which is not very reliable is allowed by the 
court. For example, in the case of the Guildford Four in England and Wales, four 
innocent people were convicted for a crime that they did not do, and their right to the 
presumption innocence was totally neglected. Furthermore, because the defence is not as 
richly resourced as the prosecution it is not always well-equipped to fight for the accused. 
This situation begs the question of how wrongful convictions can be effectively avoided 
(2011 pp.53-4). 
To sum up, the presumption of innocence is justified as it operates in a criminal justice 
system in which the State can exert vast powers over the individual. It is necessary in a 
system where the individual has little power against the State, given the great imbalance 
of resource and where the trial system is understood to be fallible. It is a fundamental 
right that the innocent citizen should be protected against wrongful accusation, 
conviction, punishment and censure. Individual autonomy and dignity demands that the 
suspect is treated as innocent until proven guilty. 
 
1.4.2.   The Right to Silence.   
 
The right to silence is the right of a suspect to refuse to answer questions or give 
information to the prosecution either at trial or during the investigation (Daly 2014 p.60). 
The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself and the right not to confess to 
guilt are expressed in Article 14(3) (g) of the ICCPR. Neither the ICCPR, nor the ECHR 
expressly guarantee the right to silence. Rather it can be inferred from international 
human rights instruments in general and also from Article 6(1) of the ECHR, which deals 
with the right to a fair trial. However, Article 6, or indeed any of the Convention’s other 
provision, does not give the specific right to remain silent. In spite of this, Berger notes 
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that Article 6 has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as including 
the right to remain silent as part of a fair trial; and case law has been providing principles 
which determine the extent to which this right will be protected by the Convention while 
at the same time allowing signatory nations to resolve the issue through domestic law. 
The European Court has thus sought to determine in what contexts the right to silence 
should be applied rather than establishing it as a specific provision (2006 p.342-6). 
 
Furthermore, although the European Court of Human Rights has not explicitly said that 
conviction should not result from just adverse inferences from silence, this has been 
referred to in the case of Murray vs. United Kingdom (1873/91) (Dennis 2013 p.179) In 
this case, the applicant had chosen to remain silent during police questioning, and the 
Court cited the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) which 
declared the privilege in Article 14 (3) (g) and stated: ‘Although not specifically 
mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention, there can be no doubt that the right to remain 
silent under police questioning is a generally recognised international standard which lies 
at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6…’ By providing the accused 
with protection against improper compulsion by the authorities, these immunities 
contribute to avoiding miscarriages of justice and securing the aims of Article 6 (Berger 
2006 p. 343). Dennis comments that since the Murray case Strasburg jurisprudence is 
clearer about when the right to silence can be applied, and goes so far as to identify in 
what circumstances inferences can be drawn and what part such inferences may play in 
convicting the accused (2002 p.37). Berger notes that just having a consensus among the 
Convention’s signatories is however not enough to allow the Court to make an exact 
definition on precisely how the right to remain silent should be applied as the context in 
which the issue arises can be very different from the core right of not being forced to 
admit guilt (2006 p.346).  
The right to silence encompasses only oral representations made by a person and refers to 
a person’s right not to make oral statements to the police or any other criminal justice 
actor during the investigation of a criminal offense. Thus, the right to silence exists in the 
context of the police station when being questioned by officers and in the context of the 
trial. Berger comments that no matter how central to their investigation, questioning 
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suspects and witnesses must be through voluntary co-operation (2006 p.352). The 
primary right to silence is in there being no legal obligation on a suspect to talk to police, 
and the secondary right is contained in the prohibition of this leading to adverse 
inferences being drawn during any subsequent trial (Griffith 1997 p.10).  
 
Griffiths also suggests that the right to silence during pre-trial procedures can be 
complicated for courts to interpret and apply. Further, that the context of the police 
station is very different from that of the court even though they are both part of the same 
process. In a courtroom, the right to silence is viewed as being part of the due process 
that occurs within an adversarial system of criminal justice. This can be different in the 
context of the police station where empirical analysis has demonstrated that this right 
operates within a process of negotiation and compromise (1997 p.17).  
 
According to Jackson, most people choose to speak to the police irrespective of their 
right not to do so. As silence is often interpreted as non-co-operation with the authorities, 
pressure to speak is high as it is regarded as behaviour that does not favour a suspect in 
terms of their liberty or the level of charge brought against them. Silence at trial risks 
being penalized by the jury even if they are told not to take it into account. This being the 
case, it would not appear that the right to silence actually protects the innocent nor does it 
affect many people’s decision about whether to speak (2008 p.848-9). Furthermore, in 
many cases of police investigation, as it is not necessary to compel suspects to give 
evidence the right to silence is maintained. Indeed, the suspect should have the chance to 
participate effectively in defending themselves (ibid p.582). 
 
Neumann points out that the right to silence is recognized as absolute in many states. In 
addition, under the international human rights conventions, there is no limitation placed 
on this right. In some domestic jurisdictions, statutory provisions have been included to 
the effect that a person has the right to silence, but if the person does not provide 
information to the authorities or at trial, then adverse inferences may be drawn from the 
failure to provide information (2004 p.3). It should be noted that the right to silence 
varies from country to country; for example, in the US citizens rely on the Fifth 
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Amendment for their protection and no adverse inferences are allowed to be drawn. The 
German Federal Code is similar to the Fifth Amendment of the United States. However, 
in Germany adverse inferences may be drawn if the defendant selectively refuses to 
answer certain questions. However, even though England, Wales, and Northern Ireland 
have the right to not speak, adverse inferences are allowed to be drawn. In Korea, illegal 
evidence is not always excluded unless the illegal conduct is the direct cause of the 
confession. In China, the privilege against self-incrimination does not exist (2004 p.138). 
 
According to Dennis, the rationale behind the right to silence is that it protects innocent 
people from being wrongfully convicted because of mistakes in the process of criminal 
justice. It is also an application of the presumption of innocence which places the burden 
of proof on the prosecution. The right also reflects a principle of respect for human 
autonomy and protects the individual from undue state intrusions or being forced to make 
cruel choices (2013 p.196). Here we see two strands to the rationale, which Jackson 
describes as ‘intrinsic substantive’ and ‘non-substantive’. The former refers to the 
principle that the accused should not be required to incriminate themselves and the latter 
that it is part of a fair trial in which address other principles such as the presumption of 
innocence and the paramount importance to avoid wrongful convictions. Jackson believes 
it is the intrinsic substantive rationale that is the main concern and links the right to 
silence with the idea that the participation of the accused should always be voluntary. 
However, it is not always easy to know to what extent participation has been voluntary – 
especially in police custody. Furthermore, given that international human rights law 
protects people from being tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, it is arguably difficult to justify a separate right to silence and the privilege 
against self-incrimination (2008 p.864). Daly comments that this right is seen as both 
protection for the suspect and hindrance for the police and prosecution and that this 
difference of interests is seen in how civil rights groups argue for ‘the preservation of this 
fundamental procedural protection’ whereas the police and government usually argue for 
greater investigative power (2014 p.61). 
 
On balance, the right to silence is an important part of the criminal process, not just as a 
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means to protect the dignity and security of the accused but also to uphold the procedural 
rights of the defence which have been shown to be crucial not just at trial but from the 
moment that criminal investigations are initiated and the suspect has to answer 
allegations. 
 
1.4.3. The Privilege against Self-Incrimination.  
  
Individuals accused of crimes have a right against self-incrimination at all stages of a 
criminal case or delinquency proceeding. Suspects are entitled to refuse to answer any 
question or produce any document that might incriminate them. It has also been 
suggested that the right to claim the privilege against self-incrimination may protect 
individuals from unlawful coercive methods used to obtain confessions (Neumann 2004 
p.3). Redmayne suggests that this privilege is ‘one of the more puzzling rules of criminal 
procedure’ as it places restrictions on criminal investigating by stipulating that no suspect 
can be required to provide evidence that could incriminate him or her at trial. They 
cannot be held in contempt of court for not answering questions or providing documents 
to the prosecution (2006 p.209).  
 
McInerney points out that the privilege is viewed as incorporating three separate though 
linked elements; namely the privilege against self-incrimination afforded to witnesses in 
criminal, civil or non-judicial investigative proceedings, the right of a defendant not to 
give evidence at trial and the right to silence of a suspect in the pre-trial criminal 
investigation (2014 p.102). He added, that the right not to incriminate oneself, is 
important and needed in all stages of criminal investigation as it affords a kind of 
‘equality of arms’ between the State and individual suspects (ibid., p138). It should noted, 
however, that bodily samples, unlike testimony can be obtained by force. PACE ss.61 & 
63 allow the police to take non-intimate samples and fingerprints.  
 
Article 14, paragraph 3 (g), guarantees the right not to be compelled to testify against 
oneself or to confess guilt. This means that the investigating authorities must not use any 
undue psychological or physical pressure, direct or indirect to obtain a confession. Any 
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confessions acquired which violate Article 7 of the Covenant should be inadmissible 
under domestic law. However, such evidence can be used to demonstrate that torture or 
other prohibited means has been used. If this happens, the State must prove that the 
statements were actually given willingly by the accused. Finally, the right not to self-
incriminate means that negative inferences cannot be drawn from the defendant’s silence 
(Zhang 2009 p.42). Redmayne comments that the European Court of Human Rights 
(EctHR) makes this privilege an integral part of a fair trial in Article 6 but that it is not 
always easy to know what the extent of this privilege is in practice and that Uk courts 
have used this uncertainty to make decisions that would seem at odds with the stance 
taken by Strasbourg (2007 p.210).  
 
The right of silence is closely related to the privilege against self- incrimination, as the 
latter concerns the threat of coercion in order to make an accused yield certain 
information, whereas the former concerns the drawing of adverse inferences when an 
accused fails to testify or to answer questions and not specifically mentioned in the 
European Convention. Their close relationship to the right to a fair trial under the 
Convention was confirmed in the Court’s judgment, citing the U.N.’s ICCPR (1966), 
which declares the privilege in Article 14(3)(g). The general right to a fair trial is dealt 
with in Article 6 (1) which also contains a short list of additional rights that are applicable 
only in criminal cases.  That short list does not include the privilege against self-
incrimination. The ECHR has interpreted the right of silence as encompassing the right 
not to self-incriminate, both having strong links to the presumption of innocence and 
underpinning the need to protect the accused from ‘improper’ police compulsion and 
miscarriages of justice (Croquet 2008 p.220). 
 
The privilege against self-incrimination made an unexpected and faltering entry into 
European human rights law.  In 1993 the Court heard the case of Funke v. France 
(10828/84)
32. Having entered Funke’s house with a warrant, French customs officers 
found evidence of foreign bank accounts and ordered Funke to produce bank statements 
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 Funke v. France  (10828/84) ECHR 25 February 199. 
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for these, which he would not do. Funke was subsequently prosecuted and convicted for 
this refusal and given a fine which increased every day he continued to refuse. Funke 
applied to the Court, alleging that as he had been asked to produce evidence that could 
incriminate him, he had not had a fair trial. Ashworth comments that this was a novel 
claim, given the limitations of the rights stated in Article 6; however, the Court found in 
favour of Funke, and thus incorporated the right not to self-incriminate into its 
jurisprudence; finding that Article 6 (1) had been breached. The scope of this right, it 
rationale and origins were not discussed by the Court (2008 p.757).  
 
The cornerstone of the protection against self-incrimination is best demonstrated in 
Saunders v. UK (1997)
33
.  This case explained that the right exists for the protection of 
the accused by the improper compulsion of the authorities, thereby contributing to the 
avoidance of the miscarriages of justice. Redmayne believes that ECtHR case law does 
show how the privilege operates in practice, also in regard to how inferences are drawn 
from a suspect’s silence which the Court believes does not infringe the privilege but 
needs to be done very cautiously (2007 p.214).  
 
The two important rationales of this right are ethics and reliability. The former is to 
prevent any incentive being given for using strategies involving deception, inducement, 
threats or brutality to extract information from a suspect. If statements acquired in this 
way are given credence in court, then the investigating authorities might be tempted to 
use them and violate the integrity and dignity of the suspect. For this reason, the right 
against self-incrimination acts as a limitation on the behaviour of the police during the 
investigation. Acquiring evidence through detection is arguably more difficult than 
extracting information through coercion, so putting legal sanctions on this is essential to 
preserve human rights (Mittal 2013 p.78). 
 
The second rationale is that it stops a nervous but innocent person from making a false 
statement under duress and being wrongly suspected. The environment in which 
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investigation takes place can be very stressful for a suspect; they may feel afraid of 
authority figures like the police, isolated and the suspect will be aware of the expectations 
of the interrogating officer. All these factors can result in a suspect yielding information 
which can be incriminating, prejudice their case and even be completely wrong. Even in 
situations where the suspect is guilty, the right not to self-incriminate acts as a protection 
against any possible aggravation of the offence by concealment of evidence or 
misrepresentation. A further protection is that the accused will not have motives read into 
any statements they might make (ibid.,). It could be said then that the privilege against 
self-incrimination is largely based on allowing the individual to protect their personal 
integrity and to be protected from coercion during the process of investigation. 
 
1.5 Non-discrimination. 
 
Although Article 7 of the UDHR (1948) was the model for Art 14 of the ECHR, they are 
different. The former states, as a general principle, “All are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal 
protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any 
incitement to such discrimination.” The latter only prohibits discrimination which affects 
the rights in the Convention
34
. Article 26 of the ICCPR states: “All persons are equal 
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the 
law. In this respect, the law prohibits any discrimination and guarantees to all persons 
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status".   Article 14 of the ECHR, is similar and   reads: “ The enjoyment of the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination 
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
                                                 
34
 Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ETS 
No. 177) is an anti-discrimination treaty of the Council of Europe. It was adopted on November 4, 2000, in 
Rome and entered into force on April 1, 2005, after tenth ratification. As of 2014, it has 18 member states 
and 19 signatories (from 47 CoE member states). Notably, the UK has not signed it yet.   
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national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status". The non-discrimination Article (3 (1)) in the ACHR is undermined by the 
statement in the Preamble which discriminates in favour of divinely-revealed religions.  
 
Scheinin & Langford suggest that Article 26 is ambitious as all grounds of 
discrimination, including that based on sexual orientation, nationality and age, are 
prohibited. It also covers discrimination by individuals; extends to all spheres of 
economic and social life and ‘enshrines a positive right to equality’ (2006 p.10). 
Although Article 26 itself doesn’t define ‘discrimination’, the Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment 18,
35
   ‘ believes that the term ‘discrimination’ as used in the Covenant 
should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which 
is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all 
persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms’  (HRC Para.6). 
Scheinin & Langford (2006 p.14).further note that there is a lack of HRC case law that 
relates to the obligation to actively promote equality that Article 26 seems to imply. 
However, the Committee’s General comments (No 18) do suggest that ‘the principle of 
equality sometimes requires State Parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish 
or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination’ (HRC Para.3).  
Nikolovska contrasts Article 26 of the ICCPR with Article 14 of the ECHR, saying that 
the latter limits itself only to ‘those rights embodied in the Convention and its Protocols’. 
This problem was addressed in the Belgian Linguistic (1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 
1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64)
36
 Case where the Court stated that non-discrimination only 
related to the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. Nevertheless applicants who 
feel discriminated against often invoke Article 14 (2006 p.24- 25).  For example, Lehman 
notes that the Court considered whether the ‘United Kingdom had, pursuant to 
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derogation, used emergency powers exclusively against the IRA, rather than against both 
the IRA and Loyalists (2011 p.120). In Gillan & Quinton v UK (4158/05)
37
 the applicants 
alleged that the powers of stop and search used against them by the police at an arms fair 
breached their rights as nothing incriminating was found. However, the court found that 
the powers were provided for by law and not disproportionate, given the risk of terrorist 
attack in London. The Court also considered that the powers of authorisation and 
confirmation as well as those of stop and search under sections 44 and 45 of the 2000 Act 
are neither sufficiently circumscribed nor subject to adequate legal safeguards against 
abuse.. The Court held that the police officer had an unacceptable level of discretion. As 
there had been no requirement to show 'reasonable suspicion’, there was a clear risk of 
discrimination. Michaelsen notes that the ICCPR states in Article 4 (1) that derogation 
cannot involve discrimination ‘solely on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion 
or social origin’. This is not extended to national origin, however, as this might prove 
problematic in times of war and the treatment of enemy aliens. In contrast Article 14 of 
the ECHR does include national origin as a possible factor in discrimination (2005 p141).  
 
In times of conflict, foreign nationals or members of groups with which the state is in 
conflict would be more likely to be suspected and this has implications for pre-trial 
procedures; however, Article 14 would prohibit this and non discrimination is also clearly 
prohibited in Shari'ah.  Having looked at the rights of the suspect to be treated fairly after 
arrest we now move on to consider how police searches and arrest affect rights to 
privacy. 
 
1.6. The Right to Privacy. 
 
 Article 17 of the ICCPR states that:‘‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family home or correspondence, nor unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation.....’’. Similarly Art.8 of ECHR states: "1. Everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be 
no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
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accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others". Also, the ACHR Art. 21 is similar to 
Article 17 of ICCPR and Article 8 of ECHR which guarantee the right to privacy. 
However, Articles 17 and 8 only protect against arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
the right to privacy. They also require the State to provide adequate safeguards to ensure 
the enjoyment of the right to privacy. This right is the focus of the following section.  
 
1.6.1. The Right to Respect for One’s Private Life.  
 
The right to privacy and the right of the individual to control personal information was 
first stated in the UDHR. This was partly as a reaction to the Nazis’ use of personal 
records in the 1930s and 40s to target certain individuals and groups. The ICCPR and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as regional human rights conventions in 
Latin America, the Middle East, and Europe also address the right to privacy. There have 
been two main approaches to establishing this right. Firstly, negatively by prohibiting 
what is generally understood to be interference in the individual’s private domain; and 
secondly, positively by emphasising respect for it (King 2011 p.549-550). 
 
Cumaraswamy & Nowak suggest that the issue of privacy is directly relevant to pre-trial 
procedures in that suspects are usually ‘subjected to surveillance, search and seizure 
procedures by the police or other investigating agencies in the process of gathering 
evidence to substantiate the suspicion’. Articles 17(2) of ICCPR and Article 8 of ECHR, 
so as not to be arbitrary or unreasonable, regulate these procedures. For example, there 
have to be guarantees in place that measures such as phone tapping or house searches are 
carried out legally, in accordance with regulations and are proportionate to the 
circumstances (2009 pp.19-20). Ballin comments that Article 8(2) allows authorities to 
breach the right to privacy if it is in the public interest. For example, simply registering 
an individual’s details may invade their privacy but may also be necessary to prevent or 
solve a crime. However, the ECHR tries to ensure that the government cannot have 
‘unlimited and arbitrary’ power to interfere with the privacy of an individual. The notion 
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of what respect for private and family life constitutes depends on the social and culture 
mores of a society and thus is not static. This has to be taken into account when assessing 
whether there has been a breach of Article 8 (1) (Ballin 2012 p.46). 
 
Joseph et al (2000 pp.348-349) point out that it is extremely difficult to precisely define 
‘privacy’. For example, a wide definition might be ‘the right to be left alone’ and a 
narrower definition ‘the right to control information about oneself’. They suggest a 
compromise definition ‘freedom from unwarranted and unreasonable intrusion into 
activities that society recognises as belonging to the realm of individual autonomy’. 
‘Individual autonomy’ being those actions, which an individual wants to do, but which do 
not encroach on the liberty of others. The meaning of privacy in Article 17 has not yet 
been thoroughly defined in either the General Comment or the case law.  
 
Robertson suggests that giving a definition of respect for private life depends on the 
current cultures and customs and varies from one domestic law to another. That would 
explain the reason for not finding a definition for privacy in any law. He said ‘as legal 
writers have observed, the wall around a person’s private life is not identically situated 
with everyone’ (1973 p.34). It would thus be important for individual states to decide 
what interpretation of the right to privacy applies when deciding on guidelines for the 
behaviour of the police. 
 
Kempen explains that Article 8 specifically protects an individual’s private life; family 
life; home and correspondence and these have to be respected during criminal 
investigations. The Article ‘is an important guarantee against unlawful or unnecessary 
searches, secret surveillance, telephone tapping, examination or seizure of written 
correspondence and other documents or electronic data, the interception of e-mail, 
monitoring Internet usage … as well as the application of such powers without serving a 
legitimate aim’. To a lesser extent, businesses and other organisations, although these 
cannot be said to have a ‘family life’, are also protected. The ECHR holds that these 
rights must be extended to the individuals within organizations (2010 p.17). This 
reinforces the importance of clear guidelines for how the police should behave when 
92 
 
going to apprehend a suspect at work or at prayer as well as at home. The situation is 
slightly different when looking at the right to privacy of the home and correspondence. 
The case of Société Colas Est v. France (37971/97)
38
, which dealt with the search and 
seizure of documents, demonstrated that the right to respect for home and correspondence 
can be extended to both the individuals in their professional capacity, in the case of the 
former, and to the organisations themselves in the latter. There is a limitation clause in 
Art.8 (2) of ECHR and the equivalent Art.17 (2) of ICCPR, the fact that the state can 
limit such rights to protect rights of others, and that should be necessary in a democratic 
society. Given that international human rights law recognises the importance of an 
individual's home and work which is strictly protected in Shari'ah, the right, through bail,  
to be able to reasonably return to home and work life after being charged is next 
explored. 
 
1.7. The Right to Bail.  
 
 Bail rights are important as the suspect may not be guilty, and it is not therefore fair to 
detain him or her before the trial as the case may take a long time to come to court. Also 
it is important to allow suspects the opportunity to gather evidence that might exonerate 
them. According to Article 9(3) of the ICCPR, an arrested or detained person ‘shall be 
entitled to trial in a reasonable time or to release. Article 9(3) guarantees an arrested or 
detained person two distinct rights: release on bail and trial within a reasonable time. 
Article 9(3) states explicitly that the general rule is to release the arrested or detained 
person on bail, a rule that seeks to reinforce the fundamental principle that the accused is 
presumed innocent and must be treated, until he is proven otherwise, in accordance with 
law. However, prolonged pre-trial detention without bail is thus incompatible with 
Article 9 and requires specific justification and periodic review (de Zayas 2005 P.18).  
 
Article 9(3) of ICCPR mentions that the granting of bail can be conditional on the 
accused’s undertaking that he will attend trial. However, other conditions that do not aim 
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merely to ensure the attendance of the arrested or detained person at his trial are also 
listed under Article 9(3) such as preventing the accused from intimidating witnesses, or 
committing an offence. On the other hand, conditions that are not related to the purposes 
of the bail system, such as basing the amount of the financial guarantee as a condition of 
bail solely on the economic consequences of a given crime that the accused has allegedly 
committed, constitutes a violation of Article 9(3) (Alharagan 2006 pp.202-203). 
 
The right to release to appear for a trial is covered by Article 9 (3) of the ICCPR and 
Articles 6(1) and 5(3) of the ECHR which states “Everyone arrested or detained in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.c of this article shall be brought promptly 
before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be 
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be 
conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial". The latter specifically refers to detainees 
awaiting trial who should be given priority for an early trial, although the authorities still 
have an obligation to arrange the trial within a reasonable time even if they are released. 
Bail can be refused only if there are ‘relevant and sufficient reasons to justify detention’, 
such as the accused’s likelihood of absconding or a danger to public order. The length of 
detention is measured from the date on which the accused is charged to the date of 
judgement and deciding what is a reasonable time of detention until trial is not an easy 
matter (Clements 1999 pp.148-149).  However, the ACHR does not state the right to bail 
in its provision.  
The case of Gault v United Kingdom (1271/1/05)
39
, demonstrates how Article 5 (3) can 
be violated. Mrs Gault was refused bail in July 2004, whilst awaiting re-trial for murder, 
even though there were no objections to it from the prosecution. She remained in custody 
until September 2004, when she was finally granted bail by the third trial judge. She was 
subsequently acquitted at her third trial. She brought an application alleging that her 
detention between July and September 2004 was a deprivation of liberty contrary to 
Article 5(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court decided 
unanimously that there had been a violation and that the question of how quickly the re-
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trial would be held was not a factor. Given that Mrs G had been previously convicted, 
there was reasonable suspicion about her involvement in the crime, but this did not of 
itself suggest that she would not attend the trial. 
To conclude, the right to bail is recognized in international human rights laws (ICPR and 
ECHR), the two charters stress that if suspects are charged and not deemed dangerous or 
likely to abscond, they should be released, otherwise their detention will violate 
international human rights norms. Shari'ah does not address the right to bail even though 
it is recognised these days by Muslim countries as a part of suspects’ rights.   
 
1.8. The Right to an Effective Remedy in International Human Rights Laws. 
 
The right to an effective remedy is contained in legislation that deals with rights 
violations and the procedures for review and appeal that should be put in place. It is a 
right that is already recognised by International Law, appearing as it does in Article 2 (3) 
of the ICCPR; and Article 13 of the ECHR. The latter is echoed by the language of the 
ICCPR’s Article 2(3) and the European Court has broadly interpreted its requirements. 
This section will focus on how the ICCPR and ECHR provide rights to an effective 
remedy 
Article 2 (3) of the ICCPR states: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated 
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a 
remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal 
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;  (c) To ensure that 
the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted". The ACHR gives 
the suspect the right to an effective remedy, however, only after trial. The provision does 
not mention if the suspect can claim for unjust accusation and harm at pre-trial as it states 
in Art.19 (2) "Anyone whose innocence is established by a final judgment shall be 
entitled to compensation for the damage suffered". 
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The Human Rights Committee is concerned that not only should an individual have a 
legal remedy if their rights are violated, but that there should be a system in place that can 
enforce this. The Committee is concerned that such remedies should be flexible enough 
to take into account the needs of particular individuals, such as children, and to be dealt 
with within the various domestic legal systems of the State Parties (HRC p.6-7)
40
.  
Furthermore, violations should be addressed promptly, effectively and impartially 
through independent bodies. Co-opting members of national human rights organisations 
can enhance this independence. Individuals who have had rights violated should be 
compensated appropriately. In order for justice to be properly served, it may be necessary 
to take such measures as public apologies, guarantees of non-repetition or even changes 
to particular laws and practices (Bloed et al 1993 p.37).  
Fohr points out that there may be conflict between domestic law and the rules of the 
Covenant. It is suggested that, in some cases, where there is no domestic law to cover 
certain human rights violations, the Covenant should be applied directly. The Covenant 
could also take precedence over older domestic legislation that is incompatible with it. At 
present, because there is no one method of incorporating the Covenant, problems can 
arise when there are discrepancies between domestic laws and the Covenant (2001 
p.427). 
 
In Article 9 (5) of the ICCPR, detainees are given certain rights such as having recourse 
to habeas corpus and to be released and compensated if they have been unlawfully 
detained. However, because the exact nature of the remedy is not specified, this possibly 
leads to different interpretations of precisely what the remedies should consist of.  
 Article 13 of ECHR is similar to Article 2 (3) of the ICCPR, in that it gives the 
individual effective remedies for human rights violations. Both treaties stress that the 
state has an obligation to take action when such rights are violated. It is also important to 
                                                 
40 General Comment No. 31 [80]  The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to 
the Covenant  Adopted on 29 March 2004 (2187th meeting). CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 26 May 2004. 
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note that if an individual fails to have his or her claims upheld in court, this does not 
necessarily signify that there was no effective local remedy and so does not signal a 
breach of Article 13 (Wilt & Lyngdorf 2009 p.46-7). 
Aurescu et al emphasize that the right to an effective remedy for human rights violations 
stems from the principle that a participating State must ‘protect human rights and 
freedoms firstly within its own legal system’ and that the European Court is addressed 
when ‘domestic remedies have been exhausted or…are unavailable or ineffective’. 
Article 13 does not give a guarantee of legal protection and thus may only be invoked 
together with one or more articles of the Convention or one of its Protocols (2007 p.9). 
Clements et al state that Article 13 does have an overlap with other articles in the ECHR, 
notably Article 5 (4) and 6 (1). If these latter have been breached, then it unnecessary to 
have recourse to Article 13 (1999 p.212).  
 
It can thus be concluded that the right to an effective remedy under Article 2 (3) of the 
ICCPR or Article 5 of the ECHR comes into play once individuals have an arguable 
claim that their rights under the Covenant have been violated. After illustrating the 
principle norms of pre-trial procedure in International human rights law, these procedures 
will now be examined in the context of Shari’ah in order to find if there is any conflict 
between the international human rights norms and Shari'ah. 
 
2. Shari’ah and Pre-Trial Procedural Rights. 
After a brief exploration of the idea of human rights in Shari'ah, the next step will be to 
examine the application of the most significant elements in criminal pre-trial procedure. 
This will correspond to the issues discussed when pre-trial procedures in the law of 
England and Wales were examined. The sources of information about human rights pre-
trial are illustrated in part by the Qur’an and interpretations by Muslim scholars. The 
relevant Articles of the Arab Charter (ACHR) (2008) have already been discussed in 
Chapters 2&3. Shari’ah demands protection of the rights of the accused in pre-trial as 
follows: 
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2.1. The Right to Liberty.   
The Holy Qur’an does not contain an explicit directive about liberty. However, it states:  
‘It is He who made the earth tame for you - so walk among its slopes and eat of His 
provision - and to Him is the resurrection.’ (Verse 67:15). This is reflected in Art.14 on 
the right to liberty of the ACHR. This however, gives no absolute guarantee as was 
explained in Chapter Two. The right to liberty is guaranteed by the ICCPR (Art.9 (1)) & 
the ECHR Art.5 (1). 
Therefore, the essence of the right is that individuals are entitled to move as they please, 
and this is recognised by the above verse from the Qur’an.  Furthermore, the holy Qur’an 
warned all people to avoid accusation being levelled against someone on the basis of 
mere suspicion
41
. In verses 24: 12, 13, 14, &15, Allah the Almighty condemns those who 
make allegations without strong evidence. That means that making unsubstantiated 
allegations is forbidden by Shari’ah. Therefore, restricting the right of an individual to 
liberty on the basis of mere suspicion is, by analogy, forbidden, as arresting or detaining a 
suspect is more harmful to him than just levelling allegations against him without 
restricting his or her liberty. In the next section, arrest and detention in Shari’ah will be 
discussed as a part of the right to liberty.  
 
2.1.1. Arrest in Shari’ah. 
There are a range of restrictions and controls on the authority of those carrying out the 
investigation on limiting the freedom of the accused and restricting their liberty and their 
rights in order to uncover the truth in the case of a crime. These restrictions are important 
guarantees for the accused at the time of his arrest in the event of home inspection or 
during his custody. However, the liberty that Islamic law gives to the accused must take 
into account the rights of the public to be protected from crime. (Hallay 1989 p.535); 
Caliph Omar was the first to interpret the shackling of a criminal by the Prophet 
                                                 
41
 "Why did not the believers - men and women - when they heard of the affair, - put the best construction 
on it in their own minds and say, "This (charge) is an obvious lie"?  Why did they not bring four witnesses 
to prove it? When they have not brought the witnesses, such men, in the sight of Allah, (stand forth) 
themselves as liars. Were it not for the grace and mercy of Allah on you, in this world and the Hereafter, a 
grievous penalty would have seized you in that ye rushed glibly into this affair. Behold, ye received it on 
your tongues, and said out of your mouths things of which ye had no knowledge; and ye thought it to be a 
light matter, while it was most serious in the sight of Allah.’ (Holy Qur'an Verses 24: 12, 13, 14, &15). 
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Mohammad as a sign that this liberty could be restricted for transgressors (Alahmed 2011 
p.2).  
 
Shari’ah ensures the sanctity of the human being, this being mentioned in both the 
Qur’an, which states ‘We have honoured the sons of Adam’ (Verse 17:70) and the Hadith 
(the Prophet’s sayings). The Prophet Muhammad also said ‘that your blood, your wealth 
and your honour are forbidden to be hurt’ (Al-Albany1993 p.70). This is implied in the 
ACHR Art.14 (1). The inviolability of the home rests on this basis of the sanctity of 
human beings. Shari’ah has developed provisions to preserve human rights and freedom 
in home. Permission must be sought when someone wants to get into another’s house - as 
the Qur’an states: “O you who believe! Do not enter houses other than your own houses 
until you have asked permission and saluted those in them. That is better for you, so that 
you might be admonished.” (Verse 24/27).This highlights the importance of respect for 
privacy when dealing with suspect pre-trial. 
 
Islam forbids spying and eavesdropping on other people's homes. As the Qur'an states; 
“O you who have believed, avoid much [negative] assumption. Indeed, some assumption 
is sin. And do not spy or backbite each other" (Verse 49/12). However, Hallay (1989 
p.712) and Sabrh (2006 p.147) point out that the privacy of the home is not absolutely 
sacrosanct as there are exceptions. The maintenance of human society is paramount and a 
house may be searched if a flagrant breach of law is apparent and it is important to gain 
evidence that would help an investigation. Verse 24/27 talks about 'asking permission'; 
sometimes this can only be given tacitly, for example, if it is clear there is a victim inside. 
  
The accused may not be intimidated, nor his family terrorized, during a search of his 
home or during his arrest. He must be treated with respect and should not be intimidated 
in a way that prevents him from seeking justice. In exhorting his people not to frighten 
each other the Prophet Muhammad says ‘It is not permissible for a Muslim to frighten 
another Muslim’. This exhortation entails the inadmissibility of intimidation of the 
suspect or his family during investigation. Nor should searches be made at night. (Al-
Albany 1985) Furthermore, behaving in violation of the rights of the accused should have 
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the negative effect of nullifying any evidence thus obtained (Hallay 1989 p.731). Guneam 
(2013)
42
 points out that what was built on wrong must be wrong and what is based on the 
forbidden is forbidden and that is used in Islamic law
43
 . In Shari’ah, nothing can be built 
on actions that are wrongfully done.  
 
2.1.2. Detention in Shari’ah.  
The Holy Qur’an does not contain an explicit directive about liberty. Furthermore, the 
words ‘temporary detention or arrest’ or ‘detention, pending investigation’ were not 
known as such in Islamic jurisprudence, but they correspond to the so-called: 
‘imprisonment in charge’ or ‘the imprisonment of rote’. Islam guarantees everyone his or 
her liberty unless there is a reason that arrest and detention could lead to the truth (Sabrh 
2006 p.89). There are two central aspects of this topic; firstly, society's interest in the 
restoration of security, the reduction of the spread of criminal acts, and the interests of the 
victim; secondly, the interests of the individual and their right to live freely and safely 
(ibid.).  
 
However, Muslim scholars have disagreed on the issue of pre-trial detention, and the 
confinement of the accused in a place intended as a prison. The majority of them want to 
legalize this, but a minority disagrees, relying on the evidence that the Prophet 
Muhammad did not use a prison. The idea of detaining the accused stems from Calepha 
Umar who rented a house to detain someone who had been accused (Al-Halby 1973 
p.197). Hallay says that whatever the debates around the issue of imprisonment, it is part 
of the Tazir (punishment, usually corporal, administered at the discretion of the judge) 
(see appendix C.2), that the accused who committed a crime considered serious should 
remain in custody (1989 p.832).  The right to detain in Shari’ah has an objective standard 
in regard to the interrogation of the accused before his incarceration. There are plenty of 
sayings of Prophet Muhammad about interrogation, even though it is not called by this 
name. The Prophet urged the extraction of a confession: he coaxed a woman accused of 
theft to withdraw her confession (Hallay 1989). This shows that there was interrogation at 
                                                 
42
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e2LBl6t609w. [Accessed April 2014] 
43
 see also http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=156351 
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that time; even though the Prophet always tried to avoid people making a confession 
otherwise he would apply Huddud which would always be harsh.  However, the right to 
interrogate applies to all criminals offences. Furthermore, in order to gain sufficient 
evidence to prosecute it is important to detain the accused, and Muslim scholars agree 
that acquiring evidence is very important for the accusation (Hallay 1989 pp.828-833). 
 
Neither the Qur’an nor the sayings of Prophet Muhammad are explicit about the duration 
of detention. There are four schools of Islam, Hanfee, which mostly applies to Egypt , 
Oman and Turkey, Safei, which most applies to Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the south of 
Saudi Arabia, Maalikis, mostly applied in Sudan and the north of Africa),  and Hanbali-, 
which mostly applies to Saudi Arabia. They disagree slightly about rituals and ideas that 
are not explicitly stated in the Qur'an or the sayings of the Prophet. All Muslim believers 
rely on Muslim scholars for interpretation and there are different views among them. The 
doctrines of most of the Hanfee, some Maalikis, and some Shafei restrict remand for a 
specific time; and this has been identified by some scholars as being fifteen days and by 
others as a month. Secondly, the doctrines of some of the Hanfee, most of the Maliki and 
the Hanbali did not limit the maximum duration of detention, but considered it the role of 
the Imam or judge – to detain the defendant as long he deems appropriate. Moreover, the 
scholars of the four schools agree that the Imam can detain the accused who has 
committed debauchery and corruption for an appropriate term, as required by the nature 
of the offence (Sabrh 2006p. 99).                                                                                         
 
No period of time is specified in any of the notes of the fuqaha. However, suspects are 
occasionally kept in remand for a considerable time if they have a bad reputation or have 
been found guilty of crimes on previous occasions (ibid.,). Remand in detention is thus to 
prevent the suspect possibly harming the public rather than relating necessarily to the 
specific charge. 
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2.1.3. The Right to be Informed Promptly of the Reason for Arrest in Shari’ah. 
 
Informing the arrestee about the nature of the accusation is essential, in order to give the 
accused the opportunity to defend himself against the accusation. Otherwise, the arrest 
will be unlawful and arbitrary and that is forbidden in Shari’ah. ‘A man came to the 
Prophet Muhammad and he complained about another man, who stole his clothes. The 
Prophet told the thief about the accusation, and he confessed and then the prophet 
applied the Had on him (cut off his hand)’ (Al-Nasay 1988 Hadith No. 4795). This right 
is clearly stated in the ACHR Art. 14(3), ICCPR Art.9 (2) and ECHR Art. 5(2).  
 
From the Hadith the Prophet informed the accused about his accusation and he did not 
apply the Had until he had confessed. So from this, it is known that informing the 
arrestee about his accusation has been regulated since the time of Prophet Muhammad. 
Although Shari'ah does not elaborate the right to be brought promptly before a judicial 
officer; the ACHR clarifies it in Art. 14(5) and it is guaranteed in ICCPR Art.9 (3) & 
ECHR Art.5 (3). Sabrah (2006 p.152) points out that Islam prohibits torturing a human 
being and that concealing the accusation from the suspect is considered to be a 
psychological torture for the suspect, so enforcement officers should inform the suspect 
about the arrest according to the principles of Islam.  However, there is a development in 
the right to be informed promptly of the reason for arrest in Saudi Law, which reflects the 
principles of Shari'ah and which will be addressed in Chapter Seven.  
 
2.2. The Right to Defence in Shari’ah. 
 
People may vary in their ability to express themselves and in presenting their case before 
a judge. Thus, Shari’ah gives the plaintiff and the defendant the right to an advocate who 
can speak on their behalf. The Prophet Muhammad said ‘I am only human so if two 
people came to me and asked me to judge between them and one of them could present 
him or herself better than the other, if I made the judgment in favour of him who speaks 
better and he was a liar, he will go to the fire, so knowing that, he can make his decision’ 
(Al-Hamad 1982p. 66). 
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Alharagan points out that the need for a lawyer did not arise during the early Islamic 
period. Initially it was just a matter of the two sides collecting evidence to lay before a 
judge so that the trial itself was the only criminal process. As such trials were public, 
legal experts would attend and any unfairness or inequalities between the plaintiff and 
defendant would have been identified and eliminated (2006 p.104).  
    
However, there is a lack of information about the right to legal assistance in the texts of 
Shari’ah. This contrasts with the ICCPR (Art.14 3(d), ECHR (Art.6 (3)) and ACHR 
(Art.16(3&4)) which have given this right. Thus, contemporary Muslim legal writers 
differ about whether or not the accused has the right to have legal assistance in criminal 
proceedings for theft, defamation or murder (Hallay 1989 p.363).   
 
2.3. The Right Against Ill-Treatment.  
 
One of the most important rights of the accused is not to disrespect his or her human 
dignity and not to have his or her liberty unlawfully taken away. The Arab concept of 'ill-
treatment' has abuse of dignity as being pivotal. A central idea in Islam is to treat every 
person in a manner that preserves their dignity whether they are alive or dead. Even if 
someone commits an offence this does not allow others to attack their dignity, 
compromise their humanity or torture them (Albar 2010). These ideas about human 
dignity are similar to those explored in Chapter Two when considering the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
 
In the Hadith, the Prophet Muhammad says “God tortures those who torture people in 
life” (Albar 2010). This is because torture shows disrespect. Indeed, the Qur'an (15:28–
29) expresses the pre-eminence of a human being’s relative position even over the angels, 
‘Behold! Thy Lord said to the angels “I am about to create man from clay, from mud 
moulded into shape. When I have fashioned him in due proportion and breathed into him 
of my spirit, fall you down in obeisance to him”. This text, as Khatab and Bouma suggest, 
demonstrates that humans have been placed at the pinnacle of creation and that to affront 
the dignity of a single individual affronts the whole of humanity including the dignity of 
103 
 
the person perpetrating the affront (2007 pp.102-103). The ACHR clarifies this in Art.8. ; 
as does ICCPR Art.7 & ECHR Art.8. 
  
According to Islam, man is God’s representative on earth and it is from this that human 
dignity and status stems. In Chapter 1 verse 30 of the Qur'an, Allah says to his angels “I 
am setting on the earth a viceroy” and further orders these angels to bow down to Adam. 
Satan refused, remarking that he was the better creation as he was created from fire, 
whilst Adam was made from clay. This lack of respect for humankind resulted in Allah 
expelling Satan from Heaven and damning him and his followers for all eternity 
(Daneshyar and Chambers 2003 p.4). 
 
From the above, it appears that Shari’ah does not make explicit what could amount to a 
violation of the human right to dignity. Therefore what actions are considered to be 
forbidden is open to interpretation. However, Muslims believe that the Shari’ah is 
complete and cannot be added to, but can be interpreted. So if Shari’ah forbids a simple 
sin, the bigger sin is forbidden as well. The Qur’an states: ‘[O] you who have believed, 
let not a people ridicule [another] people; perhaps they may be better than them; nor let 
women ridicule [other] women; perhaps they may be better than them. And do not insult 
one another and do not call each other by [offensive] nicknames. Wretched is the name of 
disobedience after [one's] faith. And whoever does not repent - then it is those who are 
the wrongdoers’ (Surat l-Hujurat 49:11). If this is so, any words or indeed actions that are 
considered to cause harm to any human are forbidden.  
 
It is therefore clear that the Qur’an upholds human dignity and extends this to all people 
including detainees. Measures such as regulating intimate body searches, allowing 
detainees access to private toilets and ensuring proper treatment in custody are in 
harmony with these principles.  
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2.4. Presumption of Innocence and the Right against Self-Incrimination. 
 
Shari’ah law recognizes the fundamental premise of innocence until proven guilty, and 
the need to be found guilty through definitive evidence. As the Qur’an states: 
‘Why did not the believers - men and women - when they heard of the affair, - put the best 
construction on it in their own minds and say, "This (charge) is an obvious lie"? Why did 
they not bring four witnesses to prove it? When they have not brought the witnesses, such 
men, in the sight of Allah, (stand forth) themselves as liars’ (Verses 24:12, 24; 13). This 
is the famous maxim that encapsulates the presumption of innocence (Alborno 1991 
p.179). In Islam the accused is considered innocent until evidence has been brought 
which shows his guilt, or until he admits the charge. The basic principle is that human 
beings are born innocent and have the right to be treated as such (Kamali 2008 p.181). 
The presumption of innocence is also guaranteed in the ACHR Art. 16, ICCPR Art.14 (2) 
& ECHR Art.8 (1).   
 
In Islamic law, all scholarly interpretations (Alhanbly, Almaleky, Alhanfy and Alshafaey) 
agree that a defendant cannot be compelled to give a confession, also that the accused has 
the right not to speak. A confession cannot be taken under force; otherwise the confession 
is not admissible. A confession, once given, can be withdrawn, even after the sentence 
has been passed or during its execution (Kamali 2008 p.183). Ibn Taymiyyah (1328) 
wrote that, at the time of the Prophet, a woman in Medina had a bad reputation as regards 
her sexual conduct, so much so that the Prophet said concerning her: ‘If I were to stone 
anyone without evidence, I would have stoned this woman’ However, even given her bad 
reputation, as there was no evidence, he did not condone the punishment Ibn Taymiyyah 
also quotes a statement of the caliph ‘Umar ibn Al-Khattab to the effect that no one may 
be punished on the basis of suspicion and mistrust’ (ibid.,).    
 
In Islamic law a person who does not have full possession of his faculties cannot make a 
legally admissible confession. A judge must revise any confession carefully and not 
accept it until he/she is fully sure it is correct and lawful. For a confession to be accepted, 
the defendant must not only admit to the category of crime, but must provide relevant 
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details to support his/her assertion of guilt. The requirements are strict for the acceptance 
of confessions as there is a higher spiritual justice than the justice in the courts that is 
recognized by Islamic law.  A Muslim believes that if a guilty person hides the truth and 
the courts cannot prove his/her guilt, he/she still would be punished by God; even if 
punishment by man may not be possible (Kamali 2008 p.183). 
 
This principle stems from the following words of the Prophet: “The burden of proof is on 
him who makes the claim, whereas the oath is on him who denies” (Al-Hanbly 2001 
p.226). In Islamic law, it is very difficult to prove a crime and, if there remains any doubt 
as to whether the defendant had committed the crime, it is not possible to punish him as 
the defendant might face a severe punishment. For that reason, it is almost impossible to 
prove the guilt with a suspicion. The Prophet’s sayings encourage the judge to pay 
attention to cases of doubt: “Avert huddud punishments by suspicions or doubts and if the 
accused has a way out, release him, it is better for the judge to pardon erroneously than to 
punish erroneously’’ (Al-Hanfy1997 p.25 No.5522).  
 
To conclude, Shari’ah does not included detailed rules with regards to the right against 
self-incrimination. However, this right can be inferred from two principles: the principle 
of innocence and the prohibition of subjecting the accused to coercion to make him 
confess. 
 
2. 5 Non- Discrimination in Shari'ah. 
Islam not only recognizes absolute equality between men, irrespective of any distinction 
of colour, race or nationality, but also makes it an important and significant principle, a 
reality. The Holy Qur’an states:  
“Mankind, we have created you from a male and female" In other words all human 
beings are siblings to one another. They all are the descendants from one father and one 
mother. "And we set you up as nations and tribes so that you may be able to recognize 
each other" (49:13). This can be interpreted as meaning that although there are social and 
cultural divisions among human beings which it is important to acknowledge, no one race 
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or culture should presume superiority over another, nor refuse them their rights. "Indeed, 
the noblest among you before God are the most heedful of you" (49:13). Superiority can 
only be on the basis of spirituality and moral integrity; and even this in no way justifies 
oppressing others even if they are perceived as ‘less pure’. It is immoral to assume airs of 
superiority and runs counter to the principle of equality integral to this verse (A’la 
Maudude1995 p.20). ACHR reflects this right in Art. 3. 
 
This has been exemplified by the Prophet in one of his sayings thus: "No Arab has any 
superiority over a non-Arab, nor does a non-Arab have any superiority over an Arab. 
Nor does a white man have any superiority over a black man or the black man any 
superiority over the white man. You are all the children of Adam, and Adam was created 
from clay".  A’la Madude comments that this shows how Islam holds that there ` should 
be absolutely no discrimination based on colour, ethnic group, nationality, gender, wealth 
or creed and that equality is seen as a God-given birthright (1995p.20). This reflects the 
ICCPR Art.26 & ECHR Art.14. 
 
2.6. The Right to Privacy. 
Islamic legal ideas value privacy very highly; in the words of the Prophet: ‘Do not 
enquire into the affairs of others; do not spy on one another; do not outbid one another; 
do not envy each other; do not hate one another; do not shun one another; be as fellow-
brothers and servants of Allah’  (Alsafreny 1993 p.271). 
The right to a private life is strongly supported by Shari’ah Law, even if an offence has 
been committed. The command ‘Spy not’ in the Qur’an is clarified by the Prophet 
(P.B.U.H) who said, “Do not be on the lookout for slips made by believers. For he who is 
eager to show up the shortcomings of a fellow believer will find that God shows up his 
faults and humiliates him before others, even though his ill deeds were performed in the 
secrecy of his own home”. This means that spying on someone is not permitted even if 
there is a strong probability that there is wrongdoing within the person’s home 
(Daneshyar & Chambers 2003 p.13). The right to privacy is also encapsulated in the 
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ACHR Art.21 and guaranteed in ICCPR Art.17 & ECHR Art.8. There is no better 
illustration of this point than the incident involving the second Caliph Omar who 
committed the sin of spying on someone he suspected of debauchery. He had broken into 
the man's property and the man confronted him saying that this was a breach of God's 
commandments, upon which the Caliph apologised and left. (Daneshyar and Chambers 
2003 pp.13-14).  Daneshyar & Chambers comment that this incident demonstrates 
Islam’s attitude to the right to privacy and to freedom of expression without fear of 
reprisals.  This is in contrast to the behaviour of many Muslim States which profess to 
follow Shari’ah Law but feel that it is permissible to place monitoring devices in the 
homes of private citizens merely on the suspicion of the police. This is also done in 
nations that pride themselves with being democratic and freedom loving (2003 p.14). 
 
2.7. The Right to Bail in Shari’ah. 
 
Bail, which is called in Arabic kafala, is a guarantee by someone to help any person has 
been suspected in demanding his or her release from detention or to stop legal action 
against the accused. The sponsor, kafil, carries a legal responsibility if the offender 
escapes during the period of time specified by the court or police. Kafala could be simply 
a matter of providing a guarantee for the suspect or, in more serious cases, putting bail 
money forward as a guarantee. Therefore, the condition of bail Kafala must be dependent 
on the circumstances of the case concerned in order to prevent the accused from fleeing 
(Qafisheh 2012 p.498). Shari’ah connects the detention with proof of the accusation; 
thus, the accused is innocent until proven guilty in court. Also if the prosecutor states that 
he has no evidence, there is no reason to detain the accused if there is no material 
evidence. Shari’ah authorizes the judge to release the accused on bail if this is the case 
(Salamh1986 p.53). 
 
To conclude, the ICCPR Art.9(3) & ECHR Art.5(3) guarantee the right to bail; whereas 
Shari'ah does not go into detail about bail and the Arab Charter (2008) stays silent about 
it and that authorizes the judges. However, regulations are stipulated in Saudi Arabia's 
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Code of Criminal Investigation. Therefore, the right to bail will be addressed in the light 
of the underlying development of criminal justice in Saudi Arabia in Chapter Seven. 
2.8. The Right to an Effective Remedy in Shari’ah. 
Under Shari’ah rules there are various mechanisms, which the accused could resort to 
when his or her rights have been violated in order to obtain a remedy. As has been 
already discussed in ‘The Right to Self-Incrimination’, the remedy for obtaining a 
confession in violation of the right against-self-incrimination, is the exclusion of such a 
confession. This applies not just to evidence obtained during a confession, but also to any 
evidence that has been obtained unlawfully    
Islamic law entitles the accused to have compensation when it is established that he or 
she has suffered damage as a result of a public official’s misconduct. In cases where the 
judge did not take appropriate time over his verdict or witnesses appeared to have lied, 
the accused should be exonerated and have suitable compensation (Al-Jofan 2014). As 
has been mentioned before, Islamic law does not allow accusations on the basis of 
suspicions and misgivings. Furthermore, Shari'ah has a principle that no punishment can 
be given unless there is clear proof; it seeks to enforce public accountability and the 
protection of the rights of the accused by prosecuting those who abuse their power or 
violate the rights of the accused. These rights and the types of compensation given will be 
addressed next.  
The right of the accused, who has been affected by false accusation, to have 
compensation is fixed in Shari’ ah.  In Verse 21:78, the Qur’an tells of the judgement of 
Solomon who gave compensation to a farmer whose fields had been used by a shepherd 
for grazing
44
 (Al-Damshgy 2002 p.355). This judgement is regarded as one of the origins 
of the Islamic rules for compensation. Shari’ah requires compensation for the accused 
who is innocent of the accusations against him. This maintains the dignity and rights of 
mankind according to Islamic law and also serves to deter people from making false 
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 The Qur’an states: ‘And [mention] David and Solomon, when they pronounced judgement concerning 
the field - when the sheep of a people overran it [at night], and we were witness to their judgment’ (Verse 
21:78) 
109 
 
accusations. In Islamic law any act considered harmful to others is the responsibility of 
the offender, and commits him or her to making compensation for damage. The Prophet 
Muhammad said ‘no harm on you and on the others’. Therefore, Shari’ah law states ‘the 
harm must be lifted’ (Sabrh 2006 p.171). The right to an effective remedy in Shari’ah is 
divided into two kinds of compensation; civil, and criminal. The right to an effective 
remedy in the ACHR was vague in Art. 14 (7) and cannot be seen as an absolute right; 
however, ICCPR Art.2 (3) & ECHR Art. 13 stipulate this right.   
Civil compensation for the accused is the money with which the accused is compensated 
for the physical, financial and/or emotional damage caused to him or her. This kind of 
compensation is divided into three parts: 
 
A. Physical damage compensation:  
The legal writers in Islam say that physical damage must be guaranteed and 
compensation given to the accused who suffered this damage (Bin Goodmah 1994 pp6-
20). The evidence for that is identified by Aumro bin Hazm who pointed out that the 
Prophet Muhammad said ‘in one eye fifty camels’, that means if someone pokes out 
another’s eye he has to pay him fifty camels (Al-Asglany 1964 p.1708). 
 
B. Financial compensation for damage:  
This is for all financial disadvantages caused by false accusations and also includes 
damage to home, car or property as a result of the investigation or if the suspect was 
disabled because of his arrest and this prevented him from working. The legal writers in 
Shari’ah agreed that there should be compensation for such material damage (Sabrh 2006 
p172). 
 
C. Emotional damage compensation:  
Just charging the accused is considered to have harmful effects on the dignity of the 
accused and his reputation, and to cause moral damage, which cannot be remedied by 
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money. Furthermore, insulting or intimidating him, affecting his work because others lose 
confidence in dealing with him, and other damaging moral implications of the accusation 
must be taken into consideration (Sabrah 2006 p.173). The Qur’an states: ‘And those who 
harm believing men and believing women for [something] other than what they have 
earned have certainly born upon themselves a slander and manifest sin’ ( Verse 33:58). 
This is illustrated by the story that Khalifa Umar paid compensation to a pregnant woman 
who lost her baby as she was frightened by his accusations (Al-Sanany 1983 p.395). 
From this story, the legal writers agree to the paying of compensation to whoever has 
been caused harm by others. However, some scholars maintain the inadmissibility of such 
compensation, arguing that the compensation is not only monetary. As illustrated by the 
story above, emotional damage is difficult to evaluate financially and in such cases it is 
better to have a process of reconciliation and forgiveness where the victim is given 
emotional solace (Sabrh 2006 p.175). 
 
Secondly, Compensation for the criminal damage to the accused: 
What is meant here is compensation for the accused for deliberate physical damage, 
whether from the judge, witnesses or the plaintiff. The defendant can raise a lawsuit 
asking for his rights against whoever was the cause of this type of damage. If his claim is 
proven, the penalty will depend on the type of damage inflicted on the defendant (Al-
Sanhory 1980). It is important to give compensation in order to prevent feuds and 
retaliation. The holy Qur’an guarantees equality before the law in Shari’ah, in matters of 
physical damage and the compensation for it
45
. 
 
Alharagan points out that Shari’ah makes no distinction between disciplinary and 
criminal offences, as any abuse of power on the part of an official will either be a sin 
contrary to Shari’ah or a violation of rules set by those governing and either of these will 
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 The Qur’an states: ‘[Fighting in] the sacred month is for [aggression committed in] the sacred month, 
and for [all] violations is legal retribution. So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way 
that he has assaulted you. And fear Allah and know that Allah is with those who fear Him’ (Verse 2:194). 
Also the Qur’an states: ‘And We ordained for them therein a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a 
nose, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, and for wounds is legal retribution. But whoever gives [up his 
right as] charity; it is an expiation for him. And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then 
it is those who are the wrongdoers’ (Verse 5:45). 
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be considered a criminal offence. (2006 p.112) This is based upon the Qur’an verse 
which states: ‘O ye who are believers! Obey Allah, and His Messenger and those who are 
charged with authority among you’. For the sake of clarity, however, the term 
‘disciplinary offence’ will be used to refer to an official’s misconduct which is contrary 
to the rules governing his job, and the term ‘criminal offence’ will be used to refer to 
criminal offences in the strictest sense. 
 
 
To conclude this section, the incorporation of the Shari'ah into domestic criminal codes 
engages a number of human rights issues. Some Islamic scholars,  Dacy & Koproste 
(2008), Al Awabdeh (2005), and Moghaddam (2012), view Shari'ah as consistent with 
the requirements of international human rights instruments. Furthermore, Shari’ah adds 
more protections which these international human rights instruments do not make explicit 
such as civil and criminal compensation. Most Islamic scholars argue that Shari’ah 
formalized how human life was to be respected long before this was done by Western 
countries. There are certain authorities in Saudi Arabia who argue that the introduction of 
Western imports such as pre-trial procedures would be in contravention of the principles 
of Islam (Alamaj 2001 & Altwojery 2013 p.15). However, as has been shown above, not 
only would the introduction of pre-trial procedures not be in contravention of Shari’ah, 
but it would actually be in accordance with the principles that are found in the texts of the 
Holy Qur’an.  
 
Conclusion  
 
International human rights law (in the ICCPR and ECHR) and Shari'ah guarantee the 
principle of the rights of the accused at the stage of criminal investigation, with which 
this thesis is concerned. These rights are more general principles than exhaustive 
explanations, which may lead to various interpretations and thus be ineffective and lose 
the purpose for which they were established. Generalisations are not enough and this is 
why monitoring bodies are important. Shari’ah has the added dimension of monitoring 
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by a God who sees all. Although this can act as a powerful agent of social control 
amongst believers, it needs backing up by effective state monitoring. 
  
This thesis hopes to demonstrate that the norms of human rights contained in Islamic law 
(Shari’ah) that apply to pre-trial rights are entirely compatible with international human 
rights law. Thus, international human rights law can be implemented through Saudi 
Arabian law or that of any Muslim country. Although, there is a disagreement between 
Shari'ah and international human rights law on some points, that cannot be seen as 
rejection of the entire body of international human rights law. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that the Shari’ah was a forerunner in the protection of human rights in law. 
As indicated previously, this thesis aims to use the example of pre-trial procedure in 
England and Wales as it is one of the most exhaustive set of procedures and well-
regarded worldwide. In order to understand how pre- trial legislation arose, it is important 
to briefly explore its history and development of criminal justice in England and Wales 
more generally, which is the focus of the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 
 
Chapter Four 
The History and Development of Criminal Justice in England and Wales 
 
Introduction:  
 
Pre-trial procedures in England and Wales have passed through many stages to be as they 
are now and, to understand their development into the form they are today, it is necessary 
to understand what was happening to the legal system in England and Wales in the past. 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the development of pre-trial criminal justice in 
England. It aims to review and investigate the history and development of pre-trial 
procedures such as arrest, stop, search and seizure, detention and questioning in the Law 
of England and Wales; in order to demonstrate how these relate to international standards 
of good practice. It is the contention of this thesis that the contemporary pre-trial 
procedures generating from this development are a sound basis for the development of 
good practice internationally and in Saudi Arabia in particular. 
 
The chapter begins with the Norman period, the Marian reforms of the sixteenth century 
and the pre-trial development of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Judges’ 
rules of 1912 are considered and criticised, and the chapter then comes to its main focus – 
the introduction of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) in 1984. This is 
discussed in general as the specific articles relating to pre-trial procedures are considered 
in Chapter 6. Finally,  the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2000 and 2006, the Serious 
Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 and Human Rights Act 1998 will be looked at in 
terms of changes made to pre-trial procedures. A historical overview shows how pre-trial 
procedures have gradually been refined and come into line with general principles of 
international human rights. Procedures that would violate human rights principles by 
modern standards were once commonplace in England and Wales, and it is of interest to 
see how these were changed, especially as this thesis contemplates such changes for 
Saudi Arabia. 
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1. Developing the concept of a pre-trial in England and Wales (The Norman period- 
Marian Reforms to the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries.) 
 
This section explores the development of pre-trial procedures from the Norman period, 
which first brought regularity to the law at a national level up to the end of the nineteenth 
century when modern pre-trial procedures began to be introduced. 
 
1.1. The Norman period. 
 
William the Conqueror brought the Norman legal system, which was partly based on 
Roman civil law, into England and started a long process by which it was to be integrated 
into the native legal system, which, at the time of the Norman Conquest, was irregular 
and varied by region (Castellano 2009 p.1). During this era, social control was exercised 
not through any separate police but through the system of ‘Frankpledge’. Working as a 
member of Frankpledge was voluntary and these individuals were not paid to do this job. 
These ‘tythingmen’ had to ‘swear’ to protect nine neighbours and arrest offenders. 
Moreover, they had to watch the suspect in custody until the time of his trial and they had 
to bring him to the court. ‘Ironically, if a ‘tythingman’ failed in his work he would pay a 
penalty. This system continued until the 17
th century’ (ibid.). 
       
However, at the time of the Norman invasion, the concept of pre-trial procedures did not 
exist. The ‘ordeal’ was a mechanism to find whether the accused was guilty or not, and 
this procedure continued after the Norman invasion. There were many kinds of ordeal for 
example; an accused person held a red-hot iron bar and walked three paces. His hand was 
then bandaged and left for three days. If the wound got better after three days, he was 
innocent. If the wound had clearly not got any better, he was guilty, as it was believed 
that God would protect the innocent (Hardaway & Tumminello 1996 p.47). There was 
also apparently no equality in justice. William the Conqueror gave considerably more 
rights to Frenchmen than to others (Hostettler 2009 p.40). It is worth noting that at this 
time the Arab Peninsula was undergoing a change to Islamism. The Prophet Mohammed 
and his companions had instituted a philosophy which paid heed to human rights and to 
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respect, rather than the system of bitter feuding that had existed before. (Explained in 
Chapter 6) Islamic law at this period was more humane than English law and did not 
employ such procedures as the ordeal. 
  
In 1215, the Pope decided that priests should not help with ordeals. As a result, ordeals 
were replaced by trials by juries (Hostettler 2009 p.53). Even though this was far from 
modern ideas of a jury, there were elements of it which are retained today. For example, 
jurors had to swear to tell the truth and tell what they knew about the crime; but, unlike 
modern witnesses, these jurors were required to go out among the community and find 
out what had happened and then bring these findings back to the court. These 
investigative activities could be seen as rudimentary pre-trial procedures. These jurors in 
effect had to gather proofs for the trial. Holdsworth (1938 p.309), remarks that ‘It was a 
long and gradual process that brought about the change from proof by jury to trial by 
jury’. However, the granting of individual rights pre-dates this in documents such as the 
Magna Carta 1215 (Hoffman & Rowe 2003 p.17).   
The Norman Conquest made a significant impact on English law in that pre-trial 
procedures such as criminal investigation albeit by jurors were established. It could be 
argued that, at this period, jurors were acting as kind of rudimentary detectives. The stage 
was now set for the Marian Reforms which further developed pre-trial procedures.  
1.2. Marian Reforms 1555. 
The reforms (1554-5) brought in during the reign of Queen Mary are believed to have 
witnessed more official regulation of English pre-trial procedures in serious crime.  What 
evolved was ‘a formal system of official investigation and evidence gathering which 
came to be a preliminary inquiry’ (Langbein 1974 p.1). 
Pettys (2009 pp.208-9) points out that according to the 1554 statute, Justices of the Peace 
now had to question both suspect and witnesses and gather written evidence to use in the 
trial before deciding to release the felon on bail. In 1555 this was extended to all suspects, 
even those put into remand. Commenting on the statutes of the Marian reforms, Hermann 
& Speer (2008 p.34) believe that the statute of 1554‘represented a seismic shift in 
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English criminal procedure’. It reversed the previous practice in common law of allowing 
others to prove the guilt of the accused and allowed him to speak for himself. 
Langbein (1994 p.1049) points out that ‘the accused speaks’ trials of the 16th century 
were characterised by various ‘rules and practices whose purpose and effect were to 
oblige the accused to respond to charges against him’. He goes on to say that the accused 
was often unskilled at defending himself and that judges were not always rigorous in their 
attempts to find out the truth. The right to remain silent and against self-incrimination 
could not develop whilst there was pressure on the accused to defend themselves. It was 
not until 1848 that the accused was told that he could refuse to answer questions and 
provision was made to caution him that what he said could be used as evidence by the 
prosecution in court (ibid., p.1061).  
Vogler (2005 p.133) comments that in spite of these changes, there was by no means a 
full pre-trial scrutiny, once the case for the prosecution had been established. Indeed, only 
prosecution witnesses would be heard. This was to change in the 18th century.  
1.3. The Eighteenth Century. 
During the 18th century many pre-trial procedures were informal negotiations between 
the victim and the accused. If the accused was young, then his parents could be the 
negotiators (King 2000 p.29). King also points out that women often ‘took conciliatory 
roles in these negotiations’ (ibid.). It should be remembered that pre-trial negotiations 
came in many forms, sometimes determined by which party had the most physical force.  
Henry Fielding, who set up a paid magistracy in Bow Street, recommended that the state 
should fund prosecutions (McLynn 2002 p.32). Before Fielding’s time there had existed a 
system of rewards to men who brought suspects to the magistracy. They made a 
comfortable living out of the fees they charged for their services, the rewards they 
received from victims for identifying suspects, and the rewards from the state for 
successful convictions, that acted as some form of compensation for the high cost of 
prosecution. However, as King (2000 p.48) points out, this system could be open to 
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abuse, and the magistrates at Bow Street –Henry and John Fielding and Sanders Welch – 
promoted the idea that law enforcement should not rely on the efforts of the victim, and 
that magistrates should be involved in the cross-examination of suspects and witnesses. 
As Rawlings explains, ‘a criminal justice system which relied on the initiative of 
individual victims’ was inadequate. Thus, the Fieldings put ‘the pre-trial detection 
process at the heart of the system rather than the victim or the trial or punishment’ and 
presented it as ‘a technical, bureaucratic, apolitical process operated by full-time experts’ 
(1999 p.32). Beattie comments that was an important step in the ‘gradual infusion of 
public money into the criminal justice system (2007 p.64).  
John Fielding, Henry’s half-brother, was concerned to establish an effective way of 
dealing with crime by encouraging the rapid reporting of crimes, apprehending the 
criminal and initiating court proceedings. Beattie argues that John Fielding’s work ‘had a 
profound effect on the nature of pre-trial procedures and on the settings in which justices 
managed the crucial first stage of criminal prosecution’ (ibid., p.70). Although Fielding’s 
main concern was to gather evidence for the prosecution, he was well aware that judges 
were concerned that such evidence had been properly obtained. Beattie says that ‘by the 
1760s the bench had adopted a rule that only confessions given freely and voluntarily 
would be allowed as evidence’. Two decades later, confessions obtained in pre-trial 
proceedings were being asked for in writing. In response to this, Bow Street produced a 
pro forma for statements (2007 p.79). 
Beattie suggests that the Fieldings can be seen as having ‘expanded the pre-trial process 
into a more extensive search for evidence than the law required’ (2007 p.83). In using 
their public and well-advertised re-examination sessions as a way of attracting possible 
further victims of the suspect who might give evidence, Fielding ‘exceeded the authority 
provided by the Marian statutes by being willing to consider evidence at the pre-trial 
stage that might give the defendant an alibi (ibid., p.89). 
John Fielding was celebrated but also criticized and his fiercest critic, according to 
Beattie, was William Augustus Miles who thought that Fielding’s rigorous cross-
examination of the accused amounted to harassment, especially as it was just a pre-trial 
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procedure. Mr. Justice Eyre, a high court judge at the Old Bailey, also criticized the 
highly publicized sessions at Bow Street, as he believed these could prejudice a jury 
(2007 p.98).    
Fielding’s innovations attracted the participation of lawyers for both the defence and the 
prosecution, and questions began to be asked about the role that such people had in pre-
trial proceedings. For instance, whether they attended at the magistrate’s discretion; 
whether they could interrupt proceedings to advise their clients not to answer certain 
questions; whether they could cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution; whether they 
could take notes and have copies of depositions and other documents. Beattie suggests 
that such involvement by solicitors eroded what remained of the pre-trial procedures set 
out in the Marian statutes, and concludes that during the next half century a debate over 
what was to replace the old system culminated in the 1848 Jervis Acts which established 
a new form of magistrates’ judicial enquiry (2007 p.99).However, magistrates were still 
not routinely conducting pre-trial hearings ‘to determine whether there was sufficient 
evidence to send an accused felon to trial’ (Beattie 2007 p.67).  
Pre-trial procedures had undergone major changes during the two hundred and fifty years 
that stretched from the Marian Reforms to the end of the C18th. Changes had come about 
partly through debate about how to successfully control crime and what constituted 
justice and partly because of huge technological changes such as the Industrial 
Revolution. Vogler (2005 p.138) comments that as the counsel acquired more pre-trial 
instructions this led to a reduction in the role of the judge in organising the case. The 
dawn of the nineteenth century even saw debates about what role the press should take in 
pre-trial procedures, a debate which continues to the modern age. 
 
1.4. The Nineteenth Century.  
 
The Bow Street Runners were the precursors of the police force and were set up by Henry 
Fielding in 1742. Initially they were a success, according to Bateson (2004 p.2) ‘but later 
the system became corrupt with the magistrates and Runners working with the criminals 
rather than putting them out of business’. However, as Hostettler (2009 p.179) remarks, 
119 
 
the Runners had demonstrated that crime could be controlled by a centrally operated 
force and they paved the way for the reforms of Robert Peel which culminated in the 
1829 Metropolitan Police Act. The newly established police force began to assume 
responsibility for prosecutions. However, it wasn’t until 1879 that a Director of Public 
Prosecutions was appointed. His role was slow to evolve from a mainly advisory role into 
the one that exists today (Manchester 1980 p.228). 
 
The police had the powers to arrest a suspect with or without a warrant from a magistrate 
and also private citizens could carry out an arrest, or it could be done by hue and cry, 
although the latter was rarely used during the nineteenth century (ibid., p.230). 
Regulations for the proper conduct of arrests were also drawn up. For example it became 
important to obtain a warrant in cases of misdemeanours. There were, however, problems 
with this as suspects were sometimes able to escape before warrants were obtained 
(ibid.). 
 
It would be useful to consider the situation nationwide at the start of this century of great 
changes. Bateson (2004 p.2) describes how each parish had its own constable who was 
expected to control each breach of the law from dealing with felonies to non-attendance 
at church and unauthorised building works. This post wasn’t very popular and Bateson 
reports that its duties would often be delegated to an illiterate and inefficient deputy. As a 
consequence, crime would often be highest in parishes where the constable and his 
deputy were particularly ineffective. The watchmen or ‘Charlies’ were also often old and 
unable to control crime adequately. Simmons (2007 p.923) notes that even after the 1829 
Act was passed, ‘private law enforcement remained dominant throughout the nineteenth 
century, particularly outside urban areas’.  
 
Further problems with controlling crime were caused by a lack of consistency in how the 
law was applied. Manchester reports that until the middle of the century, prosecutors and 
judges would use their discretion as to whether a prosecution would take place and 
sentencing also varied greatly (1980 p.231).  
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With reference to the right to counsel, Bentley (1998 p.115) comments that at the start of 
the nineteenth century a full defence was only available for charges of treason. Prisoners 
were expected to speak for themselves in court even if they were illiterate, children or 
foreigners. The Prisoners Counsel Act 1836 did give prisoners the right to counsel, but in 
practice, poor suspects who could not afford representation were discriminated against. 
Bentley also believes that the defence ‘in forma pauperise’ where poor defendants could 
in theory apply for free representation was in practice ‘a dead letter’ as many defendants 
would not even have heard of this. Hostettler (2009 p. 208), comments that the defence 
counsel also did not have the final right of reply and that this ‘concluding legislative step 
for adversariality’ did not come about until 1898 with the Criminal Evidence Act. 
 
The nineteenth century also saw changes in the administration of confessions and police 
interrogation. At the start of the century, judges worked under the rule that involuntary 
confessions were inadmissible. There was however a problem as witnesses could be 
bribed to say that the prisoner had confessed under duress. Bentley (1998 p.221) remarks 
that this was settled in 1840 when only sanctioned inducements were allowed. Debates 
remained about what constituted an inducement and there were calls for reforms. Many 
attempts were made but failed. Bentley remarks that the court’s stance was that ‘improper 
inducement’ was the only ground for exclusion. Evidence was admissible even if the 
prisoner was drunk, in severe pain, about to go into labour or told by a priest that only a 
full confession would ensure divine forgiveness. It was also ‘common police practice’ to 
send an officer into a cell disguised as a fellow prisoner to extract a confession (ibid., 
p.227).There were also problems, which still remain today, with misreported confessions 
and prisoners who pleaded not guilty when their co-accused pleaded guilty. In 1873 the 
Metropolitan Police General Orders ‘stressed the need for officers to record at the time 
and in the prisoner’s own words any statements volunteered by him’ (ibid., p.229). 
 
Debate also raged about how suspects should be questioned after arrest. There was even 
disagreement among judges about this point. Prior to the Jervis Act of 1848, some 
believed that all police interrogation was objectionable; to others this was the case only if 
there had been no caution. The Jervis Act then ‘deprived magistrates of their power to 
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examine the prisoner’ and if they could not do it then it was even less acceptable for a 
police officer to engage in interrogation after a suspect had been charged. Interrogation 
before charging a suspect was only to be done sparingly. Bentley comments that ‘of the 
nineteenth century prohibitions on the questioning of suspects nothing now remains. 
Interrogation conducted in accordance with the Code of Practice issued by the Home 
Secretary is recognised as a legitimate investigatory tool’ (ibid., pp.234-5). 
 
According to the Jervis Act, the accused was also advised that he could refuse to answer 
questions during the pre-trial procedure and that anything he said could be used against 
him at the trial (Langbein 1994 p.1061). This Act also saw the role of the Justice of the 
Peace change from an inquisitorial one to that of a ‘preliminary judge’ (Manchester 1980 
p.230). 
 
2. Judges’ Rules 1912 and the weakness of unregulated pre-trial procedures. 
 
In 1912 the Judges in England petitioned the Home Secretary to formulate rules to be of 
guidance to police officers in criminal investigation. The judges of the King’s Bench 
promulgated the first four rules, and then in 1918 the rules became nine rules. Until the 
Judges’ Rules (1912), there were no rules relating to police officers and their treatment of 
suspects, thus no real control of police conduct at the police station. Questioning and 
interrogation to obtain evidence against suspects that would be admissible in court were 
therefore highly controversial issues (Paul 1980 p.2). A lack of monitoring during the 
questioning could potentially result in inadmissible evidence and police would be unable 
to obtain a conviction. It was because of this that it was considered so important to have 
rules which controlled the giving of evidence at police stations (Marshall 1965 p.127). 
The aim of these rules was to give the police permission to interrogate but make sure that 
all the information the police officers obtained was given voluntarily and not when the 
suspect was under pressure, as such evidence would then be inadmissible (Paul 1980 p.3). 
They gave police officers a method to follow when trying to obtain evidence from the 
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accused (Softly 1980 p.2). The rules were open to interpretation and because of this faced 
criticism from the public and had to be changed to become clearer (Marshall 1965 p.122).  
 
The final Report of the Criminal Law Group
46
 (2007 p.34) suggested that cautioning the 
suspect in the course of obtaining evidence under the Judges Rules was actually 
misleading him about his rights. They perceived a contradiction in giving the suspects the 
right to silence if their use of this right is later held against them in court. The caution 
itself warns the suspect not to self-incriminate, but it is also in the suspect’s interest to 
answer questions (Paul 1980 p.3). The Judges Rules could put pressure on the 
investigating officer to make very difficult decisions. This could be the case, for example, 
with someone who could only be questioned by detaining or arresting him. In such a case 
it would be difficult to see how an officer would not have informed the suspect that he 
could be prosecuted even if no formal charge had been made (Marshall 1965 p.124). 
 
           Furthermore, it was not entirely clear who might be under ‘reasonable suspicion’ 
especially in cases of people who had committed crimes before. There were also 
decisions that had to be made about if and when to record what questions were asked or if 
questions could be re-iterated after a statement had been made. Marshall notes that 
questions could be put to the suspect if they were for ‘the purpose of preventing or 
minimizing harm or loss to some other person or to the public’ (ibid., p.127) but then 
suggests that anything which led to the conviction of a criminal could fall under this 
definition. He concludes that it would have been difficult to blame the police if they 
found these standards 'impossibly high’ (Marshall 1965 p.127). Other problems generated 
by these Rules, was how questioning would be conducted. The Judges’ Rules did not give 
any clarification about it. McBarnett (1981 p.109) agreed that under the Rules, the police 
did not have clear criteria to follow during interrogation of the accused. She also 
criticized the Judges Rules, commenting that they did not work and were just legitimizing 
abusive police interrogation of citizens (ibid., p.110).  
                                                 
46
 The Review Group on Balance in the Criminal Law was established by the Tánaiste and Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform on 1st November 2006, and was required to report by 1st March 2007.  
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          The Judges Rules were aimed at ensuring the voluntary giving of evidence without 
inducement or oppression. However, this had not been successfully achieved and these 
concepts had to be re-defined several times. The result was that the Rules had become 
very confusing (ibid., p.110); and relied on weak definitions which led to a failure to give 
clear guidance on what was and was not admissible evidence in court (ibid., p111).  
Critics of questioning and the right to silence fell into two camps – those who were 
concerned with the efficacy of the police and wanted them to have more power and those 
who thought the police were working with ambiguous rules and wanted the rules to be 
clearer (ibid.).  
There was essentially a conflict between the right to silence and the need for questioning 
during this period. The police were limited by not being able to ask the suspect certain 
questions which would lead to obtaining crucial evidence and possibly a successful 
conviction. It became apparent that the Judges Rules were not sufficiently complex to 
give the accused protection or to ensure that evidence had been properly acquired. The 
Judges’ Rules were amended in 1964 and then were completely overturned by the 1984 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act (Fat 1996 p.472), which became the law that was to 
cover the process of arresting and questioning the suspect. Even though the Judges’ Rules 
had a weak and unregulated basis, they led to the development of more effective laws 
relating to the pre-trial process. Furthermore, the government in England and Wales was 
aware of their weaknesses. This will be shown in the next section, which covers the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.   
3. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) - a Revolution.    
The impetus for PACE started in 1977, when James Callaghan’s Labour government 
established a Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure to deal with the inadequacies of 
the Judges’ Rules, which had been drawn up by Judges rather than  professionals, such as 
lawyers or police officers  who were in the front line of the pre-trial procedure (Fat 1996 
p.472). The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure made great advances by making 
recommendations which led to PACE, which replaced the problematic Judges’ Rules 
(Dixon 1992 p.517). Dixon suggested that PACE was unrivaled in its consideration of 
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both sides, balancing police powers on the one hand with the suspects' rights and length 
of detention on the other (ibid.).  
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was a response to the scandals of police 
misconduct and malpractice, which had dogged the police since its formation in the 
1820s. Planting and fabricating evidence, bribery and the covering up of serious crimes 
were among the police crimes uncovered. Scandals such as those of the Guilford Four, 
the Birmingham Six in 1975 and Carl Bridgewater meant that police malpractice had 
become a nationwide concern (Webb 1991 p.1). The investigation of specific police 
forces such as the West Midlands Serious Crime Squad showed that police officers 
sometimes suppressed or tampered with evidence, beat suspects and were prepared to 
commit perjury (ibid.).  
Dixon suggests that PACE was also necessary to regulate police powers in a way that 
was nationally uniform. Before the Act, a mix of Acts of Parliament along with common 
law and local legislation regulated them. As a result, there were regional inconsistencies 
in whether the police could, for example, stop and search people for stolen goods and 
rules surrounding the authority of the police to detain suspects were unclear. There were 
opposing views about what the police powers should be. On the one hand, senior police 
officers were lobbying for an increase in police powers, on the other there was concern 
about suspects’ rights. This concern was demonstrated by the case of Leighton, Lattimore 
and Salih where three young men (including two who were intellectually disadvantaged) 
had been wrongly convicted in connection with the death of Maxwell Confait. These 
convictions had been obtained on the basis of inaccurate confessions. (1992 p. 516) 
 
Chaired by Sir Cyril Philips, ‘the Royal Commission considered the investigation of 
offences in the light of police powers and duties as well as the rights and duties of 
suspects’ (Irving& McKenzie 1989 p.1). The Commission’s policy was that all evidence 
given to them had to be based on verified data rather than opinion and hearsay. As a result 
of this, several studies were conducted on the process and practice of police interrogation. 
These studies were to provide the Commission with evidence, which would allow it to 
evaluate how pre-trial investigations in police custody were being conducted (ibid., p.2). 
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The Royal Commission proposed new legislation on police powers to stop and search, 
arrest, detention and questioning by giving the police more power while taking into 
account the rights of suspects (Powell & Magrath 1985 p.1). 
Subsequently, The Police and Criminal Evidence Bill had a long and difficult passage 
through Parliament, and there were many amendments. The General Election also caused 
the Bill to be shelved and it did not receive Royal Assent and become law until 31
st
 
October 1984 (Irving& McKenzie 1989 p.1). As well as rationalising existing laws on 
police powers, PACE provided several new measures and provisions relating to the 
behaviour of the police. It also created powerful sanctions by making it a serious 
disciplinary offence to breach regulations. Furthermore, it granted power to the Home 
Secretary to issue Codes of Practice on pre-trial procedures (PACE).  
PACE provides subsidiary Codes (A to H). Code A deals with the exercise by police 
officers of statutory powers to search a person or vehicle without first making an arrest 
and the need for police officers to make records of such a stop. Code B deals with police 
powers to search premises and to seize and retain property found on premises and person. 
Code C sets out the requirements for the detention, treatment and questioning of people 
in police custody by police officers. Code D concerns the main methods used by the 
police to identify people in connection with the investigation of offences and the keeping 
of accurate and reliable criminal records. Code E deals with the tape-recording of 
interviews with suspects in a police station. Code F deals with the audio-visual recording 
of interviews with suspects; Code G deals with statutory powers of arrest, and Code H 
deals with the detention of terrorism suspects (Home Office 2011). The Act has been the 
subject of innumerable amendments. The codes have grown from the original four to the 
present eight; but the nature of the PACE system is essentially the same as when it came 
into force (Zander 2012 p.8). 
 
The Codes have grown in size and complexity; and the format and content of the Codes 
were ‘very much written in a formal, legalistic style’(Zander 2012 p.9). Research on 
PACE has been a preoccupation not only of academics but also of police forces (Zander, 
2003; Dixon, 1992: Pierpoint, 2006 and Skinns, 2010) These studies sought to find the 
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strengths and weakness of PACE. A thorough review would be beyond the scope of this 
section. However, Chapter Five will explore PACE more deeply and investigate the 
Codes (A-H). The purpose of this research is to determine how successfully PACE 
regulates search, arrest, detention and questioning. It will also consider how effectively 
pre-trial procedures monitor police conduct at the police station. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the whole body of discussion about 
PACE 1984. PACE has had ever-widening analysis since it was enacted and has 
encountered considerable criticism. Some of this has been taken account of by the Home 
Office in subsequent changes made to improve PACE. However, I have tried to show the 
background in which PACE was created and given a history of its development In 
Chapter Five, I will investigate and critically analyse Articles in PACE that relate to pre-
trial procedures. 
4. Contemporary Developments. 
After 09/11/2001 when terrorists blew up the World Trade Towers in the US, the issue of 
public safety in the UK also became more complicated. The government responded 
forcefully to the twin imperatives of protecting both the public and the state.  As a result, 
the strategies of all the security services in the UK to deal with suspects or those who 
were involved in terror became extremely rigorous. It became a balancing act between 
the integrity of human rights and the need to protect the state.  Anti-terrorist legislation 
has resulted in what Vogler (2011 p.9) identifies as a paradigm shift, whereby justice is 
concerned with crime prevention rather than placing emphasis on post-crime strategies. 
This prevention entails the targeting of particular groups of suspects including suspected 
terrorists; sex offenders or disruptive citizens who Vogler maintains ‘can be described as 
having forfeited all or part of their status as citizens and consequently their rights 
protection’. Vogler (2011 p.1) points out that the label of ‘terrorist’ means that a suspect 
is deprived of the usual rights which a suspect accused of a commensurate crime would 
have as a citizen of the UK. All crimes committed by ‘terrorists’ are, after all covered by 
existing offence categories. 
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The Terrorism Act 2000 s.1 defines Terrorism as acts or threats of 'serious violence 
against a person’, ‘serious damage to property' or 'serious risk' to public health and safety. 
McKeever believes that to rely on the word ‘terrorism’ can have serious consequences for 
human rights. He also said the definition is complicated and the international 
communities have failed to find a proper definition for ‘terrorism’. He believes that the 
term ‘terrorism’ is deployed for political reasons, and that for this reason it becomes 
difficult to define it clearly. Acts of terrorism might sometimes come from oppression 
and he cites the example of Israel and Palestine (2010 p.115). 
There were however problems with this as the Terrorism Act (2000 s.41) states that the 
police can arrest individuals without a warrant for ‘reasonable suspicion’ of involvement 
with terrorism whether or not they have or were about to commit a crime. Feikert and 
Doyle (2006 p.5) suggest that the government has thus a difficult job in balancing rights 
and security as the ECHR prohibits detaining someone purely to prevent a crime. In the 
case of A v UK (3455/05)
47
 where the appellants had been detained as possible terrorists 
under the UK's derogation from Article 5 under Article 15 after the 9/11 attacks. The 
court ruled that the detention of the appellants was a violation because it "discriminated 
unjustifiably between nationals and non-nationals" (ECHR 2005 Para 190)  
Feikert and Doyle (2006 p.9) point out that the discrimination against black and Asian 
people which was shown in the police responses to the stop and search provisions of the 
1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) continued to be shown in police 
behaviour under the Terrorism Acts. Under the PACE Code A (Para.1.1) discrimination 
against ethnic minorities was prohibited. However, it was acknowledged that ethnicity 
could be taken into account when dealing with international terrorism. The government 
and the police deny using ethnic and religious profiling, as they are anxious to reduce 
tensions especially in the Muslim community and do not want Stop and Search 
legislation to be seen as stigmatising this community as it could exacerbate terrorism. 
This point is reviewed later when discussing PACE. 
                                                 
47
 A v UK (3455/05), ECHR (19 February 2009) 
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The Terrorism Act 2000 section 44 gave senior police officers the power to stop and 
search pedestrians and vehicles without suspicion
48
.  So the 2000 Act makes the situation 
worse rather than protecting the people from terrorists. In contrast, under PACE 1984, as 
we have seen, police officers cannot stop and search without suspicion, but are 
empowered to do so under the 2000 Act. In other words, the problem is who defines what 
‘a terrorist’ is. Human Rights Watch (2010 p.1) noted that between 2007 and 2009 over 
148,000 people in England, Wales and Scotland were stopped and searched without 
suspicion and none of them was charged with terrorism. This gives impression the Act is 
being used improperly. The Equality and Human Rights Commission has criticised 
Section 44 on stop and search ‘the manner in which the law is being exercised may 
constitute racial profiling of certain ethnic minorities, not be proportionate and therefore 
may be unlawful racial discrimination’49. 
Human Rights Watch (2010 p.18) suggests that the section (44)
50
 should not have given 
the senior police officer a power to stop and search unless he obtained permission from 
the Home Secretary within 48 hours. This would allow time to discuss whether such 
actions could result in bad consequences for police relations with any community.  
 ‘‘S.44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 empowered a senior police officer, either verbally or in 
writing, to authorize random searches for renewable periods up to 28 days, where he or she 
“considers it expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism”. The Home Secretary must 
confirm the authorisation within 48 hours or it will lapse’’ (Vogler 2011 p.9).  
What is clear is that terrorist threats have precipitated major, controversial changes that 
have affected pre-trial procedures. We have witnessed the battle between those concerned 
to maintain national security at all costs and those who believe that this concern should 
not mean the relinquishing of pre-trial practices that are in line with ideas about human 
rights. 
 
                                                 
48
 Terrorism Act 2000 section 44, www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000011_en_1. 
49
 See Human Rights Watch (July2010) Without Suspicion p.16. 
50
 Terrorism Act 2000 (s44) An authorisation under this subsection authorises any constable in uniform to 
stop a vehicle in an area or at a place specified in the authorisation and to search (a)the vehicle;  (b)the 
driver of the vehicle; .(c)a passenger in the vehicle; . (d) anything in or on the vehicle or carried by the 
driver or a passenger. 
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Human Rights Act 1998:  
Another contemporary development is the Human Rights Act (1998); The HRA mirrors 
the rights and freedoms granted by the European Convention. These range from the right 
to life, to be free from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, slavery to the right to a 
fair trial and free expression. These rights are extended to everyone living in the UK 
whether or not they are citizens (Watson & Woolf 2003 p.2). Hoffman & Rowe believe 
that the HRA is a piece of legislation of the magnitude of the Magna Carta1215, the Bill 
of Rights and the Acts of Union with Scotland and Ireland as it is an example of 
‘constitutional legislation’ which has the power to affect how people see their identity as 
British citizens (2003 p.2). 
Donald et al point out that there was controversy about the potential effects of 
introducing this Act. Despite being hailed as the ‘beginning of the strong development of 
a human rights culture in this country’, there were warnings that public authorities could 
be overwhelmed by the litigation that this Act would unleash. Furthermore as no Human 
Rights Commission was established by the Act, there was no actual mechanism to 
achieve this ‘promised cultural renaissance’ (2008 pp.14-15). 
 
The HRA has added an extra dimension to the UK laws relating to pre-trial procedures, 
building on those rights and procedures established by PACE. It has been very specific in 
outlining what people’s rights are in relation to arrest and detention and provided the 
possibility of individuals taking their human rights grievances to domestic courts instead 
of having recourse to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The European 
Convention on Human Rights has been instrumental in shaping the HRA, which has 
caused some controversy, in particular relating to the amount of influence Europe should 
have on British law.    
 More detailed analysis of research in this area, and in particular the impact of the 
Terrorism Acts 2000- 2006, Serious Organized Crime and Police Act 2005, Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 and the Human Rights Act 1998 appears in Appendix B.  
 
 Conclusion:  
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To take an overview of the entire period covered in Chapter 4, it can be said that pre-trial 
procedures have become increasingly extensive and that the issue of the human rights of 
suspects has come to the fore. Today the rights of suspects are hotly debated in the press 
and torture is condemned both nationally and internationally. The behaviour of the police 
towards suspects is also the subject of public scrutiny. An exploration of the evolution of 
pre-trial procedures in England and Wales is illuminating when considering how a 
similarly balanced and humane system could be established in a country like Saudi 
Arabia. It is noteworthy that at the start of the period that has been considered, pre-trial 
procedures, such as they were, in England and Wales appeared to fall short of those in the 
newly Islamised Arab Peninsula in terms of human rights. There is now a reversal of this 
situation in that the pre-trial procedure in England and Wales, regulated by PACE (1984) 
among others, could be seen as a shining example of legislation that reflects international 
human rights, whereas the way that suspects are treated in Saudi Arabia is roundly 
criticised in the international press and by organisations like Amnesty International (see 
Chapter 6).  One of the main aims of this thesis is to explore both why this is the case, 
and what can be done about it. In Chapter 6 the history of pre-trial procedures in the Arab 
Peninsula will be explored so that the two developments can be compared and an 
understanding can be gained about why the legal system in what is now Saudi Arabia has 
not built on the great beginnings established by Prophet Mohammed. In order to fully 
understand what the current situation is, there will be interviews with police officers, 
prosecutors and lawyers in Chapter Seven.   
 
The history of pre-trial procedures is a dynamic one and we have seen how changes have 
occurred as the result of many factors:- foreign invasion; political forces such as the 
desire to be seen to control crime; social changes such as the Industrial Revolution and 
the expansion of modern technology;  humanitarian philosophies and the efforts of 
particular individuals. The next chapter will explore in more detail how pre-trial 
procedures are outlined in PACE and the actual practice of implementing them at one 
police station in Sussex. It will also show how pre-trial procedures continue to be an area 
of controversy and in particular how establishing regulations and practice that  serves the 
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both the interest of the individual suspect and the interests of the community to be 
protected has yet to be resolved. 
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Chapter Five 
 
The Procedure of Criminal Investigation in England and Wales 
Introduction:  
 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984), (PACE), was enacted to restore public 
confidence in urban policing and can be seen as the most far-reaching legislation on 
policing after World War II. The violent confrontations between police and communities 
in inner cities, as well as the miscarriage of justice cases prompted this move to both 
regulate and strengthen police powers, including those in pre-trial procedures (Bridges 
2011 pp.2-3). 
PACE establishes a number of controls with regards to protecting the suspect inside and 
outside police stations, but might be considered vague about how police officers should 
implement these in practice. Some police officers, who preferred to adhere to the letter of 
the law, rather than its intention, may find a number of loopholes which could be 
exploited. Several authors, including Moston (1993) and Skinns (2011), point out that 
PACE can be used by the police in their own interests. For example, Sanders and Bridges' 
research showed that officers would sometimes read out the suspect's rights so quickly as 
to be incomprehensible. Thus rather than regulating the police, PACE could be regarded 
as facilitating and legitimating existing powers and practices. In spite of its shortcomings, 
PACE remains the basis for the regulations of the powers of the police and an attempt to 
find an effective solution to upholding the rights of the individual and giving the police 
appropriate powers (Zander 2012 p.5). 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore how the provisions of PACE are carried out and 
to use empirical research to assess the balance between the interests of the whole 
community to be protected from crime and the rights and liberties of the individual. 
Dixon suggests that PACE was unrivaled in its consideration of both sides, balancing 
police powers on the one hand with the suspects' rights and length of detention on the 
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other (1992 p.517). Since it is based on empirical research in one police station in Sussex 
in order to observe actual practices in criminal procedures, the information acquired by 
this study may not be representative of general police practice. Although it is recognised 
that practice will vary across police stations, the results are nevertheless very revealing in 
determining how that balance is being achieved, and how the views and behaviours of 
actual police officers and lawyers reflect this.   
1. The Right to Liberty.  
 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has no provision that deals clearly 
with stop and search. Article 5, which deals with arrest and detention, could be relevant 
in some rare cases where a person is stopped for a sufficiently significant time for it to 
count as a deprivation of liberty (Zander 2013 p.3). However, the ECHR is more general 
than specific, and that might lead to a wide interpretation of what might affect the right to 
liberty. The relevant case law is covered in Chapter Three.   
 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and the Bail Act 1976 introduced 
new legislation governing the way in which suspects were arrested, detained and 
interviewed by police officers. PACE was intended to provide safeguards for both 
suspects and police officers. For example, Code A ensured that suspects were not 
subjected to undue and unlawful stop or search. Also Code C ensured that suspects were 
not subjected to undue pressure or oppression, and made it difficult for the police to 
record inaccurately or invent the words used by the suspect when responding to 
questioning. For the benefit of police officers, the legislation was intended to make it 
difficult for a detained person to make unfounded allegations against the police, which 
might otherwise have appeared credible; this is stated throughout Code C. However, stop 
and search may infringe people’s liberty and bodily integrity, and the constraints imposed 
by the PACE Act 1984 have been introduced to protect these rights. The next section will 
examine and explore these rights through actual observations at a police station, as well 
as the legislation on stop and search, arrest and detention.   
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1.1. The Prohibition of Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Liberty.  
 
Prior to PACE, there were a number of malpractices involving stopping and searching 
without arresting and people lost their liberty without justification The power to stop and 
search suspects dates back to the 1824 Vagrancy Act. This was passed to deal with public 
disorder and gave officers the power to search and arrest for the offence of being a 
‘‘suspicious person’’ or ‘‘reputed thief being in or on any highway with the intent to 
commit a felony’’. Section 66 Metropolitan Police Act (1839) also gave the police in 
London the power to stop and search people they ‘‘reasonably suspected’’ of carrying 
anything ‘‘stolen or unlawfully obtained’’, while similar powers existed in other major 
metropolitan areas (Delsol & Shiner 2006 p.243). 
The police stopped and searched individuals under what were known as ‘sus’ (suspicious 
person) laws. Although officers in urban centres were given local powers, the only 
national stop and search legislation was for the pursuit of drugs and firearms. Under these 
powers officers could stop a suspect solely on the basis of suspicion and did not require 
external evidence such as a witness description or crime report. It is this emphasis on 
officer suspicion that led to the use of the phrase ‘‘sus laws’’ in connection to stop and 
search (Delsol & Shiner 2006 p.243). The ‘sus’ provisions were eventually repealed on 
the advice of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP) following the 
Brixton riots in 1981, principally due to concerns about their negative impact on the 
relationship between the police and the public (The Police Foundation 2012 p.1), PACE 
Part I, following the recommendations of the 1981 RCCP, appeared as a safeguard to 
protect liberty in this regard (Cape 2003 p.357). Section 1 of PACE extended the powers 
of the police to stop and search without warrant in a number of important respects. 
Firstly, all statutory stop and search powers have to be exercised in accordance with 
procedures laid down in the Act and in its associated Code of Practice for the Exercise by 
Police Officers of Statutory Power of Stop and Search (Code A). Secondly, PACE united 
stop and search powers, to be applicable on a country-wide basis, for dealing with people 
reasonably suspected of being in possession of stolen articles, offensive weapons, and 
certain other items. Thirdly, the Act provided a codified statuary scheme for stopping 
traffic for road checks with the need for reasonable suspicion that the drivers had 
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committed an offence or were in possession of prohibited articles, for example, stopping 
and searching for equipment used in offences such as burglary, This was only on the 
basis of reasonable suspicion of carrying such articles (Feldman 2002 p.309).  
 
Section. 1(3) of the Act requires stops and searches to be based on reasonable grounds, 
and the requirement of reasonable grounds and reasonable suspicion are critical to the 
operation of this power. In the matter of stop and search powers without reasonable 
suspicion, PACE in Code A, Paras. 2.12-14 require that; an officer of the rank of 
inspector or above reasonably believes that “incidents involving serious violence may 
take place in any locality in his police area” and that it is expedient to authorize such 
powers to prevent their occurrence or that persons are carrying dangerous instruments or 
offensive weapons in any locality in his police area without good reason. Such authority 
is given in regard to any place in that locality for a period up to 24 hours, and the period 
authorized should be no longer than appears reasonably necessary to prevent incident of 
serious violence (Code A, Para 2.13). The authority is given in written form specifying 
the locality, the period covered and the grounds (Code A, Para, 2.13). For example, if 
there is a demonstration and there has been literature suggesting that the demonstrators 
might use violence in some way, or that the police have intelligence that a counter-
demonstration is due to take place, in such cases stop and search for weapons may be 
authorised even if the demonstration appears peaceful. 
  
Zander (2013 p.6) points out that the Act gives the police power to search “any person or 
vehicle” and “anything which is in or on a vehicle, for stolen or prohibited articles” and 
to detain a person or vehicle, for the purpose of such a search (s.1 (2)). ‘Reasonable 
suspicion’ is not defined in the Act, but the subject is dealt with in detail in Code A of the 
Code of Practice on stop and search. The basic rule is that stop and search must be based 
on some objective evidence and not on hunches, instinct or stereotyping. Reasonable 
grounds for suspicion depend on the circumstances in each case. There must be an 
objective basis for that suspicion based on facts, information, and/or intelligence, which 
are relevant to the likelihood of findings, and articles of a certain kind (Code A, Para 2.2). 
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This was a common theme in interviews with police officers, i.e. that a police officer 
needs ‘reasonable suspicion’ as grounds for stopping and searching people. One specified 
that:  
“The police needed something more than just ‘you look dodgy’. Police officers 
cannot stop and search without evidence, they cannot just approach someone on 
the street, but need some suspicion that the individual is up to no good.”51  
 
The officer went on to add that either s.1 of PACE or s.23 of The Misuse of Drugs Act 
are used in this connection. If the police suspect that someone has either been taking 
drugs, or is about to take drugs, then they can search
52
. However, case law suggests that 
police do not always have 'reasonable suspicion' to stop someone, and that they 
sometimes put security and public safety over this concern as the example below 
demonstrates   In the case of Austin v. The UK (369/09)
53
 Ms Austin was stopped by the 
police who had a suspicion that she had joined a demonstration. The ECHR held that 
there was no violation of Art.5 (1) of the convention. This was due to the exceptional 
nature of the case where the police cordon was used in the interests of public safety. A 
violation would have occurred if that measure had not been considered necessary. In the 
case of Mustapha Osman v Southwark Crown Court (2318/98)
54
, the police officers tried 
to search Osman who had tried to enter a park peacefully. They showed no ID and gave 
no reason, and that led him to refuse to be searched so the police handcuffed and detained 
him. Bailey and Taylor consider that stop and search requires the exercise of police 
discretion and the issues associated with it. It is worth asking how much discretion is 
necessary for the power to be workable. ‘With the maximum discretion given to the 
officer on the beat is he or she capable of being monitored and supervised 
effectively?’(2009 p.163). 
                                                 
51
 (Sussex Police Officer1, interviewed 25 February, 2013). 
52
 (ibid.,). 
53
 Austin v. The UK (369/09), ECHR (15 March 2012). 
54
 Mustapha Osman v Southwark Crown Court (2318/98) Judgment of the High Court CO/2318/98; (1999) 
The Times, 1 July, Queen's Bench. 
137 
 
At interview Police Officer 1 stated that they would not stop and search 'willy-nilly'.                                                                                                                                                                                                       
An officer who has carried out a search must make a record of this as soon as practicable 
and give a copy to the person searched if he or she wants it. In addition, persons stopped 
and asked to account for themselves should also be provided with a record of the 
encounter (Code A Para.4). These records are provided not only for the person stopped 
but to allow supervising officers to monitor the use of stop and search powers and guard 
against, for example, inappropriate generalizations being made. The recording of police 
stop and search can provide a valuable insight into the behaviour and performance of the 
participants in a police stop and search scenario (Code A Para.5).  However, if no arrest 
is made, police action cannot be effectively monitored. Possibly new recording 
technology carried by officers could rectify this problem.  
Searches involving the exposure of intimate parts of the body must not be conducted 
during stop and search as a routine extension of a less thorough search simply because 
nothing is found in the course of an initial search (Code A Para.3.7). If the search 
involves exposure of intimate parts of the body and a police station is not nearby, 
particular care must be taken to ensure that the location is suitable in the sense that the 
search can be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Code. Such a search 
may not take place in a place police vehicle. An intimate search cannot in any 
circumstance be carried out as part of stop and search (Para.3.7).  
Police stop and search powers in England and Wales are to be overhauled with a revised 
code of conduct. Home Secretary Theresa May has said she told MPs “an inquiry had 
found 27% of searches may have been illegal", she said that if this number was not 
reduced, she would seek to change the law. A recent consultation has highlighted 
concerns that stop and search was used too widely and unfairly targeted ethnic minorities 
(BBC 10 April 2014)
55
. In the following section I will examine the way that police 
officers deal with arrestee and detainee in respect of the right to liberty and with regards 
to human rights.  
 
                                                 
55
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27231306. (Accessed 10 June 2014). 
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1.1.1. Arrest.  
 
There was considerable variation in police practice regarding arrest in the pre-PACE 
period, which can be explained by regional variation in policy. Arrest involves a major 
restriction of someone’s liberty and thus needs careful regulation as, if it is carried out 
unjustifiably without specific legal powers, it can be deemed to be false imprisonment, a 
gross abuse of human rights and liable to civil action (Fenwick 2007 p.1140). Fenwick 
goes on to add that before PACE, powers of arrest rested on a ‘mass of common law and 
statutory provisions’ and there was little consistency in the legislation. These powers are 
now covered by PACE although the common law powers remain as do many statutes 
which cover powers of arrest which overlap with those of PACE (2007 p1140). 
 
Arrest procedure was totally changed by PACE (1984 Pt IV, which explicitly granted 
police arrest powers and made police questioning of arrestees a routine part of 
investigations). The details were further refined in PACE Code C,  The Act reflects the 
terms of Article 5 of the ECHR and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, which states that: 
“No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by law … (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person 
effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority of 
reasonable suspicion of having committed and offence or when it is reasonably 
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done 
so...". 
There are a number of elements that must be present for an arrest to be valid. There must 
either be an arrest warrant or a legal power to arrest without warrant. Secondly, the 
factual requirements of the relevant powers must be fulfilled: commonly the requirement 
of ‘reasonable suspicion’. If the arresting officer has made a reasonable but erroneous 
interpretation of the law, he will not have a reasonable suspicion and the arrest will be 
unlawful. The reasonableness of the officer’s decision is to be based on the information 
available to him that time.  
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In some cases, arrest is clearly wrongful; and. the arresting officer may have been 
following the letter if the law but not the spirit. Close monitoring and review should 
prevent unlawful arrests. .  
One such case is Richardson v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police (773 /2011)
56
 
where a teacher was deemed by the Court to have been unlawfully arrested after an 
unfounded allegation by a pupil. One officer commented that 'new guidelines were 
urgently needed to prevent needless arrests that wreck innocent people's careers'. 
With regards to arrest procedure under PACE, one respondent explained that the police 
officer must be professional, get along with people, and have a sense of humour as well. 
He thought it very important to get on the side of the suspect and wondered why any 
police officer would want ‘to wind someone up’, as there seemed no benefit to be gained 
from it. There are, however, many instances when this is not the case (Richardson v UK). 
 
“Winding someone up, then they want to kick off and then they throw them in a 
cell – that’s not in our interests. The police officer wants to do the job and get it 
done – in and out, basically” (Sussex Police Officer 1). 
 
Section.24 of PACE now deals exclusively with the constable's powers of arrest without 
warrant for any offence. The constable has the power to arrest without warrant anyone 
who is, or whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be, about to commit, or in 
the act of committing, an offence. But these powers are to be exercised only if the 
constable has reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to arrest the person in 
question for any of the reasons specified in s.24 (5), which include preventing harm to 
him or herself or the public or to property or to properly investigate the crime. This might 
perhaps encourage the arrest of the ‘usual suspects' on the grounds that the police are 
likely to find something that would justify an arrest.  
                                                 
56
 Richardson v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2011] EWHC 773 (QB);  [2011] WLR (D)  116 
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A number of officers observed that it is actually quite rare that they would obtain an 
arrest warrant.  
“Sometimes I don’t see them at all, other weeks I’ll see a couple of arrests that 
need search warrants, but normally it’s taken care of under PACE.".57 
 
“If I suspect that you are going to commit a crime, for example if I see you with a 
brick, just about to throw it at a window, I can arrest you at that point” 58 
 
PACE Code G states “the use of the power must be fully justified and officers exercising 
the power should consider if the necessary objectives can be met by others….”. If the 
officer has reasonable grounds to suspect but does not believe that an arrest is necessary 
there are various other options to consider, such as the issuing of a fixed penalty notice, a 
report for summons or granting street bail. If an officer arrests someone unnecessarily, 
because s/he is ignorant of these other options, then it could be argued that a violation of 
liberty has occurred. For an arrest to be necessary it must be for one of the grounds 
stipulated in s.24 (5). To say that the list of arrestable offences in section 1 and Schedule 
1A creates problems for the police is an understatement. There are well over 100 relevant 
offences. How is the ordinary officer expected to master and keep abreast of these 
detailed and complicated provisions? Worse, subsections (4) and (5) of section (24) 
extend the power of summary arrest, under certain circumstances to an ordinary citizen 
(Zander 2013 p.131). 
 
Police officer 2 argued that since the amendment of PACE to include Code G, which 
came into force in October 2012, the arresting officer has to make the decision whether 
the arrest is justified, and where certain criteria have been met. The role of custody has 
been clarified and a ‘necessity test’ (Code G Para 2.9) has to be applied by the arresting 
officer to see whether or not detention is required. If the detention is not actually required 
the situation can be dealt with by other means. He added that it was not always easy to 
                                                 
57
 (Sussex Police Officer 2, interviewed 25 February, 2013). 
58
 (Sussex Police Officer 1). 
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judge whether an arrest was justified
59
. Another police officer asserted that arresting 
people with no justification might happen but very rarely. Since the introduction of the 
necessity test, the police officer has to be very, very careful
60
. 
 
These comments show that the police officers interviewed are aware that they need a 
good reason to arrest someone and that there are alternatives. However, a legal advisor 
commented that the police arrest many people with no justification: “because police 
officers are basically ignorant of the law, or they do not have the confidence to make a 
decision, because there is so much hierarchy, that they are not allowed to make 
decisions”. She mentioned situations where there are two versions of the story, and the 
police feel they have to make a double arrest
61
. Judging by this comment, there is still 
some way to go in training police on this matter. 
 
A police officer argued that police officers have the authority to arrest someone purely on 
suspicion but with no hard evidence. He mentioned that sometimes arresting is just for 
investigating the crime.  
“It happens a lot with domestic incidents, where the wife is fed up with the husband and he’s 
drunk, She calls the police ‘He’s just pushed me’, so we have to go there, we have to arrest, we 
have to take him away. That happens a lot”62. 
 
S.24 of PACE now permits an officer to arrest without a warrant for almost any offence, 
whereas before this was restricted to serious offences. The reason given for this change 
was that officers might find it difficult to decide which offences were arrestable without a 
warrant and which were not. However, the response to this might be that officers should 
be given special training rather than making all offences arrestable without a warrant. The 
difference between a felony and a misdemeanour (a felony is punishable by more than 
                                                 
59
 (Sussex Police Officer 2). 
60
 (Sussex Police Officer 1). 
61
 (Sussex Legal Advisor 2, interviewed 13 March, 2013). 
62
 (Sussex Police Officer 3, interviewed 25 February, 2013). 
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one year in jail, a misdemeanor is generally a crime that is punishable for a year or less in 
prison) was encapsulated in common law and used by constables for centuries and this 
difference, it was abolished by the 1967 Criminal Law Act until this was replaced by 
PACE. It seems unlikely that officers today would be any less able to make the 
distinction than before (Austin 2007 p.463). However, they still need training and 
monitoring to ensure regulations are clear to them and that they follow the guidelines. 
During 2010-11 the IPCC received 12.750 complaints against the police in England and 
Wales. This figure increased more than 8000 compared to 2004 when 4.321 complaints 
were received (IPCC Report 2011 p.36).
63
 It seems that PACE fails to regulate the level 
of force when police need it, thus, the level of force should be clear in PACE to protect 
the suspect's rights while he or she being arrested or searched.  
. 
The police officer must record the arrest action; Code G 4.1 states that the arresting 
officer is required to record in his pocket book or by other methods used for recording 
information: the nature and circumstances of the offence leading to the arrest; the reason 
or reasons why arrest was anything said. Moreover, 4.2 states that such a record should 
be made at the time of the arrest unless impracticable to do so. If not made at that time, 
the record should then be completed as soon as possible thereafter. 
 
To be concluded, many situations in which an arrest can be made under s.24 of PACE 
depend upon the concept of ‘reasonable grounds for suspicion’. As PACE gives no 
guidance as to which facts may or may not be capable of being reasonable grounds for 
suspicion in the context of arrest, there are no Codes of Practice or Notes for Guidance to 
help here. Thus it has fallen to the case law, such as Richardson v. The UK and Austin v. 
The UK to develop precedents as to which grounds for suspicion are permissible; such 
guidelines, of necessity, are created in response to the facts of the case before the court 
and so lack generality; each case is to be judged on its own evidence. 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229007/9780108510991.pdf 
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1.1.2. Detention. 
 
Part IV of PACE established a new system for police detention. It created a division of 
function between the officers conducting an investigation and a ‘custody officer’ 
responsible for supervision of each suspect’s detention. It also provided for written 
records to be kept and for periodic reviews of the need for the continued detention of the 
suspect. Bottomley et al point out that safeguards involved providing limits on the length 
of detention and providing appropriate care for detainees as well as protecting their rights 
(1991 p347). The new code C clearly regulates the way that the detainee is dealt with in 
police custody, including the questions that the detainee should be asked by the custody 
officer on being booked in. Paragraph 3.5 of Code C requires the officer to ask the 
detainee whether they want legal advice and whether they want someone informed of 
their detention but, as an innovation, also requires them to ask the person whether they 
are, or might be, in need of medical treatment or attention, and whether they require an 
appropriate adult or an interpreter, to help check documentation and answer questions. 
This is part of a general attempt to create a more sophisticated approach to identifying 
suspects' needs and vulnerabilities.  
 
Paragraphs 3.6 to 3.10 of Code C require the custody officer to initiate a structured risk 
assessment as to whether the detainee is likely to present specific risks to custody staff or 
to themselves, and to make an appropriate response if such risks are identified. A risk 
assessment is required to be carried out in respect of all persons entering police custody 
and the results entered in the custody record. The risk categories include medical and 
mental conditions, medication issued, special needs, violence, escape risk, suicide or self-
harm, and problems with drink or drugs. 
 
Code C requires the custody officer to go further than Para.3.5 in that it provides that they 
must also ask whether the person is suffering from any mental health problem or 
depression and whether they have ever tried to harm themselves. These provisions also 
have the effect of placing specific responsibility on the custody officer to determine 
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whether a suspect is vulnerable as a result of mental disorder or some other mental 
condition (Code C Para.1.4).  
 
It was therefore clear that the custody officer has responsibility for suspects from their 
arrival at the police station until they are charged. During this study’s interviews, Police 
officers (3&4) described this as ‘hard work’, involving decisions about whether to 
handcuff the prisoner, checking medical needs, calling a solicitor if required. The case 
could also be referred to the Crown Prosecution Service, which increases the time spent 
at this stage in the process. 
 
“They then make the decision if it is complicated; and the person is either charged, bailed, 
receives a police caution or it could be no further action. We act on what the supervisor 
recommends”64. 
 
Another police officer said this procedure might take a long time and it was not that easy 
to give a specific time for handling the case, as it depended on the complexity of the case 
and how busy the station was.
65
 Given that a recent report by the Independent Advisory 
Panel on Deaths in Custody 2014 stated that in total there were 7,122 deaths recorded for 
the 13 years from 2000 to 2012. This is an average of 548 deaths per year. Of these 
deaths, 72% were men (5,123) and 28% (1,999) were women. There were 549 recorded 
deaths in state custody in 2012 compared to 515 in 2011. It is essential that the mental 
and physical needs of detainees as well as their legal ones in police custody area are 
effectively dealt with. Deaths and injuries were primarily caused by self-harm or were 
drug-related
 66
. The custody officer has overall responsibility for the welfare and fair 
treatment of detainees, but others, such as healthcare professionals also make an essential 
contribution; for example, when conducting intimate searches (Skinns 2009 p.400). 
 
                                                 
64
 (Sussex Police Officer 3), 
65 (Sussex Police Officer 4, interviewed 25 February, 2013). 
66
 http://iapdeathsincustody.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Independent-Advisory-Panel-
on-Deaths-in-Custody-e-bulletin-July-2014.pdf 
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Skinns goes on to add that solicitors and police are both important parties in the fair 
treatment and welfare of detainees in compliance with PACE. Although they are both 
concerned with the length of the detention, this is for different reasons. The police want 
to ensure that they comply with PACE and the solicitor has often been instructed by their 
client to obtain a speedy release. Police and solicitors can therefore negotiate mutually 
convenient times for interview, but the power to detain lies ultimately with the police and 
the suspect does not always benefit from such negotiations (2009 p.401). 
Section.37 of PACE created a two-stage approach to deciding whether an arrested 
suspect should be detained without charge in a police station. Firstly, the custody officer 
must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to charge the person with the offence 
for which he or she has been arrested (s.37 (1)). If there is, the custody officer must 
decide whether or not to charge the suspect, and detention is permitted only for this 
purpose and only for so long as is necessary to make this decision. If, and only if, the 
custody officer determines that there is not sufficient evidence to charge, he or she must 
then decide whether detention is necessary in order to obtain evidence, whether by 
questioning or by other means. S.37 does not authorize detention in order to obtain 
evidence in respect of offences other than those for which the suspect has been arrested, 
although by s.31 the suspect must be further arrested if it appears that, if released from 
the original arrest, he or she would be liable to arrest for another offence or offences 
(Cape 1999 p.877). 
 
Dixon et al (1990 p.130) argue that, although PACE seeks to ensure that detention is 
justified and cases are processed quickly, whether this happens effectively can depend on 
the police officers’ attitudes to the suspect and to PACE itself. They believe that few 
custody officers challenge the arresting officer’s decision to arrest and some reviews 
amount to not much more than an inspector making a quick check through the hatch on 
the cell door. They comment that “police followed the letter, but not the spirit of PACE” 
(Skinns 2011 p.306). 
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In the case of Al Fayed and others v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (391/2004)
67
 , all 
the suspects claimed to be detained unlawfully whilst being interrogated. The High court 
decided there was no case to answer. But even if the claims had been well-founded, 
damages for less than an hour's questioning in a police station would have been very 
small. The inconvenience and disruption would have been the same, whether they 
attended the police station for interview and finger-printing voluntarily (which the 
appellants say should have happened) or under arrest (as actually happened) .This shows 
there is a difference between interrogation after arrest and detention, and when the police 
interrogate it cannot be counted as detention.  
 
Under s.41 of PACE a person must not be kept in police detention for more than 24 hours 
without being charged, however this can be routinely extended. Reviews of detention are 
concerned with ‘periodically determining if a person’s detention, before or after charge, 
continues to be necessary’. Therefore the reviewing officer has to consider the details of 
the case and allow representations from relevant parties such as legal advisors and 
appropriate adults. During the review, the suspect should also be reminded of their 
ongoing right to free and independent legal advice and the reviewing officer is to make a 
note of any comments made by the suspect (s.42 (6) of PACE). Under s.41 custody 
officers can keep suspects in custody for more than 24 hours only for major crimes and 
then a superintendent could authorize custody for any period up to 36 hours; whereas 
anything after 36 hours has to be decided by a Magistrates' Court. The custody officer has 
to apply to a Magistrates' Court. 
 
One police officer pointed out that long detentions are rare: 
“You could argue that sometimes it might be better for people to remain in custody for a few 
reasons, so we can deal with the case a lot more expeditiously rather than having people coming 
backwards and forwards” 68 
Skinns suggests that the swift expedition of cases is in the interests of both suspects 
and the police. The former because the experience may be unpleasant, and the latter 
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 Al Fayed and others v Metropolitan Police Commissioner - [2004] ER (D) 391 (Nov), 
68
 (Sussex Police Officer 4). 
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through having pressures on their resources (Skinns 2011 p.304). To this end, 
inspectors carry out detention reviews at 6, 15 and 24 hours to check on progress 
and speed up proceedings if necessary. S.41 (6) of PACE stipulates that the 
‘detention clock’ can only be stopped if the suspect has to be taken to hospital and 
any interviews conducted there are added to the detention time. Sections 34-6 of 
PACE allow a suspect to be detained without charge for a serious offence. If it isn’t 
possible to bring the suspect to a Magistrates' Court within 24 hours, then this has to 
be done as ‘soon as is practicable’. What this actually means is the subject of much 
debate; for instance, would an indefinite detention be possible under this definition? 
If the investigating officer feels the need to detain a suspect without charge for 
more than 36 hours in a non-terrorism case, they must apply to the magistrate’s 
court for a warrant for further detention. There must be a full hearing of the 
application, at which the suspect will be entitled to be present and represented by a 
solicitor or barrister (s. 43 (2) & (3)).   
 
PACE stipulates that suspects have a right not to be held incommunicado. This means 
that they may request that someone with an interest in their welfare be informed via 
telephone of their whereabouts as soon as is practicable and at public expense (PACE 
Code C, 2012: 5.1). If that person cannot be contacted, suspects can choose up to two 
alternatives and more, if the custody officer allows. This right can be delayed, for 
example, if police think that the suspect will interfere with or harm evidence; alert other 
suspects who have not yet been arrested; or hamper the recovery of property relevant to 
that offence (PACE Code C, 2012: Annexe B). The decision to delay informing someone 
of a suspect’s whereabouts has to be authorized by a person of the rank of inspector or 
above. 
A custody record must be opened as soon as it is practicable for each person who is 
brought to a police station under arrest or is arrested at the police station having attended 
there voluntarily (Code C.2.1). The custody officer is responsible for the accuracy and 
completeness of the custody record and for ensuring that it accompanies the detained 
person on any transfer to another station (Code C.2.3). 
148 
 
 
A custody officer interviewed with regard to detention recording, considered this as an 
important safeguard to preserve the rights of both suspects and police officers, and said:  
“So, if a drink has been given to them, it is logged, if they ask for a solicitor, it gets logged, if they 
receive a phone call, it is logged. Everything is logged, meticulously. Sometimes things get missed, 
but that’s human nature isn’t it?” 69 
  
Another officer commented that this system is now computerised: 
“Generally, it’s all recorded, dated and timed via the computer” (Sussex Police Officer 4). 
 
A legal advisor agreed with the custody officers with regard to these practices. 
She stated that the detention was reviewed to make sure it was expeditiously dealt 
with. The maximum 36 hours is reserved for serious crimes like terrorism, 
nationwide drugs offences or serious assaults. 
“But generally, everybody is dealt with within 24 hours”
70
. 
The right to liberty is guaranteed in Art.9 of ICCPR and Art 5 (1) of ECHR. A 
consideration of the procedures involved in detention thus involves looking at how the 
police behave towards the suspect. What is also important is how the suspects themselves 
view the detention and their right to know why they are being arrested and what charges 
are being brought will be addressed next.   
 
1.2. The Right to Know the Reason for Arrest and What Charges are Being 
Brought.  
 
PACE regulates the information that has to be given to arrestees, whereby a person who 
is being arrested must be informed of the factual grounds for the arrest either at the time 
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 (Sussex Police Officer 3). 
70
 (Sussex Legal Advisor 1, interviewed 1 March, 2013). 
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or as soon as is practicable after the arrest (s28 (1) and (3)) This applies to anyone 
making an arrest, be it the police, a store detective or a civilian. The police have a duty to 
state the grounds for arrest even if this is obvious (s.28 (2) and (4)).  
 
PACE Code G states that “an arrested person must be given sufficient information to 
enable them to understand they have been deprived of their liberty and the reason they 
have been arrested ….” (Note of Guidance 3). There is also a requirement that suspects 
are informed of their arrest under Article 5(2) of the ECHR. An arrest is unlawful if the 
person arrested is not told the ground of arrest in compliance with s.28 (3); however, the 
arrest becomes lawful once the grounds are given. Bailey & Taylor note that an arrest is 
not rendered unlawful if no grounds are given at the time of arrest, because this was not 
practical, so long as the grounds are given as soon as it is practical to do so. Also, the 
arrest can be carried out by one officer and the grounds for arrest given by another (2009 
p.206). 
In the case of Taylor v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police - (3155/2004)
71
 , the 
claimant was seen on video throwing rocks in the direction of a farmhouse. He was 
arrested and allegedly was told that this was on suspicion of violent disorder at the 
farmhouse. He was detained for 7 hours. The court ordered that he be paid compensation 
as he said he had not been properly informed about the reasons for arrest. The chief 
constable appealed against this, and the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had 
been wrong to find that the arrest had been unlawful as the arresting officer had stated the 
reasons for arrest. The question then arose as to the period of unlawful detention. As the 
arrest was lawful it followed that the period of time following the arrest and arrival at the 
police station was not to be regarded as a period of unlawful detention. The arresting 
officer had informed the claimant of the ground for the arrest within s. 28(3) of the 1984 
Act in compliance with the Human Rights Act, in particular the requirements of 
Article 5(2) of the ECHR. He was told both the essential legal and factual grounds for his 
arrest. On the basis of this case, it would appear that the test has been satisfied to make 
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the arrest lawful. However, it highlights the importance of informing a suspect of the 
facts and grounds for an arrest.  
 
As mentioned in the section on detention under Code C, when a person arrives at a police 
station under arrest, or is arrested there, the custody officer must tell him clearly of (1) his 
right to have someone informed of the arrest, (2) his right to consult privately (see legal 
advice section in this chapter) with a solicitor, and the fact that independent legal advice 
is available free of charge, and (3) his right to consult the codes of practice. He must be 
given (1) a written notice setting out these rights, his right to a copy of the custody 
record, the terms of the caution, and the arrangement for obtaining legal advice; and (2) 
an additional notice setting out his entitlement while in custody (Code C.3.1-3, 2). 
Special arrangements apply where the person appears to be deaf, or there is doubt about 
his hearing, or he is juvenile, mentally handicapped or suffering from a mental disorder, 
is blind or seriously visually handicapped or unable to read (Code C 3.12-C.3.20). These 
normally require the involvement of an independent third party such as an interpreter, an 
approved social approved social worker or an ‘approved adult’ as the case may be. 
Arrests must be regarded as the possible first step in a criminal process and detaining 
someone in order to question them when an arrest has not been made is unlawful (Bailey 
& Taylor 2009 p.206).   
Feldman notes that not only does improper delay render an arrest unlawful, if the wrong 
grounds are given, the detention is also unlawful. Only limited delay is permitted before 
the information is given, and s.28 of PACE is clear that delays can only be justified if it is 
truly impractical to give the suspect grounds for arrest and might impede the police 
operation. Merely being inconvenient is not a sufficient excuse for a delay (2002 p.345).  
 
Clearly, PACE does satisfy the basic principles of the relevant International Human 
Rights provisions. However, the question as to whether it creates the right balance 
between the interests of the community to be protected from crime and the rights of the 
individual is a vexed one.  It is essential that justice remains impartial.  Clearly, the police 
need to protect society, but until a suspect is proven guilty they have a right to treated as 
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innocent. Furthermore, criminals also have the right to humane treatment. It seems that if 
human rights are to be upheld for both the community and the suspect, the police need to 
protect the former and use the powers they are given to do this. However, they also need 
to carry out these powers in a way that conforms to the standards of International Human 
Rights.  The right to know about the reason of arrest is clear in Article 9(2) of ICCPR and 
Article 5(2) of ECHR.  
 
1.3. The Right to be Brought Promptly Before a Judicial Officer.  
 
PACE provisions regulate the right to be brought promptly before a judicial officer, in 
accordance with Article 5(3) of the ECHR and Article 9 (3) of ICCPR , which also states 
the suspect is entitled to trial within a reasonable time and that release may conditioned 
by guarantees to appear for trial Once a person has been arrested for an offence at any 
place other than a police station, he must be taken to a police station by a constable “as 
soon as is practicable” after the arrest (s.30 (1). It should generally be a “designated 
police station” to which he is taken (s.30 (2). However, there is a major exception; s.30 
(10) allows a delay if the suspect’s presence elsewhere “is necessary in order to carry out 
such investigations as it is reasonable to carry out immediately”. So, if an element of 
surprise or the existence of evidence might be lost in the time involved in taking the 
arrestee immediately to the police station, an exception may be made by the police 
officer, but a record of this fact and the reasons behind it must be kept (PACE s. 30(11). 
In the present study, police officers considered that a delay occurs very rarely, except in 
cases where there is violence or suitable transport is not available. 
 
 In the case of O’Hara v. The UK (36555/97)72 the defendant was interrogated about IRA 
membership and suspected involvement in murder on 34 occasions in 1985. He was 
detained for six days and 13 hours in custody before being released without charge. The 
ECHR found there was a violation of Article 5 (3) of the Convention as O’Hara had not 
been brought promptly before a judicial officer. This shows that it is important to send 
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 O'Hara v. The UK (36555/97), ECHR (16 October 2001). 
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the suspect in good time for a trial if there is strong evidence against him or her. The fact 
the law allows so much time in custody without being brought before a judicial officer 
under anti-terrorism legislation is problematic.  
 
S.46 of PACE clarifies the law as to when a person must be brought before a court after 
he has been charged. Broadly, it provides that he must be brought before a court within 
36 hours. The basic provision is subsection (2), which states that he must be brought 
before a court “as soon as practicable” but this hallowed phrase is amplified by the 
additional provision “and in any event not later than the first sitting after he is charged 
with the offence”. If there is no sitting arranged for the day when he is charged, or the 
next day, the custody officer must inform the clerk to the justices, so that a special sitting 
can be arranged (sub.3). If the suspect is to appear at a court in a different part of the 
country, he must be taken there as soon as is practical and must similarly be brought 
before a court there as soon as is practicable; and in any event not later than the first 
sitting in that area after his arrival (sub.4). Subsection (5) requires the police to inform 
the justices’ clerk if there is no sitting scheduled for the day or the next day. When the 
clerk to the justices has received information under subsection (3) or (5), he is under a 
duty to arrange a special sitting of the court for the day after the charge (Zander 2013 
p.224). 
In conclusion, PACE gives police officers a responsibility to show reasonable grounds 
for delaying suspects being taken to the police station, “as soon as practicable after 
arrest” (s. 30 (1)). However, the reality is that, the police officer can justify the delay for 
any legitimate reason (transport, violence or search for evidence). Although, such delays 
must be recorded, there are still problems. A superintendent cannot be both in a police 
station and monitor directly whether the police officer started recording delays in taking 
the suspect to the police station, only the paperwork can be checked. On the whole, 
however, PACE makes an effort to prevent delay by requiring the police sergeant to 
review the case before taking the suspect into custody.  
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In order for the suspect to be brought promptly before a judicial officer and not be 
detained longer than necessary, police actions need to be closely monitored. One 
effective way of doing this is through a third party who has the rights of the suspects at 
heart. In the next section the importance of legal assistance for the suspect during this 
process will be explored.   
 
2. The Right to Legal Assistance.  
 
The Royal Commission recognised that the law, as it stood before PACE, was 
unsatisfactory in granting a suspect the right to legal advice. It recommended that anyone 
arrested should have unlimited access to a private legal advisor and that the police had a 
duty to inform the suspect of this right. PACE was enacted more or less in accordance 
with this recommendation (Shorts & Than 2001 p.62). 
S. 58(1) of PACE provides that the detainee is entitled, if he so requests, to consult a 
solicitor privately at any time. When a request is made, it must be complied with as soon 
as practicable and the custody officer must act on it without delay except so far as a delay 
is authorized in accordance with the section (s.58 (4) of PACE; Code C, Para.6.2). Where 
the person detained is a juvenile, or a mentally disordered or mentally handicapped 
person, either the detainee or the ‘appropriate adult’ (if one is present) is entitled to 
request legal advice, and any such request should be acted on immediately (Code C, 
Para.3.13 and note for Guidance 3G).  
 
Compared to some countries such as Saudi Arabia, the right to legal advice is better 
provided for in the law in England and Wales. However, its impact in due process terms 
should not be under-estimated.  Solicitor 2 was asked if the police in England and Wales 
follow procedure correctly, she answered "I don’t think they are always followed 
correctly, sometimes the police don’t make the necessary enquiries". So this section will 
examine the operation of the right to legal advice at the police station. 
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2.1. The Scope of the Right to Legal Assistance. 
 
Suspects may be ignorant of this right or they might be inarticulate or illiterate, so the 
right to legal advice is a safeguard for those who cannot express themselves. For 
example, they may not fully understand the legal complexity of their situation. However, 
police officers are authorized by PACE to delay or withhold legal advice in exceptional 
circumstances, for example where waiting for a solicitor or where it may interfere with 
the investigation or the administration of justice. In circumstances such as these, 
detention may become a frightening experience (Skinns 2011 p.20). 
 
In this study, legal advisors commented on the scope of legal advice and said that legal 
advice protects the detainee and the police:  
 
“If they do their job properly, then they are not going to get a case chucked out of court because 
of procedural irregularities. The fact that the client did not have an appropriate adult when they 
should have done; or, did not have access to a solicitor when they should have done. Perhaps 
there are mental health issues, things like that. The legal advisers make sure the police do their 
job properly.” 73 
 
They added that in the past there have been instances where good cases have been 
dismissed because the police have not acted properly. So the legal advisors are there just 
as much to clarify the law, so that procedures are followed. Moreover, it is possible that 
sometimes the police are just as glad to have a solicitor there, so they cannot be criticized 
for procedural irregularities, and also to remind clients that in some cases it may be in 
their interests to admit the crime. So far as the client is concerned, the presence of a legal 
adviser gives them a friendly face at the police station. They are able to give good legal 
advice, as solicitors have more access to what is happening with the case than the suspect 
has: 
“If they have a solicitor, the solicitor is told prior to the interview taking place, whatever evidence 
is against the client. They can go in and talk to the client and give them advice on the basis of that 
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evidence. So that is a warning for the detainee; otherwise, they do not get that warning, they do 
not know what is going to hit them”74. 
 
2.2. Legal Advice. 
 
Given that there is concern about whether legal advice to suspects is to remain of a high 
standard, as a result of recent cuts, many of rights described in the following section 
might, in practice, only be a right for those who could afford them. Suspects who can 
afford a highly experienced and qualified solicitor will be at an advantage over someone 
who is allocated a less experienced professional. This will be discussed later in more 
detail.  PACE, s.58 (1) provides that “A person arrested and held in custody … shall be 
entitled, if he so requests, to consult a solicitor privately at any time.”. Code C provides 
that all people in police detention must be informed that they may at any time consult and 
communicate privately, where in person, in writing or on the telephone, with a solicitor 
and that independent legal advice is available free of charge from the duty solicitor (Code 
C.6.1). The term ‘solicitor’ includes a solicitor with a current practicing certificate or an 
accredited or probationary representative included in the list of representatives by the 
legal advice, which must be prominently displayed in the charging area of every police 
station (Code C.6.3). The right to legal assistance is guaranteed in Article 14 (3)(b) of the 
ICCPR and Article 6 (3) (b) of ECHR. 
 
Where a person is permitted to consult a solicitor, who is available when the interview 
begins or is in progress, the solicitor must be allowed to be present at the interview (Code 
C.6.8). The solicitor may only be required to leave if his conduct is such that the 
investigation officer is unable properly to put questions, and on authority of an officer not 
below the rank of superintendent (if readily available), and otherwise an officer not below 
the rank of inspector who is not connected with the investigation (Code C.6.9, C.6.10). A 
non-accredited or probationary representative is to be admitted to police station to 
provide advice on behalf of a solicitor unless an officer of the rank of inspector or above 
considers that such a visit will hinder the investigation of crime and direct otherwise; that 
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officer should consider whether the non-accredited or probationary representative’s 
identity and status have been satisfactorily established, whether he is of suitable character 
to provide advice, and any other matters in any letter of authorization sent by the 
solicitor, the solicitor and the detained person must be informed if access is refused  
(Code C.6.12A-6.14). Under Code C, paragraph 6.9, the police can refuse to admit the 
solicitor to a police station only if an officer of the rank of inspector or above decides that 
their visit will hamper the investigation of crime. Moreover, as the right to a solicitor is 
designed as a protection for people being interviewed, nothing prevents police from 
taking a breath specimen from a drink-drive suspect while waiting for a solicitor, as the 
process involves no interview and is not included in paragraph 6.3 of Code C. 
 
If the suspect is in police detention for an indictable offence, s. 58(8) allows an officer of 
the rank of superintendent to authorize delay on reasonable grounds. If both these 
conditions are fulfilled, access, if requested, can be delayed for up to 36 hours. Delay is 
permitted where the detainee has benefited from the offence, and it is considered on 
reasonable grounds that recovery of the benefit would be hindered if the solicitor were 
contacted (Fenwick 2007 p.1217).  
In the case of John Murray v UK (18731/91)
75
, the applicant was arrested and access to a 
solicitor was delayed for 48 hours. The ECHR held that even terrorist allegations don’t 
justify holding a defendant without access to a lawyer beyond the designated period. This 
case shows that the improper denial of the right to legal advice is likely to lead to 
exclusion of a confession under s.78 of PACE; although, in this case, the domestic court 
did not take a particularly strict line on the exclusion of evidence for refusal or delay 
regarding legal advice.  Also in cases of suspected terrorism, if the suspect is exonerated, 
the deprivation of legal advice can be cause for compensation.  Murray's lack of early 
access to a lawyer was incompatible with the concept of fairness as it had placed the 
accused in a situation where his rights might be irretrievably prejudiced. Mr. Murray was 
awarded £15,000 towards his costs and expenses. 
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 In the case of Magee v. The UK (28135/95)
76
, Mr. Magee was arrested under s.12 of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 1984 in connection with an attempted bomb attack on 
military personnel, and was taken to the Castlereagh police station. He twice requested to 
see his solicitor, but that was refused. However, he was found not guilty and claimed for 
compensation. The Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 6 Para.1 
taken in conjunction with Article 6 Para. 3(c) of the ECHR as regards the denial of access 
to a solicitor.  
 
In the present study, a police officer commented that the investigating officers always 
give the suspect access to legal advice, unless there is a very good reason not to and this 
occurs only rarely.  
“I was a custody officer for three and half years and I cannot remember doing it. I would 
authorise the detainee’s rights to have the forms, and I would delay that, but not their right to 
legal advice. It is pretty strong stuff doing that and would have to be a serious offence – terrorism, 
that sort of stuff.”77 
He went on to add: 
“Yes, we do interview without a solicitor, but it is with the consent of the detainee.” 78 
A legal advisor commented that the police might stop an interview if the solicitor 
was interrupting.  
 “They can ask us to leave but we would not. If you started answering the questions for the client, 
they might get the inspector to have a talk to you. I’ve never known, and I do not believe they can 
deny the client the solicitor of their choice. The client would like the fact that you are interrupting 
the interview. The client isn’t going to sack you. That is quite rare I would say” 79 
 
Legal advice is often given on the telephone rather than in person. Where a duty solicitor 
provides advice, the Legal Service Commission requires initial advice to be given by 
telephone, but the duty solicitor must then attend any subsequent interview or identity 
parade, the legal aid costs claim will not otherwise be paid. When an advisor does attend 
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a police station, the detainee is usual entitled to consult the advisor in private (Code C, 
Notes for Guidance 6B).  
 
There is a lack of privacy when the suspect has the right to have a legal advice though the 
telephone. Telephone conversations may take place over a two-way intercom in the cells. 
The conversations between the suspect and the solicitor may be audible to staff, and 
conversations could also be picked up by the microphones associated with the CCTV 
system. However, suspects and legal advisors are both concerned about the lack of 
privacy for telephone legal consultations, particularly when suspects were only eligible to 
receive advice over the telephone. Moreover, this lack of privacy is unlawful because it 
violates human rights legislation guaranteeing suspects a right to a fair trial (Skinns, 2011 
p.37).  Code C (6J) stipulates that detainees have the right to legal advice in private. If 
this is ‘overheard, listened to, or read by others without the informed consent of the 
detainee, the right will have been effectively denied’.  
 
In spite of it being a serious offence for the police to listen to telephone conversations, 
one legal advisor interviewed said that she suspected that the police do listen in and put 
pressure on the suspect if they have heard anything incriminating
80
 . Although this is not 
the same as recording the conversation it is still a breach of the right to privacy. 
According to Skinns, if advice is inadequate or poor in quality, it is particularly 
unfortunate for suspects; and it might mislead the accused, ‘as it has a bearing on the 
acceptability of police evidence in court and thus the outcome of the case’ (2011 p.33). 
Recent cuts to legal aid will add to this problem. Bowcott (2014), points out Government 
plans for cutting criminal legal aid by £220 million have been thrown into confusion after 
the high court ruled that the Ministry of Justice consultation process was so unfair that it 
was illegal. The decision is a significant setback for Chris Grayling, the justice secretary, 
who was in charge of negotiations with the legal profession that led to 17.5% cuts in fees 
and reductions in the number of duty contracts for solicitors to attend courts and police 
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stations. Mr. Justice Burnett ruled that the process was "so unfair as to amount to 
illegality".
81 
Legal Advisor 2 pointed out that telephone advice could be given at any time. “Every 
single time you have a person, you get a call from the Defence Solicitors’ Call Centre and 
you can give telephone advice”." However, she thinks a solicitor would not be acting in 
accordance with their duty to the detainee if they just gave telephone advice and didn’t go 
down to the police station. She would rather go in person and did not think it was enough 
to give telephone advice, unless it was a professional criminal who is simply going to 
make a ‘no comment’ interview. She normally recommends a solicitor go to the station 
every time there is a detainee. 
However, the importance of face-to-face contact with a legal advisor cannot be 
minimised. A suspect might be relieved to see a friendly face in the police station, in part 
because police stations can be depressing, isolating and frightening places, even for the 
initiated (Skinns 2011 p.36).   The advisor needs to be present to know if the suspect is 
suffering from any physical condition or metal problem. Thus, attending at the police 
station could allow legal advisors to see if the suspect is ready to be interviewed. Finally, 
face-to-face contact between suspects and their legal advisor at the police station 
probably would help the legal advisor to defend their client in the police interview, where 
the legal advisors might ask his client to not comment (ibid.) 
 
Skinns believes that some suspects do not care about the longer-term consequences of 
refusing legal advice and are ready to be put at risk, just to be released as soon as 
possible. Some of them have an addiction that exacerbates this. For instance, smoking is 
not allowed at the station and that can be one of the most frustrating things in custody, so 
they want to be released for this reason (Skinns 2011 p.24). The present study also shows 
that suspects are concerned that consulting with a legal advisor is likely to prolong 
detention. Legal Advisor 2 mentions that suspects sometimes decline legal advice 
because they don’t want to stay long-term at the police station. Some suspects are just 
                                                 
81
Bowcott, O (2014) Plans to cut criminal legal aid in doubt after court  Ruling available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/sep/19/criminal-legal-aid-cuts-illegal (Accessed  9-12-2014). 
160 
 
keen to leave custody as quickly as possible; either because of the environment at the 
police station, because they have work or for a social reason.  
"Moreover, some suspects think, or may be encouraged by the police to think, that the 
solicitor might be late or that it takes a long time to arrive to the police station and that is 
unpleasant for them"
82
. 
 
Skinns argues that suspects sometimes decline legal advice on police recommendation. 
The police may mislead suspects that staying in custody might be for longer if they have 
legal advice (2011 p.25). But in reality, as one of legal advisors mentioned in my 
interview, sometimes detention does not take longer if a suspect requests a legal advisor, 
although this can be as much to do with legal advisors as the police.  
 
“...when I first started out, it happened all the time. One of my clients was arrested and the officer 
said ‘She is not going to be very pleased with you if you call her because she is on the beach and it 
is a sunny day and she won’t want to come off the beach.’ And they did not even phone me even 
though he had asked for me, because they said I would be sunbathing on the beach. They used to 
be like that a lot, but that was 27 or 28 years ago”83. 
 
However, a police officer argued that legal advice cannot be given by them, as the role of 
the police is simply to inform suspects about their rights. He added: 
“We cannot advise them to have a solicitor; they are just given that right. If an inexperienced 
person comes into custody, and says ‘What do you think?’ we say, ‘We cannot advise you but it is 
free. OK’"84.  
 
Legal Advisor 1 commented:  
“A taxi driver, who was fighting with another person for the payment did not ask for a solicitor, it 
was a member of the custody team that said to him ‘Look, you are innocent, I think you should 
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have a solicitor. In fact, the police encourage people to have a solicitor, particularly the more 
serious offences.”85 
Cape notes that sometimes solicitors do not always serve their clients adequately in a 
number of ways. They may be slow to respond, and many firms do not provide a 24-hour 
police station service and make use of unqualified or untrained staff. This can be a 
problem if the accused only wants a specific solicitor. They may give advice over the 
phone when this is inappropriate. Most significantly, they may not act adversarially on 
behalf of their client. The research study Standing Accused showed that this applied to all 
aspects of criminal defence work and notes that, “the nature of criminal defence 
practice…is overwhelmingly reactive in character and incorporates methods which 
parallel and even mock those of the police and prosecution”. Lack of resources and the 
organisation of criminal defence provision was not the problem (Cape 2004.p83). 
 
In commenting on the police-solicitor relationship, Skinns believes that the police and 
solicitors blame each other in order to avoid responsibility for delays. They were in 
reality both to blame for delays for practical reasons and a lack of resources. However, 
from the suspect’s point of view, the end result was longer waits at the police station, 
which might cause confusion as to why the delay was occurring and increasing the 
experience of detention as ‘frightening, uncomfortable and uncertain’ (2011 p.33). 
However, in interview, Legal Advisor 1 argued that in the police station custody suite, 
the relationship between the solicitors and the police was very good indeed. “I’m not 
saying they like every single solicitor that comes in there, but the cooperation is very, 
very good: it is unusual to find somebody who is hostile, a police officer who is hostile to 
you”. This advisor believed the relationship worked very well and got good results. 
Another legal advisor added,  
“There are some police stations, however, where things are very different. It is 
literally ‘us and them’ and we are called ‘the enemy’, particularly London. 
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Brighton, to a certain extent is a very unfriendly police station towards 
solicitors.” 86 
 
Another comment by a legal adviser was that some police officers were not cooperative 
because they were “a bit elderly and old-fashioned”, but that relations with the younger 
generation of police officers was usually very good
87
. 
 
This section has considered the factors affecting access to legal advice. Some of these 
factors are connected to the suspect such as their haste, the seriousness of their offence, 
their self-defined guilt or innocence and their prior experience of the police and legal 
advisers. Other factors are those relating to the police and what they tell the suspect about 
legal advice, or solicitors and their availability, experience and competence. There is 
concern that the latter will be affected by recent legal aid cuts. 
 
Lord Neuberger, President of the Supreme Court criticised the legal aid reforms in 2013, 
asserting: 
 
 "It is a mistake to have a new legal aid regime with a costs structure which will 
drive out the best lawyers. Good lawyers save money, because they are less likely 
(i) to waste time in and out of court, (ii) to be responsible for miscarriages of 
justice, and (iii) to engender appeals and retrials. It is also a mistake to structure 
legal aid costs so as to reward lawyers for doing long trials... lawyers should be 
rewarded for cases lasting less time, not more". (Cited in James 2013, p.8). 
 
The way that suspects make decisions about whether to have legal advice is thus a 
complex weighing-up of their situation, influenced by what they are told by the police as 
well as any previous experience of detention they may have had. Previous experience 
could sway the suspect into requesting or refusing legal advice making their decisions 
highly subjective. One of the reasons that suspects are given the right to legal advice is 
because it is psychologically important for them to feel that there is someone on their side 
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in what can be a very traumatic experience. The right to be treated humanely both 
physically and psychologically will be reviewed next.  
3. The Right Against Ill-Treatment. 
 
Police officers have to protect the suspect’s rights and liberty, while allowing the 
investigation to continue expeditiously. PACE modified the powers of the police 
following arrest, by introducing administrative and bureaucratic safeguards requiring 
records to be kept and copies to be provided to the suspect, with reviews and monitoring 
of the process being provided by more senior police officers (Feldman 2002 p.349). So 
this section also aims to examine the right against ill-treatment established by PACE, as 
ill treatment can arguably lead a suspect to say anything in order to get away. 
  
Section 39(1) of PACE states that a custody officer at any police station must ensure that 
all persons in police detention are treated in accordance with PACE and the Codes of 
Practice, and is also responsible for recording all required matters in custody records. If 
any detained person is transferred to another police station or to the custody of a person 
outside the original police station, then these obligations are transferred the officer who 
becomes in charge of that person under s.39 (2) of PACE. If a superior officer gives 
orders in relation to the treatment of a detained person which conflict with any PACE or 
Codes of Practice rules, or go against a decision which the custody officer would have 
made himself, then the custody officer has a duty to refer the matter to an officer of at 
least the rank of superintendent.  
 
Zuckerman argues that the provisions of PACE and Code of Practice act as a guarantor 
and safeguard for the right treatment of suspects in custody and for ‘the reliable recording 
of their statements during interrogation’. Breaches of these provisions may rob the 
suspect of their rights and also mislead the court (1990 p.501). 
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In the case of Price v. The UK (33394/9656)
88
 Ms. Price was disabled and subjected to 
degrading treatment partly because her disability was not adequately catered for. She was 
sentenced to 7 days of imprisonment, and got no help in the police station, and the court 
found there was a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. This highlights the importance of 
police custody making proper provisions for the comfort of people with disabilities. It 
may be the case that detainees with special needs may require more careful monitoring. 
Detailed rules govern the conditions of detention: for example, cells must be adequately 
heated, cleaned, ventilated and lit; bedding must be of a reasonable standard and in a 
clean and sanitary condition; access to toilet and washing facilities must be provided; at 
least two light meals and one main meal must be offered any period of 24 hours; brief 
outdoor exercise must be offered daily if practicable (Code C.8), detainees should be 
visited every hour (every half an hour if drunk) (Code C.9.3).Any complaints must be 
reported to an officer of the rank of inspector or above not connected with the 
investigation (Code C.9.2). There are also detailed provisions governing the medical 
treatment of person in custody (Code C.9.5-9.14). 
According to one police officer, detainees generally received very good treatment in 
custody; being given hot drinks, blankets and medical treatment. Drunken detainees are 
provided with low bunks and samples may be taken. Juveniles are put into a separate 
wing (Sussex Police Officer 3)  Another police officer argued that people that are in 
custody at this stage of the process are suspected of involvement or having committed an 
offence, so they are not actually guilty of an offence and must be treated accordingly
89
. 
According to one legal advisor: 
“They are treated very well. They have regular food, regular drinks, access to the telephone; they 
have toilets and access to a shower. That’s not to say that it’s a great place, because they are 
locked into an airless room with no windows and they can’t smoke, all the time they are down 
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there. But it’s not at all unpleasant. They have access to books and magazines if they want as 
well.”90 
Intimate and strip searches must be conducted in accordance with Annex A to Code C. A 
strip search is a search involving the removal of more than outer clothing, and may take 
place only if the custody officer considers it to be necessary to remove an article, which 
the detained person would not be allowed to keep (Code C Annex A.10). Statistics must 
be kept of intimate searches under s.55 and published in annual reports of chief officers 
of police (s.55. (15)). 
 
The custody officer authorizes the strip search. There will be two same-sex officers; 
 
“Unless detainees are violent, then there may be people to hold them down and they will be strip 
searched by force. So the officers will take them to a secure room, which will have CCTV for their 
protection, and then they are searched in there. That is the procedure – one item of clothing will 
be removed, that part of the body will be searched and then given back to them, so it is all done 
with dignity. Then the lower half of their clothes, and given back”91. 
 
He added that an intimate search couldn’t be carried out at the police station, but would 
be done at a hospital with the consent of the detainee.
92
 These are important safeguards 
for the right to be free of inhuman or degrading treatment in police custody; it 
corresponds to Article 7 of ICCPR and Article 3 of the ECHR. The presence of a solicitor 
during the interrogation may go some way to ensuring the proper observance of the Code 
of Practice. After illustrating the right to against ill-treatment, the presumption of 
innocence will be discussed.  
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4. Police conduct during interrogations. 
 
PACE regulates the police conduct during interrogations inside the police station. The 
presumption of innocence, the right ot silence and the right against self-incrimination will 
be discussed next.  
   
4.1.The Presumption of Innocence.  
 
 
The Presumption of Innocence is a long standing principle at the heart of the criminal 
justice system in England and Wales. Brookman & Pierpoint point out that both the 
Criminal Justice system of England and Wales and the European Convention on Human 
Rights hold that the presumption of innocence safeguards the rights of suspects, as until 
guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt anyone accused of committing an offence must 
be considered innocent (2003 p.452). In the ICCPR Article 14(2) and the ECHR Article 6 
(1), it is clear that the presumption of innocence is required in pre-trial procedure. 
 
Before the enactment of PACE, there were many cases where successful appeals were 
made against criminal convictions which involved the police violating the principles 
encapsulated in the presumption of innocence. The famous example of this being the 
cases of the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four where suspects made false 
confessions under police torture and convicted of Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
bombings that injured hundreds and killed 26 people in England (Naughton 2011 p.42). 
To stop these malpractices, PACE requires the suspect to be considered innocent till 
proven the guilt. Code G of PACE requires that facts and information relevant to a 
person’s suspected involvement in an offence should not be confined to those which tend 
to indicate the person has committed or attempted to commit the offence. Before making 
a decision to arrest, a constable should take account of any facts and information that are 
available, including claims of innocence made by the person, that might dispel the 
suspicion (Code G 2). 
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Police officers wanting to make an arrest must give sufficient information to enable the 
suspect to understand they have been deprived of their liberty and the reason they have 
been arrested, as soon as practicable after the arrest; i.e. when a person is arrested on 
suspicion of committing an offence they must be informed of the nature of the suspected 
offence and when and where it was committed. The suspect must also be informed of the 
reason or reasons why arrest is considered necessary. Vague or technical language should 
be avoided (Code G 3). An officer who believes that it is necessary to interview the 
person suspected of committing the offence must then consider whether their arrest is 
necessary in order to carry out the interview. The officer is not required to interrogate the 
suspect to determine whether they will attend a police station voluntarily to be 
interviewed but they must consider whether the suspect’s voluntary attendance is a 
practicable alternative for carrying out the interview. If it is, then arrest would not be 
necessary. Conversely, an officer who considers this option but is not satisfied that it is a 
practicable alternative, may have reasonable grounds for deciding that the arrest is 
necessary at the outset ‘on the street’. Without such considerations, the officer would not 
be able to establish that arrest was necessary in order to interview (Code G 2F). 
 
A police officer (1) interviewed asserts that they treat suspects as an innocent ' we treat 
them very well; they are innocent and have not been charged yet'. He added: we do not 
detain the suspect if they is not strong evidence against him or her and whoever arrests 
the suspect must bring a strong evidence within a tight limit of time or release him or 
her’. A legal advisor argues that the police sometimes arrest innocent people and lock 
them up in the custody cell.  A police officer (3) addressed that, saying: 'yes sometimes 
we arrest a group of people in the fight scene, we need to make sure who started that fight 
-who is the suspect'. It appears from this that the police in England and Wales give the 
presumption of innocence to the suspect till proven guilty.  
However, Naughton suggests that police investigations can breach the principles 
contained in the presumption of innocence in ways other than violations of the codes of 
conduct and guidelines contained in PACE (1984) (2011 p.43) .   
 
4.2. The Right to Silence. 
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This study discovered that the law relating to the right to silence was not adhered to as 
silence was often taken to be an indication of guilt, and the detainee was not always 
regarded as innocent. The 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (s. 34) gave 
prosecutors the right to invite negative inference from a suspect’s refusal to answer 
questions. Seidmann had pointed out that the right to silence only seems to benefit those 
who are guilty but this assumes that innocent suspects would not exercise this right and 
that only the exercise of this right would give the suspect an advantage (2005 p.593).  
 
PACE and the Code of Practice (Code C) gives certain rights to suspects being held at a 
police station in relation to the circumstances in which interviews may take place. Unlike 
in Saudi Arabia where the Code of Criminal Procedure (2001) only applies to 
prosecutors, the Code applies to constables, and to those charged with the duty of 
investigating a crime. Code C provides that when there are grounds to suspect someone 
of an offence, the person must be cautioned before being questioned regarding his 
involvement in that offence and told that his answer or silence may be given in evidence 
to a court in a prosecution. Dennis notes that these grounds could just be an anonymous 
tip off and not necessarily admissible evidence and that in many instances the caution is 
given at the start of an interview (2013 p.173). A person must be cautioned upon arrest 
for an offence unless it is practicable by reason of his condition or behaviour or he has 
already been cautioned under Para.C.10.1 (Code C.10.3). The caution is “You do not 
have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention when 
questioned something, which you later rely on in Court. Anything you do say may be 
given in evidence.” (Code C.10.5).  Regarding cautions, a police officer commented that 
detainees were cautioned and reminded of their rights at every stage of the procedure
93
. 
 
It was this principle that underlay the traditional police caution to a suspect in England 
and Wales until 1994 when inferences were allowed to be made from a detainee's silence. 
The suspect was not obliged to say anything, but anything said would be recorded and 
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might be used in evidence. In deciding whether there is a case to answer and whether the 
accused is guilty; Section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 allows a 
court or jury to draw inferences about the silence of the accused during questioning about 
information which he or she could reasonably have been expected to divulge given the 
circumstances at the time (Dennis 2013 p.175). Thus, a person’s right to remain silent is 
guaranteed by PACE, but applies in full measure only when one is not suspected of an 
offence (Feldman 2002 p.385).  
 
A solicitor should not only make the suspect aware of the right to silence, but may also 
advise if the suspect seems unable to cope with the interview or unsure about how to 
answer a particular question that he or she should say nothing (Fenwick 1993 p.388).  
 
“The right to silence should not merely remain a vital part of the criminal justice system 
of England and Wales; it should be strengthened. This is because its removal could 
increase the chances of innocent people being wrongly convicted with no obvious gains 
for law enforcement and insufficient protection is currently provided in order to avoid 
this risk” (Greer 1990 p.708). 
 
However, remaining silent can be a strategy that professional criminals can use to their 
advantage. They are experts in criminal procedure, and can remain silent to avoid a 
charge, and keep the prosecution searching for the truth until time runs out without the 
prosecution having sufficient evidence to charge them (Greer 1994 p.103). At interview, 
Police Officer 5 believed that refusal to answer questions and state ‘no comment’ 
depended on the person’s circumstances. Solicitors would often advise first offenders to 
admit the offence and just get a caution, whereas they would advise silence if their client 
was guilty and it would be up to the police to prove the crime. This view was echoed by 
Police Officer 3 who said it was 'recidivists' who would plead 'not guilty' and this was 
frustrating for the investigation as the suspect would often admit the crime in court.  Such 
comments indicate that police officers may have lost sight of the fact that the law requires 
the prosecution to prove its case. 
 
Legal Advisor 1 also believed that the ‘professional criminal’ was most likely to make no 
comment at interview, whereas it was the innocent or those who would just get a caution 
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who gave the fullest answers. Another legal advisor disagreed with the police view that 
silence wasted police time; she believes that remaining silent does not affect the 
interview.  
“Obviously, the interviewer will want to make sure the questions are put to the detainee, so that 
they can then turn round and say, “Well, I asked all these questions and he didn’t answer. So, if 
the detainee then gets to the Magistrate’s Court or the Crown Court and says, “I’m not guilty,” 
there will be an adverse inference drawn. So far as the interviewer is concerned, it does not matter 
whether he answers the questions or not, he will still go ahead and ask the questions.”94 
 
In their dealings with the State, there are many situations where ordinary citizens are 
lawfully required to give out information. The right to silence in a criminal context may 
well provide protection for both the innocent and the guilty, and although many of those 
questioned in this study believed that it was of more benefit to the guilty, this has yet to 
be demonstrated. 
 
4.3. The Right against Self-Incrimnation.  
 
Except as provided by PACE s.63, a non-intimate sample may not be taken from a person 
without the appropriate consent. However, s.63 (2A) A non-intimate sample may be 
taken from a person without the appropriate consent if two conditions are 
satisfied.(2B)The first is that the person is in police detention in consequence of his arrest 
for a recordable offence. (2C)The second is that (a) he has not had a non-intimate sample 
of the same type and from the same part of the body taken in the course of the 
investigation of the offence by the police, or (b)he has had such a sample taken but it 
proved insufficient.. In Saunders v UK, as I mentioned in Chapter Three, the ECtHR 
excluded breath samples blood samples, urine samples and bodily tissue from the scope 
of the privilege against self-incrimination. Choo notes that this may be a reason why 
procedures for obtaining statements from suspects at police stations have been the subject 
of tight regulation (2013 p.257).  
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PACE Code C (2012) states that answers to questions and statements should not be 
obtained through the use of oppression (Para. 11.5), which was defined in the case of R v 
Fulling 1987 2 All E.R. 65. by the Court of Appeal as “the exercise of authority or power 
in a burdensome, harsh or wrongful manner; unjust or cruel treatment of subjects, 
inferiors, etc.; or the imposition of unreasonable or unjust burdens, as well as involving 
impropriety on the part of the police interviewer through the use of bullying, intimidating 
and discourteous practices and lengthy interviews”. Skinns comments that this definition 
might mean that night interviews could be construed as “being on the cusp” of oppression 
as suspects might be more vulnerable at this time (2010 p123). 
Feldman comments that interviews conducted in this way risk breaching s. 76 whereby 
the courts have to exclude any confession obtained through oppression or any means, 
which might render the confession unreliable. Also, s. 78 allows the court to exercise 
discretion about any such evidence that might compromise proceedings (2002 p349). 
Zuckerman notes that because police interrogation is part of the criminal trial process and 
can determine the outcome of the trial, procedural fairness is crucial. The decisions taken 
by the Court of Appeal recognise that there is a close relationship between fair treatment 
at the police station and fairness at the trial (1990 p.500). Clearly, as long as the privilege 
against self-incrimination and the interests of law enforcement remain in conflict with 
each other, the rights of suspects will not remain secure. 
            
 In the case if R v Paris & Miller, (1993)
95
 , the appellants were convicted of murdering a 
prostitute. The appellants were threatened and bullied at interview, and the whole course 
of questions was such as to render their admissions unreliable and inadmissible under s. 
76(2) of PACE. The Court of Appeal heard the tapes and found that Miller had been 
intimidated. The court was of the opinion that the confessions obtained would have been 
unreliable even with a suspect of normal mental capacity.  This reveals the importance of 
not extracting confessions through inducement or threats, as otherwise may falsely 
extract confessions which are then no use in court whether the suspect is guilty or not. It 
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is impossible to estimate the frequency of such practice. However, it is likely to happen 
out of the police station where there is little monitoring.    
 
At interview a police officer presented his view after being asked if pressure was put on 
the suspect to obtain a confession. He said:  
 
“We are not necessarily seeking a confession. What we are seeking is the truth. So, if on the rare 
occasion that they arrest someone who is completely innocent, and I have to say that as an 
investigating officer I have done that, I am not in the business of drilling a confession out of 
someone. What I need to know is what is their version of the truth as far as they are concerned..” 
96
. 
 
This officer went on to recall when a suspect had not committed the crime he was 
accused of and the information the police had been given was incorrect. On that occasion 
the suspect told him everything to establish his innocence. Then the police officer could 
go away and check those facts. If the police officer had used oppression to get a 
confession out of the suspect, and they had charged him and taken him to court, the case 
would have crumbled. “I would have probably lost my job”. The police can exert 
pressure; there is nothing wrong with using robust questioning, or challenging someone if 
a suspect is lying.
97
 
 
Recording the interview is one of the measures regulated by PACE to ensure the rights of 
the suspect are protected. An accurate record must be made of each interview, whether or 
not the interview takes place at a police station. The record must state the place of 
interview, the time it begins and ends, any interview breaks and, subject to Para 2.6A, the 
names of all those present; and it must be made on the forms provided for this purpose or 
in the interviewer's pocket book or in accordance with the Codes of Practice E or F. Any 
written record must be made and completed during the interview, unless this would not 
be practicable or would interfere with the conduct of the interview, and must constitute 
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either a verbatim record of what has been said or, failing this, an account of the interview 
which adequately and accurately summarizes it (Code C Para.11.7).  
 
In this research, a police officer described the way they now recorded the interview 
electronically and the circumstances when paper records were still kept:   
 
“However, there are some occasions, when someone has not been brought into custody – what we 
call contemporaneous interviews. They can be recorded in a pocket notebook or on a special form. 
The police officer would ask a question and write it down and then record the suspect’s answer 
and write that down. At the end, they get the opportunity to read it, sign it and initial it after their 
answers to make sure it has been recorded correctly. The whole point of it is to ensure the integrity 
of the interview, to make sure that no words came to the suspect’s mouth by the police.” 98 
 
 
Thus, the presence of a solicitor will help the suspect who will then be fully aware that he 
can keep silent. The solicitor may sometimes advise silence and may help the suspect to 
maintain silence where advice alone might not be enough. It should be recognized, 
however, that the key question is not whether the presence of a solicitor means that the 
detainee remains silent but whether it means that he is unlikely to make an unreliable 
confession. Moreover, this highlights the importance of the presence of a legal advisor 
when the suspect is being questioned. It seems that the right to silence and the right to 
legal advice are intertwined and impact on each other.  If the suspect had no right to 
silence it would be much more difficult to establish this causal relationship.  
 
Choo comments that there are many statutory provisions in England and Wales which 
allow the police to demand information and that not only can this information be used in 
criminal prosecution, but that the suspect could be prosecuted for not providing the 
information (2013 p.239). It could thus be argued that there needs to be a more careful 
evaluation of what kinds of information could be reasonably and legally demanded from 
suspects. 
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5. Non- discrimination.  
 
All pre-trial police procedures such as arrest, detention, search and treatment could be 
subject to discriminatory practice, and this is especially true of the powers that do not 
depend on purely objective factors. On the face of it, stop and search, for example, is 
allowed on subjective interpretation of what might be reasonable grounds for doing so.  
In common with experiences in many parts of the world, the relationship between the 
English and Welsh police and minority ethnic communities has not been a happy one.  
The racist behaviour of some police officers was highlighted by the Judicial Inquiry into 
the way the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) handled the Stephen Lawrence murder. 
This inquiry, led by Sir William MacPherson, took place four years after the murder and 
after years of campaigning by Stephen Lawrence’s parents. The report concluded that the 
MPS and other police services were affected by institutional racism. Seventy 
recommendations were made aimed at “the elimination of racist prejudice and 
disadvantage and the demonstration of fairness in all aspects of policing.” (The House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2009 p.4). 
 
Macpherson recommended that all stops as well as stops and searches should be 
recorded, that the recording requirements be extended to ‘voluntary’ stops and searches, 
and that the records should be monitored and scrutinized and the results published. The 
Home Office revised Code A included a requirement that police ‘stops’ which require a 
person to account for themselves should be recorded, with a copy of the record being 
given to the person at the time of the stop (Cape 2003 p.358). 
 
Another example of police discrimination occurred in the London neighbourhood of 
Brixton in 1981, the Brixton riots were triggered by ‘Operation Swamp ‘81’. For a week, 
120 plain-clothes and uniformed police officers patrolled Brixton with specific 
instructions to stop and question anyone who looked ‘suspicious’. They stopped 943 
people in four days and were targeting black people (Bowling and Phillips 2003 p.4) 
 Bowling and Phillips point out that this is not to say that since then nothing has changed. 
On the contrary, the face of the England and Wales police service has been changed 
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radically by the recruitment of police officers from Black and Asian minority ethnic 
communities (2003 p.25). However, this still has to be improved. 
 
 
In their report ‘Ten Years after Macpherson’, The House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee concluded that the police had improved in their treatment of ethnic minorities 
and in combating racism in their workforce. Sixty-seven out of Macpherson’s seventy 
recommendations have been fully implemented. (Twelfth Report of Session 2008-9 p.4) 
 
      "We were impressed by the evidence we heard about improvements in the investigation of 
race crimes and of critical incidents involving members of ethnic minority communities. Police 
leaders have shown a clear commitment to increasing awareness of race as an issue throughout 
the service." (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee p.9). 
In spite of this, the report found that it was still the case that black communities were 
disproportionately targeted for stop and search and over-represented on the DNA 
database and this had increased since 1999. By 2009, the police still hadn’t met its target 
to employ 7% of officers from ethnic minorities. These officers were less likely to be 
promoted and more likely to be subject to disciplinary procedures (House of Commons 
Home Affairs Committee p.9).  
The Equality Act 2010 built on the Race Relations Act (2000) which was introduced in 
response to the Lawrence enquiry. It has two main purposes, to harmonize discrimination 
law and to strengthen the law to support progress on equality. The Act places a ‘general 
duty’ on public bodies, who ‘must have due regard to the need to; eliminate unlawful 
discrimination, harassment and victimization; advance equality of opportunity and foster 
good relations’. 
Cape argues that pre–PACE research mostly showed that searches were unlawful. The 
stop and search powers contained in Part I PACE, following the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (the Phillips Commission), were designed to 
provide a national power that was subject to strict safeguards. However, much of the 
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research on the PACE powers ‘has questioned the efficacy of the provisions’ (Cape 2003 
p.357). 
This study was unable to establish the extent to which if any, discrimination exists at the 
police station against any type of minority or majority. It was hard to ask a question about 
discrimination in the interviews because of the ethical implications. There have however 
been other studies on this, which are referred to later in the section. It is also is worth 
exploring PACE and analysing provisions that seek to prevent any discrimination such as 
Code A.  
Code A Para.1.1 states that stop and search powers must be used “fairly, responsibly, 
with respect for people being searched and without unlawful discrimination”, together 
with a reminder that the police are now covered by the Equality Act 2010. Further, 
consent will no longer be sufficient to provide grounds for a search so that, other than 
where a search can be conducted with consent as a condition of entry to sports grounds or 
other premises, a “person must not be searched unless the necessary legal power exists” 
(Code A Para.1.5) and not just because the officer has negative attitudes towards that type 
of suspect. It should be noted that the Equality Act 2010 simplified things considerably, 
by having a single legislative framework (replacing the numerous Acts and Regulations 
in existence) that provides a strengthened statutory basis for tackling discrimination 
whilst demonstrating a level of parity across all equality groups. The Act protects people 
from discrimination by government departments, local authorities and the police.  
Cape (2003 p.358) believed that Code A Para.1 of the Equality Act is likely to result in a 
decrease of stops and searches. With regard to the former, there is yet another attempt to 
define what may constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion: “There must be an 
objective basis for that suspicion based on facts, information, and/or intelligence which 
are relevant to the likelihood of finding an article of a certain kind …” (Code A para.2.2). 
Stop and search on “some level of generalisation stemming from the behaviour of the 
person”, even if the police have no specific information or intelligence. Recent evidence 
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cited by Teresa May
99
 shows that disproportionate stops and searches of ethnic minorities 
have continued despite the legislation, and that the regulations do not by themselves 
prevent discriminatory behaviour by the police. This is illustrated by the Gillan v UK 
case which was discussed earlier in the section on International Human Rights.  
 
Skinns suggests that evidence points to discrimination against ethnic minorities. Even 
when taking age, sex, reason for and outcome of arrest into consideration, Afro-
Caribbeans were twice as likely to be strip-searched. Furthermore, the subsequent Home 
Office report states that “the issue of racial discrimination has not yet been adequately 
addressed by the police.” Skinns also points out that there is the issue of detaining 
‘terrorist suspects’ for up to 28 days without charge, as many of these will be from ethnic 
minorities (2011 p.38).  
The recording requirement has been strengthened so that a record of a stop and search 
must be made at the time “unless there are exceptional circumstances that would make 
this wholly impracticable” (Code A para.4.1). Recording the cases that police handle is a 
safeguard for both police officers and suspects, in terms of preventing discrimination.. In 
other words, PACE formalized the way that the police officer should deal with the 
suspect and protects their both rights by recording stop and search a person.  
   
PACE Code A has attempted if not succeeded in preventing discriminatory police 
behaviour happening in England and Wales. However, there is doubt about the 
number of people who have been stopped and searched without any justification, and 
it is difficult to satisfy both citizens and police officers. If the police officers did not 
prevent crime before it happened, the citizens would blame them; if the police officers 
stop and search under any circumstance, they would also be blamed for unjust 
deprivation of liberty.  Non- discrimination is prohibited in the ICCPR Article 26 and 
the ECHR Article 14. The right against ill-treatment thus encompasses many areas of 
police behaviour and requires them to be aware of the suspect's right to silence as well 
as the importance of not discriminating against suspects on grounds such as their 
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ethnicity. The police need to be trained and monitored so that their behavior does not 
unnecessarily interfere with the lives of citizens. The next section addresses the right 
to privacy which is another important aspect of this.  
 
6. The Right to Privacy. 
 
Fenwick argues that the common law in the UK before PACE did not provide full 
protection for the citizen when police officers use their power to search and enter 
properties. However, PACE came as safeguard to address this by placing powers of entry, 
search and seizure on a clearer basis and ensuring that the person whose premises are 
searched understands the basis of search and can complain as to its conduct if necessary 
(2007 pp.995-996). However, this section seeks to furnish a brief introduction to the 
PACE 1984 treatment of Part II and the Codes of Practice in order that it can present a 
context within which one can then view the development of domestic law in England and 
Wales with regard to the right to privacy.  
 
Invasions of the right to private life could occur by police action, such as conducting a 
search of persons or property. The search warrant underpins police powers when they 
conduct a search and respects, to a degree, a person's right to private life. PACE restricts 
the power to search in order to respect the individual's rights and, to a limited degree, 
their privacy in public spaces. However, a particular problem with UK law and the 
governance of policing action has been its piecemeal approach (Taylor 2003 p.87). 
 
Part II of PACE outlines the power to search a person in properties: (1) new general 
power to search for evidence (ss.8-14 and Sch.1); (2) provision generally to search 
warrants (ss.15.16); (3) general powers of entry (s.17); (4) a power to enter and search 
after arrest (s.18). PACE, s.8 provides for the police to seek a warrant to enter and search 
premises. A Justice of the Peace must authorize the warrant. It must be established that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that an indictable offence had been committed 
(Bailey &Taylor 2009 p.184). The power to search can be exercised under s.17 to: 
execute a warrant of arrest arising out of criminal proceeding; where an officer wants to 
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arrest a person suspected of an indictable offence; to recapture someone unlawfully at 
large (such as, for example, an escapee from a prison, court or mental hospital); to save 
life or limb or prevent serious damage to property. This provision regarding criminal 
proceedings allows an entry to be made to search for someone wanted under a warrant for 
non-payment for a fine. Apart from saving life or to prevent serious damage, a constable 
can only exercise the powers if he or she has reasonable grounds for believing than the 
person in question is on the premises (PACE 1984 s.17 p.16). 
 
Mead notes that Section 17 seeks to place entry by consent of the suspect on a statutory 
footing, so that it may be regulated in the same way as entry by warrant or after an arrest. 
Regulations prior to PACE were vague and unclear and did not sufficiently demonstrate 
how entry by police officers is different in concept to trespass by a private citizen, so 
merely developing common law ideas about public law trespass would not be sufficient 
to ensure clarity on this matter (2012 p.99). Under s.18 (1), the premises must be 
controlled by a person who is under arrest. There is a missing definition and vague 
judicial guidance as to what degree of control is necessary (Bailey &Taylor 2009 p.190). 
Under section 18 (1) (b), after an arrest, a constable may search for and seize anything 
which relates to some arrestable offence which is connected to, or similar to that offence. 
Although the Act provides no precise definition of ‘connected to’ or ‘similar’, searching 
for drugs when a person has been arrested for stealing a sandwich would not be justified. 
(Shorts & Than 2001 p.130). 
 
In the present research, a police officer was asked how important it was for a police 
officer to obtain a search warrant, and he replied surprisingly that it was quite rare, as 
PACE allows the police to carry out those searches, in any event. He went on to say that 
if the police officer wants to search premises there was no problem. 
“If we have specific intelligence about drug dealing in particular premises, then we would go to a 
Magistrates' Court and ask them to authorise a search warrant. But, if we suspect a criminal 
activity has taken place, if we’ve received information, we can go the address and we would be 
able to search it under PACE, after arrest
100
. 
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The powers which the police exercise in this area seem very broad and permit 
considerable interference with private life.  Furthermore, if the information that the police 
have been obtained was totally wrong or malicious; what is the justification for the 
unlawful invasion, which might affect the occupants, particularly vulnerable people such 
children or the elderly?. In the case of S and Marper v. The UK(30502/04, 30566/04)101, 
Mr. S & Mr. Marper were arrested and charged with attempted robbery, and their 
fingerprints and DNA samples were also taken. The police retained the samples under 
s.64 of PACE. The applicants believed that it was a violation of their right to respect for 
private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR. However, s.64 is far less precise. It 
provides that retained samples and fingerprints must not be used by any person except for 
purposes related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or 
the conduct of a prosecution.The ECHR held that the retention of the applicants’ 
fingerprint and DNA samples was in violation of Art.8 of the ECHR. The United 
Kingdom is the only member state expressly to permit the systematic and indefinite 
retention of DNA profiles and cellular samples of persons who have been acquitted or in 
respect of whom criminal proceedings have been discontinued. 
 
Recording is required when the police search a person, but the police officer can easily 
avoid recording his misconduct and the supervisor can hardly supervise the manner in 
which searches are being carried out. Moreover, failure to properly record the search 
would deprive the person concerned of their rights while they are being searched (ibid., 
p.319). The subsequent revised versions of Code A do not unambiguously provide that 
consensual searches, where there is a power to search, must comply with the recording 
provisions of PACE, and Code A. However, many officers are still not recording 
searches, notwithstanding that this is an action which would protect the suspect’s rights 
and give a proper picture of the frequency with which searches are taking place and their 
success rates (ibid,). 
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181 
 
In the interviews that were conducted, an officer was asked about the circumstances in 
which it is necessary to obtain the consent of the accused to search their property, their 
person or their vehicle. He said:  
“We can use consent to search property and vehicles, but not the person. They cannot consent to 
it. We need to have grounds for searching a person”102. 
 
He added that signatures were needed for consent to search property and vehicles.  
Some limits on the extent and manner of the search are accordingly imposed by PACE 
and Code A; which give examples of what might or might not constitute ‘reasonable 
suspicion’, thereby limiting the discretion of the police. Feldman points out that there are 
difficulties with defining ‘reasonable suspicion’ as Code A does not give sufficient 
guidance. This means that the police may not use the standard of ‘reasonableness’ in 
practice. Officers often act on ‘hunches’ without consciously thinking about whether their 
grounds for suspicion are ‘reasonable (2002 pp316-7). 
 
Code B, Para. 2.9 provides that written records required under Code B which are not 
made in the search record must, unless otherwise specified, be made in the recording 
officer’s pocket book (‘pocket book’ includes any official report book issued to police 
officers) or on forms provided for the purpose. PACE acknowledges that searches should 
be made as far as possible without interfering in a person’s private life. This kind of 
regulation would totally be acceptable if it provided stricter criteria on the manner in 
which the search of a property was conducted. Police officers questioned in this study all 
agreed that they faced no particular problems when they wished to search premises, 
because PACE gives them the power to enter a house with or without a search warrant. 
Clearly, police officers can produce justifications for why they have 'reasonable 
suspicions' in order to makes searches they feel are needed.  
 
The right to privacy highlights the importance of a person's home and how this 
significance is recognised by PACE and international declarations of human rights such 
as ECHR Art.8 and ICCPR, Art.17. The suspect should not be deprived of their private 
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domain more than necessary and bail can be given so that, once charged, the suspect can 
continue their private lives. The next section addresses this right. 
 
 
7. The Right to Police Bail. 
 
Releasing a person who has not been charged with an offence before trial is by no means 
new, the right having existed for a long time. The issue of police bail is more recent in 
origin, and has developed considerably. However, the powers that the police have been 
given to grant bail could be construed as a restriction of liberty, particularly if the suspect 
has not been charged with an offence. Some have argued that this restriction might 
breach the right to liberty under Art.9 (3) of ICCPR and Art.5 of the ECHR and, is also 
breach of s.34 of PACE (Cape & Edwards 2010 p.529). 
 
PACE 1984 permits the police to bail a person without having charged them with an 
offence. S.34 (5) allows custody officers to grant bail to persons they were required to 
release under s.34 (2) because the grounds for detention did not have any justification. S. 
34(1) provides that detention of arrested persons in a police station must be in conformity 
with the provisions of the Act. Subsection (2) states that the custody officer must order 
the release of anyone whose continued detention by the police cannot be justified under 
the Act. Subsection (3) holds that only a custody officer has the authority to release a 
person from police detention. S. 37(2) permits the custody officer to release a person on 
bail or without where, having been arrested and brought to the police station, the officer 
did not have sufficient evidence to charge them with the offence for which they had been 
arrested, unless the officer believes the ground is needed. S. 37(7) enables a custody 
officer, having determined that there was sufficient evidence to charge, to release a 
person on bail as an alternative to charging them. This is in addition to the power of the 
custody officer to release a person charged with a criminal offence on bail pending their 
first court appearance. 
However, an arrested person who is not in a fit state to be charged or released under s.37 
(7) may be kept in police detention until fit (s.37 (9)). The person may not be kept in 
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police detention without charge for more than 24 hours even if still unfit (s.41 (1)). The 
person would have to be released then since there would be on grounds for continued 
detention (s.41 (6, 8)). Section.41 (9) requires a ‘fit state’, but the Act does not define 
what is meant by a ‘fit state’, and it is open to interpretation (Levenson & Fairweather 
1990 p.115). 
 
In this study, a police officer described how the police deal with a suspect from arriving 
at the police station until they are charged or released. He said that subsequently:  
 
“It could be that the police can authorize that they are charged; or it could be that we refer the 
case to the Public Prosecution Service, for lawyers to make the decision. That tends to be for 
serious stuff – domestic violence and hate crimes. Once that’s decided on, what ‘the disposal’ is, 
we call it ‘the disposal’, a charge or caution, we make a decision about bail i.e. they are released 
to go to court. We trust that they are going to turn up, or we can put bail conditions on, or we can 
keep them in custody until they go to court”103. 
 
Cape & Edwards believe that the enlargement of police powers as regards bail afforded 
when PACE came into force “has considerable constitutional and human rights 
implications (and) was simply surreptitiously slipped on to the statute book” (2010 
p.539). People who have been granted police bail can now be arrested if they fail to 
surrender on the due date or if they fail to comply with any of the conditions imposed and 
there are no time limits imposed on street bail or pre-charge bail. There are also no limits 
on the number of times someone is bailed and released. There were proposed 
amendments to the Police and Justice Bill to limit street bail to 72 hours, but this was 
rejected by Parliament (ibid., p.547).  
 
Street bail is carried out in an unsupervised environment and the police officer is in a 
powerful position over suspects, not least because it is a custody officer and not a 
magistrate that the suspects have to apply to in order to have their bail conditions 
reviewed (Cape & Edwards 2010 p.555). It is, however the case that they can appeal to 
the court for this. A custody officer may grant a suspect bail at the police station, 
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requiring him to return to the station or to the court at a designated time unless he should 
subsequently be informed that such attendance is no longer required. The police may also 
impose conditions upon the bail, such as requiring the suspect to hand over his passport; 
to pay a surety, to report regularly to the police station, to live at a specified address or 
keep away from particular people. Either a custody officer or the court may vary bail 
conditions. If the suspect fails to keep to the rules of his bail, absconds or fails to appear 
in court, then the police have a power to arrest him without a warrant and take him to the 
police station at which he was supposed to report (s.47 of PACE). 
 
A legal advisor was asked whether bail gives the professional criminal a chance to flee 
from justice. She remarked that this rarely happened as criminals needed to maintain a 
good bail record: 
“The ones more likely to jump bail are the kids, who do not realise the importance of getting up 
and going down to the police station to answer their bail. Having said that, you know I have a 
client now who has been on bail for 12 months. It is getting longer and longer and longer, it is 
getting ridiculous.”104 
 
She also commented that, bail was understandably withheld in cases of rape, domestic 
violence or paedophilia. If bail was given 
 
“Then you hear the nightmare stories in the press, where people have been kept in at the police 
station, got bail at court then gone on to kill lots of people.” 105. 
 
Sections.34-37 of PACE allows custody officers to grant bail to persons they were 
required to release, when they are deemed to be in a ‘fit state’ for release. The Act does 
not, however, define the mean of ‘fit’ and thus the situation in which bail can be given is 
somewhat vague. However, the recent study showed that bail is given in appropriate 
cases, and less likely to give a professional criminal a chance to flee from his crime. The 
right to an effective remedy to be discussed next.  
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8. The Right to an Effective Remedy in England and Wales. 
 
Complaints against the police in England and Wales are handled in different ways, 
depending on how serious the case is. At local level, the police can resolve the complaint 
themselves by Local Resolution. The police’s Professional Standards Department (PSD) 
allows for local investigation by the police, whereas under Supervised Investigation the 
complaint is dealt with by the PSD under the supervision of the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission (IPCC). The IPCC investigators investigate independently only 
in serious cases or on issues of particular concern to the local community (Waseem 2005 
pp.7-8). 
 
 
The IPCC was inaugurated in 2002 under the Police Reform Act (PRA) and set up in 
2004 following public consultation. It was intended to replace the PCA and, along with 
local police forces, is how complaints against the police are dealt within England and 
Wales. The PRA also replaced Informal Resolution by Local Resolution, whereby third 
parties, like witnesses, can also make complaints. Under Local Resolution, a complainant 
cannot ask for formal investigation once they have given consent to the Local Resolution 
process
106
. This study will explore and examine – without going deeply into the IPCC, 
which is beyond this study, the approach adopted in England and Wales when 
investigating police misconduct. 
 
The IPPC deals with appeals against police handling of complaints and serious cases such 
as deaths in custody or police shootings, police corruption and so on. It was established to 
increase confidence in the police complaints system and to set standards for police 
conduct; as well as being the source of valuable information to the police on the needs 
and concerns of local communities and what positive changes in policing could be made. 
It should be noted that it is the individual police forces that are responsible for any 
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disciplinary actions that follow IPCC rulings and that the IPCC can also refer case to the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
107
. 
 
The Home Affairs Committee points out that the main purpose of the IPCC is to increase 
public confidence in policing by ensuring that justice is done where the police are 
accused of this kind of wrongdoing (2013 p.5). It does this by: overseeing the functioning 
of the police complaints system; considering appeals where people believe that a police 
investigation has got it wrong; and lastly by conducting its own investigations into the 
most serious matters, referred to it by the police or under its own initiative (ibid., p.5).  
 
The Home Affairs Committee criticized the IPCC, as not yet being capable of delivering 
the kind of powerful, objective scrutiny that is needed to inspire that confidence (2013 
p.4). Waseem (2005) points out that the IPCC “is woefully under equipped and 
hamstrung in achieving its original objectives”. It is not large enough to adequately cover 
all 43 police forces in England and Wales, as it is even smaller that the Metropolitan 
Police’s Professional Standards Department and does not have binding authority. 
Therefore it struggles to effectively investigate all complaints and all too often the police 
are left to investigate themselves. 
 
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), which established the Police 
Complaints Authority, introduced an increased degree of independent investigation and 
supervision and established a two-tier system whereby formal investigation was carried 
out in the case of serious complaints and less serious ones, such as police incivility and 
minor assaults, through the new process of Informal Resolution. This was supposed to 
afford the complainant a speedy resolution by means of a meeting with the officer 
complained about and an investigating officer, usually an inspector. Complaints could 
then be dealt with informally and usually ended by an apology or explanation from the 
officer or force concerned. Section 85 of PACE and section 69 of the Police Act 1996 
allowed the police to use Informal Resolution if a chief officer considered the complaint 
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suitable (in practice a chief officer normally referred to an inspector or above), if the 
complaint would not lead to disciplinary or criminal action if proven, or the complainant 
gave their consent (Herrington et al 2007 p.1). 
 
At interview,  Legal Advisor 2 was asked about assaults by the police and replied that the 
procedure was to get the injuries photographed, have the allegation noted in the custody 
record and a statement made to the senior officer, which would go to Police Complaints 
Authority. Legal Advisor 1 added that this would precipitate a charge and that this 
deterred a lot of people, even if they were ‘black and blue’ so it was usually better to wait 
for the outcome of the case. 
  
Despite the 1984 reforms, the police complaints system continues to be criticized for its 
failure to command popular support. Due to the system being largely governed by the 
police, there was also criticism from a number of commentators, including the police 
themselves, about the system’s lack of independence (Herrington et al 2007 p.2). 
Fenwick comments that although the 2002 Act introduced the Police Complaints 
Commission in order to establish independent external investigation of complaints 
against the police, the police themselves mainly deal with complaints. This is largely due 
to lack of resources (2007 p.1315). 
 
Herrington et al  argue that past reforms of the (PCA) and IPCC have been largely 
unsuccessful; the complaints process has always tended to be viewed with unease and has 
never particularly enjoyed the confidence of complainants or officers. However, 
redressing this situation is one of the IPCC’s core objectives. They believe that if Local 
Resolution is to work, the complainant must participate voluntarily and that all concerned 
should have realistic expectations about what the process involves and what the likely 
outcomes will be. Both the IPCC and local PSDs are committed to reduce delays, 
preferably within 28 days, whilst recognizing that the outcome of a complaint is 
nevertheless more important than the time it takes to resolve (Herrington et al 2007 p.35).  
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Tort damages will be available as a result of some breaches of PACE and other relevant 
statutes. For example, if a police officer arrests a citizen where no reasonable suspicion 
arises under s. 24 of PACE, an action for false imprisonment will be available. Equally, 
such a remedy would be available if the Part IV provisions governing time limits on 
detention were breached or if a detention review failed to occur for a period of limit. 
Malicious prosecution will be available where police have abused their powers in 
recommending prosecution to the Crown Prosecution Service (Fenwick 2007 pp.1303-
1304).  
 
Police Officer 2 stated that, in his opinion, the police generally do a great job without 
breaching the PACE Codes they deal with and this was also believed by Police Officer 3, 
who said that although police behaviour was not ‘right every time’, usually procedures 
were done ‘by the book’   
 
A legal advisor’s answer supported the officer:  
“They do follow procedures. So far as interviewing is concerned, they have a crib 
sheet, which tells them exactly what they have to say at the beginning of the 
interview. They have a custody sergeant making sure they sign for everything. It’s 
all very procedural, and they are well-trained.”108 
 
Clearly, the police itself and the IPCC monitor the way that police officers conduct pre-
trial procedures in several ways. However, as the first step in making a complaint is to 
address it to the chief constable, complaints can stay within the police. Although this may 
lead to the problem being dealt with quickly, assaults can be denied, as was shown in one 
interview. Moreover, suspects do not like to make a complaint due to threats or being 
afraid of future actions by the police. Establishing a new commission or closer regulation 
of supervision to prevent assaults of people in public or at the police station may go some 
way to protecting communities, however, it is also possible that the police could evade 
such measures if they wanted to.  
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Conclusion: 
A review of the pre-trial procedures covered by PACE has shown that issues of 
regulation and practice  between the interests of the whole community to be protected 
from crime, and the rights of the individual are contentious, as the case law cited in this 
chapter reveals. The interviews as well as the literature demonstrate that the police do not 
always follow the letter of the law, and careful training and monitoring of police is 
crucial as well as having an effective remedy when rights are breached. The research 
discovered that there were some areas where PACE was not properly implemented. The 
suspect may well be read their rights, but too quickly to be properly understood. They are 
allowed to see a lawyer, but told that this will slow the process of their investigation. It 
has been suggested here that there is sometimes competition between the solicitors and 
the police officers, and that there is evidence that the police officers try to mislead the 
suspects by saying their solicitor might be late and that might affect the length of their 
stay in custody. It is difficult to properly monitor the process of stop and search in the 
street. The fault seems to lie less in the actual legislation contained in PACE but in how 
officers are monitored and made accountable.   
 
Although PACE is impressive in its codification of pre-trial, it has had its teething 
troubles, and as a result there have been amendments to clarify definition (as mentioned 
in Chapter Four), and much has been learnt over the 30 years of its existence about 
proper implementation There is a speedy redress if an individual wishes to make a 
complaint against police officers. However, as long as police action on the street is not 
closely monitored, it is always possible for officers to falsely deny accusations. 
Discrimination is more likely to occur during stops and searches, highlighting the 
importance of effective training,  monitoring and review.  
  
The right to privacy in Saudi Arabia relies on the culture and not the CCP - as we will 
explain in next chapter-however, PACE protects the suspect's private life through a code 
of practice. Moreover, the right to bail is being ignored in Saudi Arabia's criminal 
procedure. PACE, however, allows the police to release the suspect if there is no strong 
evidence against him and even if the suspect is charged, bail can be granted. Finally, 
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PACE does not accept any misconduct from the police and gives the suspect rights to 
claim for compensation - a right which is totally non-existent in Saudi law. Saudi Arabia, 
should take into account and adapt these elements from PACE in order to comply with 
the principles of Shari'ah and international human rights norms. In the next chapter the 
pre-trial procedures in Saudi Arabia are explored with a view pinpointing the problems 
there. The chapter will also suggest how PACE could usefully be explored by Saudi 
Arabia in establishing a pre-trial system which is fair, effective and in keeping with the 
human rights principles contained in Shari'ah and international human rights laws.  
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Chapter Six 
 
The History and Development of Criminal Justice in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
Introduction:  
 
 
           This chapter will consider the history and development of criminal justice in Saudi Arabia 
from pre-Islamic times in the Arab Peninsula to the birth of Islam in AD 610 and trace 
the changes that have happened from then up to the present day. It will look at how Islam 
introduced a system of criminal justice into what was a system of tribal law, and how this 
new system incorporated ideas about human rights, at a time when this was still very 
undeveloped in Europe. The chapter will also explore the current reforms to the Saudi 
Code of Criminal Procedure (2001), which will be further examined in Chapter 7.There 
will be a discussion of human rights in Saudi Arabia on both a national and international 
level. It will argue that Saudi Arabia is aware of issues of human rights in that it has 
signed and ratified a number of treaties. However, in practice there is still a long way to 
go before Islamic principles of human rights are reflected in both legislation and actual 
practice. 
 
 
1. Criminal Justice in the Arabian Peninsula before Islam. 
 
There is a lack of information about the history of criminal procedures in the Arab 
Peninsula and most of the resources have been taken from: the writings of Arab 
historians; books of the Torah and some Jewish books; the writings of ancient Greeks, 
Romans and Assyrians and ancient monuments in the Arabian Peninsula. Most of the 
writings of Arab historians relied on Jewish and Christian books and some superstitions 
that were conveyed from one generation to another (Razwy 1996 p.13). Thus, all the 
information about pre-trial procedures in the Arab Peninsula is uncertain in its details. 
Nevertheless, poetry was a great resource for evidence about culture in the Arab 
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Peninsula. The works of the poets were the only indigenous source of information about 
the rudimentary forms of justice that existed at this time that was not Jewish or Christian 
(ibid). The Arab Peninsula is less than 2500 km in length and approximately 2000 km in 
width, most of it desert, plateaus and mountains. The climate is very hot and dry with a 
lack of rainfall. Moreover, it never seemed to flourish from an economic point of view 
during that period. This protected the Arab Peninsula from invasion by the Roman or 
Persian empires (Al Awabdeh 2005 p.31). Therefore there were no significant external 
influences on how the law worked at this time. 
 
Arab society before the birth of Islam had particular characteristics. For example, a harsh 
life, a strong respect for social dignity and freedom, and a family’s reputation and dignity 
were of paramount importance (ibid., p.33). Moreover, strong loyalties to family and 
tribe led to a robust social solidarity, even though some customs are now considered 
unacceptable such as, killing sons if they were considered to have cowardly characters. 
Thus, a tribal law sprung from nepotism and a system of blood relations such that a tribal 
member could do anything to protect and prevent the threat to his family or tribe. This 
overrode considerations of whether such actions were right or wrong in themselves and 
the tribe thought it a sort of bravery. Al- Awabdeh argues that this ‘bravery’ for Arabs 
was only another name ‘for vicious acts and savage practice, the members of that society 
were engrossed in all sorts of vices and evils which were both deep-rooted and universal 
in nature’ (2005 p.34). 
 
Khoary points out that all communities in that period in the Arab Peninsula had different 
degrees of sophistication, and had their own laws, which applied to offenders and 
outlaws. These laws put the defence of dignity and reputation above religious values, but 
all had their system of punishing crimes such as murder and theft. These sanctions were 
often private and when a person was considered a killer, they were handed over to the 
relatives of the victim. But what is of concern here is not law enforcement but the extent 
that these customs were harbingers for that group of laws that existed before Islam and 
continued their existence thereafter (Khoary 2007 pp.129-130).  
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The most remarkable feature of the criminal justice of the Arab Peninsula in pre-Islam 
was the total absence of criminal justice organization in any form or any regulated law. 
The people of the Arab Peninsula had not experienced any government to dominate them 
except the chief or the leader of tribe who had the authority to rule the tribe. The 
authority of the tribal chiefs, however, sprung from, in most cases, ‘their character and 
personality, and was moral rather than political’ (Schacht 1982 p.8-9). 
A system of customs based on blood feud and compensation was the norm in the Arab 
Peninsula. The point here is that no generation tried to change the methods of criminal 
justice, as it was part of their culture, thus no law was formalized into a system. However, 
in the event that a crime was committed, the injured party took the law in its own hands, 
and tried to administer ‘justice’ to the offender. That system led very frequently to acts of 
cruelty. Moreover, most of the tribes had autonomy over justice issues. There were no 
police or courts to make a complaint to and they knew if they over-reacted against the 
perpetrator, his or her tribe would declare war and the war would not stop for a long time 
(Razwy1996.p.9). See Appendix C.4 for a description of the Albswas War which 
illustrates this point. 
However, there was a way to avoid all the feuds or war that could result from a tribe 
member committing a crime against another tribe. This was a process of making peace or 
conciliation which is called sulh and which usually ended in compensation. Certain 
people could play an indispensable role as arbiters in all disputes within the tribe or 
between rival tribes such as the chieftains who are called sheikhs, soothsayers and healers 
who are called Araf, and influential noblemen. The decision or hokam was made 
according to customary law or tribal law. Thus, the decision was not legally enforceable 
but binding on all the parties. ‘The effectiveness of tribal mechanisms in containing 
disputes can be attributed to a complex system of special customs and regulatory 
procedures within each group’ (Al-Ramahi 2008 p.12).       
‘‘Tribal law is built upon two basic principles: (1) the principle of collective responsibility; and 
(2) the principle of retribution or compensation. The objective of tribal law is not merely to 
punish the offender but to restore the equilibrium between the offending and the offended 
families and tribes’’ (Al-Ramahi 2008 p.3). 
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Lippman suggests that Arabs did not encourage the growth of individualism as they had a 
tribal life, a tribal mind and tribal culture. If a member of a tribe committed a crime, the 
tribe would deal with him or her according to their customs. Otherwise, if the tribe did 
not punish or react against the criminal, this sometimes resulted in bloody controversies 
that often took a long time to settle, Arbitration was the only way to end the feud between 
the tribes, and usually a man took the punishment instead of a woman and a slave would 
be punished instead of a freeman (Lippman 1989 p. 29-30). 
 
        ‘‘Pre-Islamic societies had their own methods of dispensing justice, based on custom and 
usage. The centrepiece of their archaic judicial system was their belief in blood-ties and the 
concept of clan loyalty attached to it. Notions of discipline and authority could only exist by 
the means of blood relationship. It was impossible for them to conceive both vice and virtue 
outside the tribal context’’ (Al Awabdeh 2005 p.36). 
 
Torture and flogging in order to extract confessions were not commonplace in pre-
Islamic tribal culture. Al-always comments on this, saying that torture was only permitted 
and practiced if there was societal agreement. There were some kinds of torture that were 
used as a pre-trial procedure to make a suspect confess.  Examples include putting the 
suspect on the sand on a sunny and hot day, then putting a large stone on the suspect’s 
chest, denying water to the suspect for a long time and flogging harshly. The suspect was 
unlikely to be tortured, unless there was consensus from his or her tribe to the use of 
torture to extract a confession. If this consensus were not obtained, the suspect’s tribe 
would take the revenge and declare the war (Al-alway 2008).  Taking the oath, which is 
still called qasam was a way to prove the innocence of a criminal if there were no 
witnesses at the scene (Hursh 2009 p.1405). 
 
To conclude, the Arab Peninsula had been remote from ancient civilizations and that 
affected the regulation of their methods of criminal justice. Loyalty to the tribe was a 
barrier to the development of regulated methods of criminal justice. Islam focused on 
improving the social and legal standing of everyone, especially of the weaker members of 
society by introducing some concept of authority and respect that was not purely based 
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on blood ties and clan loyalty but traditional human values. Thus, next section will 
examine the effectiveness of Islam on criminal justice in the Arab Peninsula.  
 
2. Criminal Justice after the Birth of Islam. 
 
One of the most important features of Shari’ah is that ‘every true Muslim obeys the 
Commandments of God and feels pleasure in the very act of obedience. Obedience to the 
word of God comes from within, spontaneously, and without external compulsion. In the 
light of this civil and criminal law is seen as a means of returning people to the proper 
path, rather than as a deterrent’ (Walker 1993 pp. 863-864). Hursh points out that Islam 
does not have an effective legal system. as the holy Qur’an does not sufficiently lay out 
an adequate legal system in the eighty verses or so with legal content; he believes it was 
written for purely practical reasons that related to the time of Prophet Muhammad, so that 
means it is unreliable as a guide to contemporary regulation (2009 p.1404). 
 
Vogler (2005 p.106), comments that claiming a divine source for a code of law is unique 
to Islam ‘amongst major systems of law’. He agrees with Hursh that the legal content of 
the Qur’an is indeed sparse, and that out of 6,300 verses ‘only 30 verses directly and 
unequivocally touch on criminal law and only 20 on procedure’, although up to 500 can 
be said to refer to legal matters. In spite of this, the Islamic criminal justice system was 
an advance on the blood feuds that preceded it and offered a speedier resolution for 
dealing with offences. 
 
Alexiev (2011 p.28) also agrees with Hursh, suggesting that the Prophet Muhammad took 
his ideas from Bedouin culture and he did not institute a new system of legal 
administration, rather he was simply a religious reformer. The Bedouin were without any 
written code of law, and relied on a custom (aurf). Hence, he believes that Shari’ah is a 
mixture of Bedouin customs and Prophet Muhammad’s attempts to codify them. Hursh 
and Alexiev’s arguments seem to suggest that Islamic law is insufficient as a system of 
criminal justice for this reason. However, arguments about whether Shari'ah may or may 
not contain elements of Bedouin culture is not an argument against its effectiveness 
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Furthermore, whilst it is clear that the Saudi criminal justice system might well be 
improved by closer regulation of pre-trial procedures, this in itself does not suggest that 
Shari’ah is incapable of incorporating such measures.  
 
During Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime there were no police (described in Arabic as 
shurta). The Prophet was the judge and he received his commandments from God. 
During the Abbasid and Umayyad periods, the system of justice administration became 
the shurta (police tribunals). These shurta controlled the law, each place had at least two 
courts, and the shurta was aiming to achieve the aims of Shari’ah (Alexiev 2011 p.33). 
 
Although, the Ottoman Empire had little effect on the Arab Peninsula, it is interesting to 
note that there were important changes to Shari’ah in Arab countries within the Ottoman 
Empire. Being a desert, the Ottoman rulers had little use for the Peninsula and so did not 
institute legal changes there (Alexiev 2011 p.37). 
 
Gravelle (1998 p.2) makes a distinction between different kinds of Islamic state and the 
application of Shari’ah law. Some states, like Turkey, are purely secular, others, like 
Morocco, apply Shari’ah only to family matters. There is a third category of states such 
as Qatar and Yemen, where there is a modified form of Shari’ah and certain punishments 
are excluded; whereas states such as Iran, the Sudan and Saudi Arabia  attempt to impose 
Shari’ah in a classical form. 
 
3. Contemporary Criminal Justice and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia. 
 
The process by which the Saudi government enacts new laws and makes changes to 
procedure are not a matter for public debate. For this reason, it is difficult to speculate 
why certain changes in legislation occurred or why they occurred when they did. The 
Saudi Arabian government has announced that Shari’ah is the supreme law of Saudi 
Arabia. Article One in the basic law of Saudi Arabia says, ‘‘The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its religion; Allah’s Book and the 
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Sunnah of His Prophet, Allah’s prayers and peace be upon him, are its constitution, 
Arabic is its language and Riyadh is its capital’’ (Royal Decree Number (A,90)1992 ). 
As a result of this, it would be obvious that for any new regulations, laws or systems to be 
issued, they must comply with the rule of Shari’ah, even those about human rights.  
Nevertheless, the Saudi government alleges that they apply Shari’ah as the law of Saudi 
Arabia, and as I mentioned earlier in section 2.3, Shari’ah can be suitable everywhere 
and to anyone; and criticising the Shari’ah would be a criticism of the divinity. However, 
criticising the application of Shari’ah does not criticise the law itself. Vogler (2005 
p.120) has pointed out that Shari’ah has been ‘amalgamated into a bureaucratic and 
highly repressive police hierarchy’.  In order to explore that, questions will be raised as to 
whether the Saudi government respects human rights at a local level and whether people 
feel that the legal practices actually follow Shari’ah. It is one of the main aims of this 
thesis to examine this issue, so this section will explore Saudi Arabia’s role and position 
with regard to human rights at both the national and international level.  
3.1 National Level. 
Shea (2004 p.3) believes that depriving people of their rights and freedoms is part of ‘the 
fabric of society’ in Saudi Arabia due to its practicing the Wahhabi [an ideology 
stemming from Mohammed Ibn abd Al-Wahhab] as part of Islam. She thinks the 
Wahhabi ideology causes the lack of human rights in Saudi Arabia as it asserts its 
rejection of the Western model and other Islamic legal schools of thought. The origins of 
this choice of ideology are in the period 1744-1818 when Muhammad Bin Al Sa’ud (the 
leader of Dir’iyyah, a small town in central Saudi Arabia and original home of the Al-
Sa’ud family) was in alliance with Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab, (his methodology 
today is known Wahhabism), in insisting on the importance of monotheism and the 
relationship between God and believers (Al-Rasheed 2002 p.16). This represented the 
starting point for the establishment of the reputation of Al-Sa’ud because most of the 
tribes in the Arab peninsula were difficult to control unless they were presented with an 
ideology that they perceive as having a divine origin (ibid.,). 
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King Abdul-Aziz, who united the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932, was engaged in 
wars to control the whole of the kingdom between 1902 -1932. As a result, he was not 
able to devote time to creating a law for criminal procedures. There was no police except 
in Mecca, Medina and Jeddah; the police force there was just to carry out the commands 
received from the governor and there were no proper regulations (Alalmy 1982 p.29). 
Saudi Arabia is dominated by a monarchy that makes all the ultimate legal decisions; as a 
result, there is a diminution of democracy, so the people cannot express their own will to 
choose their leader.  Meanwhile non-governmental organisations such as Human Rights 
Watch have concluded that 'overall human rights conditions are poor’ (Human Rights 
Watch 2008). Walker argues that Saudi Arabia has neglected human rights in particular 
issues. The treatment of women is one of the most important issues over which Saudi 
Arabia has been criticised; also that its government does not sufficiently attend to human 
rights. Saudi Arabia is still practicing the death penalty and juveniles as young as 15 can 
be executed. There are also serious concerns about ‘the deficiency of official 
accountability, arbitrary detention, mistreatment and torture of detainees, as well as 
restrictions on freedom of expression’ (2009 p.2). 
Echagüe & Burke (2009 p.9) believe that Saudi Arabia infringes human rights with such 
practices as arbitrary arrest by al-Amn al-Aam (the public security police), al-Mabahith al 
Amma (General Investigations) and the activities of the religious police known as al- 
Mutawaeen or Hay’at al-amr bilmaruf wan nahi an almunkar, (the Committee for the 
Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (CPVPV)). The government issues laws 
that cannot be easily understood and can have a wide interpretation. They also argue that 
in criminal cases, the government does not provide the lawyers with full information 
about the accused and the lawyers cannot therefore provide the correct legal advice, even 
though the Criminal Procedure Law of May 2001 ostensibly protects the defendant’s 
rights and gives lawyers the right to have full information about their clients. Also the 
government can detain the accused for more than five days until they have a confession, 
although, the previous law stipulates that no one can be detained for more than five days. 
However, the letter of the law often differs from actual practice in Saudi Arabia (ibid.,). 
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This will be discussed at length in Chapter Seven. It is intended to establish, in Chapter 
Seven, that the government can be criticised for its failure to establish a strong 
monitoring system. The government is making a mistake by given each state organization 
authority without accountability. It will be argued that the government is doing that 
because of the first Article of the constitution which says, “Shari’ah is the supreme law 
of Saudi Arabia” and which means that everyone should know that God is watching their 
movements and that they are responsible for all their wrongdoings. It will be argued here 
that this is insufficient. 
Between 1990-1993, NGOs in Saudi Arabia were not allowed to have access and monitor 
human rights. Moreover, international human rights organizations were unable to visit 
Saudi Arabia to assess the level of human rights protection. That gave a bad impression 
about human rights in Saudi Arabia, and the government failed to give any justification 
for their decision (Alhargan 2012 p.602). 
Alhargan ( 2012 p.605-606) pointed out that after Saddam Hussein attacked Saudi Arabia 
in 1993, there were attempts by some people to present themselves as freedom-fighters, 
i.e. the so-called ‘Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), which was 
considered a human rights NGO’. It criticised the government constitution and 
oppression in Saudi Arabia. The CDLR believed the government does not practice 
Shari’ah, and its founders sought to counter the apparent injustices, reform the country’s 
political system, modify certain internal policies and pave the way towards more public 
participation in decision-making and politics. They demanded freedom and asked for 
reforms in the country. However, the government did not accept their claims, and some 
people who signed up to the CDLR lost their jobs and some lost their passports. The 
founders (Sa`d al-Faqih and Al Mas`ari) fled to London and established a new TV 
channel as a protest against the Saudi government; because they concluded that the best 
way to affect the Saudi government was through the media (ibid.).  
There are, however, two legal human rights organisations now present in Saudi Arabia. 
On March 9 2004 the first organization for human rights The National Society for Human 
Rights (NSHR) was formally approved by royal decree., interestingly, at the same time as 
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the second Arab Charter This started badly, with the organization stating that it believed 
that the death penalty and amputation of the hand or any kind of huddud penalty was not 
torture. This was hotly debated within the United Nations Human Rights Commission 
Zuhur comments that unfortunately, ‘the practices of regimes like the Taliban, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, and Saudi Arabia have eroded elements of moderation’ (2005 p.35).  
The NSHR monitors rights recognised by Islam and it visits prisons together with 
other human rights organisations. Saudi citizens can send their complaints to the 
NSHR, which has the power to act on their behalf. The NSHR also acts as a pressure 
group on the government, demanding that their agencies receive human rights 
training and that Saudi Arabia adheres to and ratifies more international treaties that 
relate to human rights (NSHR).
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The NSHR also compiles reports on human rights in Saudi Arabia. Its first report 
was in 2007 and stressed the government’s responsibility to adhere to the 
international agreements it had signed as well as establishing regulations which 
allowed the freedom to form organisations without fear of reprisals. In 2009 a 
second report was issued. It urged the government to establish an elected Shura 
Council, implement judicial reforms more speedily and criticised power abuses by 
the CPVPV. It also called for cases of torture and lengthy detention to be 
investigated (Echagüe & Burke 2009 p.13). 
 
The Human Rights Commission came into force on 12 September 2005 to ‘protect 
human rights and spread awareness about them […] in keeping with the provisions of 
Islamic law.’ (HRC)  The commission has 18 members who are appointed by the king for 
a period of four years. The commission stated its aim was to act as a safeguard from 
oppression; it deals with over 4000 complaints on average per year. ‘The Commission 
has branches throughout Saudi Arabia, with two established specifically for women, and 
it seeks to enshrine Arab and Islamic concepts of human rights’ (ibid., p.13). The 
problem with this kind of human rights commission is that the government mostly 
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controls it, because each member must be appointed by the government. As a result, it is 
thought not to have sufficient independence and authority to regulate government 
organisation. Furthermore, this can contravene The Paris Principles which state "The key 
elements of a national institution are its independence and pluralism"(Paris 
Principles)
110
.The Human Rights Commission in Saudi Arabia does not conform to this 
as it cannot be said to have independence. 
Alhargan (2012 p.602) suggests that Saudi Arabia has made an effort to present itself as 
practicing human rights without relying on any outside assistance, either cultural or 
financial. As Saudi Arabia is not in receipt of foreign aid, it is not under economic 
pressure to improve its human rights. However, in recent years Saudi Arabia has made 
significant changes in its law, issuing many laws that are intended to protect human 
rights. One example is the Code of Criminal Procedures of 16 October 2001 which 
tackles many of the legal issues surrounding the legal safeguards against arbitrary arrest 
and secret trial proceedings, and guarantees defendants the right to legal assistance 
throughout the judicial process. Under its provisions, no violence can be used to gain 
confessions from detainees. In order to monitor how detainees are being treated, members 
of the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution have access to prison. Since 2000, there 
have been several new laws introduced in Saudi Arabia that regulate the judicial system. 
The Law of Procedure Before Shari’ah Courts stipulates the process by which pleas, 
evidence and experts are accepted by the court, and the Code of Law Practice establishes 
the qualifications necessary to become an attorney, the rights and duties of lawyers and 
attorney-client privileges (Alhargan 2012 p.616) 
Alharagan (2012 p.616) points out that Saudi Arabia has hosted many international 
organizations for human rights such as Human Rights Watch, in order to show them how 
human rights are respected in practice. Saudi Arabia admittedly had little interest in 
human rights until recently. However, after the establishment of the CDLR and pressure 
from international organizations such as the United Nations Committee Against Torture, 
which criticized Saudi Arabia over the amputations and floggings it carries out under 
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Shari’ah, the government realized that there was a need to introduce specific laws 
concerning human rights and not to just rely on customs or traditional understandings . It 
has made some basic laws in criminal procedure that will be examined later to establish 
whether the government has implemented them effectively 
  
3.2. International Level. 
At a regional level, Saudi Arabia ratified the Arab Charter on Human Rights (ACHR) in 
February 2008. (See Chapter 2 for an explanation of its significance)  However, the 
Charter, which came into force on the 30th of January 2008, has encountered some 
criticism from people who think that it is not capable of fulfilling the principles of 
international human rights. In particular, Louise Arbour, the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, has stressed that ‘the Charter is incompatible with the international 
standards for women’s, children’s and non-citizens rights’ (Walker 2009 p-3). 
At an international level, Saudi Arabia has been one of 194 members of the UN, who 
have engaged in debate and shared its ideas on human rights since its establishment. 
Saudi Arabia has objected to signing charters and conventions on human rights, which it 
considered contentious. For example, the government did not agree with some Articles 
that contravened Saudi Arabia’s religious and cultural principles such as Articles 18 and 
19 in the ICCPR and as a result did not ratify or sign the ICCPR (OHCHR 2014).   
 
 Saudi Arabia could not accept 18 and 19 of the ICCPR; Article 18 deals with the right to 
hold any religious belief, and Article 19 deals with freedom of expression. Alharagan 
comments that Saudi Arabia has consistently objected to joining the ICCPR because of 
Articles 18 & 19 and because the ICCPR guarantees the freedom to change faith. Unable 
to ratify the ICCPR, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition with several other Muslim states in 
order to devise a human rights document that would conform to Shari’ah. This has 
resulted in a number of ‘Islamic’ human rights documents (2005 p.67). The most recent 
of these were the CDHRI 1990 & the ACHR 2008 which were explained in Chapter 2.  
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 Saudi Arabia neither signed nor ratified the Covenant. Currently, 168 states are party to 
the ICCPR, while 17 UN member states have not yet ratified or acceded to the ICCPR
111
 
(OHCHR 2014). However, Kuwait and Bahrain have signed and ratified the ICCPR and 
they are culturally and politically similar to Saudi Arabia. In refusing to acknowledge the 
universality of these documents.  
 
Saudi Arabia’s objection to Article 18 was religious. The Article states ‘this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance’. Although Saudi Arabia was happy to 
recognise all people’s rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, they want to 
delete the phrase about having a right to change one’s religion, as apostasy is forbidden 
according to the majority of Islamic doctrines. To date, Saudi Arabia still hasn't ratified 
or signed the ICCPR as this principle is so central to Islam. Although, Art. 30 (1) of the 
ACHR, becomes more flexible toward the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion as it states "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, and no restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of such freedoms except as 
provided for by law.” Al-Baodry112, however, concentrated on arguing technical points 
about how other religious freedoms were accorded less importance than the right to 
change one’s faith and how the HRC had omitted to hold consultations with Islamic 
countries on the matter. He also suggested that such measures could be compared to 
missionaries’ efforts to convert people for political reasons and might result in conflict 
(Alwasil 2012 p.1073).  This demonstrates how, if any reforms and improvements in pre-
trial procedures are to be introduced in Saudi Arabia, it will have to be shown that such 
reforms are not in conflict with religious precepts. 
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On 27 June 2012, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between OHCHR and 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, represented by the Saudi Human Rights Commission. 
Within the framework of enhancing cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
and OHCHR, the Office will develop a three-year plan to enhance national capabilities 
for the promotion and protection of human rights in Saudi Arabia. The programme will 
be developed in cooperation with the Saudi Human Rights Commission and relevant 
partners, including civil society organizations and United Nations agencies (OHCHR). 
Al-Sharif et al point out that Saudi Arabia has welcomed human rights organizations, 
namely, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to assess violations of human 
rights and particularly discrimination against women, non-Muslim religion practices and 
prisoners of conscience. They argue that there is still need to improve human rights 
practice in Saudi Arabia and ‘to establish institutions specialized in training, monitoring 
and protecting human rights’ (2008 p.3).However, Saudi Arabia conforms to certain 
international human rights instruments. It acceded to four core human rights instruments 
and became legally bound by the guidelines set out in those four treaties out of seven of 
the United Nations’ conventions including the Convention on the Rights of Children 
(CRC) (1996), the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
(1997), the Convention Against Torture (CAT) (1997), the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (2000),Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)   (2008), Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children child prostitution child pornography 
(CRC-OP-SC)  (2010), and Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (CRC-OP-AC) (2011) (OHCHR).  
Alharagan notes that Saudi Arabia was keen to avoid any shame that might accrue to the 
Kingdom should it be accused of human rights violations. In particular, it wanted to 
demonstrate to the international human rights network that both national and local 
Islamic laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia complied with all ratified human rights 
conventions (2012 p.607). 
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In conclusion, Saudi Arabia’s involvement with the UN human rights organisations has 
shown that it wishes to be seen as endorsing internationally recognised standards of 
human rights. Saudi Arabia was elected to the UN HRC in 2013; Peggy Hicks of Human 
Rights Watch was more specific and said: "members of council that are committed to 
human rights will need to redouble their efforts on a number of problems" ( Aljazeera 
2013). 
Furthermore it wants to show that Islamic Shari’ah is compatible with these. This has 
been an important first step towards Saudi Arabia’s socialisation into making human 
rights a national concern. As a result of the 'Arab Spring' popular risings against 
governments in the Middle East, the Saudi government has become more open to 
developing human rights in Saudi Arabia in order to avoid outright revolts on the part of 
disgruntled citizens. The growth of the Internet and Social Networking has also meant 
that criticisms of the government and debates about human rights have become more 
open and the government is keen to respond to this. It could be argued that these factors 
make this an excellent time to introduce reforms in pre-trial procedures. Having 
discussed international human rights in relation to Saudi Arabia, the next section 
addresses how the rights are or are not upheld with regard to pre-trial procedures in the 
Code of Criminal Procedures that was introduced in 2001. 
 
4. Current Reforms in Saudi Arabia at the Stage of Pre-trial. 
As stated in the previous section, King Abdul-Aziz issued a command in 1930 to 
determine the functions and duties of the police, and establish a police force in each city 
in the kingdom, even though the regulations he made were very basic. A chief of police 
had the power to deal with any case when he felt it was necessary. For example, if 
someone did not attend in the mosque during prayer time, smoked cigarettes, or behaved 
badly in public, the chief was allowed to detain him for one day to three days and 
administer 15 lashes to deter the person from doing it again (Alalmy 1982 p.31). In 1950 
the Public Security Directorate (PSD) was established to regulate criminal procedure 
followed by the establishment of the Code of the Investigation and Public Prosecution 
Commission (CIPPC) in 1989.  The significance of this is considered in the next section, 
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before the implications of the adoption of the new Code of Criminal Procedure in 2002 
are examined in more depth.  
4.1. Investigation and Public Prosecution (IPPC) Establishment.  
 
The IPPC was established by Article 1 of the Code of the Investigation and Public 
Prosecution Commission (CIPPC) issued by Royal Decree No. M/56(30 May 1989).  The 
IPPC was established as the only service for criminal procedures; and to take the 
responsibility of investigating and prosecuting criminals from the police and giving it to 
an entirely new institution.  Although, the CIPPC was issued in 1989, it was not until 
October 3, 1993 that the IPPC started its work.  The CIPPC played a key role from when 
it started to exercise its function in 1993 until 2001 when the CCP came into force.  
However, the argument made here is that it is insufficient and still does not deal with 
most criminal cases (as will be seen in Chapter Seven). For example, thefts, bad 
behaviour and drinking alcohol are still being dealt with by the police. The IPPC just 
attend to cases of assault, drugs, rape and financial crimes. This complicates the situation 
when a suspect is alleged to have committed several crimes. It should be noted however, 
that to date, the IPPC has not fully assumed all its functions. The main reason for this is 
logistical, as the IPPC still does not have the manpower and the resources to exercise all 
the functions assigned to it by the CIPPC (1989), which are enormous. Despite this, one 
officer interviewed in this study stated that the intention seems to be that the IPPC will 
assume its responsibilities gradually, whenever it is ready to discharge them
113
. 
 It should be noted that the IPPC is not a judicial body; Article 5 of CIPPC declares that 
"members of the IPPC Committee shall enjoy full independence and, in their work, they 
shall be subject only to the provisions of the Islamic law (Shari'ah) and the laws in force. 
No one shall interfere in their work". The supervision of the IPPC is entrusted to the 
Minister of the Interior in accordance with Article 26 of the CIPPC. Moreover, the Head 
of IPPC is appointed by a Royal Decree on the advice of the Minister of the Interior.  It 
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seems that the Minister of the Interior has power over the IPPC.  In Chapter Seven, 
interviews with prosecutors, police officers and lawyers will be reviewed in order to 
observe the actual function of the IPPC. 
4.1.1. Code of Criminal Procedure CCP (2001). 
In 2001 Saudi Arabia enacted the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) 2001 which 
regulates the relations between the accused and the investigators. Until that time, there 
was no systematic criminal procedure law in Saudi Arabia. Criminal procedures mostly 
relied on individual edicts that were issued by royal decree, and the Ministry of the 
Interior, which regulated legal and criminal procedures. Furthermore, the Public Security 
Directorate (PSD) system (1950) was the only system with edicts that were issued by the 
Ministry of the Interior to regulate investigation procedures. Thus, this section will not 
discuss the PSD, because it was abolished, along with the Ministry of the Interior’s 
regulations. Moreover, as Chapter Seven will examine and explore the CCP (2001) in-
depth, it will just be briefly outlined here.  
The CCP (2001) has two hundred and twenty five Articles divided into nine chapters; the 
first chapter regulates general provisions, the second deals with the initiation of criminal 
action, the third regulates procedures relating to evidence, the fourth describes 
investigation procedures, the fifth outlines criminal jurisdiction, the sixth regulates  trial 
proceedings, the seventh chapter defines ways to appeal judgments, the eighth  chapter 
deals with sentencing and appeals  and the ninth regulates enforceable judgments (Umm 
Al-Qura 2001 No.3867).  These will be explored in more depth in Chapter Seven.  
However, some general observations are worth making at this stage to provide an 
indication of the significance of this instrument, as well as some of its limitations.  
Arfah (2001) argues that the CCP can be considered a great transformation with regards 
to human rights in criminal procedure in relation to individual private life. He argues that 
the CCP regulates criminal procedures according to Shari’ah instructions, with respect 
for human dignity. The CCP, it is argued, is totally compatible with Shari’ah since they 
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both seek to guarantee the accused’s rights in the pre-trial period. Dufyer (2011) 
considered that the CCP is the best guideline with which to apply criminal justice.   
However, the CCP suffers from a lack of implementation and needs to be augmented at 
some points. Dufyer argues that the CCP does not regulate the length of time within 
which the complaint must be made, even though legal writers such as Almalkey and 
Alhanafy (Sunni scholars) suggest that is this dealt with in Shari’ah. Moreover, in 
ordinances dealing with criminal procedures, a time-limit for complaints is usually stated 
(2011 p.25).  
Al-Hyjlan (2006 pp.182-183) suggests that the CCP needs rewording because there are 
some Articles which do not guarantee rights to individuals who are not actually accused 
of anything. For example, under; Article 41 of the CCP  "A criminal investigation officer 
may not enter or search any inhabited place except in the cases provided for in the laws, 
pursuant to a search warrant specifying the reasons for the search, issued by the Bureau 
of Investigation and Prosecution. However, other dwellings may be searched pursuant to 
a search warrant, specifying the reasons, issued by the Investigator. If the proprietor or 
the occupant of a dwelling refuses to allow the criminal investigation officer free access, 
or resists such entry, he may use all lawful means, as may be required in the 
circumstances, to enter that dwelling...’’.   Meanwhile Article 54 provides that ‘‘No 
person other than the accused and no dwelling other than his shall be searched, except 
where there are strong indications that such a search would help in the investigation’’. 
Thus, Alhyjlan argues that, as long as there is a strong indication, which is enough to 
search the house because the person is being accused, Article 54 does not guarantee 
rights to anyone not accused nor protect the privacy of home (2006 pp.182-183).). This 
point will be explained in-depth in Chapter Seven as many of the Articles have 
problematic wording. There are, for example, problems in the CCP in that there is no 
formalizing of lawyers’ rights to read the initial investigation papers before the 
interrogation of the accused. Thus, it is necessary to give a lawyer permission to prepare 
his client’s defence, as it is a right of the accused. Also Al Zahrany points out that the 
CCP needs to be augmented to require that the accused has legal advice for a serious 
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offence, and that if he does not have money, the government should provide him a free 
legal advice (2008).  
 
The CCP has also attracted some external criticism.  For example, Human Rights Watch 
(2008 p.4) has noted that the CCP does not incorporate all international standards 
pertaining to the basic rights of defendants. It does not, for example, guarantee that a 
detainee will have timely access to a counsel and makes no provision for legal aid. A 
detainee cannot challenge the lawfulness of the detention even though the CCP allows 
prosecutors to issue arrest warrants and detain suspects for up to six months without any 
judicial review and there is no requirement to provide a particular standard of evidence of 
the suspect’s guilt.  
 
Although torture and maltreatment of the suspect are not allowed, statements made under 
duress are still admissible evidence and officials who coerce suspects are not sanctioned. 
There is no statement about the presumption of innocence and the detainee is not 
protected against self-incrimination. Finally, Human Rights Watch points out that it is 
often the case that judges do not follow the procedures laid out in the CCP. It is one of 
the main aims of this thesis to discover to what extent the current procedures for criminal 
proceedings are being followed. This will be fully explored in Chapter Six when the 
actual practice of pre-trial criminal procedures in Saudi Arabia will be examined. 
 
Notwithstanding these critiques, the CCP has an important role in Saudi criminal 
procedure and will be examined in more detail in Chapter Seven. Here the CCP will be 
examined and criticised in order to understand what changes are necessary for it to be a 
practical and effective system for Saudi Arabia. These changes will be in harmony with 
Shari’ah and the religious principals which underpin it.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how the ideals of Islam have not been adhered to in 
practice, and the initial human rights principles introduced by Islam have not been 
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developed as was the case in England and Wales. As a relatively new and undeveloped 
country, Saudi Arabia's criminal justice system is still a work in progress. As a result 
Saudi Arabia has been widely criticised by international organizations for not reaching 
the threshold standards of human rights practices as set out in the international human 
rights conventions. However, it has made an effort to participate in International Human 
Rights by signing four charters. 
 However, criticisms that are coming from these organisations may well be justified in 
terms of actual police practices in Saudi Arabia, which can be construed as miscarriages 
of justice. However, to suggest that the fault lies with Islam, the Qur’an or the system of 
Shari’ah law on which it is based is erroneous. The problem is that the law is not always 
clear or unambiguous. Furthermore, it is not being carried out properly, with due care to 
the welfare of those who come under its aegis. Introducing proper regulations which 
would cover all aspects of pre-trial procedures would go a long way to answering such 
criticisms 
Saudi Arabia has issued some laws to regulate criminal justice, and the CCP was such a 
law. However, Saudi Arabia has been criticised by the Human Rights Watch and Human 
Rights against Torture for detaining people without trial and torturing them. Chapter 
Seven will explore the application of the CCP in Saudi Arabia and actual police practices.  
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Chapter Seven  
 
The Procedure of Criminal Investigation in Saudi Arabia 
 
Introduction. 
 
This chapter will explore pre-trial procedures in theory and practice to determine to what 
extent Saudi law follows the precepts of international human rights law and the pre-trial 
procedures outlined in PACE. This will be done by examining the Code of Criminal 
Procedure (CCP) which will be analysed in relation to evidence from interviews with 
Saudi police officers, prosecutors and lawyers about how this code is enforced in 
practice. 
 
Despite the government's insistence on the high standards of Saudi law and the recent 
legal reforms described in Chapter Six, there are many violations of the rights of 
individuals within the Saudi criminal justice system. A Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
(2013 p.3) report revealed that people can be arrested and detained for behaviour that is 
not ostensibly criminal or is an unwitting breach of some vague prohibition. 
Subsequently, these detainees may be subjected to many forms of ill-treatment, such as 
being put into solitary confinement. Furthermore, they are kept in the dark about why 
they are in detention and what evidence there is against them. Typically, people who are 
accused have to wait a long time before trial without access to a lawyer and abused if 
they refuse to incriminate themselves. At the trial they are thus unable to examine 
witnesses or properly present a defence. Shifting charges and being presumed guilty 
exacerbate this situation. (HRW, 2013). 
 
Human Rights Watch (2013 p.9) has pointed out that despite some attempts to improve 
the legal system, Saudi Arabia has been slow to make progress and defendants criminal 
justice system are still being deprived of their rights. The King has earmarked $1.8 bn of 
government funding for new courts and training for judges (AL-Subaie 2013 p.1). 
Furthermore, in 2007 the Law of the Judiciary and the Law of the Board of Grievances 
were amended to improve judicial independence and specialized courts dealing with 
personal status, commercial, labour and traffic disputes were set up.  
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Although Saudi Arabia promulgated the CCP, it does not permit detainees to challenge 
the lawfulness of their detention before a court and fails to guarantee access to legal 
counsel in a timely manner. The code also permits pre-trial detention of up to six months 
without judicial review and fails to make statements obtained under duress inadmissible 
in court. Judges routinely ignore provisions of the CCP. Moreover, authorities have failed 
to investigate alleged abuses by security forces.  The aim of this chapter is to examine 
which Saudi pre-trial criminal procedure laws and practices comply with international 
rights standards, and to highlight the lack of balance between perceived public interest 
and citizens' rights. This thesis will demonstrate that the police are able to exercise their 
powers to the point of breaching the existing regulations as set out in the CCP, and often 
at the expense of suspects’ rights.  
 
 
1. The Right to Liberty. 
 
There are two Codes in Saudi Arabia that ensure the right to liberty. Article 2 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure (CCP) states that "no person shall be arrested, searched, detained, 
or imprisoned except in cases provided by law.” This is clearly compatible with Article 
36 of the Basic Law of Government (BLG), which reads "The State shall provide security 
for all citizens and residents on its territories. No-one may be confined, arrested or 
imprisoned without reference to the Law".  It seems, however, that there is vagueness in 
the two Articles, Art. 36: 'reference to the Law' and Art. 2: 'except in cases provided by 
law' (Dufyer 2011 p.122). The question that arises is which law the Articles are referring 
to. The Articles prohibit the deprivation of someone's liberty, on the other hand, the 
police and the investigating prosecutors appear to be given the power to arrest and detain 
a suspect without these powers being clearly codified in any law. This can be seen as 
similar to the Arab Charter (ACHR) Art.14 on the right of liberty, (although there is no 
absolute guarantee as explained earlier in Chapter Two); a right  guaranteed by ICCPR 
Art.9(1) & ECHR Art.5 (1). 
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In the following section, the arrest and detention of a suspect under the CCP laws will be 
discussed on the basis of interview data obtained from police officers and prosecutors, 
with a view to exploring the extent to which the liberty of citizens in Saudi Arabia is 
unlawfully curtailed.   
 
1.1. The Prohibition of Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Liberty. 
 
Prior to the CCP, there was widespread malpractice in police stations. Nevertheless, the 
Public Security Directorate (PCD) system (1950) was the only government institution 
with regulations that were issued by the Ministry of the Interior to regulate investigation 
procedures. The PCD was abolished, in 2001, as explained in Chapter 6 and thus will not 
be discussed here. However, the attack on the New York Twin Towers in 2001 had a 
profound impact on Saudi Arabia, which took extreme steps to protect the country from 
terrorist attack. These included the arrest of thousands of people without any regard for 
the CCP (Almajed 2011 p.1). Almajed argues that the methods which the government 
used were entirely unacceptable. Protection should have been carried out in a measured 
and proportionate way but the government a announced that there was no other feasible 
way to protect the country (ibid. p.2).   
 
There are practices which involve restricting the freedom of citizens who have not been 
arrested, purely as a precautionary measure.  For example, police officers never work on 
the street only in their offices, they leave this task to the police soldiers who have very 
limited education and training and stop and search people on the street.  The CCP makes 
no mention of this and there are no guidelines for police officers on stop and search. This 
is unlike stop and search in PACE (1984) s.1 (3) where suspects cannot be stopped or 
searched unless it is based on reasonable grounds, and reasonable suspicion. Breaches of 
this are unlawful.  However, the CCP does not grant enforcement officers the right to 
detain suspects incommunicado in order to merely clarify who someone is, or what they 
are doing or their intended destination. Article 35 states that anyone detained should ‘be 
advised of the reasons of his detention and shall be entitled to communicate with any 
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person of his choice to inform him of his arrest' However, as this study and cases from 
Amnesty show, this does happen. 
An example is the case of Khaled al-Johani, the only person to attend a planned “Day of 
Rage” protest in Riyadh on 11 March 2011, and was arrested. He remained in custody at 
the end of the year, charged with supporting a protest and communicating with foreign 
media. For the first two months he was held incommunicado in solitary confinement in 
Ulaysha prison; he may have been tortured. He was then transferred to al-Ha’ir prison in 
Riyadh, where he was allowed access to his family (Amnesty Organization 2011). This 
shows how an innocent person can be detained without being charged in spite of Art. 35, 
which will be discussed later.   
Interviewees were asked if the police had the authorization to arrest and search without 
strong suspicion. It became apparent that there was a problem with this. Arresting Officer 
5
114
 said that the police soldiers often carried out arbitrary arrests and searches because of 
their lack of experience and Prosecutor 4 said that as 'suspicion' was open to a wide 
interpretation, there was a need for clear regulation, as the CCP gives no definition of 
'reasonable suspicion' or examples of such. Lawyer 1
115
 commented that suspects arrested 
by police soldiers who were ignorant of the proper procedures would fare badly.  
These answers reveal how suspects were arrested without warrants or reasonable 
suspicion. According to the interviewees, this is due to the lack of monitoring and 
training of police personnel. In the following section, the aim is to identify gaps in the 
application of the Law of Criminal Procedure which need to be filled in order to 
strengthen the guarantees for the accused and prevent the violation of the suspect’s rights 
specifically in terms of arrest and detention. When suspects are arrested or detained, this 
is done on the grounds of 'reasonable suspicion' which must be objective and testable. 
The absence and insufficiency of these regulations will be explored next. 
 
1.1.1. Arrest. 
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 (Riyadh Arresting Officer No.5, interviewed 23 August, 2013).    
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 (Riyadh Lawyer No. 1, interviewed 11 July, 2013). 
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Articles 33, 35 and 107 of the CCP regulate the arrest of a suspect. The CCP gives the 
police officer the power to arrest a suspect found at the scene of the crime. Art. 33 states 
that "Where a crime is in the process of commission, the criminal investigation officer 
shall arrest the suspect present at the scene of the crime where there is sufficient evidence 
for his implication. A record of that shall be made and the Bureau of Investigation and 
Prosecution shall be immediately notified. In all cases, the person under arrest shall not 
be detained for more than twenty-four hours, except pursuant to a written order from the 
Investigator. If the accused is not present, the criminal investigation officer shall issue an 
order for his arrest and a note to that effect shall be entered into the record" (CCP). The 
CCP does not monitor or review unlawful arrest and so many arrests do not conform to 
the requirements of the CCP. The question which arises is whether an unlawful arrest is 
admissible when the case is taken to court.  
 
Those interviewed answered this question, saying:  
     
     'The IPPC accepts that kind of violation. We review all cases coming to us, and if 
we find out that the procedure of arrest has been violated or the arrestee has been 
injured by the police, we usually open another case and inform the head of police 
about what happened. However, we do not release the suspect -we keep the cases as 
normal and interrogate him about the accusation.'
116
 
 
 Another Prosecutor asserted that:      
“I check the indictment document, and the reason which brought the accused to the 
IPPC, but as to the procedure of arrest, I don’t look at it at all. It is the responsibility 
of the police.” '117 
      
This demonstrates that unlawful arrests are still admissible when the case is taken to court 
or prosecution. This is because the CCP makes no provision for the procedure to be 
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 (Riyadh Prosecutor No.2, interviewed 12 July, 2013).  
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 (Riyadh Prosecutor No.5, interviewed 19 August, 2013). 
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monitored.  Another Article in the CCP regulating arrest is Article 35, which states that 
"in cases other than flagrante delicto, no person shall be arrested or detained except on 
the basis of order from the competent authority.  Any such person shall be treated 
decently and shall not be subjected to any bodily or moral harm.  He shall also be advised 
of the reasons of his detention and shall be entitled to communicate with any person of 
his choice to inform him of his arrest". Article 35 deals with two types of arrest:  flagrant 
delicto and someone arrested by the competent authority. Article 35 mentions 'the 
competent authority' but does not explain or specify the nature of the competent authority 
that can make an arrest. However, Article 103 of the CCP states: 'In all cases, the 
Investigator may, as the case may be, summon any person to be investigated, or issue a 
warrant for his arrest whenever investigation circumstances warrant it' (Alhargan 2009 
p.227). Thus, under the CCP 2001, only the members of the IPPC specialist teams are 
authorized by the law to issue arrest warrants. In contrast, s.24 of PACE (1984) addresses 
the constable's powers of arrest without warrant for any offence. This gives officers the 
power to arrest suspects without a warrant as long as there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that a crime has been or is about to be committed. 
 
Article 107 of the CCP gives the investigator the power to issue an arrest warrant to bring 
in the suspect in three circumstances. First, if the accused fails to appear without an 
acceptable cause, second if it is feared that he may flee and, third, if there is no doubt that 
the suspect has committed the crime as he has been caught in flagrante delicto. It allows 
the investigator to issue a warrant for his arrest and appearance even if the incident is of 
such kind for which the accused should not be detained- such as fear of flight.  
 
According to Article 107, the legality of an arrest warrant rests on whether there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has been perceived as having 
committed a crime. By not stipulating the nature of what behaviours merit an arrest 
warrant, enforcement officers can justify arresting people simply because they deemed it 
necessary. Moreover, if the suspect refuses to appear, the investigator apparently has the 
right to arrest him forcibly to appear without charge.  This might well happen because of 
the vagueness of Article 107 as to what exactly are arrestable offences.  The CCP confers 
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on the IPPC the power to issue arrest warrants just to the police; however, the problem is 
that other enforcement officers, namely, officers in the religious police and national 
security officers (Almbaheth) do arrest without warrants. The question arises as to how 
warrants could be more effectively issued by the IPPC to these bodies so as to regulate 
arrests across the board. PACE 1984 s.24, on the other hand, clearly expresses a number 
of elements that must be present for an arrest to be valid. Firstly, the arresting officer has 
to either have a warrant or a legal power to arrest without. Secondly, the arresting officer 
must have 'reasonable suspicion'. The arrest will be deemed unlawful if the officer's 
interpretation of the law is erroneous, even if it could be considered 'reasonable'. One 
solution for Saudi Arabia would be for judicial warrants to be available electronically. 
 
 I will argue that such powers are missing from this Article and they need to be inserted. 
All enforcement officers need to be issued with the power and required to ask for 
appropriate warrants to be able to arrest and detain in all cases where it is reasonably 
suspected that a crime has been committed and not just in cases of flagrante delicto, as is 
stipulated in Art. 33 of the CCP. Furthermore arrests and detentions should be properly 
monitored to ensure adherence to this procedure. 
 
Article 35 clearly states: 'In cases other than flagrante delicto... ’. However, Almajed 
points out that people can be arrested in front of their doors and offices, sometimes 
forcibly by executive power. He adds that if people ask for the reason for the arrest, the 
answer is only 'you will know soon' or 'please just come with us' (2011 p.4). Many times 
this is done without informing the suspect of why and by whom the order to arrest was 
issued. He believes that this constitutes unacceptable vagueness and that absolute 
transparency is necessary in arrest procedures (ibid.).   
Police Officers questioned confirmed that technically the IPPC had to issue an arrest 
warrant but that officers would just arrest people suspected of theft or caught in flagrante 
delicto. Riyadh arresting officer No.1 admitted:       
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 “The arrest warrant is a safeguard for the enforcement officers. If something goes 
wrong during the arrest procedure, the police, soldiers and officers would be legally 
covered”118 
  
Police officers were asked under what circumstances arresting officers were allowed to 
arrest: 
      “The suspect can be arrested if he is charged with a crime by any department of 
the government even if it is not the kind of crime we deal with. Also whenever the 
country is in a state of civil unrest or any kind of disorder such as, wars, drug dealing 
or riots, the police focus more and make a plan and are given wide authorization to 
arrest in order to maintain control.”119 
 
Others admitted that arrest warrants were not usually obtained, or obtained verbally, 
Arresting Officer 3 said: 
     “However, as an arresting officer, I rarely issue an arrest warrant, I am talking 
with you honestly, if you like to can go and inspect all the files you will not find any 
issued for arrest. The most important factor for us is to not to lose the suspect.”120. 
 
Arresting Officer 4 asserted that; 
      “Yes, it is true we get an arrest warrant verbally from the head of police or from 
the investigator officer - not all the time but when we want to arrest the suspect as 
quickly as we can, even if we need to arrest forcibly.” 121 
This further demonstrates how the lack of accountability leads to lax practice.  
 
1.1.2.Detention.  
In questions of custody there are two interests: firstly, the accused’s right to not be 
deprived of freedom unless he has been sentenced; secondly, the society’s right to 
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 (Riyadh  Arresting Officer No.1, interviewed 5 July, 2013).    
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 (Riyadh Arresting Officer No.3, interviewed 17 July, 2013).  
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 (Riyadh Arresting Officer No.4, interviewed 13 August 2013).    
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deprive the accused of freedom before charging him, in the interests of the investigation. 
Alhejlan believes that Saudi legislation gives society more priority, without forgetting the 
accused’s right. The legislation regulates many rights in an attempt to make a balance 
between the two interests (Alhejlan 2006 p.273).However, there are substantial problems 
when it comes to the rights of the accused, both in terms of the Code itself and in its 
implementation.   
 
Article 113 of CCP sets out a number of circumstances in which the suspect can be 
detained. This can take place if the suspect has been interrogated, to prevent him fleeing, 
if there is sufficient evidence against him; if the crime is a major crime or if the 
interrogation requires the suspect to be detained.  
 
According to Article 114 & Article 123 of the CCP, six months is the upper limit for the 
detention of a suspect without trial before he is returned to court for the accusation to be 
considered.  This can be in situations where there is no charge, merely some evidence, 
and occasionally when there are merely suspicions. This detention can be carried out at 
police station. Consequently, this has to be before the expiry of six months so that the 
suspect can be sent to trial, and then the court will decide to carry on his or her detention 
or release him or her. If the case is not ready to be looked at by the court, then the suspect 
should be released. 
 
It should be noted that, there are two types of crimes in Saudi law. Article 112 of the CCP 
reads ' The Minister of the Interior shall, upon a recommendation by the Director of the 
Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution, specify what may be treated as a major crime 
requiring detention'. It specifies 14 crimes as major crimes in Decree no.1245 of 
September 30, 2002. These major crimes include: murder; rape, kidnapping, drug and 
intoxicant abuse or dealing, theft involving forced entry, using implements or weapons, 
forming a criminal gang; fighting; firing weapons resulting in the grievous injury of 
persons; impersonating security officers; forgery; bribery; and embezzlement. People 
suspected of these crimes are detained if the investigator in charge of the case decides 
that there is some basis for suspicion. This procedure for deciding whether an arrested 
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suspect can be detained without charge is much simpler in PACE (1984) s.37. This 
stipulates that the custody officer must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to 
charge the person with the offence for which he or she has been arrested.  
 
In practice, police officers and prosecutors said, they detain just 24 hours and then ask the 
IPPC to look at the case. If nothing is found against the suspect, he or she is released. If 
the prosecutor needs more time to interrogate, authorization can be given by the 
department head, to extend the detention by up to five days. If the prosecutor needs more 
time to interrogate the suspect, he can ask permission from the Chairman of the branch of 
the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution to detain the suspect for a further 40 days. If 
he needs more, he can direct his request to the Director of the IPPC to extend the 
detention for 35 more days. The total detention must not exceed 6 months. Similarly, 
police officers have authority to extend the detention to five days, and can ask the 
Director of Police for a further extension of 35 days. The Administrative Governor also 
has the authorization to extend the detention to 35 days and up to six months.  All of 
them must clarify the reason for the extension of detention (Articles 114 & 123). The 
length of detention stipulated by Articles 114 and 123 is untenably long, and a violation 
of human rights by international human rights laws standards (ICCPR Art.9 & ECHR 
Art.5). It is also arguably unnecessary if the pre-trial procedures are carried out 
effectively.  
 
However, the researcher believes that if the detainee stays in custody 24 hours before 
being referred to the IPPC, he could be in custody for that period of time unlawfully as he 
might be innocent. The time limit in Article 35 of the IPPC should be amended to 6 
hours, which is the time stipulated by PACE s.41, since 24 hours is an excessively long 
period to detain someone without having sufficient evidence to make a charge and also 
gives inexperienced police soldiers the power to detain whoever they want for 24 hours. 
Only officers who have been properly trained and who are properly accountable should 
be able to do this.  
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 A prosecutor pointed out that police soldiers often detain innocent people 24 hours or 
more with no reason, and are neither trained nor accountable: 
     "Those who carry out this sort of arrest are groups of soldiers who are not officers 
and have no practical or legal experience, and are not qualified, and, unfortunately, 
also some members of the IPPC and the police do not know the system.”122 Prosecutor 
5 added that this problem was due also in part to the lack of IPPC staff delaying the 
procedure for the release of detainees. Lawyer 3
123
 commented that there was no 
monitoring of the IPPC who were often insufficiently trained and given overwhelming 
caseloads. This shows that there is no culture of ‘duty of care' in the treatment of 
suspects in that they are often kept in detention far longer than necessary.   
 
Another type of crime where the suspect may be detained is non-major crime. The 
suspect cannot be detained if he is not being charged unless the investigator deems that 
the investigation requires the detention of the suspect to prevent him committing a crime 
or to protect the detainee, the public or to prevent him escaping (Art.113 of CCP). This is 
done purely on the decision of the prosecutor; for example, if they believe someone is 
dangerous because they are shouting, they can decide to keep them in custody. The 
detainee is not referred for psychiatric assessment Suspects who are not charged with 
major crimes, in most cases, are automatically released under Art.120 of the CCP. 
However, this is not always case. Once such case inter alia, was that of Dr. Matrouk al-
Faleh, an academic and human rights activist, who was detained without charge or trial at 
al-Ha’ir Prison in Riyadh, and denied access to a lawyer, following his arrest in May 
2009. The authorities gave no reason for his arrest but it occurred shortly after he wrote 
an article criticizing the harsh conditions in which two brothers were detained (Amnesty 
Organization 2009). 
Furthermore, Art.108 gives the investigator power to detain a suspect who does not have 
a fixed address. In Saudi Arabia, the government needs to institute a postcode system as 
currently there is no post coded or proper address system. There are no plans to introduce 
such a system, although this may change. Therefore, in practice, this Article cannot be 
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 (Riyadh Prosecutor No.1, interviewed 16 July, 2013). 
123
 (Riyadh Lawyer No.3, interviewed 18 July, 2013). 
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applied; and unless the suspect can get a guarantor, they cannot be released. For this 
reason, most investigators rely on the right to bail by guarantor (which I will explain later 
in the section on the right to bail). An investigator officer No.5
124
commented on this, 
saying: 
 
     “For this reason, most police officers ask for a guarantor to release the suspect 
rather than release him according to his address. We cannot apply Art.108 of CCP as 
the suspect might flee and we might not find him.”125    
 
Alhargan (2009 p.253) points out that Article 113, which gives reasons for detention is 
not clear and is also given two interpretations. Firstly, the detention can be mandatory if 
after the interrogation there is sufficient evidence against the suspect or if there is 
likelihood he could flee. He can be detained if the investigation requires it and if the 
crime is a major crime but there was not sufficient evidence against the suspect. The 
second interpretation is a misinterpretation, but in practice this is current procedure in 
Saudi Arabia. Here, the suspect can be detained if there is sufficient evidence against him 
or her after the interrogation or he can be detained if the investigation requires that to be 
effective whatever the crime. Another disputed area is in the second part of Art. 113 'if 
the interests of the investigation requires his detention', which gives the investigator wide 
powers to detain a suspect under his discretion. This clause could potentially be abused 
and the onus of giving sound reasons why releasing the suspects was inadvisable should 
rest with the prosecution.  Otherwise the detention may be arbitrary, which is against the 
principles of the goals of the Saudi government and the presumption of innocence.  
 
 At interview, prosecutors were asked if the suspects were detained for other reasons than 
those given in the CCP. A prosecutor commented:   
     “Yes we do detain innocent people more than a month, just to protect them from 
others. As you know, we live in a tribal society, if someone from a tribe has fought 
someone from another tribe but his crime is not major, the law says I must release 
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him. However, we cannot if others are waiting for him outside the IPPC and they 
might kill him or hurt him, it is better to remand him until the situation settles down. 
Also with family problems, we do it, but we get permission from the Administrative 
Governor.”126 
Given the nature of Saudi society, it is important to ensure a suspect does not flee as this 
can endanger him as there may be retribution. However, it should also be noted that this 
can be open to abuse.       
 
 Human Rights Watch points out that Saudi law does not protect the right to challenge the 
lawfulness of one’s detention, but merely obliges the prosecutor to obtain a progressively 
higher level of authorization within the prosecution service to prolong detention beyond 
the initial five days, initially by instalments of any length up to 40 days, and then by 
instalments of up to 30 days for up to six months from the date of arrest At no time is a 
judge involved which is in breach of international standards (2008p.36). 
 
Detention should be seen as an exceptional procedure and should not be resorted to 
unless there is an interest in preventing the suspect from fleeing or destroying evidence, 
or when the suspect is exhibiting extreme behaviour which might constitute a danger to 
the public However, the CCP Articles in the current contexts cannot be entirely 
interpreted within the aims and principles I mentioned above. The defects in the CCP 
Articles might be addressed by careful elaboration of the regulations. These amendments 
are currently being worked on, but have yet to be issued. Amendments to the CCP by 
themselves are not enough to ensure that pre-trial procedures will be carried out lawfully 
and humanely. Lawful monitoring, staff training and the idea that officers have a duty of 
care are also essential, and the regulations themselves need to address these. PACE is 
clear in that in s. 37 and Code C.  
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 (Riyadh Prosecutor No.3, interviewed 12 August, 2013).    
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1.2. The Right to Know the Reason for Arrest and What Charges are Being 
Brought. 
Saudi law echoes international law, ICCPR Article 9 (2), at least on some procedural 
requirements. Article 116 of the CCP gives the arrested person the right to “be promptly 
notified of the reasons for his arrest or detention” and the investigator (in Saudi Arabia, 
this is also the prosecutor) must inform the detainee of the charges “when the accused 
appears for the first time for an investigation”. Also Article 35 of the CCP requires that 
'he shall also be advised of the reasons for his detention'. PACE (1984 s.28) gives this 
more importance as arrestees must be informed of the factual grounds for the arrest either 
at the time of arrest or as soon as is practicable afterwards.   This right is clearly stated in 
the ACHR Art. 14(3), ICCPR Art.9 (2) and ECHR Art.5 (2).  
 
 Human Rights Watch (2008) points out that Saudi Arabia has not codified its criminal 
offenses, with the result that the criminal law in this respect is neither accessible nor 
reasonably predictable. This deficiency in Saudi criminal law hinders the ability of law 
enforcement officials to inform detainees of the substance of the complaint. The head of 
the prosecution department, Ibrahim Juhaiman, told Human Rights Watch, “You will 
never find out the exact crime until the end of the investigation. Then you can determine 
the crime. No charges are filed until after the investigation.” (Human Rights Watch 2008, 
p.36). This admission underlies the essential unfairness of a system that does not clearly 
state what the charge is from the start.  
     
Almajed (2011 p.5) points out that the serious systemic breaches committed by members 
of the detention authorities in Saudi Arabia are in the arrest of the accused and 
subsequent custody in the detention centre without informing the accused of the charges 
under which they were arrested. He adds that the common answer the detainee receives is 
'you will know soon'. He believes that this is a kind of threat, which is intended to 
intimidate detainees and is in flagrant contravention of Article 35 of the CCP. Overriding 
this right may be due in part to the lack of formal qualifications required for enforcement 
officers who carry out such arrests. It is also a systematic abuse of human rights.  
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Evidence from the research suggested that arresting officers routinely fail to inform the 
suspect about the reason for his or her arrest. IPPC members do however say they try to 
inform the suspect of the reason for their arrest: 
     “No we do not inform the suspect about the reason for his arrest, I am ordered to 
arrest him, I just say, 'you are under arrest and in the police station you will know the 
reason for the arrest.”127    
     “We do not have this kind of procedure we are not in the US or Europe, our job is 
just to arrest the suspect and then bring him in to the police station. However, it is the 
police investigator who is responsible to inform the suspect about the reason for his 
arrest.”128 
This shows how arresting officers are clearly ignorant of Article 116 which says the 
suspects must be told when they are being arrested.  
IPPC members said that they informed the suspect about the reason for his arrest; 
otherwise, they could not talk with him and present him with the evidence against him. 
However, one of the IPPC investigators said: 
      “Sometimes it is hard to inform the suspect about the reason of his arrest, 
basically when the police bring him from place to place and bring him in to the IPPC 
to interrogate him. There is a lack of communication between us and the other 
enforcement departments, and the suspect is the victim of this.”129. 
 
One serious problem in detention centres is the lack of awareness detainees have of their 
guaranteed rights. Unfortunately, in many cases, those with the power to arrest and detain 
conceal these rights, and the accused has only a vague notion about them. This is an 
explicit violation of the rules (Articles 33 and 34), an exploitation of the weak and a 
serious violation of human rights. The government should require the executive 
authorities to respect the law and to make those who violate it accountable (Almajed 
2011p.6). One arresting officer also believed that informing the suspects of reason of 
arrest was actually inadvisable and that there was no regulation on this: 
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      “There is no law which states that I should inform the suspect when I arrest him, 
but that totally depends on the officer, if he sees that informing the suspect about the 
reason of arrest might lose evidence, he should not do it. Also sometimes if I inform 
the suspect I might face overreaction from the suspect so it is best not to do it."
130
 
       “I prefer to keep the reason for arrest vague to find out more information; I might 
discover another crime.”131 
 
A question which was asked to all the enforcement officers and the prosecutors was why 
the CCP does not formalize a caution as in PACE.  Some police officers welcomed that, 
saying they wished something like that was in place, so at least people would start to be 
aware about their rights. One police officer emphasized that the Ministry of Interior and 
the Ministry of Justice should set that up as soon as possible and make it part of the law.  
 
Saudi law is at variance with international standards such ICCPR Article 9 (2) and ECHR 
Article 5 which stipulate that formal charges have to be filed promptly and the defendant 
must be told what these charges are. There is no specific requirement in Saudi law for 
charges against a suspect to be formally written down nor that the accused should be told 
how evidence was used to establish whether he or she committed the crime (HRW p.36).  
 
1.2.1. The Right to Inform the Family. 
 
According to Article 35 of the CCP, the arrestee/detainee has the right to inform his/her 
family once he/she is arrested or detained. The reason for that is to assure the family that 
there has been no kidnap or accident. The aim of the arrest, detention or interrogation of 
the suspect should be simply to get to the truth or to know who has committed a crime. 
For this reason, the government is entirely responsible to limit any unnecessary and 
deleterious effect on any member of the suspect’s family or his or their lives (Alharagn 
2009 p.237). The reason that this issue is focussed on in this section but not elaborated in 
the other sections, is because it is a basic principle of human rights in pre-trial procedure 
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which is really neglected in practice in Saudi Arabia. However, the CCP does not 
elaborate on this point and it is open to interpretation. This section will reveal the actual 
implementation of the right detainees have to inform their families of their arrest. 
 
Of particular concern is a provision in Article 119 that gives prosecutors the right to keep 
suspects in incommunicado detention for up to 60 days. It does not define 
“communicate,” and leaves open the possibility that prosecutors may restrict a detainee’s 
contact with his or her lawyer either written or by telephone. Human Rights Watch points 
out that Article 35 of the CCP fails to set a time frame, specifying only that such 
communication should occur promptly after arrest or after the transfer between holding 
facilities (2008 p.48). 
 
In practice the arrestee is often not allowed to inform his family, and that may be deemed 
inhumane and is against Saudi law. The present research found that arrestees are hardly 
ever allowed to communicate with relatives or someone who needs to be informed him of 
the arrest. At the police station, the arrestees remain in custody without their phones, as 
custody procedures stipulate that these must be taken away. Arrestees are then at the 
mercy of the police soldiers. If they like, they will give arrestees a chance to call relatives 
to inform them about the arrest, but that cannot be said of all police stations in Saudi 
Arabia. At the police station at which the research was conducted, most of the officers 
did not allow the suspect to speak with anyone. Moreover, IPPC members alleged that the 
right to give the suspect a chance to inform his family was not part of their job, even 
though it is.   
 
     “Yes, there are rights for the suspect but we do not apply them, I know it is the law, 
but it needs to be activated to ensure the suspect gets his rights. The fault is ours; we 
do not respect the law. Of course the government seeks to get every suspect his rights 
but we do not.”132 
Another Riyadh investigator officer No.2, interviewed on 9 of July, 2013 commented: 
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     “No, we do not give the suspect the right to speak with anyone. What if the person 
he calls is involved in the crime; even his family may be involved with the crime. In 
any case, we have orders from the head of police to not allow anyone to speak with 
anyone at least in the first few hours.”133 
 
Investigating Officer No.3
134
 said that although he gave suspects the right to speak to 
their family he knew that this was not always the case. Prosecutor 2
135
 also admitted 
that this right was denied and that he sometimes wrote letters to the police asking them 
to allow suspects to speak to their families. Lawyer 2
136
 confirmed that suspects had 
trouble contacting a solicitor at the police station. 
 
Prosecutor No.5 was not happy to give suspects their rights because of his 
overwhelming workload:  
      “We do not have these kinds of rights; we do not have time for them. I mean, I am 
so busy and I have an overwhelming caseload which needs to be finished. I do the 
work of four people, and write, type up and hand the papers to my manager, and issue 
letters; most of us work like that, we do not have the time for these rights.”137 
 
It appears that many officers and prosecutors do not allow suspects to inform their 
families or call a lawyer even though the CCP gives this right, and that this is due to 
the lack of accountability. It is clear that there is ambiguity and conflict between 
Articles 119 and 35. Article 119 gives the investigator the right to prevent 
communication between the suspect and others, and gives the investigator the 
discretion to decide who the suspect can contact, which is a deprivation of liberty. On 
the other hand, Article 35 requires the executive authorities- and the investigator is 
one of them- to allow the suspect contact with his or her family. Thus, the CCP gives 
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the suspects rights and also takes them away. The government still has chance to 
change that in the regulation explanations and define the word ‘incommunicado’ 
making it clear from whom, when it applies and for what reasons. PACE sets that in 
Code C para.5.1. The ACHR gives suspects a right to contact their family in Art.14 
(3); however, it is not found in the ICCPR.  
 
1.3. The Right to be Brought Promptly Before a Judicial Officer. 
 
Fair trial standards set by international Human Rights law, such as the ICCPR Article 9 
(3), require that defendants receive a speedy trial. The prosecution must not unduly delay 
bringing a case to trial, and the court must not unduly delay adjudicating a case on its 
merits. Excessive delays in adjudicating a detainee’s case in court can render his or her 
continued detention unjustified and therefore arbitrary. Saudi law sets an absolute limit of 
six months on pre-trial detention before a detainee’s case must reach the courts, but does 
not provide legal guidance on what may constitute unreasonable delay either during those 
six months or once a trial has begun.  The fieldwork interviews aimed to determine just 
how promptly, or otherwise, detainees are brought to trial.   
 
Human Rights Watch argues that Saudi law does not give detainees the right to challenge 
the lawfulness of their detention before a court and obliges prosecutors to meet only 
administrative, but not substantive or evidentiary, requirements for issuing orders for the 
continued detention of suspects for periods of up to six months. Rather than protect the 
right of suspects to seek relief from a judicial authority, Saudi Arabia effectively places 
their detention at the discretion of the prosecution service (2008 p.48). Section 46 of 
PACE, by comparison clarifies the law as to when a person must be brought to trial 'as 
soon as practicable' after he has been charged. Generally, the suspect must go to court 
within 36 hours. This right is stipulated in ACHR Art. 14(5), ICCPR Art.9 (3) and ECHR 
Art.5 (3). 
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Articles 109 and 34 of the CCP which apply to hearing the testimony of the accused 
require the arrested person to be interrogated. If the accused fails to establish his 
innocence, the officer shall, within twenty-four hours, refer him, along with the record of 
the Investigator who shall within 24 hours, interrogate the accused under arrest and shall 
order either that the accused be detained or released. One prosecutor claimed that the 
detainees are usually sent to the IPPC in the last hour of 24 hours. Of course, the 
detainees might be innocent and they have been detained for 24 hours or more without 
reason, if they are not charged. Here a question arises as to why the police officer did not 
refer the suspect to the IPPC in the first or second hour. A Riyadh prosecutor No.4, 
interviewed on 12 of August, 2013, said that the detainees always came to him in the last 
hours of the 24 hours. This shows how detainees are, in practice, treated as if they are 
guilty even though they have not been charged and this is a breach of the principle of the 
presumption of innocence.   
     
Aljomiah (2006) considers that there are a number of prisoners detained in custody for 
periods ranging from months to years, without any checks by the Bureau of Investigation 
and Prosecution, and this delay may continue in the disposition of their cases before the 
courts. This procedure is contrary to Article 114 of the CCP which holds that 'the 
detention shall end with the passage of five days, unless the Investigator sees fit to extend 
the detention period...' so this behaviour can be described as explicit statutory violation.  
One case exemplifies this breach. A detainee had been arrested with seven of his relatives 
in a murder investigation. The murder had happened two years and eight months before, 
but he was not sent to trial. This was unlawful and in contravention of Article 114. The 
killer fugitive and four of his uncles had been arrested, two cousins, as well as his father 
who confessed in front of the security authorities that his son was a murderer. The inquiry 
was with the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution for multiple sessions and exceeded 
the CCP's requirement that the accused, if charges were not proven after a maximum 
period of six months, be released. Finally, the investigator gave his opinion, and referred 
the case to the Court which acquitted the uncles of the charge of murder after more than 
two years and eight months and dismissed the case. The original detainee added “I am 
still here waiting but the question is until when?”(Aljomiah 2006). 
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Article 120 of the CCP requires 'the release of the accused on bail if the IPPC member 
finds that the arrest has no justification that the accused undertakes to attend when asked 
to do so'. Even if we consider crimes which are not major crimes, there are still many 
people who are being detained for these in prison cells. One of the major reasons for this 
is that the IPPC have delays in the process of investigation due to excessive caseload. 
Another reason is that there are long delays in the court with carrying out the required 
paperwork. Thus, prisoners are going to stay long time in the prison. 
   
Aljomiah (2066) considers that the IPPC apply part of the law and violate the other part. 
He claimed that the IPPC alleged that there were sufficient investigators to deal with 
what is clearly an overwhelming caseload that comes every day to the IPPC. Moreover, 
investigators, he claims, lack qualifications and do not understand the principles of 
investigation. He adds that the evidence is that all the investigators just repeat the police 
officer's interrogation without adding any new information or uncovering any 
circumstances that serve the interests of the investigation. Of course it is unacceptable to 
detain innocent people for a long period because of the deficiency of employees (ibid.,). 
Prosecutors commented on that, saying:  
      “, the problem is that most IPPC investigators have graduated from Islamic 
universities and do not know anything about the law, and for that reason, the law 
cannot be applied effectively. ". 
138
 
 Prosecutor No.3 disagreed and said:  
      “The real reason is not about qualifications, the reason is the overwhelming 
caseload. We work as fast as we can, also for that reason we cannot apply the law as 
it stands, we are only human beings.”139 
   
One police officer responded to Aljomiah's argument by saying that the reasons for the 
delay were due to the investigator being faced with obstacles, such as the late arrival of 
the medical reports and laboratory technical reports for one of the parties, or to the late 
arrival of the criminal record, or the absence of the parties who required interrogation in 
                                                 
138
 (Riyadh Prosecutor No.5).      
139
 (Riyadh Prosecutor No.3).    
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his presence. Possibly the injured person did not arrive or issue his final report, or some 
of the parties escaped and there was a need to look for them, along with the late arrival of 
some of the evidence relating to crime at the scene. 
  
From these comments we can see that prosecutors tend to blame inefficiencies in the 
system both in terms of a lack of appropriate legal training and an unreasonable caseload. 
As a result, detainees are held for excessive periods and are not brought to trial, purely 
because of bureaucracy. This means that they are serving a sentence for a crime which 
has not been given any judicial scrutiny, and this is contrary to the rules and basic human 
rights, and in breach of rights established in the ICCPR.  
 
2. The Right to Legal Assistance. 
 
Saudi Arabia has only recently begun to give serious consideration to the role of defence 
lawyers. The CCP and the 2001 Attorney Law (AL) sets out a number of rights and 
duties for the legal profession. Furthermore, there are a rising number of legal (including 
Shari'ah) consultants. Alharagan (2006 p. 225) believes that the CCP is the first codified 
law in Saudi Arabia to recognize the suspect’s as well as the accuser's right to seek legal 
advice. It should be noted that in early Islamic times, criminal cases had just one stage, 
which was the trial. The judge took on the roles of lawyer and investigator as well as 
judge. In this the judge was assisted by ‘prophet companions’. They were scholars who 
were able to identify any defect or misunderstanding, and apply the moral judgments 
impartially (Alharagan 2009 pp.132-137). However, there were developments in the 
Islamic world that required a more systematic way to ensure the protection of the 
individual and society. Although there were not any explicit provisions in Shari’ah 
giving the suspect the right to legal advice, this right can be implied from the principles 
of the Islamic criminal justice system
140
  (ibid.). 
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 See more information in Chapter Six. 
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The CCP refers to the right to legal counsel in a number of Articles, notably Article 4, 
while. Article 70 also contains an important safeguard for defendants who have been able 
to retain legal counsel to prepare an effective defence, the relationship between the 
defendant and his lawyer must be confidential and Article 70 specifies that under no 
circumstances may the investigator exclude legal counsel, once the defendant has hired 
one. Articles 35 and 116 give the arrested person the right to communicate with any 
person of his or her choosing. This can be compared with the  ICCPR (Art.14 3(d) ECHR 
(Art.6 (3)) and ACHR (Art.16 (3&4)) which have given this right. 
 
However, in practice, the investigation stage is considered as starting from the time that 
the suspect, along with case file, has been referred to the IPPC, that is to say within 24 
hours following the arrest of the suspect. There are a number of problems in the 
aforementioned Articles and how they operate in practice, which will be discussed in the 
next section.   
 
2.1. Legal Advice. 
 
Article 4 of the CCP fails to provide the right to legal counsel from the moment of arrest, 
while stipulating that a first interrogation may take place within 24 hours, possibly before 
any right to legal counsel can be invoked. Once suspects are transferred to the IPPC they 
do have a right to legal advice; however, this right does not apply to the police enquiry 
stage which can be the most important time for suspects who need someone to explain 
their rights and whether or not their crime is in flagrante delicto. Moreover, at this stage 
in the police have extensive powers over the suspect (Alharagan 2006 p.255). On the 
other hand, s.58 of PACE and Code C par.6 entitles the detainee, if he so requests, to 
privately consult a solicitor. Once a request is made, the custody officer must act on it as 
soon as is reasonably possible, except when as a delay is authorized. An example is the 
case of Majed Nasser al-Shummari, who completed a three-year prison sentence in 2005 
but remained in jail. He was convicted after a secret trial in Riyadh, during which he had 
no legal assistance, of charges related to a visit he had made to Afghanistan (Amnesty 
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Organization 2009).  This case was clearly conducted in breach of Articles 35 and 116 
of the CCP.  
 
This research found that the police do not accept the presence of a lawyer for many 
reasons: a lack of understanding the law; a belief that they are not doing anything wrong 
and a belief that lawyers in Saudi Arabia do not understand criminal procedure. 
Investigating Officer 1
141
 said that he did not think there was any need for a lawyer at the 
stage of police investigation as all that was being done was hearing the suspect's 
testimony. He did not tell suspects of this right, however, if they asked for a lawyer he 
would not mind. Investigating Officer 3 added that the police often did not let lawyers 
into the police station as they didn't understand what they were doing there. This 
demonstrates the lack of police knowledge and training about the role of a legal 
representative. 
  
A number of Lawyers presented their experiences of visiting suspects at the police 
station, they said, that generally they could not go to the police station, they were not 
welcomed, the police were not cooperative and there was a level of competition between 
lawyers and police that could almost be considered animosity. 
 A Riyadh lawyer No.4, interviewed on 21 of July, 2013 pointed out that:  
 
      “The police officers have authority.  If they feel they are in danger of losing this 
authority, of course they will mistrust us, as for this reason we are like enemies for 
them.  In any case, the situation is much better in the IPPC than at the police 
station”. 142 
    
There is a significant defect in Articles 35 and 116, which gives the suspect the right to 
contact anyone he or she wants, but does not explicitly state that the suspect has the right 
to contact a solicitor. However, the suspect’s right to contact a solicitor can be implied 
from Article 35 which states that the suspect:  'shall be entitled to contact any person of 
                                                 
141
 (Riyadh Investigating Officer No1, interviewed 5 July, 2013). 
142
 (Riyadh Lawyer No.4). 
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his choice to inform him or his arrest'. This should not be interpreted as referring only to 
‘informing’ someone of the arrest and not requesting defence. 
 
Human Rights Watch (2008) points out that Article 116 grants the defendant the right to 
communicate with any person of his or her choice, provided it is “under the supervision 
of the criminal investigation officer.” Saudi law lacks provisions reflecting international 
human rights standards that allow for lawyer-client consultations to be “within sight, but 
not within the hearing, of law enforcement officials”. Although defendants often spend 
protracted time in detention beyond the periods permitted by law, in that time they do not 
have adequate means to prepare their defence.  
 
Article 70 raises questions as to what legal advice, if any, the lawyer may give a client 
during an ongoing interrogation, and seems to impinge on the right of confidentiality 
between lawyer and client. Saudi law only protects the confidentiality of written 
communication. Under Art. 84 of the CCP verbal communications are not protected.  
 
Solicitors in the Saudi system encounter obstacles from the CCP regime and also from 
the AL, which does not help the solicitors to do their job properly.  Article 19 of AL 2001 
requires that lawyers are facilitated, but that should be under certain criteria. For 
example, Article 19 (1, D) does not give the lawyer permission to copy papers from the 
file and, if he needs to read them, the reading must be under supervision. Saudi law 
appears to ignore the fact that lawyers and the investigators should seek justice and not 
create competition between them.           
 
A number of prosecutors commented on giving the suspect right to have a lawyer: 
Prosecutor 3 said that he allowed suspects to have a lawyer if they asked for one but that 
not all prosecutors did this. He felt that lawyers were a waste of money and sometimes 
did not know the law. He felt that he knew the law so he could be the one to give the 
suspect legal advice. Prosecutor 4 explained how lawyers were often kept waiting despite 
being legally allowed access to their client. 
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Such attitudes demonstrated a disregard for the importance of legal representation for 
the suspect.  Lawyer 6
143
 explained the problem they face with the IPPC who felt they 
knew the law better than lawyers  
     "IPPC members are jealous of us, because we earn good money, for one case, we 
earn double of an investigator’s wage"144.  
   
 These show the competition and lack of respect between lawyers and the IPPC.  
 
Another obstacle the lawyers in Saudi Arabia encounter is that Article 20 of the AL 
requires a Deed of Origin, which is a certificate given through a notary that the suspects 
consents to be represented by a specified lawyer. The Deed of Origin may be hard to 
obtain, because the suspect must go the court and present him or herself in front of the 
notary who issues the Deed of Origin. The Deed of Origin is not required by PACE or 
any international human rights norms in pre-trial procedures.  The question arises as to 
how long this procedure may take and why the suspect cannot just give the attorney 
verbally permission in the police station or during the investigation. 
 
In practice, if the suspect wants to have a lawyer he must go to the notary in handcuffs. 
Notary services are free but not available after 2 p.m. Lawyer 1
145
 commented that he 
could not understand why there could not  just be a verbal agreement between the suspect 
and the lawyer and that sometimes the police and judges did not accept the Deed of 
Origin. Lawyer 2 said that these were often ignored and if a lawyer wanted to get in to 
the police station, it was more important to know someone there, saying "Friendship is 
more important than the law". Lawyer 6 mentioned a case where he accompanied a 
client, but was not allowed into the interrogation by the judge. Requiring suspects to 
attend the notary's office in handcuffs is possibly damaging the reputation of a suspect 
who may be innocent. This requirement is also not necessary as a verbal declaration 
could easily be made at the police station.   
                                                 
143
 (Riyadh Lawyer No. 6 interviewed 6 August, 2013). 
144
 (Riyadh Lawyer No.6).   
145
  (Riyadh Lawyer No1, interviewed  11 July, 2013) 
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The CCP omits two important aspects of the right to legal counsel. First, it contains no 
provision for the right to be informed of the protections guaranteed under the law. 
Second, it does not protect the right to have legal counsel provided free of charge to those 
who cannot afford to hire one. Thus, in reality there seems to be no entitlement for the 
suspect to have legal advice either at the police station or the IPPC. Investigating officers 
do not inform the suspect of any right to legal advice and this cannot be obtained free of 
charge. There are two further factors which prevent people having legal advice at the 
stage of criminal investigation. Firstly, lawyers do not like to engage with criminal cases 
for financial reasons, as well as the law itself. Secondlyم some of the lawyers interviewed 
pointed out that there was little awareness in Saudi society about the right to have legal 
assistance, and that suspects were unlikely to be informed of that right at the police 
station and the prosecution.   
 
In practice, the research found that lawyers, police officers and IPPC members agreed 
that the law at the stage of criminal investigation is vague and not clear and can be 
interpreted in many ways. 
 
       "As lawyers we do not know who to refer to, the Ministry of Justice is not our 
reference; we do not yet know who we belong to. There is no Bar Association in Saudi 
Arabia, we do not have any organisation to complain to, for this reason no one 
respects us." 
146
 
He added that because there is no Bar Association in Saudi Arabia, this makes it 
difficult to find criminal lawyers. There are only about 1,200 qualified lawyers in 
Saudi Arabia and the majority of these are not interested in criminal cases. There are 
unqualified muaqb (advocates) who can keep track of cases for clients. 
Investigator 2 added that this lack of clarity and the fact that some judges did not accept 
lawyers in court was off putting for lawyers who mainly preferred to go into commercial 
law. Prosecutor 4 pointed out that lawyers could earn millions in commercial cases and 
lawyers did not want the 'moral problem' of defending 'criminal types'.  Prosecutor 2 did 
                                                 
146
 (Riyadh Lawyer No.1). 
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not even believe that legal advice should be provided Lawyer 5
147
 agreed with this saying 
that he preferred commercial cases as he did not like engaging with criminals, that the 
Attorney Law  and CCP was 'vague and complicated' and that he would have no respect 
at the police station or IPPC. Lawyer 4 also concurred, saying that, apart from problems 
with the police and IPPC, there was social ignorance about the work of criminal lawyers 
who were seen as helping criminals avoid justice. He added: 
    
“We suffer major conflicts everywhere we go; even the Lawyer Code and the IPPC do 
not protect us. Can you believe that according to the explanatory regulations of the 
Pleadings Code, a judge can detain a lawyer for 24 hours; so you see there is no 
difference between me and a criminal, it is really frustrating." 
148
 
 
These comments show that there are many factors involved in preventing effective legal 
representation. These range from lawyers themselves finding difficulties in performing 
their duties, to negative attitudes towards lawyers, and a lack of clarity about procedures 
as well as a lack of qualified lawyers who are prepared to take on criminal cases.. 
  
Khnean (2011) also argues that there are many difficulties and obstacles that prevent the 
lawyer being effective; there is no duty rota, for example.  However, these obstacles are 
not confined to the systems in Saudi Arabia that still need further development and 
modernization, if they are to keep pace with basic human rights standards  
 
3. The Right Against Ill-treatment.   
In the Saudi system, detainees spend pre-trial detention, which could last up to six 
months, in the police detention facility until they are either charged and transferred to the 
general prison or released. If the accused is aged less than 17, he is detained in the 
observation house which comes under the authority of the Social Services. If the detainee 
is female she stays in prison because there is no custody facility in the police stations for 
women. If under 17, she is detained in the Social Services facility for women. (CCP 
                                                 
147
 (Riyadh lawyer No.5,interviewed  22 July, 2013) 
148
 (Riyadh Lawyer No.4). 
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Article 114)This section discusses whether Saudi detainees are treated in accordance with 
humanitarian principles found in Shari’ah and international human rights laws. 
 
It should be remembered that in the police station there is no ‘Custody Officer’, there are 
just police soldiers who open and close the gates and search the suspect before he is 
placed in custody. However, as part of the research, two police station heads and other 
police officers were asked where detainees are put at the police station and they reported 
that all detainees are put into a single cell. This can create a number of dangers for a 
suspect - if he is put in a cell with someone abusive, with someone who has an infectious 
illness or simply if there are not sufficient provisions for hygiene. As custody can be for 
long periods of time, having everyone in one cell is a serious deprivation of privacy and 
may also lead to some more naive detainees being corrupted. This begs the question as to 
why there is no cell for every detainee as in most Western countries. Custody officers are 
made responsible by PACE s.39 (1) to ensure that all persons in police detention are 
treated in accordance with PACE and the Codes of Practice, and for recording all 
required matters in custody records.   This is stated in the ACHR Art.8, ICCPR Art.7 & 
ECHR Art.8. 
There were some attempts to justify this practice: 
     “We are human beings and by our nature we love to be engaged with others; we do 
not like to be remote from others as we like to talk to someone. If we detain everyone 
in their own cells, we will deprive them of their right to engage with others, it would 
be a kind of punishment".
149
  
And some explanations: 
 
“We just put the detainee in a small cell if he behaves badly, and the small cell is just 
one meter wide and two meters in length. However, if the suspect has committed a 
major crime he is put in a prison and not in the custody cell, which in the police 
station.” 150 
 
                                                 
149
 (Riyadh Custody Sergeant No1, interviewed 5  July, 2013). 
150
 (Riyadh Custody Sergeant No2 interviewed 12 July,2013). 
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The CCP does not provide any guidelines for dealing with suspects in custody, such as, 
providing a blanket, meals, visitors, lights and general hygiene as well as healthcare. 
Custody Sergeant 3
151
 pointed out that a custody officer does not exist at this stage of 
criminal procedure. There are no regulations for dealing with sick prisoners, in practice; 
officers simply carry out procedures as they were taught to by their predecessors. He 
sometimes opens the cell if he feels that there is a problem inside the cell. The cell is not 
for one person, but for many people and sometimes there is overcrowding and detainees 
cannot sleep properly. The police soldier just follows the commands that come from the 
officers and does not even review the case. The provisions of PACE and the Code of 
Practice safeguard the right treatment of suspects in custody, and provide for ‘the reliable 
recording of their statements during interrogation’.  
 
However, it should be noted that food and drink always come from the general prison. 
Every morning three meals will arrive and are handed out to the cell guard to feed the 
detainees. It is often difficult for the prison to know how many detainees they have in the 
custody, and there will no doubt be a shortage of food. Those interviewed gave an idea of 
cell conditions: 
 
      “Most of the detainees do not like our food, and most of them receive food from 
their relatives, also blankets as no one likes to sleep on a used blanket. In any case, 
there is a small canteen in each police station where detainees can buy what they 
want. I wish we had a nice and reasonable custody cell, but, as you know, we have 
contracted companies to clean the cells and look after the whole of the police station, 
but they do not do their job properly.  I have made many complaints to the head of the 
police station but the station is still as it, it is bureaucracy and we cannot be blamed." 
152
 
 
 Two lawyers agreed:  
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(Riyadh Custody Sergeant No.3 interviewed 13 August, 2013). 
152
 (Riyadh Custody Sergeant No.2). 
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      “The detainees are treated badly in the cell. Who would find it acceptable to stay 
in this kind of cell, which is not even fit for animals? It is disgusting- dirty blankets 
and food.” (Riyadh Lawyer No.6).  
   
     “Believe or not, there are no beds, all the detainees sleep on the floor, the custody 
cell is not suitable for humans. I was working as a manager in the IPPC and I told 
them about that many times, but it is just ink on paper.” (Riyadh Lawyer No.3). 
 
 These conditions exist because there are no regulations about detainees' food or sleeping 
arrangements.        
Article 37 of the CCP (Art. 37) stipulates merely that a member of the IPPC should visit 
the custody cell every day simply to check the number of the detainees and the reason for 
detaining them but he does not regulate anything about their conditions. 
 
However, the question arises that if the IPPC member takes the complaint seriously, what 
will happen next? For example, if there are no lights in the cell and the detainees make a 
complaint about it, the IPPC member cannot do anything for them according to the law. 
Those who deal with the suspect should do this according to their faith as a Muslim, and 
Islam encourages all its members to respect humanity (See Chapter Four). Thus, only 
giving people the most basic conditions when they have been deprived of their liberty is 
completely inadequate and must be regulated. Moreover, the Saudi courts have not 
intervened at all in the problem of unsatisfactory detention conditions, so detainees 
cannot complain about it anywhere (Alhargan 2006 p192). 
 
During the research I found that the police officers deal with the suspects according to the 
Prison and Detention Law 1989 (PDL). Article 8 states that 'anyone imprisoned must be 
searched before entering prison or detention centres and existing money or things of 
value taken from him, and then deposited securely in the prison or detention centre to be 
delivered to him upon release or given to anyone who is appointed by the prisoner'. The 
PDL does not regulate the conduct of intimate searches, and that might give the officers 
or soldiers an opportunity to violate the detainee's dignity. In practice, the detainees are 
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searched by the cell guard, and the search is very basic, consisting of simply frisking the 
detainee. All personnel at police stations are male only male detainees are accepted. 
Female detainees are sent straight to a female prison and are searched by a female guard. 
The researcher could not find anyone prepared to discuss intimate searches. 
 
     “The cell guard searches the detainees with his hands as nothing is allowed inside 
the cell. We take everything out and put it in a locker; once the suspect is released we 
give it back to him. The cell guard searches the cell three or four times a day, and if he 
feels something is wrong, he goes inside the cell and then searches the detainees.” 153 
       
Human Rights Watch (2013) in Saudi Arabia noticed that some prison staff punished 
some of the prisoners inside the prison, and meted out punishments without having the 
jurisdiction to do so. These punishments included cleaning toilets; solitary confinement 
beyond the periods permitted by the system; not allowing the prisoner out of their cell; 
sleep deprivation or handcuffing to the window frame or aisle etc. HRS also identified 
some encroachment on the detainees’ rights in the detention centres and prisons either in 
forcing them to confess or when obtaining information that may be useful to the 
investigation.  They also received some complaints from some of the detainees who 
claimed they were beaten and insulted by the secret police (HRW 2013). 
 
A breach of the principle of international human rights norms is that a former detainee 
who had been held in Riyadh’s ‘Ulaysha prison as a security suspect in 2007 and 2008 
told Amnesty International that he had been kept handcuffed and shackled for 27 days 
following his arrest before the handcuffs were removed and he was allowed to take a 
shower for the first time. He said that he had been interrogated during the night for more 
than a month and that this was routine for security suspects (Amnesty Organization 
2012). This case shows a lack of monitoring and accountability that leads to ill-treatment.  
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 (Riyadh Custody Sergeant No1). 
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Alanand (2007) has suggested that in order to protect detainees’ rights from being 
infringed by bad treatment, regulations should be included in the provisions which 
authorize the defendant or his counsel or one of his relatives to claim a medical 
examination immediately. However, defendants are in a difficult position as they may 
well be told that if they go to court and report that they have been tortured, they will be 
tortured again if they return to custody. The Office of the Ombudsman needs to take this 
into account, and investigate if prisoners are being threatened in this way and forced to 
remain silent in court. 
 
The research found that suspects were not being treated humanely, neither in accordance 
with the terms of the principles of Shari’ah nor international human rights norms. Again, 
the lack of monitoring and accountability are at the heart of this problem. The 
government could go some way to rectifying this by introducing a law which makes 
officers accountable for unlawful behaviour towards detainees and by appointing 
specially trained custody officers who must protect suspects in their care.  
 
4. Police conduct during interrogations. 
 
 The CCP is intended to operate as a safeguard for people who engage with the police and 
the IPPC. The presumption of innocence, the right to silence and the right against self-
incrimination will be discussed next.  
  
4.1. The Presumption of Innocence. 
 
The use of physical coercion was allowed in the Saudi system to obtain a confession from 
the suspect if there was sufficient evidence against him and he refused to speak. 
Permission had to be issued by the governor of each region (Emara) (Alhargan 2006 
p.160). Articles 2 and 102 regulate treatment during arrest and interrogation. The 
research has gathered information to discover whether Saudi detainees have rights against 
self-incrimination and if they are being treated as innocent until proven guilty.  The CCP 
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does provide some opportunity to monitor any misconduct that might occur during 
investigation, as abuses can be referred to the IPPC who can refer it to the Court.   
 
The presumption of innocence should be the starting point of the initial investigation; a 
human is considered innocent until proven guilty. This principle is upheld by and 
international human rights laws
154
 . The prime principle is to protect the rights and 
freedom of individuals (Mohyey Aldean 2011 p.284).  This section addresses current 
Saudi law and practice on the presumption of innocence. Article 103 of the Saudi CCP 
allows law enforcement officers to arrest suspects only pursuant to a prosecutor’s arrest 
warrant, unless the suspect is caught while committing a crime. Article 34 of the CCP 
gives law enforcement officers the power to determine whether to hold or to release 
suspects during initial interrogation. However, Art. 34 also reverses the principle of 
presumed innocence, requiring the suspect in effect to dispel the law enforcement 
officer’s suspicion that he or she has committed an offense, by demonstrating his or her 
innocence. Only if that is achieved must the arresting officer release him or her. In a 
memorandum to the Saudi government commenting on the CCP, Human Rights Watch 
(2008) pointed out that this provision, in reversing the presumption of innocence, is 
incompatible with international human rights law. PACE and the Code of Practice (Code 
C) regulate the circumstances in which interviews may take place. Suspects must be 
cautioned before being questioned and told that their answers or silence may be given in 
evidence to a court in a prosecution. This caution should be given on arrest or as soon as 
possible. Furthermore, answers to questions and statements should not be obtained 
through the use of oppression. Interviewees commented on this:  
     “I do not believe anyone brought into the police station is innocent. Why else 
would they bring him in, of course he has done something wrong.”155 
 
Arresting Officer 2 asserted that: 
      “We do not arrest anyone for no reason, we follow the law perfectly.”156 
                                                 
154
 See Chapter 3- section on presumption of innocence.  
155
 (Riyadh Arresting Officer No. 3). 
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However, prosecutor No.2 disagreed with the police officer, saying that daily there are 
many people who are really innocent and had been taken to the police with no 
sufficient reason.  
     “For this reason, our job is to review all cases to see why the arrestees have been 
brought to the IPPC. We always have problems with the police statements, they are 
often illegible, we always return them to be written well, and sometimes we ask the 
suspect about the reason for their arrest. If it is not a major crime, we send him back 
to the police station to release him after bail.”157 
 
Article 2 of the CCP states that “No person shall be arrested, searched, detained, or 
imprisoned except in cases provided by law. Detention or imprisonment shall be 
carried out only in the places designated for such purposes and shall be for the period 
prescribed by the competent authority. An arrested person shall not be subjected to 
any bodily or moral harm.  Similarly, he shall not be subjected to any torture or 
degrading treatment". It prohibits physically hurting someone during arrest. This refers 
to any hitting, wounding or damaging the integrity of the body. It also prohibits 
damaging the suspect psychologically through insults or humiliation. In general, Art.2 
prohibits the arrestee being subjected to any kind of tort, whether the tort is 
psychological or physical. 
  
Evidence from the research respondents would suggest that the government should enact 
a law for the presumption of innocence; and that the police must be trained to understand 
this principle.People cannot be arrested and detained just at the discretion of the police or 
their assistants. The police should know to deal properly with human beings and the 
government would be better if they set out a clear law to monitor police practice. This 
should be done by a third party, not by the police itself.    
4.2. The Right to Silence.            
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 (Riyadh Police Officer No.2). 
157
 (Riyadh Prosecutor No.2). 
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Suspects have the right to remain silent and refuse to answer any question at the stage of 
interrogation, and this principle is underlined in the ECHR and ICCPR, but not Saudi law 
which says nothing about this. But if the suspect does not answer the questions put to him 
and prove that he is not guilty, that silence might be against his or her interests (Alanezy 
2010 p.126). Mohyey Aldean argues that remaining silent cannot be taken as evidence 
against the suspect, as silence is one of the manifestations of freedom of the suspect to 
defend himself. Thus, there are two arguments regarding the right to remain silent, one 
for and one against the right to remain silent. Upholders of the latter point out that 
remaining silent obstructs the truth and uses the resources of the police and the IPPC who 
have to find more evidence against the suspect. However, the job of the police and the 
IPPC is to protect individuals and society not to criminalize innocent people, force them 
to speak, and possibly make a false confession under duress (Mohyey Aldean 2011 
pp.302-307). 
  
The CCP remains silent about the right to remain silent, and this gives the police and the 
IPPC an opportunity to force innocent people to speak and incriminate themselves.  
Alhargan (2009 p.124) argues for the explicit enactment of this right in the CCP. He 
adds, that does not mean the CCP doesn't recognise the principle of the right to remain 
silent, as Saudi Arabia applies Islamic law within its law and that supports the principle 
of innocence. Islam puts the burden on the prosecution, and the defendant will be 
innocent until it is shown that he is guilty or there is evidence against him.
158
 I would take 
issue with Alhargan’s argument, as applying Islamic law is not enough to regulate 
criminal procedure. If this were so, there would be no need to have introduced the CCP in 
the first place. The right to remain silent should be added to the CCP as one of the human 
rights that should be respected in criminal investigation.   
         
Through interviews, the researcher found there is no right to remain silent in practice. 
Because the CCP does not regulate it, the police and the IPPC have assumed a wide 
discretion in this matter. At the police station, some officers accept the right to silence if 
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they have strong evidence, but often they use their authorization to make the suspect 
speak. IPCC practice was similar to police practice when the suspect remained silent.  
     
     “If the suspect does not speak, his remaining silent will be evidence against him. 
Furthermore, if the suspect makes no comments, we will use our authorization to 
extend his detention. If he insists on remaining silent, after using every positive 
encouragement, we refer the case to the Emara and then they decide whether to 
release him or not.”159 
 
In the IPPC, the prosecutors use their authorization to force the suspect to speak:    
      
     “There is no dealing with someone who remains silent - no solution. After I present 
the suspect with the accusation, if he does not defend himself, I will remand him in 
custody until he speaks. At the end of the authorized period, I will send him to the 
court to deal with him. Remaining silent confuses the case and slows it down. 
Whosoever remains silent is always a professional criminal.”160 
 
In the interviews, lawyers were very critical of the way the police and IPPC members 
operated in this respect. They believed strongly that the suspect had the right to remain 
silent. However, the police and prosecutors did not care about this right, as they believed 
that if the suspect remained silent he was guilty and that was evidence against him to be 
sent on to the court. This shows how some prosecutors regard a silent suspect as guilty. 
There is no presumption of innocence and no right to remain silent. This was supported 
by the lawyers interviewed who said that the suspect cannot remain silent (Lawyers 1 and 
4).   
  In practice, recent research found it difficult to establish whether police or IPPC 
members routinely force the suspects to speak or harm them. However, a number of 
police officers confidently maintained that forcing suspects to speak no longer occurs. 
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160
 (Riyadh Prosecutor No.2).  
 
248 
 
They said that in the past some officers used to do it but not now and that confession is 
not the basis of evidence any more.  
      “, "Forcing people to speak means they might confess to something they have 
never done in their lives.”161 
This shows that there is, at least, awareness that the use of force is unlawful. It should 
be noted that these officers were being recorded and unlikely to admit to breaching the 
regulations. Also, 'not using physical force' does not exclude the use of threats or 
shouting at the suspect. However, awareness does not guarantee that this ideal is 
followed in practice.    
 
Investigating officer No.1
162
 commented  
     “If the officer uses torture or forces the suspect to speak to obtain a confession, he 
isn't qualified to be an officer at all. Why would he need that as long as he has 
evidence against him? We seek justice to protect society, not to harm innocent people. 
We just collect the evidence and send the suspect to the court or to the IPPC.”163 
 
4.3. The Right against Self- Incrimination.  
Article 102 of the CCP deals with interrogation in the IPPC and does not mention hearing 
the testimony of the accused, which is conducted in the police station. The CCP treats the 
hearing in the police station as an initial procedure and does not guarantee the suspect 
rights at that stage in the way it guarantees it at the interrogation. Article 34 states that ' 
the criminal investigation officer shall immediately hear the statement by the accused'. 
However, if the police use pressure to obtain a confession from the suspect, the question 
arises as to whether the confession will be admissible in the IPPC or not. In practice, the 
police use such powers to interrogate the suspect, and that is totally unacceptable. There 
are serious problems with abuse by untrained police soldiers and officers carrying out the 
initial hearing as the quote below suggests.  
 
                                                 
161
 (Riyadh Police Investigator No.5). 
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  (Riyadh Investigator No.1, interviewed 5 July, 2013). 
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      “Many times I received cases where the hearing testimony was not clear and in 
the end the suspect was innocent. Police soldiers are the problem.”164 
Another prosecutor commented how even in cases where malpractice is sufficient to 
warrant a letter to the Head of Police, the case is still accepted (Riyadh Prosecutor No 
4).    
 
The question arises here as to whether informing the head of police about what has 
happened is effective. Evidence from the research suggests that this is not the case and 
that the Saudi criminal procedure needs a third party to protect suspects. Alhargan (2009 
p.218) considers that any confession obtained forcibly from the suspect must be 
inadmissible because that is entirely against international and local, Islamic law, and that 
whoever wrongs a suspect will be held accountable – as stated in Royal Decree No. 43 
(1958).  
 
However, it should be noted that the Royal decree is now no longer in force, does not 
appear to have ever been applied, and did not mention who should conduct the 
application. I would argue that if there was misconduct by police during a criminal 
investigation, then the prosecutor should monitor them and refer them and their 
malpractice to the court. However, the question arises as to whom the prosecutor is 
accountable if he is guilty of misconduct during an investigation. Article 5 of the CCP 
states that 'commission members enjoy full independence, and, except for the provisions 
of Islamic law and regulations in force, no one shall interfere in their field'. It is obvious 
that the Saudi system gives the IPPC wide powers to use at the stage of criminal 
investigation and that might to lead to someone’s deprivation of liberty. This issue will be 
further discussed in Section 6 - the right to an effective remedy.  
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Nonetheless, even after the introduction of the CCP, in practice there are still widespread 
allegations of torture. Almost in every case where a confession is used as evidence 
against the defendant, the defendant alleges that he had been subjected to torture in order 
to make him confess. How many of these allegations are true cannot be verified as it is 
not possible to investigate them. This is evidenced in a recent Amnesty Report, which 
included the case in March 2009, of three Chadian men – Muhammad Hamid Ibrahim 
Sulayman, Hassan Bashir and Muhammad Salih – who were reported to have been 
convicted of theft and sentenced to have their right hands amputated on the basis of 
confessions allegedly made after they were beaten while held in prolonged 
incommunicado detention (Amnesty Organization 2009). The lack of monitoring leads 
inevitably to breaches of the law and that may have been happened in the case above.    
 
 The interviews also yielded statements which show that not all officers respect the 
official guidelines: 
      “Usually we do not force people to speak, but sometimes if we believe the suspect 
has committed the crime we use high pressure to make him speak or lead us to the 
evidence. I sometimes use sleep deprivation to make the suspect speak.”165 
 Investigating Officer 2 agreed that using pressure was effective and that even though 
threatening suspects was unlawful it was 'well-known' at the police station. Prosecutor 
4 said that it was necessary to 'put the suspect under pressure...for the sake of justice' 
 
Thus, the research found conflicting statements about the issue of forcing a suspect to 
give evidence. Some officers denied it whilst others considered it 'very effective".  
Under Article 102 of the CCP, the suspect must be interrogated inside the relevant IPPC 
Branch, except where the investigator considers it necessary to do otherwise. Alhargan 
suggests that investigators usually carry out interrogations at the police station whether 
this is necessary or otherwise so that they can behave with impunity. As police are 
subordinate to, and often friendly with, IPPC members, ill-treatment of suspects is highly 
unlikely to be reported (2006 p.163). 
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The research found that the lack of monitoring and judicial review led to the police and 
IPPC disregarding the CCP. Detainees were routinely deprived of the right to silence and 
pressured into giving evidence by enforcement officers. The government should take 
action by setting up a department dedicated to reviewing cases to see if the law has been 
breached, as described in PACE s.39. (See ACHR Art.8.; ICCPR Art.7 & ECHR Art.8.) 
 
Not covering the right to silence in CCP leads to a contradiction in Saudi criminal 
procedure. Most of the enforcement officers and their assistants expressed a belief that 
confession is not important, and evidence was the only thing they needed to obtain. On 
the other hand, they remanded the suspect in the custody until he spoke, which is against 
the principles of Shari'ah and international human rights norms.  Clarification of the CCP 
and proper training is therefore required.  
 
 5. Non- discrimination. 
 
The CCP does not have regulations about discrimination in the treatment of suspects, and 
that also gives the police in the IPPC wide powers to interrogate people differently. 
However, PACE in Code A Para.1 states that stop and search powers must be used 
“without unlawful discrimination”, and reminds officers that they are now covered by the 
Equality Act 2010, which protects people from discrimination by government 
departments, local authorities and the police. It should be noted that Saudi Arabia has 
over 45 tribes and using tribal influence (wasta) is a commonplace, every member of a 
tribe helps other members, or at least tends to be on their side, if they are not totally 
breaking the law. This explains discriminatory practices towards Saudis, but there is also 
evidence of discrimination against foreigners and non-Muslims.  Discrimination (see 
below) could exist because the CCP remains silent about it. None of the core Islamic 
sources speak about discrimination in depth, only in general.  However, this right is a key 
requirement of international human rights law, notably the ICCPR Article 26, also in 
treaties that Saudi Arabia has ratified such as the UNCRC, CEDAW and the Arab 
Charter. The ACHR reflects this right in Art. 3. This can be compared with the ICCPR 
Art.26 & ECHR Art.14. 
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 In October, 12 Filipinos and a Roman Catholic priest were arrested in Riyadh by 
religious police who raided a religious service being held in secret; accusing them of 
proselytizing. They were released on bail the following day (Amnesty Organization 
2012). This shows that there is still discrimination against non-Muslims. However, as has 
been said earlier, Shari'ah and Islam stress that such discrimination is wrong. 
 
Alanad (2007) points out that there are many complaints from foreigners as well as from 
Saudi citizens about the police and the IPPC, who are accused of using power against 
them for other interests, or treating them aggressively just because they are foreigners. He 
notes that the principle of equality before the law, regardless of gender, nationality, race, 
colour or religion is a right guaranteed by Islamic law and international conventions. 
Shari’ah has approved equality among all people, regardless of ethnic differences, assets 
and human values and there should be no prejudice in favour of Arabic people over 
people of other nationalities
166
 This shows that there is a contradiction between Shari'ah 
and the CCP, while the Prophet states that Allah does not prefer according to colour or 
language, but only looks at what is in someone's heart. (Prophet's Sayings) 
 
In the recent research, discrimination was hard to verify.  
      “We deal with all suspects in the same way. However, a woman should be 
interrogated along with one of her guardians, we cannot interrogate her alone, it is 
breaking the law and Shari’ah as well. We also interrogate anyone under 17 in front 
of his father or guardian. If there is no guardian, we ask for a member of the religious 
police and a member of the police station. In general, there is no discrimination at all 
during the investigation.”167 
 
The Commission of Human Rights in Saudi Arabia noted that the practices of some 
segments of society, including the distinction between citizens of the state on the basis of 
region or tribe, creed or origin, threatens the unity of the people and adversely affects the 
concept of belonging to a nation. These discriminatory practices cause friction between 
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253 
 
ethnic and regional groups, despite the best efforts of the state to end these practices, 
which are incompatible with the values of the Islamic religion. The treatment of detainees 
first, requires an awareness of the extent and seriousness of practices that are inconsistent 
with the values of the Islamic religion and second requires the creation of anti-
discrimination regulation in the CCP that applies penalties to those who discriminate 
adversely against particular detainees either in word or deed (2008).  
 
6. The Right to Privacy. 
 
The CCP was not the first code in Saudi law which regulated the right to privacy since 
Islamic theology covers all aspects of the respect for privacy for both the individual and 
for their premises
168
. The Basic Law of Government 1981 came to reflect some of the 
principles of Islam in this respect. Art. 37 states that 'homes are inviolable, and may not 
be entered without the owner's permission, or inspected, except in cases specified by the 
law'. Also, Art.40 states that 'telegraphic correspondence, mailing, telephone calls, and 
other means of communication, are protected, and may not be confiscated, delayed, 
viewed, or listened to, except in cases specified by the law'. PACE's Code A deals with 
this issue in a clear way. The right to privacy is guaranteed by the ACHR Art.21, ICCPR 
Art.17 & ECHR Art.8. 
The CCP sets out a number of Articles which regulate any necessary deprivation of 
privacy or search of homes (see Article 40 of the CCP). However, their impact was 
questioned during interviews conducted in three police stations in Riyadh, discussed 
below.   
 
The purpose of an inspection is to search for crime-related evidence. In the initial stage, 
the aim of this is to find evidence about a specific crime and not just to go looking for 
evidence of crimes at random. Any inspection of premises has to be occasioned by a 
specific crime which has occurred. There should be sufficient evidence to justify the 
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violation of the sanctity of someone's home (Dufyer 2011 p.115). This section addresses 
the issue of the right to privacy to see if the law is upheld in practice.  
 
There are two types of inspection, firstly, the accusation inspection (known as criminal 
inspection), which is conducted by enforcement officers to search for evidence related to 
a crime in a specific location - place or person- according to the provisions of the law. 
The inspection can be of premises or individuals, and cannot be carried before a crime is 
suspected. This kind of inspection is regulated by the CCP, which will be further 
discussed below. The second type is administrative inspection, a kind of procedure 
conducted by administrative authorities. Here, officers are not searching for criminal 
evidence but ensuring the safety of society, maintaining security and preventing leakage 
of secrets (Dufyer 2011 p.125: Alquhtany 2007 p.312). However, the CCP does not 
regulate the way to conduct administrative inspections (as I mentioned earlier in section 
1.1), and it needs to set out a new Article to clarify the law on how enforcement officers 
practice the inspection. Part II of PACE, in contrast, clearly outlines the power to search a 
person in properties. It also requires a Justice of the Peace to issue a search warrant and 
outline exceptional circumstances where a warrant is not required.  
The CCP regulates the right to privacy in three ways; individual inspection, inspection 
without a search warrant and inspection with a search warrant. 
 
6.1. Individual inspection. 
 
A search of a person inside his premises can be carried out without a warrant as long as 
the police officer finds indications that the suspect is carrying evidence which might be 
useful for the investigation. Furthermore, a criminal investigation officer may search the 
accused when it is lawful to arrest him, which may include his body, clothes, and 
belongings. If the accused is female, the search shall be conducted by a female assigned 
by the criminal investigation officer (Articles 44 & 42 CCP). The reason for that is that 
when a police officer has the authority to arrest someone, it is obligatory, to search him or 
her so as not to lose the evidence or give the suspect time to hide it or destroy it 
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(Alhargan 2009 p.185). The question arises, what if the police officer found something 
illegal or related to another crime on another individual? 
 
Interviewees commented:  
     “If the enforcement officers violate the law we accept the violation and, the case 
will be considered as separate from the original case. For example, if the enforcement 
officer entered a house without search warrant and they found drugs, we accept that 
against the suspect and we present him with an accusation. As to the violation, we just 
make a note about it to the head of police and we are asked not to do it again.”169 
 This shows how monitoring in the Saudi system is very weak. If any officer violates 
the law, he should be brought to justice not just given a note.   
Prosecutor no.3 pointed out that violations only arise if there is proved to be no 
evidence against the suspect and the suspect complains. It seems that the courts in 
Saudi Arabia, accepts violation of the law if there is a need to protect society against 
crime. I think they believe that it is unfair to not arrest a suspect who is found to be 
doing something illegal, because the procedure indicates that it is a violation of law. 
To resolve this issue, the CCP could add a new Article with this wording: ' an 
enforcement officer who enters premises without a search warrant will be accountable 
in law. However, the evidence found will be acceptable against the suspect, as well as 
the officer being held accountable.’  This would be a strong basis for providing for 
accountability but would need to be monitored to ensure it was carried out in practice. 
In practice, it would mean that that search warrants would have to be issued efficiently 
and that police breaches would have to result in effective sanctions.   
        
6.2. Inspection of Premises. 
 
The CCP gives the police officer the right to enter premises without a warrant if he is 
needed there to help. Thus, a dwelling may be entered in the case of a request for help 
from within, or in case of a demolition, drowning, fire, or in hot pursuit of a perpetrator 
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(Article 41 of the CCP). Saudi law is very strict about entering premises without a search 
warrant, unless there is a necessity to do that, for example, to help someone in the case of 
an SOS. In the case of privacy, PACE is not dissimilar, and the reasons and procedures 
for entering premises is regulated in detail, also in s.17, entry by consent of the suspect is 
regulated in the same way as entry by warrant or after an arrest. Officers are, after all, 
often called on to come in and help with a situation. However, unlike in Saudi Arabia, 
these procedures are closely monitored to ensure that practice follows the lawful 
procedure. 
 
These restrictions exist for two reasons: Firstly, Shari’ah emphasizes the individual’s 
privacy, and warns people to not disrespect it, otherwise, God will punish them. 
Secondly, Saudi culture values the family and its privacy, so any law that allowed 
interference with individual private life would create animosity against the government.               
The CCP gives IPPC members the power to issue search warrants, as provided for in Art 
(41) of CCP. However, other dwellings may be searched pursuant to a search warrant, 
specifying the reasons, issued by the Investigator.  If the proprietor or the occupant of a 
dwelling refuses to allow the criminal investigation officer free access, or resists such 
entry, he may use all lawful means, as may be required in the circumstances, to enter that 
dwelling', while the standards of International Law require that a search warrant should 
be issued by an independent judiciary in order to ensure the safety of this procedure and 
the presence of legal justification. At interview, police officers and IPPC members 
asserted that enforcement officer cannot enter any premises unless someone asks for help, 
otherwise, if entry was made without such justification, they would encounter problems 
with the law. However, Almajed (2011) points out that enforcement officers routinely 
ignore the need for arrest or search warrants. 
 
A search for the accused without a warrant is a blatant encroachment on privacy rights 
guaranteed by the law and Shari'ah.  Some enforcement officers do not respect Article 41 
of the CCP, which emphasizes that the private life of the accused cannot be violated on 
the whim of criminal investigators. Criminal investigators in Saudi Arabia lack specialist 
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training and experience in this regard, they imagine that if they obtain a search warrant, 
this grants them the right to tamper with everything (Almajed 2011). 
 
The only department that has the authorization to issue a search warrant is the IPPC (CCP 
Article 41). The police have this authorization only in the case of thefts. Prosecutors have 
the right to issue search warrants and the police officers may search and arrest after 
having permission from the head of police. Alhargan (2006 p.277), points out that Art. 41 
does not identify the person within the IPPC who has the authorization to issue the search 
warrant to search private premises. Thus, in practice officers sometimes make an arrest 
and search premises without a search warrant so as not lose evidence. Sometimes there is 
no time to wait for the IPPC’s permission.  
Arresting officer no.3 commented:      
“If there was a mistake during the search of premises, that can be justified if we found 
something illegal. This is not the case every time, only when there is a necessity. In 
any case, it is important to conduct searches.”170 
  
Arresting Officer 1 asserted that: 
     "A search warrant is very, very important, for me as an arresting officer, I cannot 
get into any premises without a search warrant, and also if I get into premises without 
a written search warrant, just a verbal order from the head of police or the head of 
investigation, and something went wrong I would be in trouble, so it is better to have a 
search warrant." 
171
. 
   
Having search warrants issued speedily and effectively by the judiciary might resolve this 
issue. It is evident that the CCP gives authorization to IPPC members to issue the search 
warrant without bearing in mind that the police is the first department which deals with 
crime. Firstly, the IPPC only works from 8 am to 2:30 pm, but the police work 24 hours, 
so if the police need to enter premises urgently, they cannot do it, otherwise, they will 
break the law. Secondly, it is the police which initially deals with the crime and goes to 
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the scene to investigate the crime and sometimes it is necessary to enter premises to 
search and arrest.  Article 41 of the CCP should be changed to set up an effective system, 
and warrants could be requested from an appropriate judiciary authority and sent 
expeditiously over the phone or PC. Urgent entry should be available on other grounds 
and not need a warrant.  
         
Article 45 of the CCP gives an explicit description of the inspection mechanism, and 
states that premises 'may be inspected only to find things related to crime, to collect 
evidence', If any other evidence, not relating to the crime is discovered, the investigating 
officer may also collect that evidence but a note must be made to that effect. There needs 
to be clear and explicit regulations about what happens in regards to the finding of 
evidence unrelated to the stated crime. 
 
Almajed (2011 p.7) argues that infringement of the private life of the accused has become 
the usual behaviour of officers involved in criminal investigation. Inspection records 
often reveal that the criminal investigation officer was found in the house of the accused 
opening sealed documents or violating the privacy of the accused by interfering with mail 
and other communications; taking advantage of the absence of a sergeant and ignoring 
Article 55 of the CCP. Although it is required by Article 56, the enforcement officer 
often does not inform the IPPC about the plan that they intend to carry out (ibid., p.7). 
 
He adds that there is a gap between theory and practice with regard to the guaranteed 
rights of the accused. For example, criminal investigators conduct inspections of homes 
and offices at night, contrary to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, (Art. 51) 
which stipulates that inspections - in cases other than flagrante delicto – must be carried 
out during the day (ibid. p.7). 
 
It should be noted that in Saudi Arabia, criminal courts do not engage in reviewing the 
legality of procedures taken during the pre-trial stage of the criminal process, with the 
exception of confessions and evidence obtained by torture. This lack of monitoring can, 
of course, lead to chaos. During an interview, one of the prosecutors mentioned that the 
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courts never cared about the violation of law or the procedure of criminal law; they just 
read the case and gave the decision depending on what they believed. 
 
       "We never write to them and mention the CCP articles to them; they would not 
understand it or care about it.”172. 
 
Alanad (2007) points out that the Human Rights Commission observed that some 
enforcement officers stormed houses, or searched without permission of the owners or 
written permission from the competent authority as the law requires. The HRC did not 
know, if any action was taken or if there was implementation of specific sanctions against 
people who exceeded the law to stop them from working or whether any other 
administrative penalty had been given. However, the HRC noted that if someone violates 
the law and enters houses without permission, a complaint is made to a high- ranking 
government official who will require those who violated the law to answer to and justify 
the violation.  
 
This research concluded that breaches of the right to privacy are seen as acceptable if 
they protect society from crime. However, if such breaches are not regulated by law and 
officers not made accountable for their actions, Saudi law will never satisfy standards 
expected by international human rights laws and Shari’ah. Reforms are needed both in 
terms of clearer CCP regulations about search warrants, adequate police training and a 
system of sanctions against enforcement officers who breach the regulations.   
 
7. The Right to Bail. 
 
The CCP sets out the right to bail, but it should be noted that in the earlier times of Islam, 
four Muslim scholars emphasized that the governor should not detain a suspect for a long 
time, but prove that the suspect is guilty or release him or her. Fundamentally, detention 
is just a temporary procedure during which the truth may be discovered. If the suspect is 
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found to be guilty, he will be sent to the judge or be released, if there is nothing against 
him or her (Dufyer 2011 p.110). 
 
The CCP allows investigators to release detainees if this does not impair the case. 
However, in cases other than those where the release is mandatory, the accused should 
not be released until he has designated a residence acceptable to the Investigator (Articles 
120 and121 of CCP). Furthermore, an order for the release should not stop the 
Investigator from issuing a new warrant for the arrest or detention of the accused if 
evidence against him becomes stronger, or where the accused violates his undertakings, 
or where the circumstances of the case require such action (CCP Article 122). 
 
These Articles seem clear and understandable, and also can work well, but in practice this 
is not the case. The regulations should reflect the principles of the 1976 Bail Act where 
there is a presumption in favour of release. The reasons why the Articles cannot be 
applied in criminal procedure will next be discussed.  This section explores to what 
extent current practice grants suspects the right to bail.  
     
Mandatory release in Saudi criminal procedure requires the release of the detainee once 
he or she ends the period of custody ordered, unless it is renewed by the competent 
authority or if the detainee has been detained six months and not sent to court.  The 
detainee must be released if the case is closed or the detainee is not charged with a 
different criminal offence; or if the period of his or her arrest is over the minimum 
penalty of his or her offense; or if the detainee has concluded all actions required by any 
civil lawsuit, and the crime was not murder, corruption or theft. If the detainee has spent 
more time than or equal to his sentence; or if the judge issued a dismissal of the case then 
the detainee must be released (Articles 120 & 216 CCP) (Dufyer 2011 p.111). However, 
the CCP does not mentioned the right to bail in its provision; Article 121 only states that 
‘In cases other than those where the release is mandatory, the accused shall not be 
released until he has designated a residence acceptable to the Investigator'.  In contrast, 
PACE (1984) clearly establishes the right to bail and in ss. 34&37 outlines all the 
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circumstances and procedures in which bail is to be given. The ICCPR Art.9(3) & ECHR 
Art.5(3) guarantees the right to bail, however the ACHR does not contain the right to bail 
neither does Shari’ah.  
 
Duyfer points out that detainees can be legally kept in custody for unnecessarily long 
periods of time, and that Art. 113 gives the prosecutor powers to detain someone if there 
is no sufficient evidence. He cannot release the detainee without approval from the head 
of branch of the IPPC. Furthermore, if the crime is considered as one of the major crimes, 
even the head of branch cannot release the suspect, even if he does not have sufficient 
evidence, he must have approval from the Chairman of the Bureau of Investigation to 
release the suspect according to Article 124 of CCP. This can be considered a deprivation 
of liberty (ibid., p.113). This practice amounts to a breach of fundamental rights to liberty 
enshrined in both Shari'ah and the ICCPR.   
 
Almajed (2011) expresses his anger about the restrictions on the right to bail in criminal 
procedure in Saudi law. Although arrest is not considered as limitless, as is currently 
practiced by criminal investigators, it is a procedure to allow them to question the 
accused, only to decide whether to charge him or her or not. The interrogation is just to 
discuss with the accused extensively, and to charge if there is strong evidence or 
otherwise release the detainee. Therefore, it is assumed that this stage will be very short, 
just to enable the authorities in the criminal investigation to hear the statements of the 
accused about the charges against him. While Article 33 of the above states: "... In all 
cases, the arrestee may not be detained for more than 24 hours, without a written order 
from the investigator ..."; in some cases the detainee remains in custody for days. People 
can be detained who have not been charged with any offence, or sometimes when an 
amount as little as SR 200 is in dispute. Accordingly, individuals can remain for three 
months or more in jail just for the sake of a small debt, which is treated as criminal 
offence in Saudi Arabia (ibid.,). Sometimes detention is for months without the detainee 
being questioned ' the article is clear but, so it is alleged, officers do not want to apply it' 
(ibid.p.3.). 
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A police officer interviewed as part of the research project said that it was sometimes 
very hard to apply Article 121 of the CCP. In cases other than those where the release is 
mandatory, the accused won’t be released until he has a designated residence acceptable 
to the Investigator. As indicated previously, in Saudi Arabia addresses are not always 
clear as we do not have post code to know exactly where the suspect lives, so there is no 
fixed address.  
“So when the IPPC investigator issues a release letter according to Article 121, we 
cannot act on it and usually we keep suspects until they bring a guarantor (kafeel) or a 
letter of guarantee from a company, otherwise they stay for a long time.” (Investigating 
Officer No.5). 
 
According to the research conducted in Riyadh, there were many cases which did not 
need bail (Kafla), and the investigator issued a release letter. However, the police officers 
did not release the suspect even though there was no justification for holding him. An 
investigator officer no.2 was asked why bail was required if there was nothing against the 
suspect. He said: ‘Any person entering custody is an accused so we need to be sure 100% 
that he will attend the police station when we needed even if there is nothing against 
him.’173. 
 
This is clearly untenable and Saudi criminal procedure should more clearly set out the 
bail regulations. It should be emphasized to the enforcement officers that they should 
release the suspect once they receive the release letter from the prosecutor, and that they 
are actually acting outside the law as it stands. A police officer 3 was asked, if they work 
to a particular law or Codes.  
He said: ‘Sometimes we follow the CCP and sometimes we follow precedent. This means 
we are used to doing something, because our predecessor used to do it and we do not 
know if it is a law or not.’174. This latter procedure is clearly neither acceptable nor 
lawful.   
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Saudi criminal procedure law needs reform in this area and the government should take 
into account the right to bail so as to release those who have not been charged with a 
crime or have been released by the prosecutor. The IPPC or whoever can arrest a suspect 
should have the same authorization to release him. Moreover, the IPPC members should 
extensively monitor the custody centres after investigators have issued a release letter to 
ensure that the law is applied. The government should regulate the right to bail in the 
police stations and not give the officers discretion to release or detain who they want. 
PACE covers the right to bail in ss.34 &37.  When suspects have been assaulted by the 
police there should be a way that they can claim compensation and that will be discussed 
next.    
 
8. The Right to an Effective Remedy in Saudi Arabia.  
 
The CCP has no regulations about the right to an effective remedy, except Art. 25 which 
states: 'Criminal investigation officers shall, in conducting their duties as provided for in 
this Law, be subject to the supervision of the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution. 
This Bureau may ask the competent authority to consider any violation or omission by 
any such officer and may request that disciplinary action be taken against him, without 
prejudice to the right to initiate criminal prosecution’.  
 In England and Wales complaints against the police are handled either locally by police 
forces, or by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). S. 85 of PACE and 
s. 69 of the Police Act 1996 allow the police to use an Informal Resolution. This is in 
stark contrast to Saudi Arabia where victims of human rights abuses at pre-trial have little 
legal recourse. Furthermore, the right to an effective remedy in the ACHR, Art. 14 (7) is 
vague and cannot be seen as an absolute right; whereas the ICCPR Art.2 (3) & ECHR 
Art. 13 stipulate this right. 
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Article 8 (1.)(B&C) of the Office of Ombudsman Code 1982 (OOC) gives the 
Ombudsman the right to challenge administrative decisions, and to overrule decisions 
which are erroneous, or violate rules and regulations, or are wrong in their application, 
interpretation, or an abuse of power. Moreover, claims for compensation against 
government departments and independent public figures, form part of its business. 
 
This study found difficulties in finding any sources, which talk about the right to an 
effective remedy. There is no clear law or regulation about compensation in criminal 
procedures except Article 8 of the OOC. Supposedly, there are four ways for the accused 
to have compensation or an effective remedy after being assaulted by enforcement 
officers. This is through application to the Chief of Police, the IPPC, the Emara (Council) 
or the Ombudsman. However, the question arises as to whether these four ways work 
properly in Saudi law, in practice. The research found that they are not as will be shown 
below.  
 
In Saudi legislation on criminal procedure, it should remembered that the criminal courts 
do not review the procedures that have been conducted by enforcement officers; the 
courts just address the evidence or the confession, which may have been obtained by 
torture. A question was asked in the interviews, whether the criminal courts in Saudi 
Arabia review the criminal procedure to see if it has been violated and whether the 
prosecutor informed the court that the police have violated the law:  
“The court does not care about that, and, to be honest with you, they do not believe in the 
CCP or the other laws. Yes, it has the right to review all cases to ensure the procedure 
has been conducted properly but it does not.”175. 
 
I argue that judges in criminal courts in Saudi Arabia cannot review the criminal 
procedure for the major reason that they are not qualified to do it. According to Judiciary 
Law 2005 Article 31 (d): 'Whoever handles the judiciary must hold a certificate of 
Islamic law or its equivalent...' However, in the opinion of some lawyers, judges often do 
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not know anything outside Islamic law, and ignore government regulations such as the 
right to legal advice. 
 
Lawyer 2 explained that, in his opinion, only few judges understood the regulations.  
Police Officer 3 believed that suspects who had been assaulted by the police could go to 
the Director of the Police Department or the city governor in the Emara (Council). The 
case would be investigated but there would be no compensation. Police Officer 2 on the 
other hand thought that if the complainant showed a medical report, there would be 
compensation. Prosecutor 4 believed that suspects injured by the police should be sent to 
hospital and a report made, but admitted that he had no idea about what happened after 
that. He did not know of any way that the injured suspect could apply for compensation 
 
It seems that police officers and the investigating prosecutor do not have any idea about 
the procedure for the right to an effective remedy. In another words, there is no regulation 
about the right to an effective remedy, only interpretations. Only lawyers appear to know 
how to apply for compensation after an assault by enforcement officers. Lawyer 1 had a 
client who was in custody for 81 days before being released without charge 
“I made a complaint to the Ministry of the Interior and then after the investigation, he 
got compensation for being detained - he got SR 90000 (around £13000) -that was not 
bad, but that was for a long detention”176. 
Lawyer 2’s client was detained for 13 days without reasonable suspicion but the accuser 
was a relative of the head of the police station. In this case, the lawyer complained 
directly to the Ministry of the Interior, as he thought it was a waste of time to go to the 
Emarh, and the police officer was sent to the Disciplinary Board but no compensation 
was granted. Lawyer 7 had a different strategy: 
 
“The only way is just to apply to The Ombudsman’s Office but it takes ages, sometimes it 
takes two years and four sessions, and then there is no guarantee to receive 
compensation. Frankly, I do not like to soil my hands with criminals, also there is no 
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clear law to follow, so I do not defend or accept any criminal cases, it is really a 
headache and it takes ages.” 177 
 
It should be noted the Ombudsman’s Office (OO) does not now accept any case that is 
against an enforcement officer any more, in breach of Article 8 of the OOC. In 2011, the 
Supreme Administrative Court of the OO took the decision to not receive certain cases 
against some government offices, particularly the Ministry of Interior and the 
Commission on Financial Contributions, and forwarded these to the relevant department 
for consideration without giving reasons. (OO Decision 87) This means that the OO 
referred all cases against enforcement officers to the Ministry of Interior, and of course 
that is unacceptable as the executioner cannot be the judge.  
 
This decision also means that requests for compensation for any mishandling of those 
actions, including expired arrest warrants or arrests lasting more than the prescribed 
period are no longer dealt with. Plaintiffs are still pursuing compensation for their 
imprisonment in criminal cases where they were found innocent of what was attributed to 
them; or were given sentences of prison terms less than their remand in prison had been. 
This is because of the delay in sending the cases to the courts or slow administrative 
procedures, and these claims for compensation include those where suspects had been 
subjected to physical pain or psychological distress as the result of the use of physical or 
verbal violence, and so on by enforcement officers (Alkholy & Almasry 2012 pp.191-
195). 
It seems that the only hope for innocents to have their rights after being assaulted by 
enforcement officers was the Ombudsman. But now this is no longer the case. 
Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia has faced a big problem with terrorists and had to protect the 
country, for this reason, most of the plaintiffs who had lawsuits against the Ministry of 
the Interior’ The Head of the Ombudsman’s Office, in a press statement (Medal East 
Newspaper in 2010 No.11668), confirmed that there was a lack of relationship with the 
Ombudsman’s Office in view of the issues or cases related to terrorism, whatever its 
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shape or size'
178
. However, to hinder justice for those seeking compensation is totally 
against the principle of Islam, and the government should establish an Independent Police 
Complaints Commission (IPCC). Furthermore, that would facilitate the right to an 
effective remedy in criminal procedure.  
 
 Conclusion: 
 
This chapter has shown that there are fundamental differences in pre-trial procedures in 
England and Wales and Saudi Arabia, not just in terms of the actual details of the 
legislation that governs procedure, but in the ethos that underpins it. In ensuring that the 
suspect is treated humanely and accorded human rights, whilst at the same time being 
arrested and detained, the system in England and Wales is able to protect individual 
rights without hindering the role of the police to protect the community.. In Saudi Arabia 
however, the rights of the individual suspect seem to fall far below that of the society. 
Although the CCP stipulates that suspects should be released if there is no strong 
evidence and no charge, there is nothing about detainees being considered innocent till 
proven guilty and so they are treated almost as though they are already criminals.  
 
This attitude is starkly reflected in the practices and attitudes of the police that this study 
discovered, in the human rights violations uncovered by organisations like Amnesty and 
the attitude of many lawyers that contact with 'criminals' is somehow demeaning to their 
reputation. The sub-standard condition of custody cells, a code of practice that allows 
some suspects to remain detained for 6 months without charge and cumbersome and 
delaying regulations such as the need for a Deed of Origin are all signs of this 'guilty till 
proven innocent' ethos. The Code of Practice actually states that it is the suspects that 
must prove their innocence (see Article 34 of CCP). Furthermore; the CCP does not make 
adequate provision for bail, for the right to a legal remedy and for close and efficient 
monitoring and recording of police procedures. For these reasons it falls far short of 
coming up to the standards expected by international human rights laws. The legislation 
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in England and Wales, on the other hand, has as far as possible, clearly regulated pre-trial 
procedures in accordance with these standards and established training and monitoring to 
ensure compliance. 
 
Saudi Arabia’s legal system falls far short of both Shari’ah principles and international 
human rights law, and measures should be taken to rectify this. Detainees should be given 
the right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention and a penal code enacted which 
prevents the practice of detaining someone purely for having debts. The police and the 
Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution should make changes in its practices 
when arresting and interrogating a person to ensure greater transparency and prevent ill- 
treatment of detainees. The police should have a clear code of practice when they deal 
with suspects. The rights of the defendant should be strengthened by the Ministry of 
Justice and the Supreme Judicial Court who could establish the principle of access to 
legal advice and that this advice is available gratis to indigent defendants. This would 
allow defendants to effectively challenge any evidence against them and ensure a fair 
trial. The criminal courts should review all the cases and the procedures carried out by the 
police and the IPPC, and not just rely on the evidence and confession. 
  
Furthermore, the Saudi government should remove responsibility for prosecutors from 
the control of the Ministry of Interior and give to the Ministry of Justice, because 
complaints against the police and the IPPC are neither investigated nor prosecuted by an 
independent and impartial authority; at present, police officers and IPPC members cannot 
be subjected to disciplinary or criminal investigation without permission from the 
Ministry of Interior. The government should remove the power to arrest, detain, and 
release suspects from the prosecution and confer it on the judges. That is to say, whatever 
changes are made in Saudi law at the stage of criminal investigation, they will not 
materialize in practice unless the judiciary are prepared to enforce them and that can be 
done only if the judges have proper education and training to deal with the provision of 
law in Saudi Arabia.  
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The solution to the problems that have been described in this chapter is that Saudi Arabia 
adapts the pre-trial regulations modelled on those set out in PACE. This research has 
uncovered much confusion and lack of understanding about pre-trial procedures among 
police officers and prosecutors who would be much clearer about what they were 
required to do if they had unambiguous set of regulations to follow. This, done in 
conjunction with the mentoring, reviewing and training suggested would bring the Saudi 
pre-trial system into line with the principles outlined in Shari’ah and international human 
rights laws.      
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined human rights at the stage of criminal investigation in 
international human rights law and Shari'ah.  It has been argued that there is a mutual 
harmony between them. It has been suggested elsewhere that the idea of international 
human rights has been based on the natural rights theory, which has roots only in 
countries with Western cultures, and cannot apply to Eastern countries with Muslim 
cultures. Shari'ah, so it is argued, has a different approach to human rights in that its 
norms derive from religious teachings which may conflict with international human 
rights law. However, this thesis has shown that the assumption that international human 
rights cannot apply to Muslim countries, is entirely false if we are exploring the effective 
regulation of pre-trial procedures. Furthermore, this thesis has also shown that these 
rights are enshrined in the Arab Charter (2008). Although, the Charter is not backed up 
by a Court, the fact that it sets out human rights in pre-trial demonstrates that these rights 
and the procedural law that would uphold them are in no way a contradiction of Shari'ah. 
 
In regard to procedural rights in both international human rights law and Shari'ah, this 
thesis has pointed out that both are expressed in general terms. The ICCPR & ECHR are 
worded in ways which can be open to different interpretations Also, Shari'ah is 
uncodified and mostly relies on the Holy Qur’an and the Prophet (peace upon him) and 
his companions' sayings. It has been interpreted in many different ways by Muslim 
scholars, that is to say, without codification. Interpretations are more a matter of history 
and culture and modern interpretations such as those put forward Alhargan (2006), 
Almaged(2011) and Alanad(2007) are more consistent with principles of international 
human rights Shari'ah. As this thesis has shown, most judges and IPPC members in Saudi 
Arabia have been educated only in Shari'ah without even being aware of or 
understanding the norms of international human rights laws and this has led to a lack of 
respect for human rights law in Saudi Arabia that will be elaborated later. It is therefore 
imperative that commonly shared values regarding pre-trial procedures, which are held 
by both international human right law and Shari’ah, are focused on. This will further the 
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advancement of human rights in Muslim countries, and Saudi Arabia (now a member of 
the UN Human Rights Council) in particular which, at present, is being advocated largely 
by Western non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International as well as human rights scholars.  
       
By adopting this approach, Muslim countries would prevent arbitrary governments from 
violating human rights, in particular those which apply to pre-trial procedures. It should 
however be pointed out, that this measure does not solve, or attempt to solve conflicts 
between Shari’ah and international human rights law, merely that it encourages the 
adoption of those human rights norms that are common to both. Applying the ideals of 
international human rights law to pre-trial procedures will help to establish a new culture 
in Muslim countries that will be more open and respectful of human rights norms; and 
which will create a system that benefits both the interests of the community and upholds 
citizens’ rights.  
        
     
Pre-Trial Procedures: Lessons from England and Wales  
 
The laws of England and Wales have evolved over a long period. This thesis has shown 
how England and Wales formalized its law, by going back to the Roman and Norman 
periods. Ordeals and torture were used to obtain confessions from suspects at that time. 
However, pre-trial procedures were set out for the first time in the Marian Reforms 
(1554-5), which gave the suspect the right to defend him or herself. In the 18th & 19th 
centuries, England and Wales established many legislative changes, and pre-trial 
procedures started to be organized in legislation such as the Metropolitan Police Act 
(1829). However, it was in the 20th century that England and Wales issued a fundamental 
Act, PACE 1984, that regulated pre-trial procedure in a clear and systematic manner.  
 
This thesis has argued that in England and Wales the implementation of the law seeks to 
be compatible with the principles of international human rights law and guarantee the 
suspects rights. It is evident that after examining the legal system and interviewing a 
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number of officers and lawyers in England that human rights are thoroughly considered 
by PACE and that officers are trained to know what the procedures are at the stage of 
criminal investigation; how they should be carried out and the consequences of breaching 
the regulation.  Although there are still gaps (e.g. ‘reasonable suspicion’ is not defined in 
PACE) and some defects in its operation (see Chapter 5), it is clear that criminal 
procedure in England and Wales is generally applied in a manner that makes the exercise 
of the guaranteed rights practical and effective and that PACE is one of the most 
powerful means of control over pre-trial practice. 
  
PACE has ensured as far as possible that essential human rights relating to pre-trial 
procedures are embedded in its provisions and that the actions of the police are closely 
monitored throughout the process of arrest and detention of suspects. By limiting the 
length of detention and granting bail, PACE encapsulates the idea that it is a serious 
matter to limit the freedom of an individual in the name of society. However, in practice, 
PACE regulations and attention to human rights are not always followed. This research 
has demonstrated that, in spite of a clear understanding of PACE, some officers do not 
always follow it to the letter. For example, innocent people can be arrested when it is not 
always clear who has committed a crime. 
 
Similarly, PACE grants detainees the right to legal advice, but interviews revealed that 
officers sometimes mislead suspects by suggesting that waiting for a lawyer would 
prolong their detention. This research has also shown that some police officers still regard 
lawyers advising their clients to remain silent as obstructive, rather than as an exercise of 
their right against self-incrimination. Furthermore the current controversy over cuts in 
spending on legal advice means that poorer suspects could end up being discriminated 
against. However, the treatment of detainees in England and Wales contrasts sharply with 
that of detainees in Saudi Arabia. Saudis are not given adequate cell facilities, for 
example. It should be noted here that the researcher was given a short tour of a police 
station in the Sussex region; the cell and the kitchen he saw were clean and the 
atmosphere at the police station was similar to that of a hospital. Whilst it is easy to 
monitor the physical conditions of detention, it is not so easy to monitor arrests or 
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searches, which is why recording these as well as the subsequent interrogation is so 
important. Even with all these safeguards in place, there remain loopholes. For example, 
this thesis has pointed out that police can easily fail to record stops and searches if they 
are unsupervised, and some critics point to the wide interpretations given to ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ as serving police interests. 
 
Also very difficult to monitor are police attitudes. PACE aims to prevent any 
discrimination in Code A; however, case law shows that discrimination does exist at 
police stations in England and Wales, and the controversy about racism in the police 
continues to rage (see Chapter 5, Teresa May's comment). The experience in England and 
Wales demonstrates how difficult it is to eradicate discrimination that is part of the 
culture of an institution; and this too will be a significant challenge in Saudi Arabia. 
 
The pre-trial procedures outlined in PACE 1984 are highly recommended as tried and 
tested practice which for three decades has operationalised the principles contained in 
international human rights law in a clear and comprehensive way. These could be 
usefully referred to by Muslim countries and by Saudi Arabia specifically. This would be 
preferable to adapting Egyptian law, as has been done by Saudi legislators or using the 
existing Code of Criminal Procedure (2001) CCP which is too vague. PACE 1984 is 
compatible with international human rights law, and international human rights are 
compatible with Shari'ah, so, there is no reason why the regulations in PACE could not 
usefully inform Saudi Arabian law. There is a fear that importing anything from Western 
cultures will be detrimental to the Muslim way of life and that, in particular, Western 
laws such as PACE would be in contravention of Shari'ah. There is an argument that says 
that Western ideas of human rights are based on Western values which make them 
incompatible with Shari'ah; furthermore, because Shari'ah is seen as God's law that there 
is no need for any codification. However, this research has shown, that far from being the 
case, adapting some of the procedures contained in PACE would be in keeping with 
Muslim ideas of justice and human rights. Codification would enhance the principles of 
justice encapsulated in Shari'ah and make them easier to implement. 
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Progressing Pre-Trial Procedure Rights in Saudi-Arabia: 
 
When Islam started in Saudi Arabia, the law, which had till then rested on blood feuds 
and retribution, was regulated and made to include issues such as dignity, privacy, 
liberty, presumption of innocence and compensation. All this showed that a respect for 
humanity as well as justice is of great importance. 
    
In spite of having made a number of declarations about the high standards of the Saudi 
justice system and the number of legal reforms made in recent years, it appears that, in 
practice, Saudi Arabia neither lives up to these standards nor has made reforms which are 
sufficient. The safeguards against arbitrary detention, ill treatment and to make sure 
defendants get a fair trial need further strengthening.          
 
Saudi Arabia has been criticized by non-governmental organizations such as Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty for not respecting the suspect in pre-trial procedures. So, this 
thesis has examined why the implementation of pre-trial procedures in Saudi Arabia does 
not reflect the principles of Shari'ah law, and why Saudi law does not appear compatible 
with international human rights standards. The answer to that is that Saudi Arabian laws 
and practices are far from the principles of Shari'ah which Saudi Arabia alleges to be 
applying. With regard to Saudi law, as opposed to its practice, this thesis has shown that 
Saudi law, as represented in CCP, and police practice fails to reach both the principles of 
international human rights law and Shari'ah ideals of human rights in many respects. In 
establishing the right to liberty, the CCP prohibits unlawfully depriving someone of their 
liberty but fails to be explicit as to how. The CCP remains silent when enforcement 
officers stop and search someone in the street. It has also been pointed out that in practice 
the police cannot control their soldiers who lack education and training about the law or 
dealing with suspects. The Saudi government should create a new article that prohibits 
stop and search in the street, unless there is a reasonable suspicion, and the types of 
suspicion should be listed to ensure that citizens' rights will not be breached. Moreover, 
recording must be carried out by enforcement officers when someone is being stopped or 
searched.  
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Arrest does not seem to be properly regulated in the CCP; also, in practice there is not 
sufficient evidence that the accused committed an offence. The IPPC is granted authority 
to issue the arrest warrant but in practice it is the police who carry that out. Also the 
police do not require an official letter to issue an arrest warrant they mostly rely on a 
verbal order. Furthermore, the suspect’s right to know the reason for the arrest is mostly 
disregarded in practice The main dilemma that this thesis has demonstrated occurs for the 
IPPC members who accept that arrest regulations are violated, but then do not find that 
this makes the case inadmissible in court and they accept such cases routinely. Clearly, 
the CCP gives the police the power to deprive suspects of their rights. However, were the 
courts required to dismiss cases where there was inadmissible evidence, this would go a 
long way to ending this practice. Thus, the courts should review the case and decide if 
there is no violation of the law, if there is, compensation should be granted to the suspect. 
Steps need to be taken to ensure that the police and the IPPC will be aware when they 
arrest someone unlawfully.       
  
It has been demonstrated that detention procedures in Saudi Arabia are far from the 
principles of international human rights and Shari'ah. Saudi law not only prohibits 
unlawful detention but paradoxically allows it. By allowing custody of up to six months 
without trial, Saudi law is contravening basic human rights.  No Saudi law requires that 
detentions be reviewed. This thesis has shown that many suspects are detained unlawfully 
and without being sent to a trial within a reasonable time. Moreover, the Saudi laws 
remain silent about the right to silence and give enforcement officers and IPPC members 
the power to force the suspect to speak or remain in the custody until he speaks. The 
Saudi government should amend the power that has been given to the IPPC member to 
detain a suspect up to six months, that should be referred to the court or to a third 
independent party.  The CCP should be changed in order to include the right to silence 
and to prohibit forcing the suspect to speak.  
 
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that suspects receive bad treatment when in custody. 
There are no individual cells, no provision of sufficient food and no proper beds or 
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blankets. That is to say, custody centres in Saudi Arabia are not compatible with 
standards set by international human rights. Also, in practice, the presumption of 
innocence seems not to exist in Saudi law; every person who enters custody is considered 
guilty in the eyes of the police. Lawyers who were interviewed confirmed that conditions 
in custody centers in Saudi Arabia are such that suspects often become sick and make a 
false confession to get away. Referring to procedures laid out in the detention section of 
PACE Articles 34& 36 and the presumption of innocence Code C 10.1 &10.3., would 
allow the creation of clear regulations.    
 
This thesis has shown that the right to legal advice is granted in Saudi law when the 
suspect is interrogated; however, the interviews revealed that this is just ink on paper. 
Lawyers do not have the power to defend a suspect or to give legal assistance. The CCP 
remains totally silent on the right to legal advice when the suspect is being taken to the 
police station and giving testimony. In practice, this research uncovered that the police 
rarely allow the suspect to meet a lawyer; moreover, IPPC members also ignore the need 
to inform suspect of their right to see a lawyer, which is in breach of the law. Moreover, 
judges do not allow the lawyers to defend the suspect even though the law grants lawyers 
that authority.  Therefore, in order to make the law compliant with the principles of 
Shari'ah and international human rights; the Saudi government should oblige 
enforcement officers, IPPC members and the judicial system to give the suspect the right 
to legal advice, and lawyers should attend the interrogation in order to ensure there is no 
violation. Having said that, the lack of accountability leads to ignoring the right to legal 
advice and the other rights as well, and suspects are often unaware of their rights. 
Furthermore, the Saudi government should establish a Bar of Association to support 
lawyers.               
 
Privacy in Saudi Arabia is protected by both cultural values and by law, as this thesis has 
showed. Enforcement officers are not allowed to enter any premises without permission 
unless they receive a search warrant from the IPPC. The problem here is that the CCP 
gives the IPPC power to issue the search warrant, which should be granted to judges. In 
practice, this thesis has pointed out that the police do not wait to receive the search 
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warrant, but make their own decision to enter premises, which is a violation of the law. 
The IPPC always accepts these violations and charges the suspect even if the police 
entered his or her house without a search warrant. That is to say, the lack of monitoring 
and accountability allow the police to violate the law.  The Saudi government should 
make an immediate change to refer the issuing of search warrants to the judiciary, and 
make those who violate the law accountable. It is important that search warrants are 
issued as speedily as possible and this could be done by using modern technology.   
     
The procedure for releasing the suspect on bail is not working properly in Saudi Arabia. 
It has been pointed that the right to bail is granted by the CPP, except for major crimes, 
but in practice procedures are not properly followed. The IPPC members entrust the 
police to bail the suspect but fail to check if the suspect is actually released. This thesis 
has shown the police always ask the suspect to bring a guarantor even if he has not been 
charged with committing a crime. Furthermore, the CCP grants bail according to the 
suspect's address which does not work in Saudi Arabia’s postal infrastructure, under 
which many people have no official postal address. The Saudi government needs to 
create a new Article to comply with the international human rights and Shari'ah. The 
Article should require the police and IPPC members to give a suspect the right to bail if 
there is no sufficient evidence even in cases of major crimes. At present, even people 
who are proven innocent are required to provide a guarantor and given bail. However, the 
suspect should be released without any condition if he has not committed a crime. The 
IPPC members should ensure that the suspect is released or granted bail properly.              
 
Saudi Arabia should tackle the fundamental shortcomings of its judicial system by 
reforming its laws and its criminal procedures, from arrest through to imprisonment, to 
ensure that they comply with international human rights standards. At present, the 
shortcomings in Saudi Arabia’s criminal justice system are so pervasive as to leave grave 
doubt that Saudi courts have established the guilt of sentenced prisoners in a fair trial and 
that law enforcement officers detain untried defendants on a sound legal basis. 
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Saudi Arabia has some fundamental problems with its pre-trial procedures, starting from 
the police, passing through the prosecution and ending with the judges. The police hire 
soldiers in its stations and they practice the law without studying it which impacts on the 
justice system in Saudi Arabia, especially on pre-trial procedures. Also police officers 
themselves lack education and knowledge about treating suspects under Shari’ah or the 
CCP. IPPC members are just graduates from Islamic departments, which do not teach 
anything about law. Judges are similar to prosecutors in that they must be graduates from 
an Islamic department to have their positions; which means that judges may also be 
ignorant about laws the government has issued such as the CCP; and they also seem 
unable to know how to apply the provisions of the laws in practice. For that reason, the 
CCP requirements are not complied with in practice. However, as long as poor education 
and training specifically in pre-trial procedure exists, suspects will continue to be 
deprived of their rights.   
 
The Saudi government should insist that a qualification in Law is mandatory to be a 
member of the judiciary. The Saudi government should also be more open to the 
principles of international human right laws; otherwise, Saudi pre-trial procedures will 
not ever make progress in approaching the aims of Shari'ah and international human 
rights law.   
 
The second problem is that the Saudi pre-trial system suffers from a lack of monitoring. It 
has been pointed out that at the police station there is no review of each case to ensure 
that the suspect has not had his or her rights violated. The IPPC should be the body which 
conducts the review and supervises police action; however, this thesis has shown that the 
IPPC is not at present effective in its supervision of the police and the exercise of judicial 
functions, including the issuing of arrest warrants. Most IPPC members blame the 
workflow system which they say prevents them doing their job properly, this problem 
would be partly solved if warrants were issued directly by the judiciary as well as the 
review and supervision of police action. The introduction of modern technology into 
these systems would also make these processes more efficient. Furthermore, the judiciary 
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do not review cases referred from the IPPC, the reason for that being poor education 
which leads judges to ignore the reviewing stage.  
 
The Saudi government should overhaul the reviewing system in pre-trial procedures. The 
police should give the custody sergeant the authority to review the case before take 
someone into the custody. The IPPC should review the case from the time the suspect 
was arrested until he is brought to the IPPC centre. The judges should review the case 
from the beginning and exclude the case if the enforcement officer has broken the law. 
The government should computerize the system rather than just using the old fashion 
system in pre-trial procedure, which would make it more difficult for enforcement 
officers to procrastinate. Electronic communications automatically record the date that 
communications are sent out and replied to and this would make it obvious if there had 
been unreasonable delays. It would be more effective if search warrants were to be issued 
by judges, rather than authorized by the IPPC.   
 
The third problem that the Saudi system suffers from is lack of accountability. The police 
and IPPC members both work under the Ministry of the Interior; and this thesis has 
shown that there is a good relationship between them. The police back up the IPPC and 
vice versa, so the suspect becomes a victim between them. Poor education leads to poor 
reviewing and all of it leads to less accountability. It has left the Saudi legal system 
paralyzed in responding adequately to the challenges it faces, including the need to 
provide effective protection to the suspect. It is therefore ironic that the IPPC was 
entrusted with investigative and judicial functions in order to improve accountability. 
This thesis has shown that there has never been an accountability case against the IPPC 
or the police, and it seems that the judges turn a blind eye when rights have violated; 
thus, the IPPC and the police still remain unaccountable.  
 
The Saudi government should split up the IPPC and the police; the former should be 
under the Ministry of Justice and the latter remain under the Ministry of the Interior. That 
would lead the IPPC to achieve its principal objectives rather than uncritically supporting 
the police because they both work for the Ministry of the Interior. In addition, the 
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structure of the existing system needs to change so as to incorporate an independent body 
that monitors the behaviour of the police and the IPPC. It has been pointed out that the 
IPPC has been given more work than it can adequately deal with. Prosecutors complained 
about an overwhelming workload which meant that it was difficult to do their jobs 
properly. At present, the IPPC has the authorization to take full measures against 
suspects, except in cases of theft. The IPPC carries out the criminal investigation, the 
supervision of the police, the prosecution of criminal cases and the lodging of appeals 
against judgment. 
 
Agencies involved in pre-trial procedures would become more accountable if powers 
were taken from the IPPC. The police should take responsibility for investigating crimes 
and deciding whether a suspect should be charged. The IPPC's role should be 
supervisory; their job should be to check that the police have carried out pre-trial 
procedures correctly. The role of the judiciary should be to review the case overall and 
check that the IPPC and police have acted in accordance with regulations.  
 
This thesis has shown that many judges are unwilling to review the case to ensure that the 
suspect has not been subjected to torture or other mistreatment. So, it would be better if 
the Saudi government established a new department in the court with the sole job of 
reviewing all the cases referred to it, to ensure that suspects' rights in pre-trial procedures 
have not been violated. Moreover, this new department would have the authority to offer 
the suspect compensation when a breach of the law was found and impacted on his or her 
rights. It should be noted that relevant education and training in understanding and 
implementing the law would be an essential requirement to be a member of this 
department. These provisions, along with better education and training for the police and 
the IPPC, will go a long way to ensuring that the law is rigorously upheld and those 
violating it are made accountable; otherwise, there will be no progress in establishing a 
fair and humane system of pre-trial procedures. 
 
Although these recommendations are very radical and their implementation may take 
some time, it would make sense to implement them now; whilst the IPPC is currently 
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under review. Delaying making these changes would only serve to make the resolution of 
the problems more difficult and costly. 
 
The final problem that this thesis has revealed is the lack of monitoring. Saudi laws are 
silent about the importance of monitoring to prevent enforcement officers violating the 
law. This thesis has shown that there is no monitoring in theory or practice. As a result, 
the police or IPPC could violate the law and allege that they did not, as long as the 
suspect could not prove it. 
 
The Saudi government should establish new articles in each section of the CCP to oblige 
the police and IPPC members to record every single incident from when they arrest 
suspects until they bail or release them, in whatever way is appropriate and efficient. A 
copy of this recording should be given to the suspect. Recording will guarantee the 
enforcement officers’ rights if there are malicious accusations against them, as well as 
guaranteeing that the suspect’s rights are not violated. 
 
This thesis has suggested that the problems that Saudi Arabia suffers from in its pre-trial 
procedures are related to each other. The lack of education and training leads to the lack 
of reviewing, and the lack of reviewing leads to unaccountability. The Saudi government 
should take all of these into account and tackle them to ensure that the system of justice is 
working properly. If the recommendations made here are acted on, the criminal procedure 
system and practice should fall into line with the principles of international human rights 
law and Shari'ah. Furthermore, adoption of a humane and efficient pre-trial system may 
not only find support among many citizens of Saudi Arabia, but also enhance the cultural 
credibility of Saudi Arabia in the eyes of the international community.      
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the assumption that Saudi Arabia cannot apply 
international human rights law or adopt any law from the West compatible with 
international human rights is simply false. Applying both Shari'ah and international 
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human rights law to the pre-trial stage of criminal investigation aims to guarantee that 
suspects are treated in a dignified and fair manner, whilst preserving the interests of the 
whole Saudi community in effective law enforcement. Furthermore, the underlying 
values and principles of Islamic law will be reinforced rather than undermined by these 
measures.  
 
Close study of different international human rights laws, has allowed this researcher to 
gain the knowledge and perspective needed to propose some recommendations that Saudi 
Arabia needs as a starting point for changing its criminal system. Moreover, an 
exploration of different international laws has highlighted the common ground between 
Shari'ah and international human rights law and Shari'ah; demonstrating that Saudi 
Arabia could adopt the principles of international human rights law or any laws 
compatible with the principles of international human rights laws such as PACE 1984, as 
long as there is no confliction with Shari'ah, and that this would lead to create a system 
that benefits both the interests of the community and upholds citizens’ rights.   
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Appendix A 
 
Contemporary Development of Criminal Justice in England and Wales 
 
Terrorism Acts 2000- 2006. 
Terrorism is a crime which has a political aspect in that it seeks force others to concede to 
demands often in a way that creates an over-reaction. Sondhi believes that it can result in 
the undermining of those governments and institutions that the terrorists consider 
enemies. In the cause of pursuing a political or religious cause, terrorism can stir up deep 
hatred and desire for revenge which can encourage others to engage in terrorist 
behaviour. (2000 p.1) 
Counter- terrorism strategies have become more draconian in an attempt to deal with 
what is seen an international issue. There is concern that these strategies will be abused 
and there is much debate how terrorism is defined.  
The Terrorism Act 2000 s.1 defines Terrorism as acts of violence against person or 
property and threats of such action. The Terrorism Act 2006 did not provide a clear 
definition, but it was wider than the 2000 Act.  
 ‘‘ The UK Terrorism Act 2006 amends this definition slightly, but broadens 
rather than limits the scope so as to encompass also threats actions aimed at 
influencing an international organisation’’ (McKeever 2010 p.115). .  
Many countries that have been facing a problem with their security system or receiving 
terrorist threats from abroad or inside the state have issued new laws for protection. 
However, although enacting laws may make a good impression on the citizens initially, 
but after enforcing the law it creates a different impression when people see that it affects 
issues of liberty and civil rights (Neal 2010 p.1). 
One such example is in Peru where in 1992 the then president Alberto Fujimori 
introduced two laws [Law 25475 and Law 25659] in the aftermath of a coup d’état. These 
laws purported to combat terrorism but were in violation of human rights. Detainees were 
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offered release for informing on ‘subversive individuals’ and many innocent people were 
wrongly imprisoned. These laws exist to this day (Wieland 2003 p.1). 
Dorling (2007 p.4) believes that anti-terrorist legislation that was passed in the UK 
between 1973 and 2000 needs to be viewed in the context of the campaigns of public 
violence, which resulted from the situation in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland 
Emergency Provisions Act (EPA) was passed in 1973 section (2) and among other things 
removed the right of trial by jury as well as giving the police and the army extensive 
rights to arrest and search. This was done because it was felt that ‘the actions of terrorist 
groups left the ordinary criminal justice system unable to function’. Neal (2010 p.5) 
points out that the 1973 Act was built on the 1922 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 
which was revised and made permanent in 1933. 
 
The 1974 Birmingham bombing resulted in the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in the 
same year. This Act gave the police the power to detain anyone suspected of terrorism for 
up to seven days. Neal (2010 p.5) is convinced that such British laws relating to terrorism 
are ‘rushed, reactive and repetitive’ and that the 1974 legislation is a case in point. The 
then Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, who actually introduced the Act famously said of it “I 
would have been horrified to have been told at the time that it would still be law nearly 
two decades later” (ibid.,).  
Neal (2010 p.5) also notes that there was a similar reaction to the events of 9/11 and the 
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (2000) was rushed through, followed by further 
legislation in 2005 and 2008. Neal comments that both these pieces of legislation were 
counter-productive as they bred resentment in the ‘suspect’ communities.  
The Terrorism Act 2006 was drafted after the July bombings in central London in July of 
2005 and Rahman believes that this parallels the 2001 Act which followed the events of 
September 11
th
. Both Acts were hurried responses to tragic events and the 2006 Act 
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significantly extended the time that the police could detain a suspect for questioning prior 
to being charged from 7 to 28 days (2009 p.2). 
Rahman (2009 p.2) adds that the subsequent Crime and Security Act 2001 contained ‘a 
clear breach of the individual’s right to privacy’ by section 92 as it gave police the right 
to search, fingerprint and photograph suspects against their will. This included the 
police’s right to remove any headwear and face-coverings worn by the suspect for this 
purpose.  
Both the EPA and the PTA were replaced and superseded by the Terrorism Act of 2000. 
This Act was created as the result of an enquiry conducted by Lord Lloyd into the need 
for permanent anti-terrorism legislation (Rahman 2009 p.1). It was supposed to strike a 
balance between the need to both restrain terrorism and protect the rights of the ordinary 
people and should have been compatible with the Articles of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Rahman comments that there was further controversy about the Act’s definition of what 
constituted terrorism. He believes that ‘the definition was so wide’ that the government 
could use the Act against virtually any group it wanted. The definition was extended to 
include, for example, even people campaigning against genetically modified crops (2009 
p.2). 
Derogation of Article 5 of the ECHR had to be used to retain the powers of lengthy 
detention which, despite criticism, rose from 48 hours in 2000 [under Section 41, 
Schedule 8]to 14 days in 2003 [CJA] and 28 days in 2006 [Terrorism Act]. Horne and 
Berman point out that the Government had initially pressed for a 90-day period, but this 
was rejected in the House of Commons. Furthermore, there was to be new procedural 
protections for suspects and the detention limit was to be subject to yearly review. Thus, 
at present, anyone arrested under suspicion of being a terrorist can be detained for long 
periods of time without any charge being made. This is in order that the police can 
‘preserve, analyze or examine evidence for use in criminal proceedings’ (2011 p.1) 
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Under the 2006 Act, the initial 48 hours is reviewed by a judge and then reviewed every 
seven days until the last 14 days, which a senior judge has to review. These judges have 
to be satisfied that detention will result in relevant evidence being obtained and that the 
investigation is properly conducted. Controversially, detainees may be prevented from 
consultation with a lawyer or informing others of their detention during this period. 
Article 15 of the ECHR allowed for derogation in times of ‘war or public emergency’. 
Dorling (2007 p.11) notes that this had to be used in relation to Article 5 which stipulates 
that a suspect should be brought ‘promptly’ before a judge, although what constitutes 
‘promptly has to be assessed in each case.  
The Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005) section (1) established the controversial Control 
Orders. These could be used for suspects of any nationality, specifically to prevent acts of 
terrorism. There were two types of Control Order – the non-derogating and the 
derogating. The latter had to be approved by the Secretary of State and made through an 
application to the High Court. There was a preliminary hearing, which could happen 
without notifying the individual concerned who was thus deprived of the possibility of 
making representations to the court. The Control Order could impose bail conditions, 
probation, electronic tagging, curfews and restrictions on communication such as use of 
the Internet or communicating with certain individuals. The suspect could also be 
required to stay at a particular address or be relocated; be subject to work restrictions, 
surrender their passport and accept searches and phone tapping. If they contravened the 
Order, they could be arrested without a warrant and receive fines of prison sentences of 
up to 5 years (ibid.,). 
According to Feikert and Doyle (2006 p.11) these Control orders constituted ‘the biggest 
threat to civil liberty of British citizens for over 300 years’ particularly because the 
suspect could lose their liberty without even being aware of what evidence was being 
presented against them. The government was not prosecuting individuals for existing 
offences because it would not remove the restrictions on intercepted evidence as they felt 
that presenting such evidence in court would jeopardise national security. 
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These Orders were so controversial that a ‘sunset’ (or last minute) clause had to be 
introduced to enable the legislation to be passed. According to this the Act had to be 
reviewed by the Secretary of State every three months and be brought before Parliament 
after a year (ibid., p.12). 
Vogler ( 2011 p.6) suggests that these Control orders can be seen as an infringement of 
the rights of unconvicted individuals and as such, to be an infringement of Clause 39 of 
the Magna Carta of 1215 whereby a person should not have their freedom restricted 
unless convicted. 
In July 2010, the Macdonald review called for abolition of the Control Orders as it said 
that the security services had superseded the police in the management of these with the 
result that the due process of investigation and prosecution had been undermined. The 
government decided to abolish Control Orders by the end of 2011 and replace them with 
Terrorism and Prevention and Investigation Measures which would reduce curfew times 
and permit time to be spent away from home (ibid., p.9). 
 
The 2006 Terrorism Act was passed as a reaction to the London bombings of July 2005 
and, in part, was concerned to target the glorification of terrorism. In this, the Act went 
further than US legislation in curbing civil liberties including that of freedom of speech. 
The Act allows the government to prosecute individuals for encouraging terrorism or for 
disseminating terrorist publications as well as targeting organisations that are seen to 
promote terrorism. The House of Lords rejected the ‘glorification’ sections of the Act 
twice but passed it at the third vote with the proviso that the Home Secretary would 
review all legislation relating to terrorism the following year (Parker 2007 p.713). 
Walker (2009 p.21) comments that the subsequent analysis carried out by Jonathan 
Evans, Director of Security Service, showed that although there were nearly 2,000 
suspects identified as posing a threat to national security, only 15 Orders were in force by 
the end of 2008. ‘The absence of custom is not for want of customers, but because these 
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executive measures are neither cost-effective nor legally certain compared to criminal 
prosecution’. 
Vogler (2011 p. 10) believes that the power to stop and search suspects have been used in 
ways that have little to do with stopping terrorism and more to do with the social control 
of certain groups such as demonstrators. 
The nature of the perceived terrorist threat in the UK has shifted from problems with 
organisations such as the IRA which many people in the UK understood and for whom a 
few had some sympathy, to problems with groups such as Al-Qaeda. Breau, Livingstone 
& O’Connell suggest that there is international agreement that strong action should be 
taken against such groups and one would imagine that any legal measures introduced to 
deal with these groups would be welcome. The Human Rights Commission agreed that, 
according to secret evidence, there was a serious threat to the nation and that given this 
factor detention without trial was an acceptable solution. The Commission could also not 
have overturned a legislative measure (2011 p.6).  
The UK government is using unnecessarily strong measures in legislation against 
terrorism, as we have seen, most arrestees were from ethnic minorities and most of them 
were released without charge (As Theresa May pointed out -see Chapter 5). There is a 
need for a clearer definition of what constitutes terrorism. In my opinion, terrorism is not 
just threats to the state by bombing people. Terrorism is terrorising the people by any 
kind of crime such as, kidnapping, looting property and so on. There is no difference 
between a gunman who fires on people in the street and a person who carries a bomb to 
kill some people, even though they have different aims. The UK government should take 
into account that most terrorists are working in groups and organizations. Their behaviour 
sometimes stems from religious beliefs or oppression and it is important to address these 
in the fight against terrorism. 
Serious Organized Crime and Police Act 2005. 
In the new millennium the UK has attempted to address the problem of organized crime 
by issuing new legislation in order to give the police more power. This came in the form 
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of the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA). In this section I will 
review the background of the Act without examining the changes made on PACE, which 
will be examined in chapter four. 
The changes introduced by SOCPA follow the outcome of the Report of The Joint Home 
Office/Cabinet Office Review of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (2002), and 
have regard to responses received by the Government following publication of its 
Consultation Paper “Policing: Modernising Police Powers to Meet Community Needs” 
(Fortson 2004 p.3). 
March 2004 saw the publication of the White Paper ‘One Step Ahead: a 21st Century 
Strategy to Defeat Organised Crime (Cm 6167). This paper envisaged ways to reduce the 
profits that organised criminal enterprise could make, affecting their activities and 
improving detection and prosecution. Royal Assent was granted to SOCPA on 7
th
 April 
2005. The new Act was designed to achieve the aims envisaged in the White Paper and 
included new rules for police powers
179
. 
From January 1, 2006, police powers were substantially altered by SOCPA – particularly 
in relation to arrest and those powers available to constables following an arrest.  These 
changes introduced by SOCPA were to have considerable practical effects on all policing 
(Fortson 2004 p,2). 
The anticipated benefits of the changes to the powers of arrest were summarised by the 
authors of the team who prepared the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill Summary 
Regulatory Impact Assessment:  
          “Arrest: Should result in improved police efficiency and effectiveness in 
terms of the police investigative process and raise the level of successful 
outcomes to investigations. Enables police to determine on a case by case basis 
whether or not a person needs to be taken into custody – potential savings on 
police time and related accommodation issues” (ibid., p.3). 
                                                 
179
  See  Memorandum to the Home Affairs Committee Post-Legislative Assessment of the Serious 
Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 p.1. 
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Notable changes which SOCPA made include the extension of the powers of Community 
Support officers (CSOs) and other individuals accredited by the provisions of Part 4 0f 
the Police Reform Act (2002)
180
. 
According to sections 110-114 and Schedule 7, the police had new powers of arrest. The 
justification for arrest was now to be judged according to necessity rather than how 
serious the alleged crime was. Powers to search premises and seize evidence were 
extended and warrants could be issued which covered more than just one location. Under 
Schedule 7 the term ‘indictable offence’ replaced ‘arrestable’ and ‘serious arrestable’ 
offence
181
. 
Under Section 12 the police can arrest an individual without a warrant if they fail to leave 
an exclusion area when told to by a police officer. These exclusion requirements are 
imposed on adult and juvenile offenders as part of a community sentence, suspended 
sentence or a licence condition when released from custody. According to the Home 
Office Circular 29/2005 these new powers began on July 1 2005
182
. 
The sections of SOCPA (120-1), which introduced staff custody officers, were repealed 
in 2010 as the result of the Police Federation of England and Wales, the Police 
Superintendents’ Association, Liberty and the Law Society raising concerns about 
custody being handled by non-sworn police staff
183
. 
The PACE Review published 4 March 2010 believed that SOCPA had achieved its aim to 
provide police with the power to effectively deal with crime. However, Frotson is 
doubtful that it was necessary for a definitive list of arrestable offences to have been 
enacted. The problem when dealing with minor crimes was usually to do with whether an 
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arrest was appropriate rather than whether the powers of arrest existed. Arrests can be 
both time-consuming and costly and deciding whether to proceed with an arrest can 
therefore be complex. He believes that the new framework, rather than ameliorating 
matters, is an additional burden on police officers (Fortson 2004 p.4). 
When the House of Lords debated the Bill that was to become SOCPA, there was 
concern that the police might be accused of using their powers of arrest inappropriately. 
Lord Dholakia made a point that they might be seen to be using their powers too 
frequently. The Government, however, was adamant that the police should ‘have access 
to effective and proportionate powers to tackle crime when it occurs’ and that the Codes 
of Practice would make it clear what constituted ‘necessity’ (ibid., p.10). 
It is important that anyone arrested knows that the officer arresting him or her has done 
so legitimately. Similarly it is of paramount importance that arresting offers have a clear 
understanding of their powers. This is to prevent accusations of the harassment of 
particular individuals or groups that could be levelled at arresting officers (ibid.,). 
There is a great deal of implied criticism levelled at PACE by the provisions of both 
SOCPA  2005,and so Chapter Five will cover most of these arguments. It was necessary 
to mention both these Acts just to give an idea about them before going on to deeply 
examine PACE.  
Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA) is one of the most important pieces of legislation 
issued in England and Wales after PACE 1984 that deals with pre-trial procedures. The 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 deals with many aspects of criminal law, but in this section I 
will review it in a nutshell and concentrate on the part that relates to pre-trial procedures.  
In July 2002 the UK government issued a White Paper on criminal justice procedures 
called ‘Justice for All’, specifically dealing with criminal law ‘on reforms to courts 
procedures and sentencing’. The purpose of this was to accelerate the trial and reach a 
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clear case to the court
184
. Two documents were instrumental influences on this White 
Paper; ‘Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales’ by Sir Robin Auld (2001) 
and ‘Making Punishment Work’: a report on the sentencing framework of England and 
Wales (2001) by John Halliday.  
Keogh suggests that the Law Commission also contributed significantly to ‘Justice for 
All’ ‘notably through the reports it delivered on hearsay (LC 245). Double jeopardy (LC 
267) and bad character (LC 273). He believes that the latter two subjects in particular, 
along with that of jury trials were controversial and the passage of the CJA was 
contentious in spite of its being commonsense in the main and simply there ‘to make 
practical changes to the way in which the criminal justice system works (2004 p.1). 
The opposition to the Bill was reflected in the speech that Matthias Kelly made when he 
became Chairman of the Bar Council. In it he said that far from being ‘tough on crime, 
tough on the causes of crime’ -to paraphrase Blair’s election promises-, the Bill tampered 
with people’s rights to a fair, jury trial, with the presumption of innocence and made it 
easier to convict the wrong person. Those opposed constituted a strong lobby.                         
      ‘‘We are working closely with Justice, Liberty, The Legal Action Group and the Law 
Society for change to the Bill. We have already lined up a powerful coalition in the House of 
Commons against the Government’s proposal’’ (ibid.,). 
In spite of this, the Bill survived with only the proposals relating to trial by jury partly 
enacted. Keogh comments that these ‘are unlikely ever to be implemented’ (ibid., p.2). 
The (CJA) was issued for England and Wales and contains fourteen parts. The first part 
of the 2003 Criminal Justice Act (CJA) aimed to amend PACE with the objective of 
reducing police paperwork and speeding up procedures. It provides for a greater role for 
support staff than did PACE and gives the police wider powers of arrest. They are able to 
this, for example, in relation to crimes relating to passports and the possession of 
cannabis. Suspect aged 14-17 can be tested for class A drugs as long as an appropriate 
adult is present (section 38 and 63Bof PACE 1984). The Act also allows the taking of 
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which received Royal Assent on 20th November 2003. 
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samples from suspects without consent and the issuing of street bail (PACE 1984, s.36C 
93) (Keogh 2004 p.4). This is so that the suspect need not necessarily go to the police 
station. Detention reviews can also be conducted over the phone, or preferably by video 
conferencing (section 40A A and 45A of PACE) (ibid.,). More discussion about these 
points will be reviewed in chapter four. 
Part 1 of the Act extends the range of articles which the police can stop and search people 
for (section 1of PACE). Detention without charge has been extended to any arrestable 
offence, terrorism offences and recording what suspects have on them is at the discretion 
of the arresting officer. 
Keogh points out that the CJA seemed to be moving away from the founding principles 
of PACE. For example, Section 7 is an amendment of Section 42(1) of PACE and allows 
detention of up to 36 hours for all arrestable offences as opposed to serious arrestable 
offences. The Philips Commission (1981) thought that a court process or independent 
visitation should be necessary for detention of more than 24 hours (2004 p.14). 
In a similar way, Section 306 of the Act amended the Terrorism Act 2000 (Schedule 8) so 
that people suspected of terrorism could be held for 14 days without charge. However, 
extensions beyond 7 days only applied if 7 days had already been granted. The extension 
was only 3 days for the first application but could be extended subsequently (Keogh 2004 
p.15) 
The CJA also took into consideration the progress that had been made in technology. 
Section 9 amended Section 61 of PACE to allow for fingerprints to be taken 
electronically and for the acquisition of DNA samples. These could be done on anyone 
arrested; charged with; or notified that he or she would be reported for a recordable 
offence provided that no fingerprints had been previously taken during the investigation 
(Keogh 2004 p.16). 
The way that codes of practice are established and amended is changed under the Act. 
Consultation and parliamentary investigation is less extensive. As I analysed PACE 
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extensively in Chapter 5, I will not compare to the CJA in great detail here. It is however, 
interesting to note here a number of criticisms of the CJA legislation.  Qureshi (2007 
p.467) believes that the CJA gives the police enormous powers of stop and search. They 
can now do this if the suspect that someone is carrying a can of spray paint or even a 
marker pen. Qureshi notes that the CJA was implemented at the same time as the Anti-
Social Behaviour Act. Qureshi believes that these Acts were generated by the notion that 
visible minor crimes engender fear in the community, encourage a decline in that 
community and therefore increase the likelihood of major crimes occurring. These laws 
thus show how the state has assumed responsibility for crime control. However, widening 
police powers of stop and search can have an adverse effect on police relations with 
ethnic minority groups, as it is often members of these communities who are stopped and 
searched.  
If the CJA is to work, the public must be informed of changes in stop and search 
legislation and the police have to be properly trained in conducting searches in line with 
the 2005 European Code of Practice (ibid., p.478). Another critic of the CJA, Ashworth 
(2004 p.9), suggests that there is complete lack of a ‘human rights culture’ in the Home 
Office and that the CJA ‘seemed to have been put together either in defiance or oblivion 
of the Convention’. He goes on to say that the CJA and the Antisocial Behaviour Act can 
encourage ‘disproportionality’ where there are ‘disproportionate responses to behaviour 
that is relatively low on the scale of seriousness’ and that this goes against the 
recommendations of the Council of Europe 1992 which stipulate appropriate penalties for 
offences (ibid., p.10). 
Ashworth (2004 p.11) remarks that the focus on public protection, which is clearly at the 
heart of the 2003 legislation is important but that it should not be at the expense of other 
values such as that of public liberty. He also suggests that creating a feeling of public 
protection by spurious means such as giving higher sentences is disingenuous. The public 
need to feel safe, but they need to know what will make them actually safer – measures 
such as improving detection rates, for example. He concludes that there should be 
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‘greater transparency and less posturing about the proper means and the most effective 
means of achieving that’ (ibid., p.13). 
To summarise, The Criminal Justice Act 2003 was intended to reduce paperwork for the 
police, give a more active role for support staff and to extend the powers of the police in 
terms of arrest and detention. However, many argue that the CJA went beyond what the 
situation required. People want to understand their rights and what needs to be done in 
order that they are protected. Many such as Ashworth feel that it was not in the interests 
of the public to have promoted a new Act under the pretext of protecting the state and 
society. PACE could have been amended in order to deal with the criticisms that were 
levelled at it. 
 
The Human Rights Act [HRA] 1998. 
 
In order to gain a complete perspective of human rights in the UK, it is necessary to 
explore the HRA. A brief history of its introduction into the UK, including the arguments 
for and against its introduction, will be given before explaining what the Act consists of 
and how it is implemented. Hoffman and Rowe point out that, before the HRA there was 
no single human rights document. The concept of ‘human rights’ as being ‘natural rights’ 
that applied to all first appeared in the C18th in Tom Paine’s ‘The Rights of Man’. 
However, the granting of individual rights pre-dates this in documents such as the Magna 
Carta1215 (2003 p.17).   
 
Lord Irvine introduced the Human Rights Bill to Parliament on October 23
rd
 1998. His 
aim was to incorporate human rights into domestic law to avoid UK citizens having 
recourse to ‘the long slow road to the Court in Strasbourg’. Also to protect ‘the individual 
citizen against erosion of liberties’ and ‘develop a process of justice based on the 
promotion of positive rights’ (1998 p.221). Royal Assent was obtained in November of 
that year and the Act came into force in October 2000. It implemented the human rights 
encapsulated by the European Convention into domestic law and made it unlawful for 
public authorities to contravene the rights established by the Convention (Donald et al 
2008 p.1) These public bodies include ‘local authorities, government departments and the 
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National Service as well as some charities and private companies’ (Watson and Woolf 
2003 p.2). 
    
  ‘‘The Human Rights Act is a revolutionary document. Quite apart from its important subject 
matter, the mechanics of the Act are unique in constitutional terms. However, the Act is only a 
few pages long and is very much a skeleton which must be fleshed out by reference to the case-
law of the commission and Court of Human Rights’’  (Coppel 2003 p.8). 
 
Lord Irvine emphasizes that the Act means that a person’s rights are clearly stated as 
positive entitlements. An example of this is ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security 
of person’ (Article 5). All exceptions to this are then expressed as specific, justifiable 
situations. If an authority wants to arrest or detain someone, they have to show how this 
justified according to the terms of the Act (1998 p.224). Article 5 will be specifically 
focused on in this section, as it is the part of HRA, which is most pertinent to a 
consideration of pre-trial procedures in UK law. 
 
Furthermore, Article 5, which sets out in detail what it means to be ‘free’ and the specific 
conditions by which that freedom can be curtailed i.e. arrest and detention, is by no 
means new to UK law. Indeed, Section 24 of PACE addressed the procedures for arrest 
and detention. It specified that summary arrests (arrests without a warrant) should only be 
carried out if there was ‘reasonable suspicion’ that an arrestable offence had been 
committed. Detainees were not to be kept in a police station for more than 24 hours 
without charge, although there were provisions to extend this. Article 5 simply adds the 
stipulation that the state carried out these procedures in line with the European 
Convention and act with ‘fairness and proportionality’ (Hoffman and Rowe 2003 pp. 
132-3). 
 
Hoffman and Rowe believe that the HRA does respect Parliament’s sovereignty and has 
not changed the constitutional relationship between Parliament and the courts. Unlike the 
Supreme Court in the USA, which can decree that a law is invalid if it is shown to be 
unconstitutional, British courts can only rule that specific legal provisions contravene the 
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human rights of particular individuals or groups by issuing a declaration of 
incompatibility under s. 4 HRA. Judges cannot over-rule Parliament (2003 p.39). 
 
The HRA has altered the mechanism by which an individual can complain to the courts 
about human rights violations. Before the HRA was passed, many cases from the UK 
came before the Court in Strasbourg. These cases were brought by people who felt that 
the domestic courts had not recognised their rights or suitably rectified what they 
believed were human rights violations (Watson and Woolf 2003 p.111). They were 
entitled to do this as the complaints mechanism of the European Convention, as I 
discussed in chapter two, allows applicants from countries who have signed up to the 
Convention to bring their cases the Court.    
 
Hoffman and Rowe suggest that the UK’s record before the European Court was not 
satisfactory and that individuals would have to exhaust domestic legal remedies first. 
This was often costly and time-consuming. Only if the European Court decided that there 
was a violation would the UK have to change its laws and procedures. Even after the 
passing of the HRA, individuals may still have recourse to Strasbourg if they are 
unsatisfied that domestic courts have protected their human rights. (2003 p.134)  
However, now they have a direct course of action in domestic law if they consider that a 
public authority has acted incompatibly with one of their Convention rights.  This is 
because Section 2 (para A of the HRA states that 'A court or tribunal determining a 
question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account 
any judgement, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the ECtHR' The HRA also 
requires legislation to be 'read and given effect in a way that is compatible with 
Convention rights (Section 3 Para 1). 
 
It should be noted that, section 134 of the CJA (2003) partially adopts the rights outlined 
in the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (1997)  It was this which was cited in the House of Lords’ 
decision to extradite General Pinochet to Spain (Watson and Woolf 2003 p.114). 
Hoffman and Rowe note that the international treaties to which the UK is a signatory can 
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usefully be referred to ‘where the law is ambiguous or uncertain’ especially when 
considering the rights of particular social groups. 
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Appendix B 
Miscellaneous 
 
 
1. Law of Criminal Procedure, Issued by Royal Decree Number (M,39) Date 
16/10/2001,The Shari'ah Procedure Law, Issued by Royal Decree  Number (115) Date 
15/08/2000,Lawyer Law, Issued by Royal Decree Number (119) Date 02/10/2001. 
Organization of Human Rights Commission, Issued by Royal Decree Number (207) Date 
14/01/2005.  Law of investigation Commission and prosecution, Issued by Royal Decree 
Number (140) Date 12/03/1989. Basic Regulation of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Issued by 
Royal Decree Number (A, 90) Date 02/03/1992.  Regime Commission to Promote Virtue 
and Prevention of Vice, Issued by Royal Decree Number (M 37) Date 28/08/1980. 
 
2- " Tazir crimes are less serious than the Hadd crimes found in the Qur’an. Tazir crimes 
can and do have comparable "minor felony equivalents." These "minor felonies" are not 
found in the Qur’an so the Islamic judges are free to punish the offender in almost any 
fashion. Mohammed Salam Madkoar, who was the head of Islamic Law at the University 
of Cairo, makes the following observation (Ministry of the Interior, 1976, p.104):  “Tazir 
punishments vary according to the circumstances. They change from time to time and 
from place to place. They vary according to the gravity of the crime and the extent of the 
criminal disposition of the criminal himself.  Tazir crimes are acts which are punished 
because the offender disobeys God's law and word. Tazir crimes can be punished if they 
harm the societal interest. Shari’ah Law places an emphasis on the societal or public 
interest. The assumption of the punishment is that a greater "evil” will be prevented in the 
future if you punish this offender now.”  (Saint Group ND)185. 
 
3." Hadd crimes are the most serious under Islamic Law, and Tazir crimes are the least 
serious. Some Western writers use the felony analogy for Hudod crimes and 
                                                 
185
 www.saint-claire.org/.../Islamic%20Law%20-%20SHARIA%20AND%20. 
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misdemeanour label for Tazir crimes. The analogy is partially accurate, but not entirely 
true. Common Law has no comparable form of Qesas crimes.     
Punishments are prescribed in the Qur’an and are often harsh with the emphasis on 
corporal and capital punishment. Theft is punished by imprisonment or amputation of 
hands or feet, depending on the number of times it is committed". However, Qesas 
Crimes (revenge crimes restitution). Qisas, in Arabic, is defined as ‘equality in crime and 
punishment’, whereby the punishment is commensurate with the offence. This 
punishment has its roots in the Quran: ‘And we prescribed for them in it. The life for the 
life, and the eye for the eye, and the nose for the nose, and the ear for the ear …' ( Verse 
54:5). 
4. Two tribes the Taglab and Bakar had lived together for long time and they had even 
inter-married. The war started when the leader of the Taglab killed Albswas’s camel. She 
asked her nephew Jasas to take her revenge on the leader, and Jasas killed him and fled 
to his tribal territory. Then, the leader’s brother Alzer Salam requested Jasas’ head along 
with others but Bakar’s leader turned that down. He was afraid of losing Jasas’ dignity 
and freedom or life even though he had committed a murder. It was considered shameful 
to extradite a member of one’s tribe who would then be tortured by another tribe (Bakther 
1990). 
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